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Preface 
A Motivation 
From the commencement of my studies, I have been very interested in the economic 
and legal issues of competition law, on both the European and national level. Having 
previously mainly concentrated on substantive law aspects, the question as to the right 
enforcement strategy emerged as the next logical avenue of investigation. Private 
enforcement has remained a much younger and less known topic than that of public 
enforcement strategies for a long time, at least in Europe. Spurred by the current 
developments in the European Union with regard to private enforcement of 
competition law and thinking about ways to improve the status of private enforcement 
compared to the role it still currently has in Europe, the issue of group litigation 
appeared to me to be the most vital point. for a detailed examination Other 
commentators seem to agree, and there is a growing body of literature on the topic 
emerging, mainly originating from the United States of America (US). To approach 
the debate from a Law and Economics perspective, a sound framework to analyse 
group litigation mechanisms that differ from the existing ones, the class action and 
representative actions, by associations with injunctive relief predominating in the US 
and Europe respectively, was needed.  
A lot of the debate in the literature rests on arguments found by comparisons with 
existing forms of group litigation. This often neglected that there were other legal 
rules in place influencing the effect of that mechanism and at times the qualities of 
one proclaimed benefit of a form of bundling similar interests. Moreover, arguments 
for benefits concerning the deterrence effect were frequently mixed with arguments 
concerning the goal of compensatory justice. Alternatively, arguments concerning 
procedural efficiency were combined with claims for case-by-case individual 
compensation of harm, without acknowledging that these aims or benefits often can 
not be pursued by the same means at the same time, so that trade-offs are necessary.  
From both the theoretical as well as the practical level, however, it is crucial, at least 
in my point of view, that such trade-offs are identified and made explicit in the 
analysis, as well as in the decision making process. The decision to give preference to 
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one aim over another conflicting aim of the group litigation being discussed should 
consequently be justified by the decision makers.  
It therefore seemed to be necessary to choose and apply a consistent framework, to 
increase the quality of the discussion and to highlight the benefits and costs connected 
to specific types of group litigation as well as the necessary trade offs. Through the 
use of this method, classic arguments used in the debate can also be seen in a new 
light, which allows for a more differentiated approach and possibly more qualified 
decision making.  
B Problem Definition 
The recent developments in the European Union indicate that there will be 
movements towards enhancing private enforcement of competition law, regardless of 
the still ongoing debate of private versus public enforcement. Taking this as granted, 
the problem dealt with in this thesis is how a group litigation mechanism needs to be 
designed in order to efficiently achieve the goal of deterrence.  
The first question to be answered then is what benefits group litigation mechanisms 
will have compared to traditional forms of litigation with regard to deterrence through 
private enforcement. Once this question is answered, the framework provided in that 
answer can be, and was used, to analyze and discuss the efficiency of generalised 
forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, as well as to develop more theoretical 
ideas about the form the optimal group ligation mechanisms should adopt.  
Following the general economic reasoning, as well as a common conception that to 
avoid harm is a better form of justice than compensation afterwards, deterrence has 
been chosen as the goal which is seeking to be pursued. This choice, however, will 
not make the results of this analysis obsolete, even when a different goal should be 
pursued by policy makers, as will be explained below. 
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C Methodology 
The framework used and the ideas developed in this thesis rest on streams of legal and 
economic literature concerned with competition policy, the theory of crime and 
punishment, as well as litigation theory, combining them to develop a more integrated 
framework.  
The economic ideas applied in this thesis rest on what may be called standard 
economics. Although there exist many variations, some features of economic theory 
are widely accepted and taught in standard economic textbooks (hence the term 
standard economics).1 One approach that is widely used in such economic theory is 
that of a total welfare or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency approach.2  Under such an approach, 
negative changes in the welfare of some members of society can be weighed against 
positive changes in the welfare of others. When the latter are larger than the former, 
the change is considered efficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense. Another assumption used 
in this analysis is that full compliance with competition law is not efficient. For these 
reasons it is assumed that there are possibilities for efficient breaches of competition 
law.
The approach taken here also uses a slightly different angle than the vast majority of 
the Law and Economics literature on the topic, by placing a great value on the 
possibility to increase the probability of detection. It does so using what is called in 
economics ‘backward induction’,3 first examining the requirements for the imposition 
of the optimal sanction once detection has taken place, and then analysing the 
requirements necessary to optimise the rate of detection. Along side applying this 
framework to abstract forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, the setting is 
also used to develop ideas about the optimal form of group litigation with regard to 
deterrence and to evaluate the current proposals by the European Commission against 
                                                
1 It seems most of new industrial economic theory, game-theory and microeconomic insights fit that 
description, which can be found in any textbook on microeconomics and new industrial organisation. 
See for example Tirole, The theory of industrial organization,MIT press (1993). Lipczynski, et al, 
Industrial organization: competition, strategy, policy,Financial Times/Prentice Hall (2005). Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics,International Edition, Singapore: Prentice Hall (2005). Rubinstein, et 
al, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,Princeton University Press (2007). 
2 The concept will be discussed in greater detail in chapter one. 
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this benchmark. In that sense, the analysis is a normative one, rather than a positive 
one. 
Additionally, a legal comparison is conducted, comparing the legal systems of three 
selected countries: the US, United Kingdom (UK),4 and Germany in Chapter 5. The 
US represents a country with a well known and long established group litigation 
mechanism, capable of providing us with profound experiences and empirical 
findings. The UK was selected as a common law country in the European Union, 
which has developed different forms of group litigation from those found in the US. 
Germany was selected as it represents one of the more conservative civil law 
countries in the European Union, where so far only tentative steps have been taken in 
the field of group litigation. The legal comparison of the legal systems of these three 
countries, their experiences and the ongoing debate being conducted in these three 
countries contributes to the theoretical part by demonstrating the difficulty of 
designing an effective group litigation mechanism.    
D Limitations of this research 
The goal, as it is discussed in Europe, is to utilise the long grown and well established 
basics of tort regulation as they exist in the Member States. To enforce competition 
law, other avenues may also be taken. Competition authorities could be endowed with 
more resources and power. Alternatively, public enforcement could be improved by 
instigating solutions to perceived inefficiencies of public enforcement. Criminal law 
could be made applicable. Also additional public bodies could be created and charged 
with the task of investigating markets and firms to detect competition law 
infringements. However all these avenues are beyond the realm of this thesis, which is 
concerned with the question of, if and how private actions for damages may assist to 
protect competition and thereby ultimately benefit the consumer. To be more precise, 
the focus here is on what role group litigations for damages could play. Other 
important and currently discussed issues are not included, such as the still ongoing 
                                                                                                                               
3 Backward induction in economic theory refers to reasoning backwards in time, i.e. beginning at the 
end of a problem and then determining the sequence of optimal actions leading there. 
4 In the economic and legal analysis, the UK is understood to comprise only England and Wales. 
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debate of private versus public enforcement, which may be outrun by actual advances. 
Current developments on the European level, as well as in individual Member States 
suggests that soon there will be some form of private enforcement with group 
litigation in actions for damages due to competition law infringements. This is the 
starting point of this analysis. Moreover, other debated features of private actions for 
damages, inter alia: such as the correct way to calculate damages; whether or not to 
allow for a passing-on defence; or all the different possibilities to finance such 
litigations; can not be dealt with in depth in this analysis. Instead here the focus is on 
group litigation mechanisms. Class actions in antitrust law is a well known and 
established concept in the United States and other common law countries, such as 
Canada or Australia. However, group litigation in general and especially in 
competition law cases has not been widely used in the Member States of the European 
Union. Therefore empirical research of group litigation due to infringement of 
European Competition Law is to remain a point of future research, after different 
systems have already been introduced in the Member States and applied sufficiently. 
The theoretical analysis conducted here is limited to a law and economics approach 
and therefore focuses on the goal of deterrence, rather than that of compensation, and 
as a consequence, also on stand-alone actions rather than follow-on actions.5
However, many of the obstacles to efficiency of the discussed systems under the 
deterrence approach are also relevant for follow-on or compensation considerations. 
Moreover, follow-on cases are also discussed in the analysis of the legal changes 
proposed by the European Commission and in the legal comparison of the US, UK 
and Germany. For both these reasons and the fact that the European Commission also 
wants to also encourage stand-alone actions,6 the analysis conducted here also 
provides insights into these other approaches. Moreover, the efficiency of substantive 
rules of competition law or their public enforcement is not evaluated. The analysis 
rests on the assumption that the imposition of the optimal fine, as developed in 
deterrence theory, will lead to total welfare increase by increasing compliance with 
competition laws and only allowing total welfare enhancing breaches. Another 
assumption is that public enforcement as it exists is not perfect and does not detect 
                                                
5 A focus on stand-alone actions is a consequence of focusing on the goal of deterrence, as will be 
shown in chapter three. 
Group Litigation in European Competition Law: Preface                                                                      6
and/or deter all infringements, so that private enforcement may increase deterrence as 
a second enforcement pillar. Further research would have to provide more detailed 
insights into the costs and benefits of such enforcement of competition law activities 
to allow a more accurate evaluation of effects on total welfare and maybe also a cost-
benefit comparison of private versus public enforcement. Moreover, just as is done in 
competition law, the firm will be treated as one entity, not taking considerations into 
account that are dealt with in the stream of corporate governance literature and others. 
Also, harmonisation costs or costs of legal change are not taken into account. These 
can differ greatly from one legal system to another and would have to be weighed 
against any increase in total welfare the specific group litigation systems may bring 
about.
Legislative and policy developments as well as case law could only be taken into 
account until the first of August 2009, advances after that date have not been 
incorporated. 
E Social relevance 
The economic losses caused to society by competition law infringements are 
significant.7 A few estimates may clarify the amounts at stake. In the US, the yearly 
benefit (avoided losses) achieved by the nevertheless imperfect enforcement system 
has been estimated at $50 to 100 billion per year, using a tentative approach of 
estimation.8 For Australia, the OECD estimated the yearly benefit of their effective 
competition policy at 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).9 In Europe, 2.5 
percent of GPD would amount to € 396 billion per year. It may be safe to say that 
                                                                                                                               
6 European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404," (2008), 3. 
7 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Report on the Nature and Impact of 
Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels under National Competition Laws," (2002) 7, 
2.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "The Role of Competition Policy in 
Regulatory  Reform, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, Reform of the United Kingdom " (2002) 
55. Citing estimates of annual losses in the UK due to monopolistic behaviour to be around £ 4.5 
billion and £ 9 billion annually. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/61/27068497.pdf 
8 See Baker, "The case for antitrust enforcement," JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 17 
(2003): 27.  
9 Renda, et al, "Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the 
impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions," (2007) 92. 
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such figures are anything else but “peanuts”. It is therefore crucial that efficient 
enforcement systems are developed that sufficiently deter harmful anticompetitive 
practices and minimise the corresponding social welfare losses.  
Because of the acknowledged enormous losses, several venues to achieve efficient 
enforcement of competition rules have recently been pursued by legislators. First, 
there has been a tendency to strengthen the investigative powers of competition 
authorities.10 Secondly, just like the UK and Ireland, other Member States are 
discussing the possibility of criminalising competition law infringements as a tool to 
achieve more efficient and effective deterrence against anticompetitive behaviour.11
And the third avenue, strongly pursued not only by the European Commission, is to 
increase competition law enforcement and its deterrence effect by strengthening 
private enforcement, following the example of legal systems such as those in the US.  
It is the last mentioned venue, where the introduction of a group litigation mechanism 
plays a vital role. In consequence, information about the most efficient way to design 
such a system, what benefits and costs will be incurred by choosing one specific 
variation over other alternatives and what other legal rules and principles will affect 
the overall performance, are paramount. Answers to these questions are presented in 
this thesis. 
The insights developed here within the context of pursuing the goal of the deterrence 
will also be relevant to a great extent to any analysis or evaluation conducted where 
compensatory justice is instead set as the overriding goal. There, the trade-offs 
between the features that make a particular litigation mechanism efficient or effective 
and compensatory justice will be most relevant. At least the former, but sometimes 
also the latter side of these trade-offs are identified in this analysis.  
                                                
10 Wils, "Is criminalization of EU competition law the answer?" WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND 
ECONOMICS REVIEW 28 (2005): 117, 136. 
11 See for example the contributions by Luna and DeLong, discussing the risks and costs connected to 
an overextension of criminal law. Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law. GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING. ed. Healy. Washington DC: Cato Institute 
(2004), 1; DeLong, The New 'Criminal' Classes: Legal Sanctions and Business Managers. GO
DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING. ed. Healy. 
Washington DC: Cato Institute (2004), 9. 
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F Scientific relevance 
This research brings together several streams of legal and economic literature, 
including the literature on optimal deterrence, litigation theory, transaction costs, and 
new industrial economics, in the attempt to build an integrated theoretical framework 
for assessing the efficiency of any type of group litigation.  
In that respect, the project contributes to the legal and economic literature in this field, 
which so far has been mainly characterised by legal and economic analysis of specific 
existing mechanisms within their legal surrounding, overwhelmingly the American 
class action, on the one hand, and the analysis of very special details in specific 
settings through economic models on the other.  The integrated framework developed 
here presents a tool through which to analyse any form of group litigation while still 
allowing ‘context aware benchmarking’. This is achieved by identifying the areas 
where the peculiarities of existing legal systems and their expected rigidity will have 
to be incorporated when contemplating the introduction of group litigation into 
existing legal systems.   
The result may still be far from implementable in reality. However, it uses several 
ideas voiced in the literature, combines them in new ways and develops them further. 
In particular, the idea for a market for private enforcement is developed in greater 
detail. Both applications of that framework can be considered to contribute to the 
scientific approach to group litigation as deterrence tool.  
Moreover, the framework is applied to mechanisms currently envisioned by the 
European Commission as well as instruments already being used in three selected 
countries, namely, the US, the UK and Germany. The analysis demonstrates the 
pitfalls of these mechanisms and highlights implications for future reforms. 
G Expected or desired impact 
Due to its social and scientific relevance, as well as the fact that it deals with a very 
timely and intensively discussed topic I envisage that this thesis may be of interest to 
legislators and scholars alike, and that even practitioners may gain valuable insights.  
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The legislators and decision makers reading this thesis should gain many relevant 
insights and information needed to assess any form of group litigation they may be 
contemplating the introduction of into their legal system. Additionally since the recent 
developments not only on the European level, it seems likely that national legislators 
will debate such issues in the near future. The framework presented here is most likely 
more useful to legislators than the scattered insights gained by numerous specific 
economic models, while at the same time providing a potentially sounder analytical 
basis than a legal comparison on its own. In order to avoid complex and costly 
reforms of civil procedure and other regulations to establish a group litigation 
mechanism that then may fail to achieve the desired effects, legislators should tread 
carefully and employ as many scientific insights as possible and efficient. 
Scholars on the other hand may pick up on the notion that group litigation 
mechanisms encompass a multitude of different forms and features that can be very 
different from the forms we see in reality today and develop further insights into 
general principles rather than into the specific features of known systems. 
Practitioners may gain insights or ideas that may help them to develop better tools to 
organise and lead group litigation mechanisms, as well as arguments to use in the 
policy debate. 
H Structure 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
placement of the thesis topic in the general debate about enforcement of competition 
law and the recent developments concerning private enforcement of competition law 
in the European Union. In Chapter 2, the general framework used throughout this 
thesis is established. This includes the definition of relevant terms and concepts used, 
as well as the general legal and economic framework. Chapter 3 applies the 
framework established in the previous Chapter. First, generalised forms of existing 
forms of group litigation mechanisms, i.e. collective actions and representative 
actions, are analysed. The insights gained in this analysis then are used to develop a 
form of group litigation, which would be more efficient than previous forms, i.e. a 
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market based mechanism combined with auctions.  In Chapter 4, the proposals made 
by the European Commission in the Green Paper and the ensuing White Paper are 
analysed with regard to efficient deterrence, following the insights gained in Chapter 
3. As deterrence is not the primary goal for the Commission’s position, also other 
goals as defined by the European Commission and potential legal obstacles are 
described and discussed. Chapter 5 provides a legal comparison of three selected legal 
systems: the US, UK and Germany, as well as an analysis of the group litigation 
mechanisms in place in these countries with regard to the results developed in Chapter 
3. The thesis ends with overall conclusions, policy implications of the found results 
and points for future research in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 1 : Enforcement of European Competition Law 
A The Rationale of European Competition Law 
1 Protection of Competition 
The main aim of competition law is to protect competition from restrictions.12 Art. 3 
(1) (g) of the EC Treaty provides that one of the activities of the Community is to 
achieve the objectives set out in Art. 2 EC Treaty, that is, “a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted”. Also the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that "[t]here is general 
consensus that the basic objective of competition policy is to protect and preserve 
competition as the most appropriate means of ensuring the efficient allocation of 
resources – and thus efficient market outcomes -– in free market economies. While 
countries differ somewhat in defining efficient market outcomes, there is general 
agreement that the concept is manifested by lower consumer prices, higher quality 
products and better product choice."13
That competition in the market will lead to an efficient allocation of resources is an 
economic concept. Competition law restricting anti-competitive behaviour of market 
participants is undoubtledly heavily based on economic theory. The notions that 
cartels or monopoly power may be undesirable from a societal point of view, are 
rooted in the realisation that these deviations from competition in the market lead to 
welfare losses and inefficiencies. The idea that competitive markets generate benefits 
for society by increasing welfare and economic growth, can be traced back (at least) 
to the seminal work of Adam Smith.14  Since then, economic theory has been further 
developed and has grown into a large set of specialised parts of economic theory. In 
                                                
12 Budzinski, "Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics," CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 32 (2007): 295, 295; Langen and Bunte, Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen 
Kartellrecht. Luchterhand (2001), nr 53; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, München: Beck (2001), 1 ; Van Den 
Bergh and Camesasca, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell (2006), 5 f, 16 ff. 
13 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Competition Policy and Efficiency 
Claims in Horizontal Agreements" Paris, 1996), 5. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/4/2379526.pdf 
14 Möschel, Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, Köln: Heymann (1983) , 42.  
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the 1950’s, traditional industrial economics developed the so called 'structure-
conduct-performance paradigm', which heavily influenced competition laws for a 
substantial time.15 The basic idea was that there was a structural relationship between 
market structure, behaviour of firms in the market and market outcome. The lessons 
drawn from that theory were that the most important thing for competition law to 
achieve and protect is the appropriate market structure, which if maintained would 
eventually lead to the desired market outcomes. However, it was soon realised that the 
theory was insufficient to describe actual developments.  
In response new theoretical foundations were researched. As a result, new industrial 
economics was developed. Within this paradigm the behaviour of firms in the market 
is analysed. However, there is a lack of consensus, even in economic theory, as to 
what form of efficiency should be the ultimate subject of protection. A number of 
different types of efficiencies have been posited: static efficiency, which includes the 
classical theories on monopoly power and the resulting allocative inefficiency;16
productive efficiency, relating to efficiency in the production process;17 and, dynamic 
efficiency,18 which relates to innovations and developments which may have even 
larger impacts on an economy than static efficiency.19 Between these goals, the lines 
are blurred and conflicts can arise. Productive efficiency, where the costs of 
production are reduced per unit because large amounts are produced (so called 
economies of scale) can lead to allocative inefficiency, when this advantage of size 
leads to a natural monopoly with monopoly prices and lower quantities produced than 
                                                
15 At least until recently, also the EU competition law was protecting certain market structures, if it 
does not still do so. See Behrens, Theoretische und Praktische Probleme einer Ökonomisierung der 
Kartellrechtsanwendung. INTERNATIONALISIERUNG DES RECHTS UND SEINE 
ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. eds. Eger, et al. (2008), 457 , 462. See also Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities, Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European 
Communities (2007) nr 664, referring to the protection of certain market structures. 
16 Allocative efficiency requires that manufacturers produce and sell products that society wants in the 
amount and at the price that society wants, which means that productions is aligned with consumer 
preferences.Hubbard and O'Brien, Microeconomics, London: Prentice Hall (2008), 10. 
17 Productive efficiency refers to a situation in which a good or service is produced at the lowest costs 
possible. Ibidem, 10. 
18 Dynamic efficiency refers to an adequate balance between short run concerns (static efficiency) with 
concerns in the long run (focusing on encouraging research and development). Stiglitz and Walsh, 
Economics, New York: W. W. Norton (2006), 457 f. For a discussion on dynamic efficiency see also 
Audretsch, et al, "Competition policy in dynamic markets," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 19 (2001): 613 
19 Foer, "The Goals of Antitrust: Thoughts on Consumer Welfare in the US," AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 05-09 (2005). 
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in a competitive market.20 Another example is the conflict between static efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency in the area of research and development (innovation). In this 
case firms conducting costly and risky research projects, for example in the 
pharmaceutical industry, need to be granted a temporary monopoly on their products 
(usually through patent rights) and allowed to earn supra-competitive profits for a 
certain time period, in order to give sufficient incentives for firms to develop desired 
products.21
Since its inception, the development and application of competition law, however, has 
not been limited to one particular branch of economic theory. The beginnings of EC 
competition law were heavily influenced by the ordo-liberal view on competition, 
which focus on the market structures necessary to generate rivalry in the markets and 
the necessity to regulate and control these market structures.22 Since then, the basic 
concepts underlining European Competition Law have undergone changes and 
developments. The two most recent of these, are the hotly debated so called 'more 
economic approach', and the shift towards placing more emphasis on the protection of 
consumers. The latter, will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
The 'more economic approach' relates to the idea that firms' behaviour itself should be 
evaluated and the effects of certain behaviour on the market should be assessed. This 
approach opened the way for efficiency arguments to be included in the assessment of 
firms' conduct.23 Just as economic theory does not provide a clear answer; it also 
remains a matter of discussion in the debate about the goals of antitrust regulation. 
There are different ways in which the goals of regulation could be prioritised and 
compared. Different efficiency goals could be ordered in a kind of ranking so that 
goal A would be the foremost, followed by goal B and so on. Alternatively, one goal 
could also clearly predominate all the others, but these could have equal value and 
                                                
20 Behrens, Theoretische und Praktische Probleme einer Ökonomisierung der Kartellrechtsanwendung
457, 464. 
21 On the potential conflicts of the different efficiency concepts see alsoVan Den Bergh, European 
competition law and economics: a comparative perspective , 29 f. 
22See Pera, "Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and EC Antitrust Law," EUROPEAN
COMPETITION JOURNAL 4 (2008): 127. 
23 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission, Notice, Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08)," OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 47 (2004): 97, nr 24 und 33. For Art. 82 European Commission, "Discussion 
Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses." BRUSSELS, (ONLINE 
PUBLICATION) (2005), nr 84.  
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could be taken into account as complement to the main goal. It may also be possible 
not to provide a ranking at all but give the goals equal value and evaluate them on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Despite the seemingly multiple different economic theories, certain aspects of 
economic theory are met by wide consensus in the world of economics and may be 
called standard economic theory,24 which will be applied here.25
2 Total versus Consumer Welfare 
Another important discussion currently taking place in Europe, and also a matter of 
dispute in the USA,26 is whether the welfare approach taken in competition law should 
be that of consumer welfare or total welfare. This dialogue is also connected to the 
discussion described above concerning the 'more economic approach.'27
The use of total welfare or an efficiency standard is aimed at maximising total welfare 
to society in a Kaldor-Hicks28 sense. Kaldor-Hicks improvements refer to changes 
which result in some members of society winning and some members of society 
losing, but where the gains outweigh the losses. Therefore, when there is a Kaldor-
Hicks improvement, the winners could compensate the losers and still be better off 
than before the event. For that reason, this is also called potential Pareto 
improvement.29 Focusing on the total welfare of society implies that a wealth transfer 
                                                
24 It seems most of new industrial economic theory, game-theory and microeconomic insights fit that 
description, which can be found in any textbook on microeconomics and new industrial organisation. 
See for example Tirole, The theory of industrial organization. Lipczynski, Industrial organization: 
competition, strategy, policy. Pindyck, Microeconomics. Rubinstein, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior.
25 See Chapter 2 section C on the economic framework used in this analysis for details. 
26 See Farrell and Katz, "The economics of welfare standards in antitrust," COMPETITION POLICY 
INTERNATIONAL 2 (2006): 3.. Heyer, "Welfare standards and merger analysis: Why not the best?" 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WORKING PAPER (2006). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=959454. 
27 For an overview see Vanberg, "Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom–On the 
Normative Foundations of Competition Policy," FREIBURG DISCUSSION PAPERS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2009). Available at: 
http://www.eucken.de/publikationen/09_03bw.pdf. 
28 Named after the economists Nicholas Kaldor (1908-1986) and John Hicks (1904-1989). A Kaldor-
Hicks improvement is achieved, when – theoretically -, those made off better through the change could 
fully compensate those made off worse and still be better off. 
29 Pure Pareto-improvement will be described below. 
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from one part of society to another has no impact, as it does not influence the welfare 
of all members of society, as a sum. In the  area of competition law the use of the 
Kaldor-Hicks approach to efficiency allows firms to engage in conduct that does 
result in dynamic efficiency, for example by providing increased incentives for 
innovation, but which leads to higher prices for consumers, at least in the short run. 
The aim is to increase the sum of the consumer and producer surplus and therefore 
total welfare.  
On the other hand, a pure and narrow consumer welfare approach could prohibit any 
conduct by firms that would lead to a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers. 
There are a couple of different ways in which a narrow consumer welfare approach 
can be implemented. When the consumer welfare standard is defined as allowing only 
Pareto improvements then the above mentioned behaviour by firms will not be 
allowed. Under this approach the gain of one part of society (producers) will only be 
allowed when the other part of society (consumers) is not made worse off. Apart from 
practical problems of such an approach, the so called Pareto improvement30
requirement would put an enormous limitation on any changes of the status quo.31
A second interpretation of the consumer welfare approach could be that it aims at 
maximising consumer surplus. This would be along the line of prohibitions of 
excessive prices, for example. In such a setting, consumers would always have to win 
and losses of producers would not be taken into account.32 Again, such an approach 
could lead to unwanted outcomes when dynamic efficiency is taken into 
consideration, unless the future benefits of consumers that result from temporary 
producer surpluses are adequately taken into account.  For example, consumers can be 
made worse off when they have to endure higher prices due to a patent protected 
monopoly for a certain period of time, but at the same time consumers would still be 
made worse off if patents were abandoned and innovative activity plummeted as a 
consequence.  
                                                
30 Named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). A pareto improvement is said to be 
achieved when at least the situation of one person can be improved, without making any other 
individual worse off. Pareto-efficiency is achieved when no further pareto improvements are possible. 
31 Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective 40 f. 
32 In that respect, the voiced argument might be included that individual members of society not only 
act as consumers, but can also be shareholders and employees of firms, in turn benefiting from 
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Like the literature, the approach in reality seems not to be clear cut. In the US, total 
welfare is sometimes interpreted as consumer welfare.33 There also are voices that 
argue that in fact consumer welfare usually does correlate with total social welfare, so 
that enhancing the latter would automatically also increase the former.34 Also the 
normative foundations of EC Competition Law are criticised as not being well 
developed.35 In a number of statements, the European Commission seems to follow 
the line of thought, that efficient allocation of resources and consumer welfare will be 
correlated.36 However, other Commission statements could lead to different 
conclusions, especially those stating that consumer welfare should be given priority.37
Additionally, the current case law does not seem to clarify the predominance 
consumer welfare should have in the application of competition law. In British 
Airways, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) considered that “Article 82 EC is aimed 
not only at practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at 
those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition 
structure, such as is mentioned in Article 3(1)(g) EC.”38 In while the court of first 
instance clarified that “it must be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that Article 
82 EC covers not only practices which may prejudice consumers directly but also 
                                                                                                                               
producer surplus. As such, the focus on consumer welfare might be slightly less favourable also for 
members of society intuitively assumed to be only consumers. 
33 See Behrens, Theoretische und Praktische Probleme einer Ökonomisierung der 
Kartellrechtsanwendung 457, 468; as an example see  Bork, The antitrust paradox: A policy at war 
with itself,Basic Books New York (1978). 
34Foer, The Goals of Antitrust: Thoughts on Consumer Welfare in the US 19 f. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103510. 
35 For a discussion, see Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an 
Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law. ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMPETITION LAW. ed. Drexl. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2009), 93. 
36 Neelie Kroes, "Damages Actions for Breaches of EU Competition Rules: Realities and Potentials 
Opening speech at the conference ‘La reparation du prejudice cause par une pratique anti-
concurentielle en France et à l’étranger : bilan et perspectives ’, Cour de Cassation" 17 Oct 2005), , 
Neelie Kroes, "Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in 
Europe,SPEECH/05/533" Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512&format=HTML&aged=1&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
37  Mario Monti, "European Commissioner for Competition Policy, A reformed competition policy: 
achievements and challenges for the future" Brussels, 28 October 2004),  Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/477&format=HTML&aged=1&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  Neelie Kroes, "Consumers at the heart of EU Competition Policy 
SPEECH/08/212" 22 April 2008), Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/212&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
38 ECJ 15.03.2007, C-95/04,(British Airways/Commission), nr 106. 
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those which indirectly prejudice them by impairing an effective competitive 
structure.”39
The major problem in the discussion of which consumer welfare standard should be 
applied is that there is an absence of a clear cut definition of 'consumer welfare'. What 
exactly counts as hindering or fostering consumer welfare, and what concept should 
be given priority when conflicts arise between a form of efficiency and consumer 
welfare, as defined, should be decided upon and made explicit. Consumer welfare that 
includes long-run gains, for example from dynamic competition, will come much 
closer to the total welfare standard since it also has to take into account the producer 
surplus. This is in contrast to a limited definition that includes just the short-run 
consumer surplus.40 If the Commission really wants to pursue that goal as a priority, 
such a definition would be vital, however, to allow sensible decision making and to 
increase legal certainty.  
The substantive rules of competition law may be focusing on various different criteria 
and definitions of consumer welfare, at various times. The approach chosen for the 
analysis in this thesis is that of total welfare, i.e., the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus. This approach will allow for so called 'efficient breaches' of competition law, 
where the profit for the infringing firm outweighs the losses caused to society at large. 
Moreover, enforcement activities that would lead to more costs than they could create 
benefits in terms of deterrence are considered inefficient and therefore undesirable 
from a social point of view. The choice for a total welfare approach is motivated by 
several reasons.  
First, standard economic theory applies total welfare concepts when analysing the 
effects of certain firm’s behaviour in the market. It is the standard approach adopted 
in the Law and Economics literature when analysing legal rules.41 Redistribution 
mechanisms which should “take from the rich and give to the poor” are usually 
                                                
39Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission 
of the European Communities, nr 664.  
40 Canoy, et al, "Dominance and Monopolization," TILEC DISCUSSION PAPER DP 2004-022 (2004),  
7. Available at http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/publications/discussionpapers/2004-022.pdf. 
41 Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist on the 
Normative Foundations of Competition Law 93, 104 f. 
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advocated to be outside the realm of competition, and even private, law.42 This is 
because otherwise the incentives structures of market players and the functioning of 
markets would be distorted.43
Second, as can be seen from the description above, the consumer welfare approach, 
even if it were to be strictly applied in European Competition Law, is not yet clearly 
defined. Whether consumer welfare is harmed by the short-run monopoly prices 
allowed by a patent, or increased by the incentives provided for innovation, are 
amongst the many aspects which would have to be decided upon in the definition. 
Depending on the definition, it is possible that the consumer welfare approach closely 
mirrors the total welfare approach, so that the choice between these two approaches 
may be of less importance. 
Third, whether the substantive criterion is harm to consumers or restriction of 
effective competition in the markets, the total welfare criteria may still be applied 
when the issue of enforcement is discussed. Arguably, allowing for efficient breaches 
would then entail that the law protecting consumers would be infringed and the gain 
for the infringer would outweigh the losses caused to consumers. This may be seen as 
being in conflict with the law focusing on consumer welfare in the short-run. 
However, the difference between substantive law and its enforcement should also be 
taken into account. Enforcement of a law that prohibits some certain unwanted 
behaviour can also be designed to pursue different objectives than the underlying 
substantive law. Amongst these objectives may be the punishment of offenders for 
their wrongdoing, deterrence of other potential infringers or infringements, and also 
some form of justice goal. This may imply the extortion of illegal profits gained by 
the offender through the infringement. These are the classical arguments, not only for 
sanctions imposed in public proceedings, but also for proclaimed goals of tort law.44
                                                
42 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics,Pearson (2003) , 7 f. 
43 See Kaplow and Shavell, "Fairness versus welfare," HARVARD LAW REVIEW 114 (2000): 961. 
44 See Polinsky and Shavell, Punitive Damages. TORT LAW AND ECOMOMICS, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. ed. Faure. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (2009), 228, 
228 f. Kionka, Torts in a Nutshell, St. Paul: Thomson West (1999), 5 ff. Kötz, Ziele des 
Haftungsrechts. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERNST STEINDORFF. ed. Baur. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & 
Co. (1990), 643, 643 f. 
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Fourth, although inefficient markets cause costs to be borne by a number of different 
members of society enforcement mechanisms are also costly. Enforcement costs may 
be borne by society at large. In particular, public enforcement as a state activity, is 
typically financed through general tax revenues. If calculating costs as those incurred 
by the whole of society, including: competitors, small and medium enterprises that 
have business relations with the infringer, and end consumers, then it seems 
reasonable to contrast these with the total welfare of society, and not just a part of 
society. Under this approach enforcement mechanisms that will increase total welfare 
should be given preference. That again implies a total welfare approach.  
Lastly, the choice of which member of society in which function should be given 
more rights compared to other members in other functions seems to be a political one, 
and is not to be answered here. The total welfare approach remains relevant, and will 
still reveal important information about the costs and benefits of certain choices 
compared to other choices, even if a political choice were to be made that would 
favour a different welfare approach.  
B Enforcement of Competition Law in the European Union 
In the last years, European Competition Law has been reformed and made more 
sophisticated. Spurred by developments on the substantive law, the importance of 
evaluating and subsequently reforming the enforcement instruments has been 
increasingly recognised throughout the decade. It is uncontroversial that the debate 
about the 'best' competition law rules remains meaningless, apart from it being a nice 
theoretical exercise, if enforcement is lacking or inefficient. One of the most 
important reform steps taken in this regard was EC Regulation 1/2003, which came 
into force 1 May 2004 and modernised the European enforcement system.45 With this 
regulation, the Member States abolished the notification system under Art. 81 EC, 
decentralised enforcement giving more responsibility to the national competition 
authorities and courts, and made Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty directly applicable.  
                                                
45 Council of the European Union, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on 
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2003), 
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Public enforcement still predominates the enforcement of competition law in the 
European Union. However, the decentralisation of enforcement mechanisms, and the 
consequential decisions of the ECJ, has meant that private enforcement mechanisms 
have become more important. This form of enforcement has to take place before the 
national courts of the Member States, following national procedure. This spurred the 
interest in the prospects and obstacles of private enforcement in the Member States, 
however with a focus on actions for damages and less so on other possible legal 
remedies. In 2004, a study (Ashurst Study) 46 was undertaken to identify obstacles to 
private enforcement in the Member States. The findings led to the result of 
“astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment”47 of effective systems for private 
damage claims in the Member States. In the wake of the Ashurst Study there have 
only been some limited developments designed to increase private enforcement in the 
Member States.  
The principle of private enforcement of Community law rights in addition to their 
enforcement by the public authorities reaches back to the 1963 Van Gend & Loos 
judgment,48 in which the ECJ held that the EC Treaty not only established the rights 
and duties of Member States, but also directly for individuals. The landmark 2002 
Courage decision,49 examined the right for damages due to competition law 
infringements. In this judgement, the EJC clarified the existence of a right to sue for 
damages due to European Competition Law infringements. In its decision, the ECJ 
also considered that private enforcement can “make a significant contribution to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Community”.50 Furthermore, that “[t]he 
full effectiveness of Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 81 EC) and, in particular, 
the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) would be put at risk if 
                                                
46 The study is frequently referred to as the “Ashurst Study”, as it was the law firm Ashurst conducting 
the study. Waelbroeck, et al, "Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement 
of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, Ashurst Study for 
Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, London, England," (2004) Available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private_enforcement/comparative_report_
clean_en.pdf. 
47 “Ashurst Study”Ibidem, 4. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/national_reports/spain_en.
pdf.
48 European Court of Justice, Case 26/62 Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos v Nederlandse administratie der belastingen (1963)
49 European Court of Justice, Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297
(2001)
50 Ibidem nr 34. 
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it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.” In a later judgement, 
the so called Manfredi judgement,51 the ECJ reconfirmed the importance of actions 
for damages. However, the question of how private enforcement could or should play 
a role in enforcement of competition law in Europe remained open. 
In December 2005, the European Commission issued a Green Paper “Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”.52 The release of the Green paper initiated 
a discussion as to obstacles and possible changes to enhance private actions for 
damages. Following the Green Paper and the resulting debate, a White Paper was 
prepared and published in 2008. 53 In it the Commission presented its vision as to what 
legal changes are necessary and desirable.54 If the Commission decides to take a next 
step going beyond a mere suggestion, these proposals have the potential to have a 
profound impact on the national legal systems of Member States. In  2009, after 
receiving support by the European Parliament,55 the Commission was expected to 
present legislative measures in the near future.56
In light of these developments in Europe, old discussions have resurfaced, with new 
features and questions attached. The questions raised include: Why should private 
enforcement be enhanced in the first place? Should it be designed so as to replace 
public enforcement, or does it pursue completely different goals and act as a mere and 
completely independent complement? Or is its function something in between? These 
questions have already been addressed in the classic debate about public versus 
private enforcement.57 In the following section, an overview is given of the classic 
                                                
51 European Court of Justice, Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v. Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others ECR I-6619 (2006) 
52 European Commission, "Green Paper: Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules," (2005), 
COM(2005) 672 final. 
53 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404.
54 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the propositions laid out in the White Paper. 
55 See Press-Release: Antitrust: Commissioner Kroes welcomes the European Parliament’s cross-party 
support for damages for consumer and business victims of competition breaches , MEMO/09/135, 
26/03/2009. 
56 See e.g. http://www.martindale.com/antitrust-trade-regulation-law/article_Jones-Day_692038.htm. 
57 Public enforcement refers to the detection and sanctioning of illegal conduct by public enforcement 
agencies, such as the police or competition authorities. Private enforcement refers to such enforcement 
activities outside the public law realm, such as legal actions by private individuals or by consumer 
associations. 
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public versus private enforcement dispute and its specific features in the area of 
private enforcement of competition law. 
1 The Classic Debate: Private versus Public Enforcement 
Taking a step back from the current discussion about the most appropriate tools with 
which private enforcement should be enhanced, the underlying issue of the potential 
of private enforcement vis-à-vis public enforcement comes once again to the fore. The 
question to be answered first is whether private enforcement may be able to substitute 
for public enforcement of European Competition Law. Currently this may be said to 
be the case in antitrust enforcement in the US, where 90 percent of all antitrust cases 
are of a private nature.58 If not, the next question would be whether private 
enforcement may act as a suitable complement to the public enforcement, which 
currently clearly predominates in the European Union (EU).59
The debate about private versus public enforcement of competition law also hinges on 
the question which goal is to be achieved by which mechanism. Broadly speaking, 
often commentators argue that while public enforcement is concerned primarily with 
deterrence and punishment, private enforcement is concerned with compensation and 
justice for victims. However, legal theory also sometimes includes deterrence as one 
of the functions of tort law, as well as the function to at least deprive the offender of 
its illegal gain.60
From an economic point of view, which is the approach taken in this thesis, the goal 
of any enforcement activity is mainly that of deterrence. When offenders are 
efficiently deterred from committing the undesirable offence, the losses incurred by 
members of the society are minimised and therefore total welfare to society is 
                                                
58 Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, 325. 
59 Segal and Whinston, "Public vs. private enforcement of antitrust law: A survey," STANFORD LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 335 (2006), 1.  Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=9520671. Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a 
comparative perspective, 325. 
60 For example skimming-off procedures in Germany are brought by associations under civil law, even 
though their predominantly preventive function is acknowledged. See Stadler, "Grenzüberschreitender 
kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa," JuristenZeitung 64 (February 2009): 121.  For an economic 
analysis of skimming-off procedures, mainly focusing on criminal procedures, see Bowles, et al, 
"Forfeiture of Illegal Gain: An Economic Perspective," OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 25 
(2005): 275. 
Enforcement of European Competition Law                                                                              23
maximised. Compensation, in the form of the compensatory damages awarded to a 
plaintiff for harm caused by the defendant, for example, then is only a matter of 
distribution between members of the society, but not in itself relevant for the total 
welfare of a society as a whole. Such a (re-)distribution, from an economic point of 
view, is not completely irrelevant, however. It plays an important role where it 
influences the incentives for certain behaviour by the members of society, or leads to 
an efficient risk distribution, for example. However, distribution issues therefore form 
a tool with which to reach the primary goal of efficient deterrence, rather than it being 
a goal in itself. Consequently, most of the economic and law and economics literature 
concerning public versus private enforcement focuses on the potential for private 
enforcement to achieve deterrence as a goal compared to public enforcement. 
1.1 Advantages of Public Enforcement 
Private enforcement as a substitute, or a complement, to public enforcement has been 
a point of deliberations in the Law and Economics literature since the seminal work of 
Gary Becker and George Stigler in 1974.61 In their work, the authors focused on the 
deterrence effect of private enforcement, and argued that it could be just as, or even 
more, efficient than public enforcement when correctly designed. According to the 
authors the prerequisites for such effective private enforcement entail setting the 
damages awarded in court so as to exceed the actual harm caused in order to account 
for the low probability of detection, and granting the damages awarded to those 
private parties who play an active role in detection and conviction.62 This positive 
view of private enforcement as potential substitute to public enforcement, however, 
has been frequently challenged in the ensuing debate during the past four decades.  
In response, Landes and Posner63 argued that the general efficiency of private 
enforcement will be more restricted than Becker and Stigler proposed, especially 
where large investments are necessary to increase the probability of detection. They 
                                                
61 Becker and Stigler, "Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of Enforces," THE
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 3 (1974): 1. 
62 See Ibidem, 14. 
63 Landes and Posner, "The Private Enforcement of Law," THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 4 
(1975): 1. 
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further hinted towards possible problems concerning duplications of efforts, a race to 
the courts, waste of resources and over-enforcement.64
Much later, Posner65 also pointed to other problems of private enforcement, such as 
the trade-off or conflict between providing the right incentives for private 
enforcement (which are directly influenced by the amount of damages awarded) and 
setting the penalty faced by the infringer (which equals the amount of damages 
awarded) at an optimal level.
Following these initial assessments of private versus public enforcement, a number of 
argument supporting the supremacy of public over private enforcement were 
developed. These shall be presented here. 
1.1.1 Private incentives to sue are lacking 
The classic argument why public enforcement activities may be more efficient than 
private enforcement concerns the different incentives to detect and sanction offences. 
Public enforcement is thought to dominate private enforcement because the individual 
plaintiff does not have the social welfare in mind when suing for damages.66 The 
individual harmed by certain conduct will generally only decide to file suit against the 
offender when such an action will provide more benefits to themselves as the injured 
party than it entails in costs. A simple example may be that a victim having incurred a 
loss of € 5 is not expected to incur litigation costs of €100 in order to sue for 
damages.67 This leads to a subset of problems. There will be inadequate investment in 
litigation because the private plaintiff does not consider the total costs and benefits to 
society, but merely his own expected costs and expected gain from litigating. This can 
lead to under-investment in enforcement activities, because the deterrence effects of 
such suits on other potential offenders, enhancing legal certainty and similarly 
                                                
64  See Ibidem.
65 Posner, Economic analysis of law, Boston: Little, Brown and Company (2003),  632.See also 
Shavell, "Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, The," THE 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 11 (1982): 333. 
66 Wils, "Should private antitrust enforcement be encouraged in Europe?" WORLD COMPETITION 26 
(2003): 473, 482 ; Segal, Public vs. private enforcement of antitrust law: A survey 1, 7.  Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952067; see also Shavell, Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a 
Costly Legal System, The 333. 
67 In these cases the  rational plaintiff will remain rationally apathic, see section 3.2 in chapter two. 
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beneficial aspects of successfully challenging a certain illegal conduct in court, are not 
taken into account by the private party. When these effects are taken into account the 
total benefit to society may well exceed the costs of litigation the potential plaintiff 
faces, so that litigation would be desirable from a total social point of view. 
Furthermore, there may be additional costs the individual faces on top of the 
enforcement costs. For example, firms harmed by a competition law infringement by 
an important business partner may fear retaliation and therefore be reluctant to 
commence action even if the harm would justify the costs, they possess sufficient 
relevant information and evidence. This may especially be the case when economic 
dependencies exist.68
On the other hand, the deviation of incentives to engage in enforcement activities by 
private parties may also lead to over-investment in litigation in some cases. An 
example of this would be when competition law is used as a shield to protect the 
plaintiff from a strong competitor rather than to protect competition itself.69 While 
direct competitors and close business partners are likely to have sufficient knowledge 
to detect an infringement and the necessary resources and motivations to sue, these 
private enforcers are also the ones which may benefit the most from using competition 
law strategically. Due to the prospective gains, private parties may have increased 
incentives to use competition law rather as a shield than as a sword, i.e. to abuse 
competition law to prevent strong competition.70 The risk of unmeritous suits will 
have to be incorporated in the creation of the optimal group litigation mechanism. 
Another example would be a case where the aim of the plaintiff is merely to extract a 
settlement from the defendant by threatening costly litigation although the case has 
little or no merits.71 Here, the individual plaintiff does not incorporate into his 
reckoning the total costs to society that his behaviour triggers. This includes 
unnecessary costs invested in this rent-seeking behaviour (for example the lawyers 
costs) and the costs of deterring legal behaviour that would be beneficial to society.  
                                                
68Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, 331.  
69 Möschel, "Law and Market Organization: The Historical Experience in Germany From 1900 to the 
Law Against Restraints of Competition (1957)-Comment," JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND 
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 151 (1995): 21, 23 ; Ginsburg, "Comparing antitrust enforcement in the 
United States and Europe," JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (2005): 427, 435. 
70 This argument has frequently been made, seeSnyder and Kauper, "Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The 
Competitor Plaintiff," MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 90 (1991): 551;Ginsburg, Comparing antitrust 
enforcement in the United States and Europe 427, 435 f. 
71 For a more detail analysis of such nuisance suits, see section 2.2.2 in chapter 3. 
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Since the individual plaintiff is generally considered not to incorporate the total costs 
and benefits to society into his decision, it follows that private enforcement activities 
will deviate from the optimal level. This deviation of the private incentive to sue from 
that of society is a pitfall that public enforcement may cure, as public enforcement 
agents could (should?) consider total costs and benefits to society.  
1.1.2 Lack of information on the victims side 
Another argument for public enforcement concerns problems of information. In tort 
law, the victim of an offence is usually assumed to be aware of the harming act and 
the responsible offender. A classic example would be a traffic accident. However, 
while these arguments are valid in some instances they can be much less true for other 
victims and offences. Examples where this is not the case include damages caused by 
violations against environmental protection regulations or end-consumers harmed by a 
price-cartel at the manufacturer level. In such cases, specialised enforcement agents 
such as public enforcement agents may be in a much better position to detect and 
prosecute violations against the law. They often possess greater knowledge, 
experience, resources and powers to do so, than individual parties. This is especially 
the case for competition law infringements that are not obvious and subject to a per se
prohibition. In such cases a more profound analysis and subsequent balancing of 
positive and negative effects of a certain conduct to society is demanded, and much 
more extensive information and knowledge required. Where such information is not 
directly available but has to be acquired, public authorities are often assumed to have 
an advantage over private parties.72 They regularly have greater investigative power 
than individuals and are specialised in performing an analysis of potentially anti-
competitive behaviour.  
Public enforcement also offers additional tools to enhance revelation of information. 
Where information advantages on the side of private parties exist, they can and 
already often are taken advantage of also in public enforcement activities. For 
example, any natural or legal person can file a complaint for breach of European 
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Competition Law to the European Commission, which invokes a duty for the 
European Commission to react to that complaint.73 Another important tool can be 
found in the leniency programs offered by public enforcers, which incentivise the 
most informed parties, the offenders themselves, to disclose the information. Leniency 
programs have frequently been reported as successful mechanisms to increase 
detection,74 in both the EU and the US. Thus far they exhibit great potential to further 
destabilise already unstable cartel agreements, enhancing the general deterrence 
effect.
1.1.3 Limited sanctions in private enforcement  
A third important argument favouring public over private enforcement relates to the 
necessity to set the sanction to be imposed on the infringer at the optimal level in 
order not to under-deter illegal behaviour and not to over-deter beneficial conduct. 
The principle idea for deterrence of unwanted behaviour is that the sanction imposed 
on the potential infringer has to be large enough to outweigh the potential gains from 
the law infringement. This is so that after weighing the expected benefits and costs the 
potential offender will decide to refrain from breaking the law.75 The optimal level of 
sanction, ensuring that only breaches of law that are beneficial to society as a whole 
from a total welfare perspective will take place, is the level of sanction that forces the 
potential infringer to internalise the total harm done to society. That in turn requires 
that the optimal sanction be at least as large as the total harm done to society in 
monetary terms.76 Unfortunately, the sanction imposed in private enforcement, for 
example through individual actions for damages, generally captures only those harms 
borne by those individuals that can and do file suit. Other damages caused to society, 
for example the dead weight loss incurred due to monopoly prices, are not 
incorporated in the private sanction. Even if multipliers are used, as for example treble 
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damages in the USA,77 public enforcement still may allow for a better fine tuning of 
the imposed sanction than would be feasible in private damages actions with a fixed 
multiplier.78
In addition, settlements agreed upon between plaintiff and defendant may be far from 
optimal from a social welfare perspective, irrespective of the merits of the case. A 
settlement agreement between the parties that satisfies the plaintiff and the defendant 
alike may not have the same deterrence effects that the outcome of the trial would 
have had. Individuals may prefer to settle even though society would have preferred 
the case being tried.79 Therefore, even if offenders are certain they will have to 
compensate all victims that step forward, some illegal conduct causing damages to 
society can still be beneficial to potential offenders. Since they are still not forced to 
incorporate the total harm caused to society into their cost-benefit calculation. Public 
fines have the potential to be set at adequate levels in order to deter efficiently.  
If the public fine is set at the optimal level, the optimal sanction will be imposed on 
the offender in just one costly proceeding, rather than in numerous individual and 
costly trials before the courts. This adds to the efficiency of the overall enforcement 
activities, by reducing the costs of doubled efforts that would arise in several 
proceedings. 
1.1.4 Specific public sanctions needed 
Fines or sanctions in form of financial payments to be made by the convicted also face 
the risk that the wrongdoer may escape part or all of his liability because he is unable 
to pay the total amount. The optimal monetary sanction, equal to the total harm done 
to society, can in some cases surmount the wealth of the offender. The actual expected 
fine a potential offender takes into account when contemplating whether or not to 
                                                                                                                               
76 The optimal sanction would also have to take into account the probability of detection, which is often 
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77 As done in the US. For a discussion of treble damages see Polinsky, "Detrebling Versus Decoupling 
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break the law is limited to his own wealth. If that is less than the expected benefit, the 
illegal conduct will likely seem beneficial to the potential infringer, despite the fact 
that total harm caused to society would be much larger. Private enforcement has little 
alternatives to offer in such cases, but public enforcement may resort to other 
mechanisms. One of these is the use of criminal sanctions.80 The threat of 
imprisonment on top of monetary sanctions could cure this obstacle to efficient 
deterrence. The imposition of criminal fines, however, is traditionally restricted to 
public enforcement activities. Therefore in this regard public enforcement also has an 
advantage over private enforcement. 
Last but not least, enforcement through specialised public authorities is considered to 
add more to the development and clarification of the law than private suits. This is for 
reasons connected to the different incentives to sue or to enforce. The general interests 
of society are less likely to be an issue in private actions before the courts, where the 
interest of the individual plaintiff will be dominant. These interests may strongly 
deviate from those of society, as discussed above. This may be a problem especially 
in the case of competition law enforcement.81
Summing up, it may be argued that public enforcement is absolutely necessary to 
achieve efficient deterrence, as it can help to close some gaps that may persist if 
enforcement were only take place through private actions. Therefore, private 
enforcement, as it generally is constructed, is unsuitable to act as perfect substitute for 
public enforcement. However, as it is currently designed public enforcement may also 
be insufficient on its own. Therefore there is likely to be a growing role for private 
enforcement. This may all the more be the case, when private enforcement is changed 
and designed in a way to be more efficient, or when other goals than that of deterrence 
are pursued through law enforcement. 
                                                
80 For example Shavell, "Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent," 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW(1985): 1232; Wils, Is criminalization of EU competition law the answer?
117,145. 
81 For a general assessment, see Wils, "The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and 
Private Actions for Damages," WORLD COMPETITION 32 (2009): 3. 
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1.2 Advantages of Private Enforcement  
In many cases the injured party will have a large information advantage over a public 
authority with regard to the detection of a law infringement.82 A clear example could 
be a competition law infringement concerning refusal to deal.83 In such a case, the 
retailer is instantly aware of the conduct of his opponent, while a competition 
authority would have to invest considerable resources to detect that infringement. As 
already mentioned, such private information may be voluntarily supplied to the public 
authorities. In addition to the option to file complaints with the authorities, positive 
experiences are claimed with private claims for injunction as well.84 Private claims for 
damages, which are the focus in the current discussion and this thesis, may be an 
additional and possibly overall more efficient avenue to utilise private information 
advantages where they exist, thus increasing the number of prosecuted cases and 
consequently increasing deterrence.
As explained above, from an economic perspective, compensation of victims is only 
important to the extent that fear of its payment engenders deterrence. Nevertheless, 
sound arguments also exist for private enforcement when taking deterrence as a major 
objective. More particularly, private enforcement may be a beneficial complement to 
public enforcement. If public enforcement were perfect, the optimal number of cases 
would be prosecuted and optimal sanctions would be imposed, leading to optimal 
deterrence. But when public enforcement is not efficient or even effective enough, 
enhancing private enforcement may remedy pitfalls of public enforcement in Europe. 
The level of sanction imposed on offenders can also be positively influenced by using 
private enforcement as complement to public enforcement. Commentators have 
repeatedly raised concerns that the current fines imposed by competition authorities 
are not high enough to efficiently deter firms from engaging in anti-competitive 
                                                
82 McAfee, et al, "Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis," JOURNAL OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 92 (2008): 1863, 1864 f; Brodley, "Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: 
Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement," MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 94 (1995): 1, 35.  
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behaviour.85 Apart from further increasing fines or even introducing prison sanctions, 
follow-on private claims for damages in the wake of decisions taken by competition 
authorities may also form a partial remedy to address this. Thereby the deterrence 
effect could be enhanced through the use of such complementary sanctions.   
Stand-alone private claims on the other hand may at least lead to some punishment 
when no prosecution though competition authorities takes place. There are a number 
of reasons why a specific case even it is brought to the attention of the competition 
authorities may not be pursued. Limited resources can be a source for such an 
omission. Public authorities working under budget constraints may not be able to deal 
with all cases brought to their attention.86 The case selection and invested efforts may 
also be biased.87 The selection of cases to be investigated may be biased towards more 
prestigious cases in light of the self-interest of the agencies.88 In addition, it may be 
path-dependant. It has been noted that a large number of competition law 
infringement are detected by the competition authorities when investigating a 
previously discovered and related violation.89 Once investigations are started, there 
may also be a tendency to find an infringement, due to the confirmation bias,90 or a 
desire to justify invested resources. Imperfect private enforcement may capture some 
of those cases that otherwise may escape the enforcement system. Adequately 
designed private enforcement may capture even more. Complementary private 
enforcement permits more cases to be investigated and more infringements to be 
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punished by drawing more resources to enforcement compared to public enforcement 
alone and thereby leads to a closing of the enforcement gap.91
Lastly, another major advantage of private enforcement through actions for damages, 
compared to public enforcement through fines or possibly also criminal sanctions, is 
that the former can also lead to compensation of the victims and therefore to 
corrective justice.92 The major objective is to compensate parties that suffered harm 
due to the unlawful conduct of another. Depending on the value society attaches to 
that goal, private damages suits may be preferred to an indirect compensation of 
victims, for example trough the redistribution of collected public fines. The latter 
could lead to a compensation relatively unrelated to the actual amount of individual 
damage sustained. In such cases, private enforcement has large advantages over 
public enforcement. However, as will become clear in the analysis of the optimal 
group litigation below, the goals of compensating individual victims and at the same 
time providing adequate incentives for private enforcement may not be reconcilable. 
In such cases, society will have to make a choice about which goal should be given 
precedence.  
2 The Right Private Enforcement as Complement to Public 
Enforcement 
The classic debate over private versus public enforcement was heavily based on the 
existing mechanisms of private and public enforcement alike. At least in theory, both 
systems could be improved. For example, public enforcement agents could be 
endowed with more resources, so that the enforcement gap could be reduced. On the 
other hand, maybe private enforcement could be designed as to give incentives to 
private actors that are better aligned with those of society in order to pursue more 
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beneficial private claims. It is this second possibility, i.e. ways to enhance private 
enforcement that is the topic of this thesis. The focus being placed here is on the 
optimal design of a group litigation mechanism. 
Leaving public enforcement to the realm of ceteris paribus, the question answered is 
how group litigation mechanisms should be designed in order to reach optimal 
deterrence. Again, while this goal may not be the foremost goal for current legislators, 
it is the choice paradigm in which to conduct an economic analysis. Compensation as 
a goal will be discussed as far as relevant and the analysis conducted with regard to 
the goal of deterrence. Additionally many valuable insights for the efficiency of group 
litigation mechanisms when the goal is that of corrective justice will be highlighted. 
For example, the same obstacles to detection and litigation of damages due to 
competition law infringements limit the degree to which either goal, compensation or 
corrective justice, can be achieved. Moreover, necessary trade-offs between 
effectiveness or efficiency of private enforcement and the goal of corrective justice 
for individuals will be demonstrated.  
When designing such a group litigation mechanism, some deviations from the 
traditional private two-party dispute may be required, even if only theoretically 
possible. For example, the way in which the amount of damages to be awarded to 
private plaintiffs is established will have a great effect on the efficiency of such a 
system. Some commentators fear that when the damages awarded exceed the actual 
harm imposed on the plaintiff, private parties may have inefficiently high incentives 
to sue.93 However, when damages awarded will only be based on the individual harm 
suffered and not connected to the optimal sanction, exclusive private enforcement will 
lead to under deterrence.94 As the analysis shows, the critical point in all these 
exercises is that in order to reach sufficient, or even efficient, deterrence effects 
through the means of claims for damages, a departure form the idea of damages as 
just compensation for inflicted harm will be necessary. The general principle of 
restitutio ad integrum still dominates in most European countries. Although the 
                                                
93 Kalven Jr and Rosenfield, "Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, The," THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 8 (1941): 684, 684 f. Micklitz and Stadler, "The Development of Collective 
Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure," EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW 
REVIEW 17 (2006): 1473, 1476, 1482. 
Enforcement of European Competition Law                                                                              34
deterrence function of tort law is recognised, it remains thus far subsidiary to the goal 
of compensation.95
The optimally designed group litigation as a tool of private enforcement is discussed 
in great detail in the following chapters. It is shown how private enforcement may 
then act as complement, or even a substitute, to public enforcement. 
3   The Development in the European Union  
In the previous part the old debate which resurfaces now, although possibly with new 
or different clothes in some places, was revisited. We turn now to an overview of the 
recent developments in the discussion of private enforcement of competition law in 
the European Union.
Currently in regards to the utilisation of private enforcement, the European 
Commission places a greater value on the goal of compensatory justice than on the 
goal of deterrence In light of current European developments and the connected 
discourses being held on the national as well as the supra-national level, the value 
attached to the goal of corrective justice seems to justify at least some costs connected 
to changes concerning actions for damages due to competition law infringements. 
However, how legal changes may be incorporated into the existing cultural and legal 
framework or, when not, whether the peculiarities of damages due to competition law 
infringements are large enough to justify special legal provisions outside traditional 
tort law is still debated.96 Moreover, the Member States are likely to be given some 
leeway to be able to incorporate the proposed measures into their legal systems, so 
that slight variations may persist from Member State to Member State. For all these 
                                                                                                                               
94Wils, Should private antitrust enforcement be encouraged in Europe? 473, 483.Van Den Bergh, 
European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, 330. 
95 Magnus, Unification of tort law: Damages, Principles of European Tort Law, The Hague, London, 
Boston: Kluwer Law International (2001), 185 ff. 
96 Eilmansberger, The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the Ec Antitrust Rules and 
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upcoming changes, the debate about the most relevant features of private enforcement 
will be paramount in providing sufficient information for informed decision making. 
Traditional means to pursue corrective justice, i.e. the general provisions of tort law, 
are often regarded as inadequate to effectively deal with the complex, risky and 
consequently costly undertaking to establish a competition law infringement and to 
proof the resulting harm.97 Indeed, in the 2004, Ashurst Study the obstacles to private 
enforcement of competition law in the Member States were identified and private 
enforcement of competition law was found to be in a state of “total 
underdevelopment”.98 Subsequently, several avenues to enable and encourage private 
parties to seek compensation in front of courts have been explored and debated in the 
European Union.  These include changes to substantive or procedural law, for 
example concerning standing or time  limitations, as well as non-legal, such as the 
establishment of legal  aid funds for specific purposes or private insurance for legal 
costs. In its Green Paper, the Commission sketched the perceived obstacles to private 
actions for damages and invited a discussion on possible solutions, which were 
elaborated in the annexed Staff Working Document.99 The Green Paper was followed 
by a White Paper, in which the Commission after deliberation of the comments on the 
Green Paper and an extensive impact assessment focused the proposals on specific 
measures.100 The White Paper will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. In this 
section, an introduction into the debate that took place on the European as well as 
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national levels shall be provided, focusing on the main issues there are or were to be 
solved.  
Some of the proposals focused on ways to reduce the costs of litigation faced by 
potential plaintiffs (contingency fees and other financing mechanisms; one way fee-
shifting). Others were meant to increase the incentives to sue in general (types of 
damages awarded) or for specific types of plaintiffs (passing-on defence and standing 
of indirect consumers). Methods to ease the complexity of establishing a competition 
law infringement (disclosure rules; access to evidence) were also discussed. Most 
importantly for our purposes was that also the introduction of some form of group 
litigation was mooted. The effects of each option individually not only depend on its 
specific design but also on its combination with others. A rough summary of some 
major points in the discussion shall therefore suffice here. 
3.1 One way fee- shifting  
In the Green Paper, the Commission opened the discussion about an adequate cost and 
fee-shifting rule in cases of claims for damages due to competition law infringements. 
The most common fee-shifting rule in the Member States is the so called English rule, 
whereby the succumbing party in a trial has to bear all or part of costs of the 
prevailing party.101 In combination with high risks and large costs connected to a trial 
concerning an alleged competition law infringement, such a rule can have a great 
discouraging effect on potential plaintiffs. Therefore, one way fee-shifting, in which 
that rule is only applied to a losing defendant is debated.  
This idea is not entirely new and has been widely discussed in the Law and 
Economics literature, with regard to its merits concerning encouragement of lawsuits, 
as well as its potential to increase unmeritous suits.102 The basic arguments are the 
                                                
101 “Ashurst Study”Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of 
Infringement of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, 
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following. One  way fee-shifting reduces the expected costs of the plaintiff concerning 
the bringing of a claim and thereby encourages litigation. However, not all plaintiffs 
may need such encouragement. Competitor plaintiffs using competition law 
strategically would also benefit from such a rule. Moreover, apart from well-founded 
suits, unmeritous suits would also be encouraged precisely because they reduce the 
expected costs for the potential plaintiff of filing suit. This is because he is protected 
from having to bear the opponents costs, unless some safeguards against abuse (such 
as limiting the application of the fee-shifting rule to plaintiffs that did not act 
unreasonable) are in place. 
3.2 Financing mechanisms 
The magnitude of expenses connected to the establishment of a breach of competition 
law, which typically requires the deployment of not only legal but also economical 
experts, can act as a deterrent for potential plaintiffs. Private individuals may not be 
able to pre-finance such expenditures. The issue of financing mechanisms was not 
directly addressed in the Green Paper, but opened up for consideration and debate in 
the following White Paper.103 Amongst options to be considered by the Member States 
were contingency fees, legal aid mechanisms or insurance systems. All of these issues 
have been addressed in the legal and economic literature, while the majority of law 
and economics literature focused on contingency fee arrangements and their effects. 
Contingency fee arrangements, whereby the lawyer bears the burden of financing the 
lawsuit in exchange for a percentage of the awards granted in the damage claim, 
relieve the plaintiff of pre-financing obligations and the risk connected to loosing the 
case at trial.104 The effects of such a fee arrangement are heavily debated in the Law 
                                                                                                                               
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 78 (2003): 1887. Feuerstein, "Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary 
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and Economics literature. Such fee systems obviously are less feasible for individual 
claims with very low values, unless they can be bundled. A common criticism against 
contingency fees is their potentially negative impact on the principal-agent problems 
between client and lawyer.105 However, other commentators see the contingency fee 
arrangement as a partial solution to the principal-agent problem.106 Opinions also 
differ with regard to the effect of contingency fee arrangement on the incentives to 
file unmeritous suits. Obviously, when the plaintiff is secured against any costs of the 
litigation, he may be more willing to pursue suits that have little or no merits.107
However, other authors claim that contingency fees may reduce or at least not 
exacerbate the incentives to file unmeritous suits, when the lawyer acts as a kind of 
gate keeper.108
Legal aid or insurance systems are similarly problematic and debated. While reducing 
disincentives for plaintiffs to file suit, they also may encourage unmeritous suits, as 
the plaintiff does not have to take the costs of the litigation into account. Total welfare 
can only be increased when the costs incurred by society due to more litigation 
activities are outweighed by the deterrence effects created by that litigation activity.109
Before-the-event legal expense insurance can influence the bargaining position 
between opposing parties, by making the threat to sue credible even in those cases, 
where the claim itself would otherwise have a negative expected value, because the 
plaintiff will not have to bear the litigation costs.110 This effect would work in cases 
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109 For an analysis seeVan Velthoven, "Legal cost insurance and social welfare," ECONOMICS 
LETTERS 72 (2001): 387. 
110 Negative Expected Value cases refer to cases where the costs of litigation are expected to outweigh 
the prospective benefits, either because the probability of winning the case at trial is low (the case has 
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that have little merits and are started in order to extract a settlement offer from the 
defendant, as well as in meritous cases.111 After-the-event legal expenditure insurance 
is not likely to have the same effect, as the insurance companies can be expected to 
only offer insurance in cases where they consider the probability of winning to be 
large. It should be noted, however, that many legal expense insurance policies (at least 
before-the-event insurances) do not provide coverage for competition law cases. This 
may be due to the complexity of cases and the difficulties in assessing the expected 
value of such cases. Moreover, they also often involve a minimum value of the case, 
which may not be met in case where small and widely scattered damages occurred to 
end consumers due to a competition law infringement. 
Another possible alternative are professional litigation funders, who have become 
increasingly important in the recent years. Their “modus operandi” can be regarded as 
an investment in a risky endeavour, typically rewarded by a contingency payment. 
These forms of financing also lead to a shift of risk and costs away from the plaintiff 
while at the same time the professional litigation funders will also thoroughly 
investigate the risks and chances connected to an investment into a specific case. 
Therefore, they are also likely to prefer financing the litigation of cases with a larger 
probability of winning, and at the same time, also cases with a larger total value.   
3.3 Types of damages awarded 
A first issue with regard to damages awarded would be which types of harms can be 
compensated, i.e. whether only harm caused to direct purchasers can be compensated 
or whether also indirect purchasers may be compensated.112 As this question is 
strongly connected to the issue of the passing-on defence, it will be discussed in detail 
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in that section.113 Other types of harm that would have to be included in order to reach 
the optimal sanction to efficiently deter anti-competitive conduct would also include 
the harm caused to competitors or the deadweight loss.114
Other issues that need to be decided upon relating to the damages awarded are 
connected to the way damages will be quantified, for example whether damages can 
be aggregated, and the amount of damages, for example whether interest is granted or 
multipliers are used. In July 2008, the European Commission issued a tender 
invitation to investigate methods to quantify damages due to competition law 
infringements, which is expected to provide much needed insights and 
recommendations.115
Just like the general debate on private enforcement of competition law, also the 
discussion about adequate damages due to competition law or antitrust infringements 
divided commentators into two slightly different approaches: those who analyze 
damages with the goal of deterrence in mind,116 and few who focus on the goal of 
corrective justice.117 While the former view necessitates that, in order to efficiently 
deter, the damages awarded should be based on total costs imposed on society due to 
the infringement,118 the latter view focuses on the more traditional individual harm 
based methods and the idea of institution ad integrum to establish the amount of 
damages. Harm-based or gain-based methods to determine damages, as they were 
introduced as point of deliberation in the Green Paper, reach the compensation and 
deterrence goal to differing degrees.119 When the illegal gains to the infringer exceeds 
the costs imposed on private parties as victims of the infringement, a gains based 
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estimation of damages, such as disgorgement of profits, would be preferable from a 
strict deterrence point of view.120  Moreover, individual harm may be more difficult to 
quantify and prove than the illegal gain, so that a gains based estimation could lead to 
a higher probability of conviction. However, the lack of a direct link between harm 
and illegal gain leads to inaccurate compensation of plaintiffs. In addition, gains based 
methods for quantifying damages also bear no systematic relationship to the total 
harm caused to society, so that in cases where the gain is smaller than the harm, 
under-deterrence could result.  
Other deliberations include the possibility to award multiple (double or treble) 
damages, in order to incorporate the low probability of detection to increase the level 
of deterrence and to further motivate victims to undertake the complex and risky task 
of litigation.121 However, mandatory doubling of damages constitutes only an 
extremely crude method to account for the low probability of detection, which differs 
greatly depending on the anti-competitive conduct in question122 and on whether 
private litigation takes place as stand-alone or follow-on suits.123 Moreover, the risk of 
unmeritous suits also increases with the amount of expected gain from litigation, as it 
makes any litigation more profitable and the threat of litigation more credible.  
Less disputed in the European Union are questions relating to pre-judgment interest. 
Pre-judgement interest is, contrary to the US, normally granted in the Member States 
of the European Union, in accordance with the goal of fully compensating the victim, 
although the dates from which pre-judgement interest is granted differ.124
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3.4 Passing-on defence and standing of indirect buyers 
Possibly influenced by the famous US cases Illinois Brick v. Illinois and Hannover 
Shoe,.125 where standing to sue was denied to indirect purchasers, the Green Paper and 
the annexed working paper discussed the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser 
standing as possible obstacles to private damage claims due to competition law 
infringements. In the White Paper, the Commission opted for allowing the passing-on 
defence in cases of direct purchasers as plaintiffs and a general but rebuttable 
assumption of full passing-on in cases of indirect purchaser claims, shifting the 
burden of proof in both cases on the defendant.126 The likely effects of this decision 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, while in this section a general 
overview shall be given over the issues discussed. 
Businesses harmed by a competition law infringement, for example distributors as 
direct buyers paying supra-competitive prices due to a price cartel on the 
manufacturer level, may be able to pass all or part of their additional costs on to 
indirect buyers, such as the end consumer. Being sued for damages by direct buyers, 
the defendant may invoke this fact as the so called passing-on defence and thereby 
reduce the damages to be paid to the plaintiff by the amount of costs passed on to 
direct consumers.  
The passing-on defence insures that the direct buyer does receive compensation only 
for the actual harm caused to him and therefore would mirror the legal landscape of 
damages in torts as existent in the Member States. It also would follow the reasoning 
that the same harm should not be compensated twice, in case the indirect purchasers 
harmed by the same infringements would also sue for damages. For such reasons, the 
passing-on defence is supported by some commentators. 
At the same time, it has been frequently argued that allowing a passing-on defence 
entails the risk that the party closest to the infringement and therefore the best 
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informed party with lower costs to sue may have too little incentives to file suit. 127
Direct buyers may already be hesitant to file damages claims, either because of fear of 
retaliation,128 or because they benefit from the restriction of competition in the 
upstream markets themselves.129  At the same time, the more distant indirect buyers, 
for example end consumers, may never file suit for their damages.130 Overall, 
calculating and proving accurate damages along a distribution chain may become a 
very complex task.131 In consequence, potential competition law infringers would face 
a low probability of ever being held liable and under deterrence would result. 
Therefore, it has been suggested to prohibit the passing-on defence, often connected 
to a restriction of standing to direct purchasers.132
3.5 Access to evidence 
Competition law infringements are likely to pose larger obstacles as regards to 
establishment of cause and resulting harm than other torts, especially in stand-alone 
suits. Legal provision concerning access to evidence in competition cases therefore 
may be a crucial tool to enhance or hinder private claims for damages. Civil law 
tradition, as opposed to the common law tradition, relies on information gathered 
during the process and often severely restricts the possibilities for plaintiffs to extract 
evidence from the defendant.133 Very broad and general pre-trial disclosure regimes, 
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as they are available in the US, are fairly alien to many Member States. Broadening 
discovery rules could help to overcome initial information asymmetries between 
plaintiffs and defendants and allow more accurate fact findings. Moreover, as the 
economic literature states, the incentives to settle increase when parties’ estimations 
of the likely outcome of the trial converge,134 thereby reducing overall costs of 
litigation. The reason lies in the effect that settlement is more likely when the 
opposing parties have similar assessment of the likely outcome of the case when it 
proceeds to trial and broad discovery rules can reduce information asymmetry 
between the parties, leading to more similar assessments. 
However, broad discovery rules also may enable plaintiffs to pressure defendants, for 
whom the discovery procedure can entail considerable costs, into settlements even if 
the merits of the case are uncertain.135 Consequently the risk of abuse increases.136
Other issues debated in the Green Paper concerning that context include the 
availability of information gathered by the European Commission or national 
competition authorities and possibilities to reduce the burden of proof on the 
claimant’s side.137 In the White Paper, the Commission opted for several options to 
ease the burden on plaintiffs with regard to the access to evidence.138 A minimum 
disclosure inter partes should be ensured, in line with general rules on legal 
procedures in many Member States.  Moreover, final decisions taken by public 
bodies, such as the European Commission or national competition authorities should 
be made binding for national courts in cases of follow-on actions for damages. The 
necessity for plaintiffs to proof fault of the defendant should be reduced, so that only 
an excusable error could eliminate liability of the defendant. 
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3.6 Group litigation mechanisms 
The last feature that the Commission generally opened for discussion in the Green 
Paper and narrowed down to specific proposals in the White Paper are group litigation 
mechanisms. These are the main subject of this thesis and are described and analysed 
in depth throughout the following Chapters. Therefore it may suffice here to say that 
the proposals of the European Commission in the White Paper include: representative 
actions brought by qualified entities, for example consumer associations, on behalf of 
the victims; and opt-in collective actions brought by one or more victims on their own 
behalf and on behalf of other victims.  
C Summary 
This Chapter provides a brief overview of the placement of the thesis topic in the 
current discussion about private enforcement of competition law. As the enforcement 
of competition law may not absolutely be looked at separately from the actual goals of 
competition law, a quick overview has been given of relevant matters of discussion, 
i.e., what is the actual subject of protection in European Competition Law and what 
weights are given to consumer versus producer welfare. Next, private enforcement of 
competition law was described as part of the classic debate about private versus public 
enforcement. Advantages of private and public enforcement vis-à-vis each other were 
described and related to the specific issue of competition law infringement. As was 
noted, the strength of the arguments depends very much on the specific design of both 
private and public enforcement mechanisms. Last, the current developments and 
issues of debate and reform concerning private enforcement of competition law on the 
European level were briefly described. 
After this overview of placement of the topic of group litigation in the broader context 
of enforcement of European Competition law, the next chapter will introduce the 
framework used for the analysis of group litigation as conducted in chapter three and 
                                                                                                                               
138 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 4f. 
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applied in the following chapters, including definitions of relevant concepts and 
terms.  
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Chapter 2: Group Litigation: A General Legal and 
Economic Framework
In this section, the general framework of the analysis is presented and the most 
important concepts defined. This framework is required in order to identify the 
specific features a group litigation mechanism would need to entail in order to achieve 
efficient deterrence effects. Therefore, in the first section the general definitions of 
terms connected to group litigation mechanisms as they are used here are given. In the 
second section, a broad overview of the legal framework used for the analysis as a 
starting point is described. In the last section, the economic framework is presented in 
detail. 
A Definition of General Concepts 
“For he went in many guises, and won renown under many names” J.R.R. Tolkien, Lord of the Rings 
Recently, countries both within the European Union and beyond, have been faced 
with relatively new problems that have challenged the sometimes long grown legal 
traditions of civil procedure. In the age of globalisation, technological developments 
have lead to an opening of tight knit and small communities to the world. Mass 
production and exchange on the world market take place with modern technologies 
and amongst anonymous parties. Consequently it has become possible for very large 
numbers of people to become victims of just one particular incidence. Courts were 
being faced with legal claims that exceeded the possibilities of traditional means to 
bundle similar interest into one procedure. In the light of the special needs that 
emerged and the general underlying legal system, different group litigation 
mechanisms have been developed and incorporated. A large diversity exists in reality, 
and even more forms are theoretically possible, as a multitude of features can be 
regulated individually and only in combination shape a particular system. To clarify 
the concepts used, some basic principles and definitions are introduced here. 
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1 The types of group litigation 
The first criterion that will be used to distinguish different forms of group litigation is 
the nature of the representative. Joinder procedures occur when several victims file 
individual suits, but their suits are bundled into one procedure (either voluntarily or by 
order of the court). If  the group of harmed individuals (group members) represented 
by only one (or relatively very few) of the group members, so that this so called lead 
plaintiff and/or the lawyer are the main driving forces behind the action, the form will 
be considered to be that of a collective action. If an association, organisation or public 
body is the main actor and files suit on behalf of the group members then it is a 
Representative Action.  
1.1 Joinder procedures 
Joinder procedures are already commonly conducted in many Member States. 
Litigants can decide to bring a suit together in one trial against the same defendant, 
when legal or factual questions of the case are common. Typically, such procedures 
are only allowed where some of basic questions of facts to be determined are common 
to all individual claims, such as the question of liability for instance. Each plaintiff 
may each have their own lawyer representing them, or they can decide to be 
represented by the same lawyer or association. The critical fact is that the individual 
claims remain fully intact over the proceeding to the same extent as they are in 
traditional civil litigation. Consequently, claims are filed and tried on an individual 
basis. The individual plaintiffs remain the opponent of the defendant, can change their 
legal representative, settle with the defendant or withdraw their claim as though it was 
an individual procedure. However, it is possible for the group to coordinate their 
efforts through contractual agreements. Victims and their lawyers do not become 
anonymous, as they may in other forms of group litigation, and the different claims 
are not merged into one.  
Joinder procedures have long been included amongst the mechanisms of civil 
procedure in many Member States. The obstacles to private damage claims identified 
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in the Ashurst-Study139 apparently have not been overcome by allowing joinder 
procedures. This may be why the Commission in its White Paper140 focused on the 
development of representative actions and collective actions. These systems are 
described below.  
In addition, some other forms of existing group litigation mechanisms are very close 
to the principles of joinder. Test case procedures, for example, lead to the selection of 
one of the many individually filed suits, in which some issues common to all the 
individual claims are decided upon. Plaintiffs, made aware of each other through an 
association, can also decide to bring a law suit jointly, or it may be possible for them 
to assign their claims to the association for enforcement. Examples include so called 
Sammelklagen, as they exist in Germany141  and Austria.142 Depending on the specific 
design, such mechanisms are either closer to joinder procedures or closer to 
representative actions with a requirement for victims to explicitly express their wish 
to be represented by the association and possibly to provide proof and evidence with 
regard to their claims.  
This form of bundling similar claims into one proceeding is not analysed explicitly 
here for several reasons. First of all, many of the obstacles to the more traditional 
individual actions for damages also inhibit the efficiency of joinder procedures. 
Second, experience has shown that these mechanisms have not been significantly 
effective in those countries, where actions for damages due to competition law 
infringements have been available for a long time.143 Moreover, these experiences are 
                                                
139 See Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC 
Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, Ashurst Study for 
Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, London, England. Available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private_enforcement/comparative_report_
clean_en.pdf. 
140 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404.
141 Koch, "Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law," DUKE JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2001): 355, 360. See also Günter Hörmann, 
"Sammelklagen im Energie- und Versicherungsrecht" (paper presented at Kollektive 
Rechtsdurchsetzung – Chancen und Risiken, Bamberg, 79-88. 
142 See Beate Pirker-Hörmann and Peter Kolba, "Österreich: Von der Verbandsklage zur Sammelklage" 
(paper presented at Kollektive Rechtsdurchsetzung – Chancen und Risiken, Bamberg, 199-211. 
143 Ashurst Study Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of 
Infringement of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, 
Ashurst Study for Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, London, England, speaking 
of a “total underdevelopment”, 1. 
Group Litigation: A General Law and Economics Framework                                                           50
akin with those using these procedures in other areas of law.144 Third, the whole 
discussion about enhancing private enforcement of European Competition law rests 
on the findings that these existing mechanisms are not in completely sufficient. 
1.2 Representative actions 
In many Member States certified bodies, such as consumer associations, are already 
endowed with selected rights to act on behalf of victims of illegal behaviour. Very 
often, these rights are limited to cease and desist orders and to specific areas of law. 
For example, in France, associations are granted standing to bring claims in the 
general interest of consumers (intérêt collectif des consommateurs).145 However, 
although damages to the collective could be claimed, courts typically granted only 
reimbursement for expenses.146 Therefore the experiences with such claims remained 
limited. In Spain, since the reform of the law on civil procedure (LEC 2001), 
representative actions for damages have been introduced in the area of consumer 
protection. 147   Therefore, represented parties in both cases will have to enforce their 
title for damages against the defendant individually.  
As the Commission discussed and proposed in its White Paper, one option is that 
certified associations could be granted standing to represent their members, or even 
larger groups.148 The Commission’s preferred option for establishing the group of 
those represented is through opt-in procedures, while in special cases also unidentified 
victims may be represented.149 The alternative of representation of unidentified 
victims would make opt-in solutions unfeasible. The certified body envisioned by the 
                                                
144 See for example the Test-case procedure in Germany and the Group Litigation Order in the UK, 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
145 See Cafaggi and Micklitz, "Administrative and Judicial Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law 
in the US and the European Community," EUI LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 2007/22(2007), p 24. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024103 ; Wagner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz – 
Regelungsbedarf bei Massen- und Streuschäden. AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN 
SAMMELKLAGE? eds. Casper, et al. Munchen: European law publishers GmBH (2009), 41, 73 ff. 
146 Beuchler, Länderbericht Frankreich. DAS VERBANDSKLAGERECHT IN DER 
INFORMATIONS-UND DIENSTLEISTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT. eds. Micklitz andStadler. Münster: 
Landwirtschaftsverlag (2005), 57, 57. 
147 See Mom, Länderbericht Spanien. DAS VERBANDSKLAGERECHT IN DER INFORMATIONS- 
UND DIENSTLEISTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT. eds. Micklitz andStadler. Münster: 
Landwirtschaftsverlag (2005), 655. 
148 See European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 18 ff 
149 Ibidem, 18 ff. 
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Commission is an association, such as a trade or a consumer association. In that 
definition, it acts according to and in adherence to its written statutes, which could 
form the basis of certification. The financing of activities of such associations often is 
done through membership fees, and frequently supplemented by public subsidies. To 
attract members, associations typically offer services, such as information through 
publications, consultancy services, and representation in representative actions.  
In this analysis, the definition adopted will be as followed. A representative action is 
an action brought by an association or specified body on behalf of a group of victims. 
The important distinction to joinder procedures is that the association is the main actor 
and initiator. In representative actions as defined here, the incentives for the 
association which are inherent in the system become very important and greatly 
influence the effectiveness and efficiency of any representative action. Ad hoc
associations, as defined by the European Commission,150 will not be considered as a 
separate option in this analysis. This is because ad hoc associations may resemble, 
depending on their specific design, various other forms of group litigation. They may 
approximate joinder procedures (for example when victims themselves form the 
association ad hoc for administrative purposes in joinder procedures), or collective 
actions (for example when lawyers form the association and ask a premium in the 
form of a percentage of the aggregate value of the damages achieved by the 
represented victims).  
1.3 Collective actions 
Collective actions (or class actions) are actions brought by one member of the group 
that is to be represented in the action. The so called lead plaintiff belongs to the group 
and represents the interest of himself as well as that of all group members. A classic 
example would be the class action system as it exists in the USA. This scenario allows 
lawyers to take a very dominant role, to the extent that the lawyer may even be able to 
choose the lead plaintiff for the group litigation that they themselves initiate. This is 
especially the case when victims are less informed and knowledgeable. Then there 
may be a large possibility that the active party motivating the litigation is the lawyer, 
                                                
150 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 4. 
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rather than the victims. Therefore, in collective actions, the main actors will be the 
lead plaintiff and/or the lawyer. In such cases, the incentive structures guiding the 
decisions taken by the lawyer and the lead plaintiff play an important role. 
While the US class action system is typically characterised by opt-out systems, in 
contrast the Commission’s proposal includes an opt-in collective action. In this case  
other victims have to be notified of the proceeding and decide to opt-in, in order to 
become a represented member of the group. Experiences with collective actions in the 
Member States are generally limited and recent.151
2 Establishing group membership 
Another important criterion, which is relevant whenever plaintiffs are not bringing 
their claims themselves, is under what conditions they will be eligible to be part of the 
represented group. Again, these systems can be constructed in many different ways  
so that although technically taking one form they may resemble other forms in their 
effect. Here a general distinction will be made between opt-in, opt-out and mandatory 
regimes.  
2.1 Opt-in systems 
Opt-in systems require the victims, upon notification, to express their wishes to take 
part in a group litigation procedure. In the internet age, this may be as simple as filling 
in a legal form that states a wish to be represented in a group litigation. However, it 
may also require victims do much more, for example provide the specifics and 
evidence concerning their claim, or fill out extensive legal forms. An other option is 
where victims assign their rights to litigate their claim to some other party acting on 
their behalf. However, the latter system resembles much more the course of a joinder 
procedure.  
                                                
151 For example Sweden introduced allegedly as first Member State an opt-in class action in 2003 (Lag 
(2002:599) Om Grupprättegång). Denmark introduced a similar class action with generally opt-in, and 
an opt-out solution in special circumstances in 2008.  
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In general, opt-in procedures require a minimum of activity on the side of the victim, 
who only have to inform themselves about the consequences of opting-in, spend at 
least some time in filling out forms and in some cases possibly accept liability for 
financial participation. This will be the major difference in the definition used in this 
analysis compared to opt-out procedures.  
Given the fact that individual damages can in some cases be widespread and very 
small in amount, a large risk of using an opt-in procedure in the case of small claims 
is that victims will remain passive and the group finally represented will be relatively 
small. 
2.2 Opt-out systems 
Contrarz to opt-in procedures, opt-out procedures require the represented members of 
the group only to become active, if they do not wish to be part of the group.  
Opt-out procedures can be designed in a way that would make them similar to opt-in 
or even joinder procedures. For example, if individuals are required to file individual 
claims against the defendant after liability (or potentially also the damage amount per 
represented party) has been established in a group proceeding, the opt-out system will 
have a similar effect to test case procedures. If victims need to become active, by 
filling out forms, providing proof for their claim and eligibility to participate in the 
group in order to receive their damage awards, then the system will have similar 
effects as an opt-in system, even though the “opt-in” would take place in a latter stage. 
If opt-in and opt-out procedures are designed to take place at the same period in the 
proceeding and individuals need to be sent individual letters inquiring whether they 
want to opt-out (or opt-in), the difference between these two mechanisms becomes 
smaller. Therefore, in this analysis, opt-out procedures are generally assumed to not 
require victims to become active, unless they do not wish to be represented in the 
group proceeding. 
Depending on the way notification and certification are regulated, the members of the 
group may become anonymous and detached from the trial. Again, victims ideally 
should inform themselves about the possible consequences of their choice. Splitting 
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the costs ex ante over all those represented, as under opt-in, becomes much more 
difficult in the context of an opt-out procedure, since all parties may not yet be 
identified. Therefore this can only be done ex post. The major risk with opt-out 
systems is that created by inadequate notification systems. Notification can take place 
through direct contacts with each potential group member (when the relevant data is 
available to the initiator of the action), or be attempted indirectly through mechanisms 
such as advertisements in newspapers. Notification therefore can be more or less exact 
and might become very costly, depending on the case at hand and possible number of 
victims. If the notification system is insufficient there is a risk that members of the 
group represented in the proceeding and bound by the subsequent legal decision may 
not even have been aware of the proceeding.  
2.3 Mandatory systems 
Mandatory procedures do not allow victims to exempt themselves from 
representation. All those described as members of the group are automatically 
represented and they can not opt-out of the proceedings.  
Such a mandatory representation is not very common in traditional civil law tort 
actions for damages. However, other litigation mechanisms do exist that have legal 
effects on victims without their prior consent, such actions on behalf of the public 
interest or affected groups, however this usually restricted to injunctive relief. An 
example would be the German Verbandsklage, where § 33 Abs. 2 GWB grants 
standing to associations to bring claims for injunction on behalf of a group of 
competitors. Similarly, in cases of infringements of the law against unfair competition 
and competition law (§§ 10 UWG, 34a GWB), associations have standing to bring 
skimming off procedures before the court.152 In these cases the association earns a fee 
to compensate for their expenses, but any other award must be passed on to the 
state.153 Here, the association might also be interpreted as enforcing rights that 
actually would have originated elsewhere, without the expressed consent of the 
                                                
152 Skimming-off procedures refer to claims to retrieve the illegal gain by the law infringing party. 
153 Van Boom and Loos, Effective Enforcement of consumer law in Europe. COLLECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW. eds. Van Boom andLoos. Europa Law Publishing (2007), 
231, 250. See Eichholtz, Die US-amerikanische Class Action und ihre deutschen Funktionsäquivalente,
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original right holder. Although participation in these cases may be considered to be 
mandatory, none of the existing systems described here seem to preclude the 
individual enforcement of the rights as well. 
A mandatory group litigation system is not envisioned by the Commission and due to 
the important legal questions it raises, would almost certainly meet strong opposition 
amongst the Community. However, there may be benefits to such a system compared 
to opt-in and opt-out systems, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
3 Remuneration of lawyers 
In this thesis, three general ways to remunerate lawyers for their efforts are discussed, 
hourly fee arrangements, conditional fee arrangements and contingency fee 
arrangements. The latter two concepts are sometimes mixed up, so that a definition of 
how these concepts are used is in order. The line between the different systems: 
conditional and contingency fee, can often be blurred and they may be used to form 
mixed variations. Also, often due to established principles of freedom of contract, 
parties often may contract for different kind of payment methods. However, not all of 
these may be considered to be recoverable by the winning opponent under the British 
cost shifting rule (loser pays) in all countries. 
3.1 Hourly fee arrangements 
In most Member States of the European Union, lawyers are generally paid through an 
hourly fee arrangement, granting them a certain amount of payment for each hour 
worked.154 In some countries, like in Germany, there are also general regulations on 
the quantum of these fees. There, these rules also form the basis of the amount of fees 
that can be recovered by the winning opponent under the British cost shifting rule.  
                                                                                                                               
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2002), 274. Wagner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz – Regelungsbedarf bei 
Massen- und Streuschäden 41, 80.  
154 The code of the European Association of Lawyers prohibited pactum quota litis, and many Member 
States only recently began to soften their strict ban, for example by introducing forms of conditional 
fee arrangements. Emons and Garoupa, "The economics of US-style contingent fees and UK-style 
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3.2 Conditional  fee arrangements 
Contingent or conditional fee arrangements in this analysis are understood to refer to 
rather to “no win, less fee” arrangements, as opposed to contingency fee arrangements 
which are more clearly “no win, no fee”, although the line between these two may be 
thin. Contingent fee agreements grant the lawyer some kind of success bonus and are 
otherwise based on the hourly fee system. Such systems exist in the UK and also have 
been recently introduced in Germany.155
3.3 Contingency fee arrangements 
Contingency fee arrangements are understood to refer to agreements that provide the 
lawyer with no fee, in case his client looses, and a (typically) larger fee156 in case the 
client wins. This system is known from the US, where the lawyer’s payment is usually 
determined as a percentage of the amount in dispute, rather than being based on 
hourly fees. As is the case in other contingent or contingency fee systems, the larger 
fee in case of success has to be interpreted at least partially, as compensation for the 
risk taken by the lawyer. 
4 The types of victims 
Different types of competition law infringements can harm different sets of victims. 
As the nature of these can play an important role in the effectiveness or efficiency of a 
specific group litigation mechanism, the victims also need to be incorporated in the 
analysis. Broadly speaking, six types of victims harmed can be distinguished.157 First, 
direct purchasers (generally other businesses) can incur losses when they sell less of 
their products at higher prices due to an increased price for their input factor. Second, 
customers that refrain from buying the product in question or switched to less 
                                                                                                                               
conditional fees," CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH (CEPR) DISCUSSION PAPER 
NO. 4473(2004), 327. 
155 See Chapter 5 on the regulations in these countries. 
156 Research has shown that such contingency fee arrangements in the US can lead to effective hourly 
rates up to thousands of dollars. See Brickman, "Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency Fee Lawyers: 
Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees," WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 81 
(2003): 653. 
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favourable substitutes are harmed, which forms the so called deadweight loss. Third, 
customers of firms outside a cartel, that have also raised their prices under the price 
umbrella, are harmed as they also have to pay supra competitive prices. Fourth, 
indirect purchasers of the infringing firm(s) products may have to pay part of the 
overcharging that have been passed on by the direct purchasers. Fifth, suppliers to the 
infringing parties sell less of their products when output is reduced by the offending 
party. And last, competitors can be harmed by anti-competitive conduct when certain 
illegal behaviour is aimed at reducing their ability to enter or compete on the market, 
or simply has that effect.158 Depending on the specific case in question, such as how 
much of the larger costs can be passed on from direct to indirect purchasers, only few 
or all of these types of victims may be harmed by a certain type of conduct.  
The nature of the types of victims can also change. A direct purchaser will very often 
be another firm, such as a retailer, but in some cases direct purchasers may also be 
private persons, such as end consumers. Customers refraining from buying the 
product in question because of the non-competitive prices being charged can be both 
companies as well as private individuals.  
The distinction between the victims is relevant to the analysis wherever the nature of 
the victims influences the extent to which certain advantages or disadvantages of 
group litigation can arise. A company in business relationship with the infringer will 
often consume larger amounts of the product affected by the competition law 
infringement, have a more direct relationship with the offender, possess better 
knowledge about the market and competition law, and have larger resources available 
for litigation than a private end consumer. For these reason, the abilities and 
incentives of victims to detect infringements and to act upon the detection will differ 
largely.  
                                                                                                                               
157 There can, however, be many more, for examples shareholders that are negatively affected, or 
employees. 
158 For types of victims of an infringement of Art. 82 ECT see, Mackenrodt, Private Incentive, Optimal 
Deterrence and Damage Claims for Abuses of Dominant Positionsí The Interaction between the 
Economic Review of the Prohibition of Abuses of Dominant Positions and Private Enforcement. 
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION: NEW INTERPRETATION, NEW ENFORCEMENT 
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AND TAX LAW. eds. Mackenrodt, et al. Berlin: Springer (2008), 165 f. For a classification of victims 
in cartel cases, see Connor, Global price fixing, Berlin: Springer (2008), 80 ff. 
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B The Legal Framework 
1 The types of infringements 
Naturally, the first legal basis taken into account in this analysis are the regulations 
governing European Competition Law, namely Art. 81 and Art. 82 EC Treaty.159
These regulations form the basis on which illegal conduct has to be deterred and 
which violations of law form the legal basis of actions for damages.  
However a simple distinction between these two rules often will not suffice. There is a 
variation in the range of possible infringements under EC Competition Law. This 
variation will have a different effect in regards to the possibilities available for private 
enforcement. Throughout the analysis, trade-offs are necessary between generalisation 
and a case by case analysis. Therefore, in the analysis, reference will be made to 
which forms of group litigation will be better suited to deal with or what problems are 
connected to specific types of infringements of Art. 81 and Art. 82 EC Treaty. In the 
end, it may depend on real life experience as to which type of cases may be grouped 
together and treated in a similar fashion with regard to private enforcement and which 
cases may need an altered approach. 
Breaches of Art. 81 and Art. 82 EC Treaty can be broadly categorised into three 
categories. Those involving horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, and abuses of 
a dominant position. 
1.1 Horizontal Agreements 
Cartel agreements are one form of horizontal agreement or collusive behaviour that is 
typically prohibited by competition regulation. Such cooperative anti-competitive 
behaviour includes price fixing, output restriction, the freezing of existing market 
shares, market division, targeted actions against rivals, and non-price competition 
restrictions, such as agreements concerning advertising.  The effects of all these forms 
of horizontal agreements can be described as allowing firms to jointly enjoy a market 
                                                
159 This section shall only provide a quick and basic introduction. For more detailed information, please 
seeVan Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective; Motta, 
Competition policy: theory and practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004); Jones and 
Sufrin, EC Competition Law: text, cases and materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA (2007).  
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power they would not have otherwise, leading to larger prices and reduced output, and 
consequently welfare losses.160 These agreements can harm all types of potential 
victims, as described above, depending on the type of infringement and specifics of 
the case in question.  
Art. 81 (1) ECT prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings, and concerted practices that have the restriction of competition either 
as their objective, or as their effect. The guidelines clarify that agreements having the 
restriction of competition as their object, either through price fixing, output restriction 
or market or costumer sharing will fall under Art. 81 (1) without the necessity to 
analyse their specific effects.161 Therefore, especially hard-core cartel agreements fall 
under almost a per se prohibition of Art. 81 (1) ECT. An exemption is made for those 
agreements fulfilling the requirements of Art. 81 (3) ECT. Art. 81 (3) ECT  applies to 
agreements that contribute to the improvement of production or distribution of 
products, or to the promotion of technical or economic progress, as well as granting 
consumers a fair share of the benefits.162 However, the restrictions on competition 
must be indispensable to each these benefits and may not make the elimination of 
competition for that product possible. For certain types of agreements in specific 
industries, the fulfilment of these requirements is legally presumed and they therefore 
fall under so called Block Exemptions.163 Courts are bound by these block 
exemptions, while national competition authorities may withdraw the exemption 
under certain circumstances.164
Horizontal cooperation agreements can be either explicit in nature (a direct agreement 
between the cartelists, which is seldom), or implicit (which is more common, where 
cartelists do not directly communicate with each other). The former may be easier to 
                                                
160 Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, 155 ff; 
Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice, 137. 
161 European Commission, "COMMISSION NOTICE- Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements (2001/C 3/02)," OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES(2001) nr 18. 
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163 European Commission, "Block Exemptions for Horizontal Agreements:  Commission regulation No 
2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the  application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to categories of 
specialisation  agreements," (2000) ; European Commission, "Commission regulation No 2659/2000 of 
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development agreements," (2000). 
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establish in court, as in such cases the effect of the agreement does not have to be 
proven, proving the purpose of the agreement suffices.165 An explicit agreement may 
be proven by providing documents that establish or relate to the agreement. Such 
documents may be recovered either in a prior public proceeding or potentially in a 
trial through discovery procedures, when the existence of such documents is 
reasonably certain. For the establishment of a tacit agreement, some form of invitation 
to achieve a common goal of one party to the agreement to the other must be 
established.166 An explicit agreement therefore may be easier to prove than an implicit 
agreement, provided that the evidence for the former is accessible.  
For the potential plaintiff, however, it would also be necessary to have an idea of 
whether the alleged infringement falling under Art. 81 (1) ECT may potentially be 
exempted as fulfilling the conditions of Art. 81 (3) ECT, or as falling under one of the 
Block Exemptions. This could make the assessment more complex and consequently 
more costly. On the other hand, the fact that all conditions of Art. 81 (3) ECT have to 
be fulfilled cumulatively, it would be sufficient to establish to a reasonable degree that 
one of the conditions will not be met. 
1.2 Vertical Agreements 
Vertical restraints typically take the form of an agreement between firms on different 
levels of the supply chain. These may be contracts between producers and their 
wholesalers and or retailers. Vertical restraints will in most cases be beneficial to both 
parties to the contract, and only harm third parties, if at all.167 However, vertical 
restraints can also be overall beneficial in many cases, or at least also exhibit 
efficiency gains which would have to be weighed against the potential anti-
competitive effects. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that the majority of vertical 
agreements enhance welfare168 Vertical restraints can raise concerns with regard to 
                                                                                                                               
164 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Notice, Guidelines on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08) 97, nr 36 f. 
165 Ibidem, nr 2 and 20 ff. 
166 Ibidem, nr 15. 
167 For example all agreements avoiding vertical externalities such as the problem of double-
marginalisation, when both producer and retailer have some market power, leading to larger prices and 
less products sold, in turn leading to less profit for both parties, than had they jointly agreed upon a 
price/quantity. See, e.g. Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice, 307 ff.  
168 Cooper, et al, "Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy: What About the Evidence?, Vanderbilt 
Public Law Research Paper No. 05-32," COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 1 (2005): 45; 
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reduction of competition as they may be used to protect a position of market power in 
one market, or to extend it into other markets, thereby reducing total welfare.  For 
example, exclusive dealing contracts may create barriers to entry in the market. 
Art. 81 (1) ECT also applies to vertical agreements, which may affect trade between 
Member States, and that prevent, restrict or distort competition. In light of the 
ambiguity that vertical restraints can exhibit and the fact that many vertical restraints 
can be total welfare enhancing, the Commission adopted an economic approach to 
vertical restraints in its 2000 “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints”, recognising their 
potential pro-competitive effects.169 A number of vertical agreements are presumed to 
be beneficial overall and are exempted from the application of Art. 81 (1) ECT under 
the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER).170 These block exemption provide 
a safe harbour for suppliers (or buyers in certain cases) with a market share of less 
than 30 percent (Art. 3 VBER), where the agreement does not contain hard core 
restrictions as defined in Art. 4 or certain non compete regulations laid down in Art. 5.  
In a public procedure, the Commission may withdraw the block exemption in special 
cases, where the agreement falls under Art. 81 (1) ECT and does not fulfil the 
requirements of Art. 81 (3), however. Following the general guidelines on the 
application of Art. 81 (1) ECT, courts do not have the same ability, therefore block 
exemptions are binding on courts, also in the case of vertical agreements.171 For all 
cases not falling under the Block Exemptions Regulations, the Commission adopts an 
economic approach for establishing the overall effect of a specific agreement, taking 
negative and positive effects into account. The Commission acknowledges the 
                                                                                                                               
Lafontaine and Slade, "Exclusive contracts and vertical restraints: Empirical evidence and public 
policy," HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, P.BUCCIROSSI (ED.) CAMBRIDGE: MIT 
PRESS(2008).
169 See European Commission, "Guidelines on the application of vertical restraints, Official Journal of 
the European Communities (2000/C 291/01)," OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES(2000). Although the Guidelines will not be binding for courts, it can be assumed that 
courts are likely to take the Commission’s approach with regard to the assessment of certain types of 
infringements into consideration, especially when private enforcement is just developing. 
170 European Commission, "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 
on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices," OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1999). In addition, specific 
Block Exemptions regulations have been enacted for certain industries, which will not be considered 
here.
171 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Notice, Guidelines on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08) 97, rn 2 and 36;European Commission, Guidelines on 
the application of vertical restraints, Official Journal of the European Communities (2000/C 291/01),
nr 71 ff. 
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following possible negative effects: market foreclosure or barriers to entry; reduction 
of inter-brand or intra-brand competition; and inhibiting market integration.172
On the other hand, non price competition and improved service quality are mentioned 
by the Commission as positive effects. The commission also cites that this may 
provide the solution to different forms of free riding behaviour and furthermore it 
could provide economies of scale in distribution, curb capital market imperfections 
and ensures uniformity and quality standardisation.173
Vertical restraints are less likely than horizontal agreements to be covert,174 so the 
probability of detection can be assumed to be considerably larger. Other market 
participants are likely to notice such conduct that may affect them negatively. 
However, as these kinds of infringements follow more a rule of reason approach, 
establishing the illegality of a certain observed conduct may be more complex, and 
consequently costly.175
1.3 Abuse of a Dominant Position  
Art. 82 ECT prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or more undertakings. 
Art. 82 ECT mentions the following particular examples of abusive behaviour: 
imposing unfair prices or trading conditions; limiting production or markets or 
innovation; special trade conditions for specific customers; and, imposing 
supplementary obligations on the contracting party which have no connection with the 
subject of the contracts (tying).  
The Commission’s Guidelines in relation to the application of Art. 82 to exclusionary 
conduct176 identify the following as specific forms of abuse of a dominant position: 
types of exclusive dealing; tying and bundling; predation practices; refusal to supply; 
                                                
172 Ibidem  nr 103 ff. 
173 Ibidem  nr 115 ff. 
174 As already stated byKauper and Snyder, "Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, An," GEORGETOWN LAW 
JOURNAL 74 (1985): 1163, 1164. 
175 Ginsburg (2005) observes that “experience shows that when plaintiffs had to prove the challenged 
practices harmed competition, they were very rarely able to do so”, Ginsburg, Comparing antitrust 
enforcement in the United States and Europe 427, 438. 
176 European Commission, "COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings 2009,". 
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and, margins squeezes. In the application of Art. 82, the Commission incorporates the 
efficiency claims brought by the undertaking in question into its assessment.177
Infringements of Art. 82, as opposed to Art. 81, commonly impose direct harm on 
competitors. This is especially the case for all types of behaviour that can be 
subsumed under exclusionary abuses. Therefore, in many cases of abuse of 
dominance, the probability of detection is likely to be very high, as the conduct is 
easily observable, including the resulting harm. Often, evidence supporting the 
assessment of the conduct will be in the in the hands of the primary victims of the 
infringements. Also, the market power of the company in question is probably known 
to other actors in the market - if not insofar as its legal definition then possibly at least 
in regards to its economic consequences. On the other hand, the competitor plaintiff 
may also have to be regarded with greater caution, as they may also have larger 
incentives to abuse competition law, for example using it to impose costs on a 
particular competitor, or lessening the competitive pressure exerted by a strong 
competitor.  
There are also other cases in which plaintiffs would have a very hard time detecting 
an infringement and the resulting harm, for example in cases of abuse of a dominant 
position that leads to the inhibition of innovation and consequently to losses caused by 
dynamic inefficiency. Forms of exploitative abuses can cause harm directly to 
consumers.178 These however, are likely to be less detectable and generally more 
difficult to assess an infringement. 
2 Other Relevant Regulations 
Other regulations relevant to group litigation mechanisms include, amongst others, 
general rules on civil procedure, general rules on tort law and regulations concerning 
the conduct and reimbursement of lawyers or associations.  
                                                
177 Ibidem, nr 28 ff. 
178 Jones, EC Competition Law: text, cases and materials, 316 ff. 
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When using theory to design the ‘optimal group litigation’ for a certain type of 
competition law infringement, a choice has to be made upfront about which 
boundaries of a legal system are to be treated as given. That choice obviously greatly 
influences the outcome of the subsequent analysis, but is unavoidable if a minimum 
relevance to the current discussion within Europe is to be maintained.  
As mentioned above, the effects, both positive and negative, of the proposed changes 
to enhance private enforcement of competition law through the avenue of private 
claims for damages, depend on their specific design, and on their combination. It 
should be clear at this point that making reasonable statements about the effects of 
one specific tool to enhance private enforcement, especially concerning the 
introduction of a group litigation mechanism, will often necessitate the incorporation 
of changes or limitations in other features of the private enforcement design as well. 
Moreover, when studying the effectiveness of a particular group litigation mechanism, 
other features of the private enforcement system have to be taken into account. 
Therefore it will sometimes be unavoidable during the course of analysis to 
incorporate effects not primarily caused by the group litigation mechanism itself. 
The basic starting point to this analysis will be that of traditional actions for damages, 
as they have been developed. The very basic and common concept behind these 
regulations is that a victim of a harm caused by an illegal act of another has the right 
to be compensated.179 Compensation should be given for the full harm caused (unless 
the victim is partially responsible as well).  But the victim should not be able to gain 
from the fact that harm was caused, and therefore should not receive more than actual 
damages. Such so called unjust enrichment is also explicitly made impossible by 
Community Law.180  Following the concept of restitutio ad integrum,181 the goal is to 
                                                
179 See for example the general provision of the German BGB, § 823, stating that who unnlawfully and 
intentionally or negligently violates someone else’s right has to compensate the victim for the resulting 
harm  (Wer vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig das Leben, den Körper, die Gesundheit, die Freiheit, das 
Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht eines anderen widerrechtlich verletzt, ist dem anderen zum Ersatz 
des daraus entstehenden Schadens verpflichtet) 
180 Courage Judgement, European Court of Justice, Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan 
[2001] ECR I-6297, nr 30: “In that regard, the Court has held that Community law does not prevent 
national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by Community 
law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them”. See also discussion in European 
Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER, Annex to the GREEN PAPER Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, (COM(2005) 672 final), 46 ff. 
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put the victim in a position he/she would have been in had the damage causing 
incident never occurred.  
However, sometimes such compensation may not be possible or feasible. If, for 
example, the damages to the individual victim are so low that the costs of litigating, 
awarding or transferring the individual amounts would exceed them,182 other avenues 
of compensation could be taken. Such mechanisms can be combined under the 
heading of cy press distribution.183 Although not very common, the European 
Commission has embraced such mechanisms in special cases.184 Also the national 
laws of Member States are familiar with concepts under which proceeds of a trial in 
the name of unidentified victims, such as the public as whole, are given to the state or 
associations to be used to protect the interest of those represented.185 Other Member 
States have regulations that allow a deviation from the concept of damage awards 
being based on the harm caused in cases where the former may be too difficult to 
establish or to proof. In such cases damages may also be based on the illegal gain the 
offender reaped from his law infringement.186 In such cases, it seems the idea of 
deterrence, or not allowing illegal gain, takes precedence over the concept of just and 
full compensation of individual harm. Especially when focusing on the goal of 
deterrence, the possibility to use these different mechanisms may be vital. Therefore, 
while the traditional regulations on actions for damages will be the starting point of 
                                                                                                                               
181 The ECJ clarified that point in the Manfredi decision, granting “any individual” standing.European 
Court of Justice, Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v. Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA and Others ECR I-6619.
182 Farmer, "More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust 
Actions Brought by State Attorneys General," FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 68 (1999): 361. Stuyck, et al, 
"An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through 
ordinary judicial proceedings Final Report," (2007). Available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports_studies/comparative_report_en.pdf 
183 Cy press constitutes a possibility to put damage awards to their “next best” use when they can not be 
used to compensate individual victims. An example would be awarding the damages to some agency 
that will use the proceeds in the general interest of the represented group, such as a charitable 
organisation. 
184 See European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 20.  
185 Such as the German skimming-off procedure discussed above cahapter one section 2.3, or the 
Portuguese popular caction, see Mulheron, "Competition Law Cases under the Opt-out Regimes of 
Australia, Canada and Portugal: A research paper for the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform," (2008), 77. 
186 For example in the UK, seeOffice of Fair Trading, "Private actions in competition law: effective 
redress for consumers and business, OFT Discussion Paper 916," (April 2007), paragraph 2.11, 
although possibly restricted to proprietary tort cases; in Germany, § 33 Abs. 3 GWB allows the 
estimation of the damages incurred by a plaintiff on basis of the illegal profit the defendant gained as a 
result of the infringement. 
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analysis, these other mechanisms that were developed in national member states law 
will also need to be taken into consideration.  
It is also quite common (at least in civil law countries), that the types of rights 
discussed here can be transferred to another actual or legal person.187 In some cases, 
such a transfer can even be regulated to take place automatically, as is common for 
example often in insurance law. In other cases, owners of the right can trade it just as 
any other object with a certain value.188 Such a right may then be considered to have a 
value in itself, independent of the original victim, so that the transfer can take place 
through a contract that includes a payment for the transfer of the rights.189  While this 
possibility may be an important concept in some group litigation mechanisms, it may 
not be feasible in others, as the analysis will show. 
As mentioned above, there are a wide range of possibilities through which to finance 
such damages actions. Legal aid insurance, professional finance institutions, changes 
in the general regulation of court costs, and contingency fees for lawyers, are only 
some of these. Alleviating the cost burden placed on the plaintiffs’ side in one way or 
another will generally increase the incentives of potential plaintiffs to use the legal 
system to sue for damages. But the total effects of the different cost alleviating 
mechanisms are likely to differ. However, the issue of financing is not intrinsically 
related to group litigations. The same questions also arise with regard to traditional 
one-on-one litigation. The same is true for the question of how lawyers will be 
remunerated for their efforts in general. These matters will be taken into consideration 
whenever they are important to the analysis. 
The prevailing method of cost and fee shifting rules, as well as rules on the discovery 
process, are important when looking at the efficiency of existing group litigation 
mechanisms. However they may be less relevant to the specific design of a group 
litigation mechanism than the rules on damages or payment of lawyers, as the analysis 
will show. 
                                                
187 For example, in Germany § 398 BGB allows for such an assignation, and although it is generally 
restricted to specific circumstances, it has been successfully been done in the cases brought by the 
Cartel Damage Claim company, see Chapter 5 section C. 
188 Banks for example sell credit claims as valuable goods. 
189 This is the approach taken by the Cartel Damage Claims Company, see Chapter 5 section C. 
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While the existing regulations will form the starting point of the analysis, some of 
these regulations, as they exist in the Member States of the European Union, may 
have to be changed in order to make a specific form of group litigation efficient or 
even feasible. The analysis of the optimal group litigation will highlight these points. 
C The Economic Framework 
1 The Rationality Assumption 
Economics analysis traditionally assumes that individuals are “rational”.190 The 
economic definition of rationality, however, differs from the common intuitive 
understanding of the term in everyday life. Most economic models apply the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions regarding individual behaviour,191 postulating 
that individuals are rational maximisers of their expected utility. In that respect, utility 
is a measure of the relative satisfaction the decision maker will gain from a certain 
choice, for example the consumption of a particular good. If that level of utility is not 
certain ex ante, the decision maker can only make a choice based on the level of 
satisfaction she expects to derive from the choices, therefore the model deals with 
expected utility. The very basic assumptions concerning the rationality assumption are 
the following. Presented with a finite number of choices, an individual can always say 
whether he prefers A to B, B to A or is indifferent (completeness axiom). When the 
consumer prefers A to B and B to C, he also prefers A to C (transitivity axiom). The 
preference of one alternative over the other should not change, when an additional 
option is added. Overall it is assumed that the individual will choose the most 
preferred option, thereby maximising her utility or welfare. This does not imply, 
however, that the choices made could be considered rational choices from an 
                                                
190 See Sen, Rational Behaviour. THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS. eds. 
Durlauf andBlume. (2008),. Available at: 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_R000022. For a contrast of rational 
choice theory with insights from behavioural economics see Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in 
Law and Economics. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME I. THE HISTORY 
AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS . eds. Bouckaert andDe Geest. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar (2000), 790. 
191 Von Neumann/ Morgenstern introduced uncertainty in the general utility analysis.  
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objective perspective.192 Individuals can make such choices even when they are not 
fully informed about the actual and real alternatives; it only matters how these options 
are perceived.193 Also, for the predictions of a certain model to hold, individuals do 
not even have to make these choices consciously. In fact, it is only necessary for 
individuals to behave as if they would follow such a rationale in aggregate. Following 
this standard approach in Law and Economics, the behaviour of individuals in this 
analysis is assumed to be rational in the economic sense.194 This implies that 
individuals will consider the costs and benefits of alternative choices and choose the 
option that maximises their expected utility. That approach and what it entails will be 
explained in greater detail below. 
2 The Theory of Optimal Deterrence 
Economic analysis of optimal sanctions traditionally focuses on the goal of 
deterrence.195 In a total (social) welfare analysis, the wealth of all individual members 
of the society is maximised, whereas wealth distribution is irrelevant, as it has no 
effects on total wealth maximisation. This basic idea is closely connected to the so 
called concept of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency.196 Under this efficiency regime, changes 
in the system subject to the investigation are considered efficient when gains 
generated by the changes to some members of the affected society are larger than the 
losses caused to others. Using adequate mechanisms of redistribution, the winners 
could theoretically fully compensate the losers while total welfare would increase. If 
such a compensation system is used, the alterations analysed would also fulfil the 
                                                
192 A very good overview over the rationality assumption, its usefullness and its justification even in 
light of insights from behavioural eceonomics can be found inSchäfer and Ott, Lehrbuch der 
ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer (2005), 58 ff; and 
Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics 790. 
193 Becker, "The economic way of looking at life," NOBEL LECTURE, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 101 (1993): 385 available at: http://home.uchicago.edu/~gbecker/Nobel/nobellecture.pdf 
194 In few instances also insights from behavioural approaches to Law and Economics might  
195 Becker, Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of Enforces 1. Landes, Optimal 
sanctions for antitrust violations 652, 652. Baker, Private information and the deterrent effect of 
antitrust damage remedies 385. Wils, "Optimal antitrust fines: theory and practice," WORLD 
COMPETITION 29 (2006): 183.
196 See Chapter 1, Section A 2. 
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requirements of Pareto Efficiency,197 in that no individual would suffer losses but at 
least one would be better off.  
Deterrence, also called the preventive function, is a major goal of the sanctions 
imposed against violations of Art. 81 and Art. 82 EC Treaty.198 The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) emphasised the possibilities of private actions for damages to deter 
infringements of competition law.199 Also national legislation concerning damages for 
breaches of competition law has been drafted with the explicit aim of creating an 
effective private sanctioning system to increase deterrence of infringements.200
Although the Commission and some authors argue that the foremost goal of private 
actions for damages is to compensate victims, i.e. corrective justice,201 the goal of 
deterrence is also generally recognised as part of the functions of tort law.202 In 
general, enforcement to prevent competition law infringements is a widely accepted 
and legitimate aim also for private enforcement.203
                                                
197 Named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). A pareto improvement is said to be 
achieved when at least the situation of one person can be improved, without making any other 
individual worse off. Pareto-efficiency is achieved when no further pareto improvements are possible. 
198 Art. 3.1. (g) EC Treaty states that competition law is enacted to create “a system ensuring 
that competition in the internal market is not distorted“.; see also Krüger, Öffentliche und private 
Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots von Art. 81 EG, Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitaets-Verlag (2007), 
8.
199 EJC emphazised that notion in its decision: European Court of Justice, Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd 
v Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, nr 26 f. 
200 German Bundestag, BT-Drucks. 15/3640, 35. Main goal in US antitrust:Lande, "Are 
Antitrust'Treble'Damages Really Single Damages?" OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 54 (1993): 115,
124; Easterbrook, "Predatory strategies and counterstrategies," THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
LAW REVIEW 48 (1981): 263, 319 (with further ref. also to court decisions in fn 126). Posner, 
Antitrust Law: Economic Perspective, Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press (1976), 221.
201 At least now, see European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 3.  
202 See Faure and Van Boom, Introducing "Shifts in Compensation Between Private and Public 
Systems". SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS. eds. 
Faure andVan Boom. Wien: Springer (2007), 1, 8 f. 
203 Hoseinian, "Passing-on Damages and Community Antitrust Policy—An Economic Background," 
WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 28 (2005): 3, 6. Also Commission in 
European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 3, acknowledging the deterrence functions. See also Wils, 
Should private antitrust enforcement be encouraged in Europe? 473. 
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2.1 Optimal sanction 
The economic analysis of law enforcement largely rests on the economic models 
developed to explain the behaviour of criminals.204 Just like the core of economic 
analysis, these models apply the rational choice theory.  Postulating certain features of 
individuals’ preferences,205 the individual is assumed to maximise his or her expected 
utility from those preferences, under various constraints, such as limited resources. 
Traditionally, the economic analysis of deterrence focused on criminal law as subject. 
However, as private enforcement emerged as possible alternative or complement to 
public enforcement efforts based on criminal law, tort law became a topic of 
interest.206 Criminal law is strongly connected to the principle of deterrence. Actions 
for damages in tort law, however, can also work as a kind of market mechanism that 
increases the expected costs of an offence. In that respect, they might have a 
deterrence effect, similar to that of criminal fines where it is more the fine that deters, 
than the moral connotation of a criminal sanction. Therefore, if private tort actions for 
damages are designed in a way to reach optimal deterrence, their impact must mirror 
the effect of the optimal (criminal) fine, as analysed under criminal law aspects. 
Therefore, the research done on the deterrence effects of criminal fines becomes 
relevant. 
The idea to treat an individual’s decision whether or not to commit an illegal act as if 
it were a rational decision weighing costs and benefits, is neither a completely novel, 
nor a very recent invention. As early as 1788, Bentham wrote about the decision of a 
criminal in terms of “profit of the crime” and “pain of punishment”.207 Also other 
                                                
204 Namely the theories developed by Becker, Stigler and Landes.Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach," THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 76 (1968): 169.Stigler, "The 
Optimum Enforcement of Laws," THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 78 (1970): 526. 
Landes, Optimal sanctions for antitrust violations 652. Becker and Landes, Essays in the Economics of 
Crime and Punishment, New York: Columbia University Press (1974). 
205 See the description of the rationality assumption above  
206 In the USA, only 10 percent of all antitrust cases are brought by public authorities. For recent 
discussions about private competition law infringements in Europe, seeVan Den Bergh and Keske, 
"Private Enforcement of European Competition Law: Quo Vadis?" EUROPEAN REVIEW OF 
CONTRACT LAW 3 (2007): 468 ; Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a 
comparative perspective, 325,  
207 Bentham, Principles of penal law,The Works of Jeremy Benthem (1843), 399 ff. 
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classic writers, such as Beccaria and Montesquieu applied such logic to individual 
behaviour.208
The analysis of criminal behaviour became a central topic in the Law and Economics 
literature in the late 1970s. In his seminal work Crime and punishment,209 Gary S. 
Becker analysed the behaviour of a criminal as a rational decision maker, maximising 
his income dependent utility function. Under such assumptions, the potential criminal 
weighs the expected gains from committing the offence against the expected costs. 
The expected benefits are derived from the probability of escaping any liability times 
the profit or monetary equivalent of gains from the illegal conduct. The expected costs 
are derived from the probability of getting caught and convicted times the fine or 
monetary equivalent of the punishment. Larger punishments or increases in the 
probability of getting caught and convicted decrease the incentives to commit the 
crime,210 whereas increasing expected benefits from the offence have opposite effects, 
ceteris paribus. Using a total welfare approach, Becker analysed which form of 
sanction would be socially desirable. 
Becker’s analysis includes two important insights for the economic analysis of 
deterrence. The first insight is that given positive detection costs, maximum 
deterrence may not be optimal, as the benefits to society resulting from deterred 
offences have to be balanced against the costs of enforcement. In a total welfare 
analysis, society should try to minimise the sum of the costs of enforcement activities 
and the costs borne due to remaining offences. The second insight is that from a social 
welfare point of view, there may be efficient violations of the law that should not be 
deterred. These occur when the harm done to society is less than the gain to the 
offender, so that the effect on total welfare is a positive one.211
                                                
208 Beccaria, On Crime and Punishment. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT. ed. Grupp. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press (1971), 117. 
209 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 169. 
210 The substitutability of the probability of having to pay the fine and the amount of the fine depends 
on the individuals attitude towards risk. Risk-lovers would be more deterred by an increase in the 
probability than one in the amount of fine, while the opposite is true for risk-averse individuals. Same 
effect is achieved for risk-neutral persons. See Ibidem, 178. 
211 The assumption of a social benefit from the offence was criticised for illegal conduct such as rape or 
murder, see e.g. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws 526, 527.Polinsky and Shavell, Public
Enforcement of Law. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. eds. Bouckaert andDe Geest. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2000), 307. But the arguments do not relate to competition law 
infringements. 
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When costs of detection and conviction are zero and the probability of being detected 
equals one, the optimal fine equals the total harm done to society.212 The costs of 
detection and conviction include the expenditures borne by society to apprehend and 
convict the infringer. But when detection and conviction is costly, while the monetary 
transfer of the fine from offender to society is costless, the optimal sanction should be 
set in a way that the amount of fine is as large as possible to allow for the minimal 
rate of detection. The basic arguments for this result are as follows. When imposing a 
fine is costless and the detection of an infringement requires expenditures, society 
would fare best to increase the fine as much as possible, reduce detection efforts and 
thereby save detection costs, while keeping the level of deterrence constant. Since the 
maximal level that a fine that can be set at is limited by the total wealth of the 
infringer, the optimal sanction consists of the total wealth of the infringer combined 
with the corresponding probability of detection.213
In the later research done in Law and Economics, different aspects of Becker’s model 
have been investigated more thoroughly and arguments why the maximum fine may 
not be optimal under specific circumstances have been developed. These include 
criticisms that the maximum fine may be too low to efficiently deter, so that 
imprisonment is suggested as alternative,214 as well as arguments connected to the 
idea that imposing a fine is not entirely costless.215
Two years after Becker’s foundation laying work, Stigler 1970 introduced marginal 
deterrence into the discussion, or at least coined the term.216 He argued that imposing 
the same punishment on different violations of law although the amount of resulting 
harm is not the same, will distort the potential offender’s decision whether to commit 
                                                
212 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 169, 192. 
213 Garoupa, "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS 11 
(1997): 267, 268 f.  Shavell, "A note on marginal deterrence," INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 12 (1992): 345, 346. 
214 See e.g.Wils, Is criminalization of EU competition law the answer? 117. Möschel, Kommentar: 
Erweiterter Privatrechtsschutz im Kartellrecht 115.  
215 Analysing the deterrence effect and necessity of non-monetary sanctions isShavell, Criminal law 
and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent 1232. For an overview of models 
extending Beckers analysis, including positive enforcement costs, see:Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal 
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Group Litigation: A General Law and Economics Framework                                                           73
a crime that causes larger or smaller damages. One implication of marginal deterrence 
is that the maximum fine may not be optimal for all offences and that the penalty 
should rather be set in a way to resemble the amount of damages effectuated.217 This 
economic argument reflects certain legal principles, such as the principle of 
proportionality.  
In 1974, Stigler and Becker shifted their attention from setting the optimal penalty to 
the question of how to induce public as well as private enforcers, to perform at a high 
level of quality.218 They argue that public enforcers, working on a salary basis, may 
fall prey to bribery or intimidation unless their salary is determined in relation to the 
temptation for such malfeasances. Private enforcers may avoid the pitfalls of public 
enforcement, when rewarded by the fine levied on, or damages paid, by the 
offender.219 On the other hand they might not as readily impose the optimal sanction 
as public enforcers. As both public and private enforcement agents were not 
remunerated accordingly at that time in the US, the authors conclude that performance 
of both enforcement entities may be enhanced compared to the applied enforcement 
strategies by either increasing salaries for public officials so as to protect them from 
bribery, or to allow private actors to engage in enforcement activities. 
In 1992, Shavell extended the original analysis of marginal deterrence and concluded 
that the optimal sanction increases with the magnitude of harm when enforcement 
efforts can not be specifically tailored to the harmfulness of the act.220 Moreover, the 
sanction should rise with the harmfulness of the act when the probability of 
apprehension falls with increasing damage caused by the illegal conduct.221
In addition a great deal of research following Becker’s original analysis was 
conducted to analyse circumstances under which the optimal fine would not be the 
                                                                                                                               
216 Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws 526. The ideas of marginal deterrence where already 
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345. 
217 Polinsky, Public Enforcement of Law 307, 312. 
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219 Again, these fines or damage payments would have to be adjusted for the probability of being 
convicted. See Ibidem, 14.
220 See Shavell, A note on marginal deterrence 345. One could argue that this will often be the case in 
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detection of those price-fixing cartels that cause the greatest damages.  
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maximum.222 This research includes, for example, a paper by Shavell and Polinksy,223
who evaluated the effect of different states of wealth amongst individuals with 
positive enforcement costs. These authors concluded that the maximum fine, which 
equals the total wealth of the offender, is only optimal when the probability of 
apprehension is independent from the level of wealth. When, on the other hand, this 
probability is dependent? of wealth, the optimal sanction equals the harm divided by 
the probability of apprehension. Bebchuk and Kaplow224 analysed the effect of 
imperfect information of individuals with regard to the probability of detection. They 
found that under such circumstances the optimal sanction would consist of a larger 
probability of detection and conviction, coupled with a lower fine.  
Polinsky and Shavell,225 investigated the effects of different types of enforcement 
costs on the level of the optimal sanction. To reach optimal deterrence, a distinction 
has to be made between fixed and variable enforcement costs. Whenever enforcement 
costs include a variable cost borne by society that depends on the number of 
infringements, such as costs of investigation and litigation once detection has taken 
place, these costs have to be placed on the infringer, each costs adjusted for the 
probability that in the end a fine will be imposed. If (fixed) detection costs, (variable) 
costs of litigation and (variable) cost of actually imposing the fine are present, that 
implies that the optimal sanction is set to equal the total costs imposed on society 
divided by the probability of detection and conviction, plus the costs of litigation 
adjusted for the probability that conviction will take place, and in addition the costs of 
imposing a fine. The general upshot of their findings is that variable enforcement 
costs, depending on the number of offenders, should be added on top of the penalty 
that equals harm divided by the probability of detection, while fixed enforcement 
costs should not. Under perfect circumstances, where no type I or type II errors226 are 
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made, society as a whole will be made better off through such an enforcement regime. 
There will also be no wasteful effort. An example may help to clarify this, following 
the analysis of Polinsky and Shavell.  If total net losses caused by a detected and 
prosecuted offence (including enforcement costs)  are 90, litigation (variable 
enforcement) costs are 10 and the probability of detection and conviction is 10 
percent, the total award (fine) paid to the enforcer by the infringer will be 1000 
(90+10 divided by 0.1). One hundred of that will compensate society for the actual 
harm done, which includes all resources spent on detection and conviction. Nine 
hundred are a pure monetary transfer between the infringer and society (from a total 
welfare point of view), leaving society as a whole, which includes both parties, 
indifferent. The design of the optimal sanction under optimal circumstances leads to 
the effect that the infringer will only breach competition law if his additional gain 
exceeds the expected 100 (1000 with a probability of 0.1) he has to pay in 
compensation. If the offender’s gain does not exceed this amount, he is deterred and 
the case will not arise. The model shows how enforcers under such a system can have 
sufficient incentives to file suit, and that optimal deterrence could be achieved. One 
pitfall of this analysis is that it requires the fixed costs of detection to be set at an 
optimal level by the (centralised) enforcer. If this is possible, then optimal 
enforcement could be achieved.  
Next to this so called internalisation approach to deterrence, which forces the 
potential infringer to internalise the cost imposed on society, another so called 
complete deterrence theory has also been developed.227 The latter theory postulates 
that when efficient breaches, where the gain to the offender exceeds the harm inflicted 
on society, are never possible,228 then the optimal fine should be set at a level that 
exceeds the gain to the offender, so as to completely deter that behaviour. This 
approach has also sometimes been advocated for competition law infringements in 
general229 or only for hard core cartel.230 In practice, so called skimming-off 
procedures, under which offenders have to repay the amount of illegal gain, seem to 
apply this concept. Nevertheless, such sanctions bear no connection to the amount of 
                                                
227 See Wils, Optimal antitrust fines: theory and practice 183, 195 f. Hylton, "The theory of penalties 
and the economics of criminal law," REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (2005): 175,175.  
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harm caused, which according to the theory of marginal deterrence can be inefficient. 
Moreover, simply skimming-off the illegal additional profits gained through anti-
competitive behaviour does not take into account the potentially very low probability 
of detection. Therefore it results in under deterrence. The same effect occurs when 
these illegal gains are underestimated, so that the infringer still profits from violation 
of the competition regulation. It is probably for these reasons, and due to the 
important fact that efficient breaches are often considered a positive thing in the 
economic analysis, that the most commonly accepted approach to deterrence is the 
internalisation approach. It is that approach, which has also been frequently applied to 
the context of competition law infringements and which is used here.  
2.2 Optimal sanction for anticompetitive conduct 
In 1983, William Landes analysed the optimal sanction with regard to antitrust 
violations.231 In line with Becker’s analysis, Landes conclusion leads to an optimal 
sanction that imposes the net harm effectuated in society, which includes the 
enforcement costs per case divided by the probability of detection and conviction,232
on the potential infringer in order to achieve deterrence. Such a sanction takes into 
account the fact that some anti-competitive conduct may have an overall beneficial 
effect on total welfare and therefore should not be deterred. This approach has been 
accepted by many scholars.233 In such a setting, an economic entity that contemplates 
engaging in an anti-competitive behaviour, like participating in a prohibited cartel 
agreement, can be assumed to weigh the individual (not total social) costs and benefits 
of such an activity against each other. The benefits can be seen in the additional 
profits gained by engaging in that illegal activity.234 The costs on the other hand 
depend on the possibility of being apprehended and punished and on the amount of  
the sanction.235  Consequently, a rational decision maker will only engage in anti-
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competitive conduct, when the individual expected profits outweigh the expected 
costs. 
When applying the described models to the field of antitrust violations, one 
qualification may be in order. The law against restraints of competition in Europe 
focuses on the firm as the target of the regulation and the one liable in actions for 
damages.236 Also Landes treated the firm as the decision maker in his analysis. In 
reality, the individuals actually deciding whether or not to enter a cartel agreement 
(e.g. the managers) may not be the ones who have to bear all the costs (in Europe, as 
opposed to the US, only the company is fined).237 However, in contrast to other 
breaches of law such as murder, it can be argued that the decision makers behind 
antitrust infringements do behave rationally. Often the motivation behind the decision 
to partake or to engage in illegal conduct will be an increase in the profit to be gained 
by it for the firm.238 Nonmonetary benefits and costs could also be translated into 
monetary terms. For example, managers, trying to impress shareholders and build a 
reputation are likely to be counting on a future monetary value of such a reputation in 
form of higher salaries. Nevertheless, costs and benefits of the contemplated offence 
are not fully borne by the decision maker, which gives rise to so called principal
agent problems239 and may impact the effectiveness of a sanction.  A whole stream of 
literature is dedicated to the complex problems related to corporate liability240 and a 
full application of their insights would be beyond the scope of this thesis. For the sake 
of this analysis, the principal agent problems between shareholders (principals) and 
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agents (managers) and their effect on the deterrence mechanisms are not discussed, 
and the company is seen as the economic entity making the decision.241
This assumes a risk neutral decision maker.242 The attitude of entities towards risk 
influences their welfare function, so that firms which are not risk neutral may be more 
or less deterred by the same sanction. Different economic models have been 
developed to investigate these effects, but one general conclusion shall be noted. If 
one accepts the following assumptions: i) the company as economic entity is risk 
averse (although less so with accumulated wealth – decreasing absolute risk aversion)
ii) non-monetary costs caused by the penalty (such as reputational losses) can be 
translated into monetary losses and III) there is only one sanction, the general effect of 
an increase of the expected penalty will be a reduction in legal offences.243
2.3 Optimal deterrence 
The point must be repeated that optimal deterrence is not the same as maximum 
deterrence. Especially with regard to competition law, many activities of firms in the 
market will have to be thoroughly investigated to allow for an evaluation for their 
conformity with the law.  The effects of non-hard-core agreements amongst firms, 
such as research and development co-operations, could be beneficial for competition, 
also from a consumer welfare point of view. Such benefits would be lost if there was 
over deterrence, due to excessive expected penalties. Sanctions that are too high will 
be inefficient in several ways. First, in combination with the possibility of judicial 
errors244 or unmeritous claims,245 firms could also be deterred from engaging in a 
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socially beneficial activity.246 Second, when the nature of the illegal conduct has little 
or no relation to the amount of the penalty, the infringer will not be inhibited from 
choosing the more harmful alternative.247 Third, in as much as firms will rely on 
expert advice concerning the legality of their planned business transactions, excessive 
expected fines could result in too may resources spent on that “prevention 
measure”.248
Under deterrence takes place when the expected sanction is not large enough to make 
the decision maker refrain from a law infringing activity that causes more harm to 
society than it creates benefit. Analogues to the possible reasons for overdeterrence, 
under deterrence can result because of too small expected penalties. 
2.4 Optimal enforcement 
Another important point is that enforcement costs should be minimised. The 
enforcement of regulations is time consuming and costly in general, but all the more 
so concerning complex issues such as the establishment of an infringement of 
competition law. The resources spent on enforcement have to be balanced against the 
gains to be achieved through the enforcement efforts. Optimal enforcement is 
achieved when the total costs of such harmful activities to society, including the costs 
of enforcement, are minimised.249  This necessitates that increases in the resources 
spent on enforcement should be offset by a reduction in costs caused by violations. If 
that is not the case, over enforcement takes place, with a waste of resources. Under 
enforcement takes place when the costs suffered because of infringements are larger 
than the costs that would have to be borne to enforce the law.  
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2.5 Actions for damages as deterrence tool  
Under the discussed models of optimal deterrence, the individuals decision whether or 
not to violate a competition law regulation depends on the expected benefits and the 
expected costs. Any firm committing an intentional offence is likely to expect some 
additional profit from the violation, or to avoid some costs otherwise incurred. These 
profits to the individual firm depend, amongst other factors, on the type of violation 
and its scope and breadth. The expected costs taken into account in the calculation are 
largely determined by the probability of apprehension and conviction, as well as the 
expected penalty. The latter two parameters are those which can be used to influence 
the weighing of costs and benefits by a rational utility maximiser, by decreasing his 
expected utility from the offence. For actions for damages to act as deterrence 
mechanism, there therefore would have to be either increased probability of detection 
and conviction and/or the amount of penalty. Ideally, the optimal sanction and optimal 
deterrence could be achieved in this way. 
The goal of imposing the optimal sanction, which forces the infringer to internalise all 
the damages caused, while enforcement costs are minimised, could theoretically be 
achieved through traditional individual tort claims. However, there are some obstacles 
to the efficiency of such tort claims. Private parties may lack necessary information 
and their individual incentives to discover infringements or to sue may divert from the 
social interest in such proceedings. Moreover, many individual suits for damages 
could be considered to be wasteful enforcement efforts, if these claims could also be 
as efficiently dealt with, in only one costly procedure.  
2.6 Policy implications of the rational choice model 
Economic analysis using the rational utility maximising approach to discuss the 
behaviour of criminals has frequently been criticised. One of the most common points 
of critique is the assumption that a criminal will act rationally. Apart from the fact that 
often rationality is not understood in the economic sense, such criticism relating to the 
“irrationality” of offenders in the sense of emotional acts, seems to be more justified 
when criminal acts like assault or murder are discussed, than when economic crimes 
resulting from business decisions are the subject of investigation. Second, 
criminology, sociology and other sciences have identified a multitude of factors that 
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influence the likelihood that an individual will commit a crime. Amongst these are 
peer pressure and poverty. These are factors that are excluded in this analysis, as they 
are probably not relevant to the decisions of companies. However,, the economic 
analysis conducted here does not exclude other policies that may be targeted to 
increase education, law abiding behaviour, and moral consciousness.  
An economic approach to the topic of private enforcement helps to clarify where 
conflicts between several simultaneously pursued goals may arise, i.e. where 
necessary trade offs occur. It also adds information with regard to the choice of 
instruments used to pursue a given goal. Moreover, it highlights the advantages and 
disadvantages, or costs and benefits, of specific choices in a way that can make a 
weighing of these more explicit and better informed.  
3 Obstacles in cases of competition law infringements  
Claims for damages under traditional tort law are likely to lead to under deterrence 
and socially inefficient enforcement due to several problems connected to private 
litigation in cases of competition law infringements. These include the information 
asymmetry between victims and offenders, rational apathy250 of affected parties, free 
riding behaviour and cost inefficiency of several proceedings. The ideal group 
litigation mechanisms would overcome the obstacles faced by individual tort claims.  
3.1 Information asymmetry 
It is generally true that with regards to the establishment of an infringement of 
competition law, potential plaintiffs requirement far greater knowledge and 
information than is required than in most other tort cases.251 Private parties may lack 
the information and skills of public authorities in assessing a potential competition 
law infringement. These include for example knowledge on how to establish the 
relevant market, or whether price developments are caused by general economic 
                                                
250 This concept, also called rational ignorance, was reportedly first developed by Anthony Downs in 
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developments in the market as opposed to being the result of an anti-competitive 
conduct.  Private enforcement faces  the problem of asymmetric information, where 
the potential defendants have a large information advantage over the potential 
plaintiffs. Public enforcers as well as private enforcers are faced with these obstacles, 
but the problems can frequently be much more severe for the latter. 
The degree of information asymmetry between offenders and injured parties or 
enforcement agents is not uniform. Proponents of private enforcement often advance 
the potential information advantages other business entities operating in the affected 
market have over a public competition authority.252 While a direct competitor can 
reasonably be presumed to have the knowledge, skills and resources to notice and 
combat anti-competitive conduct in many cases, this is less likely to be the case if the 
harmed entity is the end consumer.  Consumers may lack information about the fact 
that harm is being done, due to the often small but widely dispersed nature of the 
damages. End consumers often may not even notice a small uniform upward price 
movement across one industry.  
Even where a potential harm may be recognised, information about the amount of, 
and the cause for, that harm may be lacking. Other businesses, for example direct 
buyers, may be expected to stay informed about the industry and the market they 
operate in. It may also be expected they possess sufficient knowledge about the 
relevant legal provisions applicable. However it is problematic that few end 
consumers will know about competition law regulations in detail. Very few will be 
able to establish the relevant market, the market structure and other relevant factors to 
estimate whether or not a cartel is the likely cause for observed product or price 
alterations. Nonetheless, such skills are necessary to establish, for example, whether a 
perceived price increase for a particular product is the result of concerted practices of 
cartel members, the unilateral behaviour of a non-cartel member enjoying the benefits 
of the price umbrella253 created by a cartel, or merely due to economic developments. 
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Moreover, as will be discussed below, the harm done to the individual at that stage of 
the distribution chain can often be far too small to justify any investment in the 
gathering of all the necessary information.  Therefore, the type of victim being 
inflicted with the most harm influences the degree to which asymmetric information 
problems occur. 
The severity of asymmetric information also depends on the type of anti-competitive 
conduct, as well as the incentives for the offender to cure this obstruction. Cases of 
refusal to deal or exclusive dealing contracts convey substantial parts of necessary 
information to the victim. In such cases, the information about an infringement and 
even some of the necessary proof are already in the hands of the victim. Manufacturer 
cartel agreements present a very different scenario. Detecting and proving such an 
infringement can be extremely complex. In some cases, these information problems 
can be prohibitively large.  
Generally, there are two ways to overcome problems of asymmetric information. The 
first is to design a mechanism under which information will have to be revealed by the 
ones in possession of the information, or given to the less informed party by a third 
party. Mechanisms of this kind include notification systems, where for example 
cooperation agreements are made dependant on prior approval. Unfortunately, 
notification systems have been widely abolished. Once the decision to breach 
competition law has been made, offenders can not reasonably be compelled to divulge 
their anti-competitive conduct. They may be enticed to make use of leniency 
programs, but such tools are difficult to implement in tort actions. Nonetheless, when 
detection of a likely offence has taken place, specific procedural rules can make it 
easier for plaintiffs to gather evidence. Such solutions to asymmetric information 
between parties to a legal dispute are applied for example in pre-trial discovery 
regulations, such as those in the US. The second way to reduce or overcome problems 
of asymmetric information would be to design a mechanism under which sufficient 
incentives to victims or third party agents are given to search for and provide the 
relevant information. Such incentives concerning the detection of competition law 
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infringements are of major concern in the design of the optimal group litigation 
mechanism.   
3.2 Rational apathy 
Another major problem that should be overcome through the mechanism of group 
litigation is the rational apathy problem. It refers to situations in which it is utility 
maximising for an individual to decide not to invest resources into research and 
collecting of data, because the expected costs of doing so exceed the expected 
benefits.  
The problem of rational apathy is relevant with regard to two aspects.254 The first is 
the rational apathy that prevents individuals from investing resources in overcoming 
the above discussed information asymmetry. The individual harm suffered can often 
be so small that it is rational for the individual victim not to invest resources into 
research and information gathering. Rational apathy reinforcing information 
asymmetries is more or less persistent, depending on the type of victim and the 
infringement under investigation, as described above.  
The second aspect of rational apathy relates to the incentives to file suit. Assuming all 
the necessary information is available, victims might still decide not to file suit. 
Again, this can be a rational choice, when the individual expected costs of a 
proceeding outweigh the potential gains. Just as the harm done to the individual end 
consumer can be too small to justify an investment in gathering of information, it can 
also be too small to justify investment into a costly and uncertain legal proceeding. It 
is important to keep in mind that competition law infringements frequently are much 
more complex to prove than other torts in general. Especially with regard to hard-core 
cartels, conspiring firms will be willing to invest large resources in keeping their anti-
competitive conduct secret. This investment in masking conduct raises the costs of 
detection for the enforcer. On the other hand, when firms believe themselves to be 
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the Class Suit, The 684, 684 f. Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives 
for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations 183, 184 f. Micklitz, The Development of 
Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure 1473, 1476, 1482.Landes, 
The Private Enforcement of Law 1, 33 f.
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acting in accordance with the law, detection might be easier. This is because the 
agreement is not being kept secret. However in this case proving the restrictive effect 
on competition is likely to be a very complex and uncertain exercise. An example of 
such a scenario would be legal joint venture agreements, which can border on illegal 
cartel agreements.255
Moreover, an individual plaintiff suing for damages will face a defendant who is 
likely to be able and willing to outspend him in a legal proceeding.256 In a perfect 
capital market, victims should be able to borrow money covered by the expected 
damage awards. If the capital market is not perfect, however, financing problems 
increase the rational apathy. Large commercial entities are more likely to be able to 
finance such a lawsuit than private end consumers. Asymmetric spending power and 
resulting negotiation power between plaintiff and defendants can present a large 
disincentive to sue.  
Attitudes towards risk also influence the degree of rational apathy. If private 
individuals are risk averse, they place more value on potential losses than on potential 
gains, which shifts any weighing of potential costs and benefits towards a more 
negative outcome.  
Also the incentives to sue on the side of affected firms can be less than sufficient. For 
example, in the case of firms as direct purchasers, such as retailers, the harm caused 
by the illegal agreement on the manufacturer’s level might be passed on to the next 
level in the distributions chain, such as the end consumer. The less the competitive 
pressure on these direct purchasers, and the less price sensitive the individual demand 
curves faced by them are, the higher the proportion of the overcharges that can be 
passed on to indirect purchasers. Moreover, fear of retaliation and economic 
dependencies on one or more offenders can also increase the perceived costs of filing 
                                                
255 For a discussion of these problems and legal treatment see Van Den Bergh, European competition 
law and economics: a comparative perspective,197 ff. 
256 On the natural advantages of defendants in mass tort cases see Rosenberg, "Casual Connection in 
Mass Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort System, The," HARVARD LAW REVIEW 97 
(1983): 849, 902 f. Coffee Jr, "Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, The," THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 54 
(1987): 877, 883. On a general discussion see Hay and Rosenberg, ""Sweetheart" and" Blackmail" 
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy," NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 75 (2000): 1377. 
Group Litigation: A General Law and Economics Framework                                                           86
a claim for the individual firm. Their incentives to sue are therefore suboptimal from a 
social point of view.  
These problems are exacerbated when individuals or small enterprises are more risk 
averse than large companies. The attitude towards risk also influences the degree of 
rational apathy. Risk averse entities will be even more reluctant to engage in such 
exercises, as they value possible losses higher than possible gains. When more weight 
is placed on potential losses, any weighing of expected costs and benefits is slightly 
skewed towards a more negative outcome. 
Solutions to rational apathy problems rest on changing the balance of costs and 
benefits, either by decreasing the factors that the individual incorporates on the cost 
side, or by increasing the benefits to be gained. The challenge for the design of  group 
litigation is to create such effects. 
3.3 Free riding behaviour 
Another obstacle that inhibits individuals from beginning a legal procedure is the risk 
of so called free riding behaviour, where victims have incentives to free ride on the 
initial investments of others. Such free riding takes place when victims stay quiescent 
in the hope that others may invest in costly proceedings. 257  This is beneficial for the 
individual remaining silent when either the outcome of that proceeding has its effect 
also for those who remained passive (as is the case for example with an injunction) or 
the evidence gathered in the first proceeding can be applied to one’s own proceeding  
thereby reducing their own costs. For these reasons, it can be profitable for private 
parties to delay filing their actions for damages until a public proceeding has been 
conducted (as follow on actions) in which the breach of a competition law has already 
been established. Similarly, business entities may hope to be able to free ride on 
                                                
257 Van Den Bergh, European competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, 331. For 
free-rider problems in opt-out class actions see:Friedman, "Constrained Individualism in Group 
Litigation: Requiring Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing before Opting Out of a Federal 
Class Action," THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 100 (1990): 745. For an economic theory of free-rider 
problems in collective actions see: Stigler, "Free riders and collective action: An appendix to theories 
of economic regulation," THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 5 
(1974): 359. 
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someone else’s decision to file suit, when the fear of retaliation prevents the initiation 
of a damage claim on their own.  
Whenever such free riding is possible, being the first to litigate can become a 
disadvantage. This can result in delayed actions or even in no actions being brought 
against the infringing parties. 
3.4 Total enforcement costs to society are not minimised 
Even without all the above mentioned obstacles to private actions, individual 
litigation under tort law will not fulfil the criteria of optimal enforcement requiring the 
minimisation of total enforcement costs.  
Each individual legal procedure against the same defendant for the same conduct 
entails at least a partial duplication of efforts and costs. Even if all the evidence 
gathered in the first trial is available and applicable to all the following actions, each 
trial will at least require time and resources spent on lawyers and court fees. These 
costs are only minimised when all damage claims are bundled into one procedure that 
clarifies the relevant factors common to all claims. Moreover, all the resources spent 
by several entities to detect the infringement in the first place also represent a wasteful 
doubling of resources.  
Cost minimisation would require that the capital spent on detection as well as 
litigation expenditures is kept to the lowest level possible while achieving optimal 
deterrence. Hence, procedural efficiency is an integral part of cost minimisation. 
D Summary 
This chapter introduced the legal and economic framework used in the analysis of the 
optimal group litigation mechanism in the coming chapters. The legal framework has 
been less stringent than it would have been in a legal analysis.  The reason for this is 
that many of existing rules and regulations would need to undergo change should 
group litigation mechanisms, which so far are not very common in the European 
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Member States, be introduced into existing legal systems. Therefore, while taking the 
general legal framework as starting point, the analysis will point out which rules 
would need to be amended. 
 Having defined the most important terms and concepts, as well as having introduced 
the legal and economic framework, the next chapter will apply these frameworks. 
This will first be to generalised forms of exiting forms of group litigation as defined in 
this chapter. Then, the insights gained from this analysis will be used to develop 
another mechanism which may curb problems that remain under the known forms. 
This mechanism will provide an indication as to the more efficient forms of group 
litigation and form a kind of benchmark for the further analysis conducted in chapters 
four and five. 
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Chapter 3 : Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence 
Perspective
In this section, the framework established in the previous chapter is applied to assess 
the optimal design of a group litigation mechanism. 258 This section is structured as 
follows. First, the deterrence effects of follow-on suits are contrasted with those of 
stand-alone suits. Then, stylised forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, i.e. 
collective action and representative action, are investigated as to their effectiveness to 
reach the goal of optimal deterrence. In this analysis, using backward induction,259 the 
necessary features of a group litigation mechanism that will achieve the optimal 
sanction are first discussed. Then, the potential of different forms of group litigation 
systems will be analysed with regard to optimising the probability of detection and 
litigation, as well as procedural efficiency. The system therefore would have to 
remedy the discussed pitfalls of individual litigation, namely information asymmetry, 
rational apathy, free riding behaviour and multiplication of litigation efforts 
(procedural efficiency). Moreover, its aim would be to achieve the goal of optimal 
deterrence while minimising total enforcement costs. The conclusion provides an 
overview of the findings and relates the different types of group litigation mechanisms 
analysed to specific types of infringements.  
A Deterrence effect of follow-on suits versus stand-alone suits 
Private claims for damages can take two different forms. They can be conducted in 
the aftermath of public enforcement, so called follow-on suits. Alternatively they can 
take place when no public proceeding has been started, as so called stand-alone suits. 
If both avenues of enforcement (public and private) are taken, the timing of private 
enforcement becomes important to estimating its potential to deter. 
                                                
258 As strict optimality requirements in a “first best” context might never be met to full extend, 
optimality is understood to refer also to optimality in a second (or third) best context. 
259 Backward induction refers to the process of reasoning backwards in time, starting from the desired 
outcome the optimal steps are necessary to get there are traced back to the beginning.  
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In the case of private follow-on suits, the infringement has already been detected by 
public authorities. If actions for damages and/or group litigation mechanisms were 
restricted to follow-on suits, they could never add to the rate of detection, as follow-
on cases only take place after a public investigation. When estimating their deterrence 
effect, therefore, the probability of getting caught has to be set equal to one 
(certainty). Any effect on deterrence as described in the economic model above then 
can only lie in increasing the sanction faced by the infringer.  
The optimal level of deterrence requires the optimal level for the expected penalty 
imposed on the infringing party, leading to neither over- nor under-deterrence. When, 
as in follow-on suits, the probability of detection equals one, the optimal amount of 
penalty would equal total loss caused to society. In the ideal case then, damages 
awarded in the private legal suits should not be directly established by looking at the 
harm done to the individual plaintiff(s), but would have to be calculated as total harm 
to society (including the so called dead weight loss).260
However, follow-on suits take place after a public investigation and the imposition of 
public fines. To ensure the total penalty imposed is at the optimal level, fines imposed 
in a preceding administrative proceeding by competition authorities would have to be 
taken into account in the private proceeding. Prior administered public fines would 
have to be subtracted from the damages awarded to avoid imposing a level of 
expected penalty which exceeds the optimal amount.261
The closer the level of public fines imposed on the infringer(s) is to the optimal 
expected sanction, the less room there will be for additional sanctions imposed by 
private claims for damages. The probability of detection in such a case is only related 
to the efforts by the public agency and not influenced by private actions. When this 
arguably low rate of (public) detection262 is not adequately taken into account when 
                                                
260 Dead weight loss (also allocative inefficiency) refers to the total social welfare loss caused by a 
market not being in competitive equilibrium. For a discussion see Leslie, "Antitrust Damages and 
Deadweight Loss," ANTITRUST BULLETIN 51 (2006): 521. 
261 How such downward adjustments in private suits for damages could be legally justifiable is another 
question, however, very much depends on the way damages will be established in court (i.e. which 
proxies and methods of estimation are used). 
262 Estimates for the detection of cartels are roughly between 10 % and 33 %.  Most commentators 
work with an assumed detection rate of about 15%. See Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in 
the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust 
damages actions, 96. 
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the fines are calculated, the gap between the level of fines and the level of optimal 
sanction is greater and additional sanctions could fill a larger gap.  
Consequently, private damage claims only add to deterrence if public fines are too 
low to deter and these private claims will capture the remainder required for reaching 
the optimal amount of penalty faced by the infringer. Focusing on deterrence, the only 
rationale for follow-on suits then would be to increase the amount of the total sanction 
faced by the infringer.  
Before going further into the details of adequate ways to combine public fines and 
subsequent damage payments to reach the optimal sanction, the preceding question is, 
whether an upward adjustment of the insufficient penalty because of too low public 
fines could not be achieved in more efficient ways. As discussed above,263 optimal 
deterrence does not mean deterrence at any cost. All other things being equal, a 
mechanism that is less costly in reaching a certain outcome than any other should be 
strictly preferred. In that respect, two separate proceedings (a private judicial 
proceeding following the first administrative proceeding) seems like a costly way to 
achieve a higher or even possibly the optimal amount of penalty. Increasing the public 
administrative fines imposed in the first proceeding to the optimal penalty amount in 
the first place would be less costly and therefore more efficient.  
It also has been frequently stated that the optimal monetary penalties needed for 
optimal deterrence, whether they are public fines alone or in combination with 
damage awards, can be prohibitively large.264 Therefore, and also with respect to the 
above mentioned principal-agent problems between managers and shareholders,265
several authors argue for the necessity of criminal sanctions, i.e. imprisonment of the 
responsible individuals.266 However these discussions are not part of this analysis; 
since criminal sanctions remain the prerogative of public authorities. Nevertheless it 
could be argued that if fines at the proclaimed low level of detection need to be 
                                                
263 See section Optimal deterrence in Chapter 2.
264 The defendant may be judgment-proof and escape (part of the) liability 
265 See section Optimal Sanction for anti-competitive conduct in chapter 2 
266 See for example Wils, Is criminalization of EU competition law the answer? 117. Möschel, 
Kommentar: Erweiterter Privatrechtsschutz im Kartellrecht 115 
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prohibitively large, i.e. larger than the individual wealth,267 to reach optimal 
deterrence, another solution would be to focus on ways to increase the level of 
detection.268 The higher the level of detection, the lower the quantum of the penalty 
required to achieve the optimal sanction. However, efforts to increase the probability 
of detection are costly. Therefore the benefit of further detection efforts would have to 
be weighed against the costs of these efforts.269 When the costs of increasing the 
probability of detection to one are larger than the resulting benefits, the optimal 
detection rate will remain at less than one.   
The focus on increasing the detection rate has been widely acknowledged in the 
literature on deterrence as the major potential contribution of private enforcement to 
overall deterrence.270 The problem however is that follow-on damages actions do not 
add to that part of the expected costs faced by the potential infringer. 
In conclusion, regardless of the availability of criminal sanctions, private follow-on 
suits can be disregarded when looking for the optimal group litigation mechanisms 
from a deterrence point of view. First, they do not add anything to the probability of 
detection and conviction, as they only take place after a public proceeding. In 
addition, because the monetary penalty needed to reach deterrence despite the low 
probability of exposure is likely too large, the rate of detection may be the crucial 
aspect in any enforcement activity. Second, if the amount of fines or sanctions 
imposed in the prior public proceeding are too low to efficiently deter, private follow-
on actions for damages are an inefficient mechanism to increase the amount of penalty 
faced by the potential infringer. If necessary and feasible, such an increase should take 
place in the first procedure, i.e. the public enforcement, as two separate proceedings 
                                                
267 The idea of justice expressed in the proportionality between severity of act and size of sanction 
should not be disturbed by the optimal sanction, which is based on actual harm caused.  
268 This would also be of vital importance when additional factors, such as the availability bias
(established in behavioural economics) taken into account. That bias reflects the notion that people 
base their estimate of the probability that a certain event will occur on how easy information about such 
an event can be brought to mind. See Korobkin and Ulen, "Law ansd Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics," CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 88 (2000): 1051, 
1087 f.  
269 The same argument applies, however, to the imposition of costly non-monetary sanctions, such as 
imprisonment. 
270  Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 63. 
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are a doubling of efforts and a waste of resources. Consequently, the subsequent 
analysis concerning the goal of deterrence will focus on stand-alone suits. 
B Deterrence effects of stand-alone suits with regard to different 
types of infringements 
1 Introduction 
Stand-alone cases, i.e., private suits where no prior public enforcement has taken 
place, present a different scenario. Such suits influence both the ex ante probability of 
getting caught and convicted, as well as the amount of penalty faced by the potential 
infringer.
This section examines the optimal group litigation design from a deterrence 
perspective in a mere theoretical sphere. In this theoretical world, few existing legal 
rules inhibit the options of a group litigation mechanism. It is mainly the interplay 
between costs and benefits that drives the litigation decision. First, questions 
regarding the optimal sanction in stand-alone cases will be discussed. Thereafter, two 
general efficiency aspects concerning the optimal procedure to establish group 
membership, and the choice between stand-alone and follow-on procedures, which 
follow from the results of the optimal sanction analysis, are discussed. The final 
section will then analyse the incentives to detect and prosecute infringements in 
different settings. 
2 The optimal sanction in stand-alone suits 
2.1 The optimal sanction and consequences 
In light of the requirements with regard to the optimal sanction from a deterrence 
perspective as discussed above,271 the damages sued for in the group litigation should 
be based on the total damage caused to society. The optimal sanction should allow for 
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(Kaldor-Hicks) efficient breaches, taking the probability of detection into account, 
and should not lead to distortions of the principles of proportionality and marginal 
deterrence. The total damage caused to society will include damages to victims who, 
in the real world, would not be in a position to provide sufficient proof of their 
damages. To reach optimal deterrence, this amount should be adjusted according to 
the probability of detection and conviction.  As the offender imposes enforcement 
costs on society, he should incorporate these costs in his cost-benefit analysis, so that 
the variable enforcement costs are also imposed on him.272 It the further analysis, it is 
assumed that this can, and will be achieved, by cost-shifting rules that impose most or 
all of these costs on the defendant in case he looses at trial. Therefore for simplicity 
the optimal sanction will be the total damages times the inverse probability of 
detection and conviction.273
In order for the sanction imposed on the antitrust offender(s) to reach the optimal 
amount in a given group litigation proceeding, all losses caused to the different 
victims would have to be included in that very proceeding. That would require the 
group litigation mechanism to be of a mandatory nature.  
That is, members of the group should not be required to opt-in or allowed to opt-out. 
This is the theoretical concept that forms the basis for example for the concept of 
mandatory class action, as known in the US,274 and potentially also the underlying 
rationale for the Portuguese popular action.275 Especially opt-in but also opt-out 
mechanisms bear the risk that not all victims will join, or that some victims may drop 
out of the damage action. Some may not become aware of the action, some may find 
the expected benefits not enough to justify the effort of informing themselves about 
their rights and duties of participating and therefore ignore it, and even others may 
                                                                                                                               
271 See 1.3 Optimal Sanction for anti-competitive conduct in Chapter 2. 
272 Polinsky, Public Enforcement of Law 307, 316. The incorporation of plaintiffs litigation costs may 
already exist in those member States that follow the British rule with regard to cost shifting. 
273 The incorporation of plaintiffs litigation costs may already exist in those member States that follow 
the British rule with regard to cost shifting. The used simplification for the analysis does not change the 
main results of the analysis. 
274 See FRCP Rule  23 (b) (1) (A); (b) (1) (B); (b) (2), although limited to specific circumstances, see 
Pace, "Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical 
Literature," (2007), 11 and 15; Rowe Jr, "State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: 
Differences from-and Lessons for?-Federal Rule 23," WESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
35 (2007): 147, 155 f. 
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deliberately decide not to be part of the group litigation as they expect to do better on 
their own in the wake of the group proceeding. It has been pointed out in the literature 
that deciding not to participate in a group litigation, but to initiate an individual 
proceeding, is only a viable option for those victims who have relatively large losses 
to sue for. Victims with small and scattered losses have no alternatives, when the 
expected rewards do not justify the expenses. Empirical results, though difficult to 
attain, seem to support that idea.276 Moreover, opt-out rates seem to be very low on 
average, so that an opt-out solution may come close to a mandatory solution in reality 
in many cases.277 Opt-in proceedings are likely to lead to the lowest levels of 
participation. Both Law and Economics literature, as well as actual experiences with 
forms of opt-in proceedings, corroborate this.278
If not all damages are sued for, the penalty imposed will fall short of the optimal 
sanction, leading to under deterrence. If, on the other hand, all those victims deciding 
not to opt-in or deciding to opt-out would indeed bring their own claims, the optimal 
sanction may be imposed, however at higher total costs. Moreover, in jurisdictions 
without strict rules of precedent, or between different jurisdictions, there may be the 
costs of potentially inconsistent judgments and consequent lack of clarity in the law. 
In conclusion, the following statements can be made. In order to reach optimal 
deterrence by imposing the optimal sanction on offenders, total damages caused to 
society must be sued for. The optimal group litigation therefore will have to capture 
all harmed individuals. As neither opt-in, nor opt-out mechanisms can guarantee that 
all harmed individuals will be included the best mechanism seems to be a mandatory 
                                                                                                                               
275 Mulheron, Competition Law Cases under the Opt-out Regimes of Australia, Canada and Portugal: 
A research paper for the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
276 See Connor, Global price fixing Chapter 15, 393 ff, analysing the outcome of settlements in several 
federal class action cases and also 417. 
277 Studies of consumer cases over a period of ten years suggest an average opt-out rate of less than 0, 
2%, see Eisenberg and Miller, "Role of Opt-outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical 
and Empirical Issues, The," VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 57 (2004): 1529, 1532. 
278 Issacharoff and Miller, "Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?" NYU LAW AND 
ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 08-46(2008). Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296843. 
Lampe and Rossman, "Procedural Approaches for Countering the Dual-Filed FLSA Collective Action 
and State-Law Wage Class Action," LABOR LAWYER 20 (2004): 311, 313 f ; Baetge, "National report 
Germany: Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation," GLOBAL CLASS 
ACTIONS(2007), 31. Available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/Germany_National_Report.pdf; Mulheron, "Some 
Difficulties with Group Litigation Orders-and Why a Class Action is Superior," CIVIL JUSTICE 
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one. Overall, the optimal system would require the initiator (agent) of the group 
litigation to be endowed with the right to represent all harmed victims in society.279
Moreover, the adjustment of the actual amount of harm done with the low probability 
of detection would require the court to be able to estimate that probability correctly 
and there also be some mechanism to circumvent legal obstacles such as the prevalent 
ban on overcompensation or unjust enrichment. Punitive damages or the like would 
have to be possible. Existing legal impediments to reaching  such a solution will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
2.2 Settlements 
Another aspect relevant to the imposition of the optimal sanction at lowest possible 
costs is the question of settlements.  
Settlements may allow a reduction of enforcement costs by reducing resources spent 
on litigation. Under conditions of complete information and equal bargaining power, 
the settlement outcome should equal the outcome that would have resulted in a trial. 
When the interests of the representing party are identical to the interest of society, that 
settlement agreement should be the optimal sanction. Additionally, since settlements 
are commonly understood to require fewer resources than a court trial,280 such a 
settlement would reach the desired effect at lower costs. However, when the 
conditions of complete information and equal bargaining power are not given, the 
costs to be saved by settlements compared to litigation would have to be weighted 
against any negative effects settlements may have on deterrence. This will be 
explained in more detail below. 
Assuming that there is no information asymmetry, both parties have the same 
expectation of the outcome of the trial, both are equally risk neutral and have the same 
                                                                                                                               
QUARTERLY 24 (2005): 40. For an example of the difficulties that an opt-in approach may entail see 
also the case brought by the Uk consumer association WHICH?, discussed in chapter 5. 
279 Ideally, that would also include victims of the same infringement in another jurisdiction. However, 
cross-border solutions are not foreseen in the current European development. Compare chapter 5, 
section A. 1.3.7. on the U.S. nationwide class action for a brief  discussion of occurring problems. 
280Gross and Syverud, "Getting to no: A study of settlement negotiations and the selection of cases for 
trial," MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 90 (1991): 319, 320. Shavell, "The level of litigation: Private versus 
social optimality of suit and of settlement," INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW & ECONOMICS 19 
(1999): 99, 100 f. 
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costs and resources, the settlement amount should equal that expected outcome. In 
this case both parties can avoid the costs of litigation by coming to an agreement. 
Under such simplistic models, the adversaries will settle their dispute for the same 
amount as the expected trial outcome. Shavell281 showed that a settlement is even 
mutually beneficial in scenarios where plaintiff and defendant have different 
expectations with regard to the expected outcome of the trial, as long as the sum of 
litigation costs to be saved exceeds the discrepancy between their expectations.  
However, such models are based on strong assumptions, which may be lacking in 
reality. Other assumptions as to the nature and aim of the involved parties can lead to 
the assessment that settlement agreements bear the risk of not imposing the optimal 
sanction on the infringing party and thus interfere with the desired deterrence effect of 
claims for damages. Such assumptions include information asymmetry between the 
parties, different attitudes towards risk, different estimates of probabilities and 
strategic or opportunistic behaviour by self interested parties.282  These assumptions 
may be more realistic. 
Different risk attitudes can interfere with the deterrence effect of settlements.283 When 
plaintiffs are more risk averse than defendants, the bargaining power is distributed 
unequally, enabling the less risk averse defendant to settle for more favourable 
amounts. If potential offenders can count on the possibility of a settlement agreement 
that will be less than the expected outcome of the trial, the deterrence effect  ex ante is 
diminished.  
Also strategic behaviour of involved individuals can lead to socially inefficient 
settlements. Scholars repeatedly point out that while the bundling of several claims 
into one procedure increases the incentives to file suit, it also enhances the risk of 
                                                
281 Shavell, "Economic analysis of litigation and the legal process," HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, PAPER 404(2004) 9 f. 
282 All possible settings can not be discussed here. For an overview of settlement models in various 
settings see Daughety, Settlement. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME I. THE 
HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS . eds. Bouckaert andDe Geest. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2000), 95. 
283 Ibidem, 176 ff. 
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unmeritorious cases.284 Such frivolous suits, which are part of negative value suits 
(NEV),285 are brought with the mere aim to extract a settlement from the defendant. 286
The threat of costly, publicity evoking suits could force defendants into accepting 
such settlement offers. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section, as they may depend on the form of group litigation. 
Therefore, the general assumption of settlements being a less costly mechanism to 
solve a dispute while reaching the same result as litigation becomes less convincing 
when such other factors are taken into account. Reputational losses or the economic 
necessity to keep certain types of information secret increase the incentives for 
defendants to avoid a trial, even if the allegations against them lack sufficient 
grounds. Other procedural rules, for example broad discovery rules287 or possibly 
costly pre-trial certification procedures, strengthen these effects. Additionally, legal 
certainty and the development of legal rules are only facilitated when cases do go to 
trial. This is because most settlement agreements are not public released, which may 
also be an argument that needs to be taken into account by policy makers.     
In the following analysis, settlements will generally be treated as welfare enhancing, 
i.e. as cost minimising. However, where incentives are present that may inhibit 
reaching the optimal settlement amount, these issues will be discussed. 
2.3 Optimal enforcement 
If the sanction imposed in a private action for damages is the socially optimal sanction 
to reach deterrence, the incentives of the acting parties leading to either too much or 
                                                
284 For example Hay and Rosenberg, ""Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: 
Reality and Remedy," NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 75 (2000): 1377 ; Rosenberg and Kozel, "Solving 
the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment," HARVARD LAW AND 
ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 469; HARVARD PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 
90(2004).Available online at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=485242 ; Schäfer, The Bundling of 
Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations
183, 187. 
285 Negative value suits are suits where the expected outcome does not justify the expected expenses for 
giong to trial. That can be due to teh fact that the costs of suing are simply too larger, or that the 
probability of winning at trial is too low (for example because the case has little merits) For a model on 
NEV suits, see Bebchuk, Negative Expected Value Suits.
286 Rosenberg and Shavell, "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (1985): 3. 
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too little litigation become relevant. The risk of under deterrence relates to the 
obstacles faced by individuals contemplating whether or not to bring an action for 
damages. These obstacles should ideally be overcome by the optimal group litigation 
mechanism. On the other hand, the mechanism should not give too large or wrong 
incentives, so as to avoid over deterrence. The risk of under , but also that of over 
deterrence, under which also activities are deterred which would have an overall 
beneficial effect for society, are both closely related to the incentives of the individual 
initiating and conducting the action for damages. Different entities may act as this 
agent and the specific issues concerning the incentive structure of each will be 
discussed below, when the choice of the agent is discussed.   
However prior to turning to this, two general results from choosing a mandatory 
mechanism on efficient deterrence are first described here. 
2.4 Reducing free riding and moral hazard problems 
Including all victims in one procedure helps to solve the problems connected to free 
rider behaviour. Waiting for prior public enforcement is not an option when the group 
litigation mechanism is confined to stand-alone cases. Counting on some other victim 
to initiate proceedings is only beneficial then, when the passive group members can 
expect to be made at least equally well off as the initiating party.288 Making the group 
membership mandatory would also overcome the disincentives of dependent business 
partners, who otherwise would refrain from filing suit due to fear of retaliation. End 
consumers would not be deterred by having to fill out forms or make initial payments 
in order to opt-in. Additionally, important plaintiffs with relatively large claims and 
sufficient individual resources to file individual claims can not opt-out to the 
detriment of the remaining group members. The risk that group members vital to the 
success of the group, for example those represented in or initiating the precedence 
case, might be bought off during the proceedings or enticed to settle confidentially 
and exit, which would lead to under deterrence, is avoided. 
                                                                                                                               
287 As available for example in the US. For an economic analysis see Wagener, Modelling the effect of 
one-way fee shifting on discovery abuse for private antitrust litigation 1887.
288 These questions are closely connected to the discussion about the type of agent that will represent 
the group. These issues are dealt with in greater detail below. 
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2.5 Procedural efficiency 
Looking at cost efficiency, it becomes clear that the claims for damages, as an 
enforcement tool imposing the optimal sanction on the infringing party or parties, 
should best be bundled into just one legal procedure. Having several victims claim 
individual damages is connected to a multiplication of efforts and a waste of 
resources. Court fees, lawyers and experts have to be paid several times to impose the 
total of the sanction. Therefore, as soon as detection has taken place, all victims 
should be represented in just one group litigation. Damages caused to competitors, 
direct and indirect purchasers, would all be dealt with in just the one legal procedure. 
Again, this requires the group litigation mechanisms to be of a mandatory nature, 
where no victim is required to opt-in (as it may refrain from doing so) or allowed to 
opt-out. Thereby the additional costs of notification and registration as they occur in 
opt-in and opt-out procedures can also be avoided. Also in reality, as long as the 
factual and legal issues are the same for the majority of the victims,289 mandatory 
group litigation would generally have to be preferred from a cost perspective.   
The costs analysed so far only relate to litigation expenditures. However, also the 
detection of an offence in the first place can be very resource demanding. These 
detection expenditures should be justified by the rate of detection that can be 
achieved. Put in another way, the optimal rate of detection should be achieved with 
the lowest overall burden on society. Trade offs with giving sufficient incentives for 
private parties to investigate potential anti-competitive conduct may be unavoidable. 
These aspects will be analysed thoroughly when the incentive structures of the agents 
are examined below.   
C The optimal enforcement agent 
So far, the picture of one representing party (the agent) emerges, who enforces 
competition law on behalf of society at large, i.e., all those victims harmed by an 
                                                
289 In the following analysis, this is assumed to be the case, as the most difficult legal issue common to 
all claims often will be the question of liability. Exact individual amounts of harm may be of less 
importance, as will be developed. 
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offence, using the tool of actions for damages in a mandatory procedure to impose the 
optimal sanction on the violating parties. These basic principles present great 
similarities to the case of public enforcement. It also follows closely the general 
principles of optimal deterrence as laid out in the economic literature by Becker and 
Stigler290, Landes and Posner291, Shavell and Polinsky292 and all the other works that 
followed. With the optimal sanction and some basic efficiency features established, 
the focus now turns to the incentives of the agent to act accordingly. 
The optimal system should not only give optimal incentives to the agent to detect and 
punish anti-competitive conduct, but to also minimise the costs that activity imposes 
on society, including the costs of abuse of the system for personal gains. As a 
consequence, the optimal group litigation mechanism must exhibit features that allow 
for an efficient reduction of the information asymmetry problem, and an avoidance of 
the problems connected to free riding behaviour and rational apathy. Last but not 
least, the design of the system should not give rise to principal-agent problems that 
distort the efficiency of the system. Focusing on the goal of deterrence, these 
problems, while already present between representing and represented parties, may 
also arise between the enforcing party as agent, and society at large as principal. 
Both information asymmetry and rational apathy problems are closely connected to 
the incentives which a specific group litigation mechanism is able to set for the 
initiator. The incentives of public agencies and their employees to invest in the 
investigation of certain incidents are explained in the Law and Economics literature 
using the theory of public choice.293 Although public enforcement is not the topic of 
this thesis, the insights of that stream of literature may also be used in the further 
analysis of group actions for damages due to competition law infringement. The 
incentive structures of agents involved in group litigations, for example when 
associations act on behalf of the group, could be influenced by similar concepts, for 
example building or maintaining a reputation, gaining publicity or building individual 
careers. For, as assumed, for more profit oriented purely private actors, such as firms 
                                                
290 Becker, Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of Enforces 1. 
291 Landes, The Private Enforcement of Law 1. 
292 Polinsky, A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals 618. 
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or individuals, the incentive to sue for damages is assumed to be mainly influenced by 
the awards granted in court. Other possible motivations, such as revenge or the wish 
to altruistically contribute to the welfare of society at large are not be taken into 
account, as it is assumed unlikely that they would be the main driving force in the 
majority of cases.294 Additionally, the influence of the group litigation mechanism on 
the motivations to abuse the system of private claims for damages due to competition 
law infringements for personal gains is discussed.  
The major focus of the following section will be the analysis of different agents and 
the particular incentive structures provided by the systems governing these agents. 
The analysis also follows a backwards induction approach. Starting from the desired 
outcome, which is that the optimal sanction is imposed on the offender, the necessary 
steps leading to that outcome are traced. First the features of the group litigation 
relating to the incentives and disincentives to file claim once detection has taken place 
are investigated. These are mainly the issues of rational apathy and free riding 
behaviour. Then the incentives and possibilities to detect an offence in the first place 
are analysed, which chiefly deal with the problem of information asymmetry and the 
incentives to overcome that obstacle. Lastly, also the problems that may inhibit the 
efficiency of the system because of inconsistent incentives of the players involved 
(principal-agent problems) and nuisance suits, as well as the possibility to minimise 
costs, are discussed.  
In the analysis, the question of how the optimal sanction imposed on the offender will 
be distributed amongst different parties will initially be left open. From a deterrence 
perspective, the distribution does not matter, as long as it does not benefit the 
infringer, and as long as it is costless. What does matter, however, is how different 
variations of distribution influence the players involved, therefore the discussion of 
the distribution issue will be developed in that respect. 
                                                                                                                               
293 For general insights in the theory of public choice, see Van den Hauwe, Public Choice, 
Constitutional Political Economy and Law and Economics. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS. eds. Bouckaert andDe Geest. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2000), 603. 
294 Cases brought by companies in order to harm a strong competitor or cases brought in order  to 
extract a positive settlement amount (nuisance suits) will be taken into account. 
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1 Lead plaintiff/ attorney (collective action) 
The first possible agent acting on behalf of the collective is one member of the group.  
The legislator could grant standing to one injured party to represent himself and all 
other victims in the position of a so called lead plaintiff,295 Any individual who has 
suffered harm due to a competition law infringement could hire a lawyer upon 
detection of the malfeasance. Ideally, this lead plaintiff would be a sophisticated 
player and someone frequently involved in similar proceedings. The other injured 
parties would be automatically members of the group, without the possibility of 
exempting themselves from the procedure.   
In this combination, the incentives and interests of three players: society, the lead 
plaintiff, and lawyer, can conflict. Therefore the incentives of both lawyer and lead 
plaintiff have to be investigated. When client’s and lawyer’s incentives are not 
completely aligned, the effects of conflicting interests can distort the efficiency of the 
collective action regarding deterrence. It is then relevant which interests will prevail. 
The same is true for the lead plaintiff acting in the interest of society.  
On the other hand, while in other types of tort cases the injured party will often seek 
legal advice in the case of group actions it is also possible that the lawyer has 
incentives to approach potential clients. If that is the case, the lawyer becomes the 
main driving force behind the detection and litigation of offences, while the lead 
plaintiff may be little more than a figure head. In that case, the possibly conflicting 
interests of society and the lawyers become crucial.  
1.1  Free Rider Problems 
Free rider problems may be reduced under this type of collective action, as the 
mandatory nature of the mechanism includes all victims in one proceeding. Incentives 
to wait for a prior public proceeding that will lead to the establishment of an 
                                                
295 Term taken from the US class action concept. For an analysis of the effects of an insititutional 
investor as lead plaintiff in private securities litigation, see: Cox and Thomas, "Does the plaintiff 
matter? An empirical analysis of lead plaintiffs in securities class actions," COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
106 (2006): 1587. 
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infringement in order to reduce costs only remain if collective actions could also be 
conducted as follow on proceedings. However, in such cases, each individual still 
would have to weigh the risk of others filing suit first and becoming the lead plaintiff 
against the potential cost savings by remaining inactive and waiting for a prior public 
proceeding. 
The crucial question is what motivation a victim has to become the lead plaintiff 
rather than to stay a silent group member, when the damages awarded will be 
distributed according to actual harm suffered later on. Becoming active would imply 
the spending of time and resources on the side of the initiating plaintiff. In order to 
provide incentives for a victim to take up that task, some additional reimbursement for 
these extra efforts are required. As the mandatory procedure would not allow for all 
parties to contract beforehand with each other, it seems that such monetary reward 
would need to be paid out from the total damages awarded. In the following analysis 
the reward paid to lead plaintiffs will be treated as a certain share of the total damages 
granted to the whole pool of plaintiffs. Depending on the size of the share compared 
to the efforts expended by the plaintiff, it then can become more beneficial to take the 
role of the lead rather than to be one of the latter. If the awards are not to be 
distributed amongst the other victims, then it is in fact only the lead plaintiff who 
receives some form of compensation for the suffered losses.296 In this case the 
incentive to become active would be even larger.  
It may be noteworthy that when the lead plaintiff is allowed to settle the claims, there 
is also the possibility for the lead plaintiff to collude with the defendant(s), thereby 
extracting the total of damage awards, regardless of the shares the law would assign to 
him. If possible, this would really provide incentives to come forward and become the 
lead plaintiff. The reasoning for this goes as follows. Ideally, the lead plaintiff would 
accept only a settlement offer that equals or exceeds his expected net outcome from 
the trial. However, the amount the defendant(s) expect to have to pay in total exceeds 
that amount, as long as the lead plaintiff does not receive the total group damages. 
                                                
296 This may be the case when total damages will be used in a cy press mechanism, and only the lead 
plaintiff receives compensation and remuneration. Cy press constitutes a possibility to put damage 
awards to their “next best” use when they can not be used to compensate individual victims. An 
example would be awarding the damages to some agency that will use the proceeds in the general 
interest of the represented group. 
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Their willingness to pay in the settlement agreement therefore is capped only by the 
amount that equals total expected damages. Within the parameters established by two 
amounts, the adversaries can bargain for a settlement amount which is preferred to the 
trial outcome by both, because litigation costs can be saved. If all the bargaining 
power were in the hands of the victim, he or she would settle for an amount that 
equals or only marginally falls short of the total damage awards. From a social point 
of view, this would be an efficient outcome. 
On the other hand, if all the bargaining power resides with the defendant(s), the 
settlement amount would be only marginally larger than the expected payments made 
to the lead plaintiff if the case were to go to trial. In this case there would be little 
incentive for an individual victim to take on the task of becoming lead plaintiff  
When it is in fact the lawyer detecting an infringement and driving the litigation, free 
riding behaviour would be reduced, as lawyers would only gain when they are the first 
to detect and prosecute. The mandatory nature of the group litigation would eliminate 
the free riding behaviour of lawyers bringing follow on cases on behalf of sub groups 
or different classes of victims in the wake of cases unearthed by their fellow lawyers. 
The details of such a system and the relevant incentives structures will be discussed in 
depth below, where market based mechanisms are discussed.297
1.2 Overcoming rational apathy  
It may be recalled that the individual victim will only have incentives to file suit upon 
detection, when the personal expected outcome at trial is as least as large as the costs 
of doing so. The factors that influence these variables are: the total costs of the group 
litigation, which the lead plaintiff may have to bear partially or totally or to pre-
finance; the possibilities opened up by the group proceeding to share costs with other 
victims; the use of other financing mechanisms; and, ways to increase the personal 
outcome. 
                                                
297 See section 3. 
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1.2.1 The total costs of litigation 
One of the individuals harmed by anticompetitive conduct may be able to engage a 
lawyer and prosecute the claims of all other victims, including him or herself. This 
lead plaintiff will face many of the above discussed problems concerning traditional 
tort claims. Moreover, with the enactment of a group litigation mechanism, the whole 
procedure can become much more complex and resource demanding. For example, if 
not only one’s own individual damages, but damages to the whole group, have to be 
proven. Also, such a group mechanism can take considerably longer than traditional 
civil litigation. Data from the US shows that class actions require more than four 
times the effort of other average civil cases.298 In consequence, the rational apathy 
problem preventing the individual to start proceedings can become even more severe.  
If the plaintiff only receives his actual damages as her award, the value she places on 
these claims is much less than the value the prosecution of these claims has for 
society. This is the same problem faced in traditional litigation. The incentives to file 
a suit in the first place may also be influenced by the fee arrangement agreed upon 
between lead plaintiff and legal representative. Larger fees for the attorney generally 
have a negative effect on the plaintiff’s incentives to file suit. A plaintiff may also 
have to bear both his own, and the opponent’s lawyer’s costs, in the event the case is 
lost, when, as in most Member States, the English fee shifting rule is applied. Unless 
some additional benefits, such as compensation of expenses and an additional 
monetary award for becoming the lead plaintiff can be granted, the individual will 
tend to have even less incentives to file suit than without group litigation, as total 
litigation costs are likely to increase.  
1.2.2 Spreading the costs 
On the other hand, the use of group actions could allow the division of costs amongst 
all those represented. Ideally, the costs of the procedure would be spread over all the 
victims represented in the group litigation, thereby substantially reducing the costs 
                                                
298 Willging, et al, "Empirical study of class actions in four federal district courts: Final report to the 
advisory committee on civil rules," WASHINGTON, DC: FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER(1996), 7 f. 
Available online at: www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf 
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each individual has to bear. However, as the optimal system has to be one of a 
mandatory nature, this is not a feasible solution unless the total costs of the 
proceeding are paid from the amount of the awarded damages and the individual lead 
plaintiff will bear none of the risks involved, for example costs imposed on him if the 
case is dismissed due to the lack of merits. It is clear that implementing such a 
solution would create other risks that would inhibit the efficiency of the system with 
regard to deterrence. For example, this may increase the risk of cases being brought 
before the courts with little or no merits, purely in order to extract a settlement from 
the defendant. 
1.2.3 Using other ways of financing 
Under a perfect capital market system, pre-financing of such suits would not be a 
problem. The claims for damages have an economic value therefore the holder of 
these rights should be able to borrow on the capital market against the expected 
recovery of these claims.299 While the capital market is likely to be less than perfect, 
other ways to shift the risk and costs may be available. 
Possibilities allowing the risk of the trial, and initial expenditures to be shifted on to 
third parties, such as the lawyer or professional litigation funder, would greatly 
decrease the rational apathy problem on the side of injured parties, especially for non 
commercial clients.300 Professional funders of civil litigation already exist in a number 
of Member States, for example IM Litigation Funding in the UK, and Foris AG and 
Juratec AG in Germany, to name a few. Both mentioned alternatives would require 
the funder to gain compensation for the costs and risks taken, and are only likely to 
work when it is profitable to do so. Therefore, as seen in reality, these financiers are 
going to ask for a substantial share of total damage awards. 
Several authors also praise the potential for contingency fees to overcome the 
disincentive to sue connected to the financing abilities of the plaintiff, as the lawyer 
                                                
299 Schwartz, Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, An 1125, 1125. 
See also Landes, The Private Enforcement of Law 1. 
300 Rubinfeld, Contingent fees 415, 415 f. 
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bears initial expenses.301 The possibility of reducing or shifting the risk of losing the 
trial because it is better distributed amongst plaintiff and lawyer in such cases also has 
these effects.302 That is the case because the utility for the plaintiff will always be 
higher under a contingency fee contract, when she is risk averse, due to the risk 
shifting feature of contingency contracts. On the other hand, as will be discussed 
below, contingency fee arrangements can influence the severity of principal-agent 
problems and the incentives to file unmeritorious suits. Other possibilities with similar 
effects on the rational apathy problem experienced on the injured party’s side include: 
legal insurance schemes; specialised public financing funds; or, professional 
financers. 303 Critics of contingency fee systems often refer to such systems as 
methods to avoid possible negative side effects of contingency fee arrangements, i.e. 
principal-agent problems.304The potential negative effects on other factors 
determining the efficiency of the system must be discounted from the beneficial 
effects discussed here. 
It has to be mentioned that alternative financing systems are not only possible in any 
form of group litigation mechanism, but also in traditional litigation. However, both a 
contingency fee lawyer and professional funders will only invest resources in cases 
that involve sufficiently large amounts. Therefore they might be more likely to invest 
in the group proceedings rather than in the individual suits that might be brought 
instead.
1.2.4 The lawyer as agent 
The rational apathy problem concerning the lawyer is analogous to the assessment of 
the victims, and depends on the remuneration of the lawyer for his efforts. The 
                                                
301 For example Gravelle, No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees 1205 ; 
Schwartz, Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, An 1125;. Rubinfeld, 
Contingent fees 415, 415f.  
302 See Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation 213 Halpern, Legal fees contracts and 
alternative cost rules: An economic analysis 3. 
303 See Office of Fair Trading, "Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, Recommendations by the Office of Fair Traiding 
," (November 2007), nr. 5.3. Available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ 
reports/comp_policy/oft916resp.pdf. See also Riley, Damages in EC antitrust actions: who pays the 
piper? 748,  who propose the establishment of a contingency legal aid fund (CLAF) for cartel cases in 
the European context. 
304 Which are discussed below. 
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remuneration may be larger under a contingency fee contract than under an hourly fee 
arrangement, especially when the latter is strictly regulated and capped. However, 
both could also be established in a way to lead to the same total amounts. What will 
be crucial is the effect these remuneration systems will have on the incentives of the 
lawyer vis-à-vis the incentives of society. These problems will be discussed in the 
section on principal-agent problems. 
1.2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion it may be said that additional benefits or a reimbursement for time and 
effort expended on filing the suit should be granted to the lead plaintiff by allowing 
her to receive all, or a part, of the total damages awarded.305 Depending on the share 
the plaintiff will receive, the individual assessment of whether the expected awards 
justify the expected expenses could be tailored towards a positive outcome. To make 
that positive shift, the money awarded to the lead plaintiff must at least cover the 
actual damages suffered, adjusted for the probability of losing at trial, and 
compensation for all the resources spent on and all the costs caused by the prosecution 
of the defendant(s).306  Granting the lead plaintiff a share of total awards that exceeds 
his own actual damages would help to overcome the problem of rational apathy 
concerning the filing of suit persistent on the victim’s side. Both end consumers and 
undertakings as direct victims of offences could be encouraged in these ways to bring 
claims. For the former, the problem of otherwise too small damages is solved. For the 
latter, purchasers incorporating future economic losses due to retaliation measures 
into their calculation could also be awarded compensation for these expected 
losses.307
If the lead plaintiff receives less than the total damages of the group, and the amount 
redistributed amongst those victims that can be identified does not amount to the full 
fund paid by the defendant(s), the question is raised as to what will happen to any 
unclaimed damages. If distribution to the victims takes place, funds may be created 
                                                
305 The legal limits to such mechanisms will be discussed below in section C. 
306 That is, when the victim is risk-neutral. The compensation would need to be higher when lead 
plaintiffs are risk-averse.
307 Though admittedly, this may increase the problems of nuisance suits especially in cases of 
competitor plaintiffs, who may stand to gain from imposing costs on their competitor.  
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from which other victims able and willing to provide proof of their affiliation to the 
group could later receive some compensation. The remaining awards may also flow to 
the state or to other entities to be used for specified purposes, using the cy press
instrument. However, from a deterrence point of view, the subsequent distribution of 
the damage awards is irrelevant, as long as it does not interfere with the deterrence 
effect by somehow benefiting the defendant(s) or creating wrong incentives for the 
players involved. Distribution mechanisms that create additional costs to be borne by 
society will however be inefficient from a total welfare perspective. 
1.3 Asymmetric information  
So far, the obstacles and possible solutions connected to the filing of suits have been 
discussed. However, litigation can only take place once infringements have been 
detected. No compensation or reward is offered for any efforts spent on detection, so 
far.
That may not be of major importance in cases where detection is simple and 
consequently the problem of asymmetric information is not large. In cases where 
detection rates are extremely high, and no or only limited resources have to be spent 
on detection, special incentives for detection may be considered unnecessary. For 
such offences, the lead plaintiff will likely be in a good position to commence 
proceedings. In other cases, especially in cases of hard-core cartels, gaining 
knowledge about an infringement is a complex task. The type of infringement affects 
the potential of, and risk connected with, such an enforcement system. While 
horizontal cartels are covert and inherently difficult to detect, other types of 
infringements create far fewer problems of asymmetric information. In cases where 
the illegal conduct of the defendant is easy to discover, for example in types of 
vertical restraints, the incentives created by awarding the enforcement agent more 
than actual damages to overcome disincentives to invest resources in detection entails 
a risk of counterproductive effects, especially concerning nuisance suits. Often, the 
information concerning an infringement and even the necessary proof are already in 
the hands of the victim. Cases of abuse of a dominant position under Art. 82 EC 
Treaty are also likely to be more easily observable, for example in cases of refusal to 
deal. Also predatory pricing strategies typically harm direct competitors. While the 
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practise itself is quite easily observable, the information required establish an 
infringement encompasses not only all the information needed to establish the 
dominant position of the predator, but also includes knowledge about the actual cost 
function of the alleged competition law infringer.308 Competitors claiming lost profits 
can also appear in cases of refusal to deal. In this case the detection rate is likely to be 
close to 100 percent. Here any gain to the plaintiff exceeding the actual damages 
caused to him would increase the risk of unmeritorious claims brought to extract a 
settlement despite low merits of the case, especially in cases ruled by a rule-of-reason 
approach or an effects based analysis. However,  the detection rate in such cases 
should be set very high, thereby granting the plaintiff only smaller additional gains 
from litigation, compared to other types of offences. Over deterrence of conduct that 
may actually enhance total welfare is a larger risk in cases where typically 
competitors are the plaintiffs than in cases of cartels. In sthe former cases, the 
necessity of far reaching group litigation mechanism is also lower. 
In the case of larger asymmetric information problems, victims of illegal conduct 
remain unlikely to invest resources to uncover such offences without providing 
additional awards for engaging in such activities. An example would be end 
consumers harmed by a price cartel where the total damages were passed on to them. 
That means that prosecuting victims will not only have to receive the share of total 
damages to compensate them for the risks and costs of litigation, but more than that to 
cover detection expenses.309
Under the collective action mechanism, both the lawyer and lead plaintiff may be 
given incentives to overcome the problem of asymmetric information, by granting 
them a larger than proportional share of the total damages. As the lead plaintiff 
receives a share of (or maybe even the total of) awarded damages, the amount he 
receives that exceeds his total costs and damages constitutes a profit that may justify 
initial expenditures in detection. The same argument is true for the lawyer when 
working on a contingency fee basis, granting also him a share of total damage awards. 
                                                
308 On a discussion of the European approach to predatory pricing, see Van Den Bergh, European
competition law and economics: a comparative perspective, 293. 
309 Which is one of the arguments in favour for punitive or exemplary damages. They cover costs that 
are not compensated by compensatory damages and provide a form of reward for the plaintiff enforcing 
legal rules and thereby fulfilling a socially valuable task.  
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Obviously, the lead plaintiff will only monitor and investigate markets she is active in, 
and firms she is conducting business with, as personal harm is the basic requirement 
to become a lead plaintiff in a collective action procedure, as defined here. End 
consumers would cover the largest part of the market, but would also need larger 
compensation, as their costs of detection typically are larger than for companies.  
Because, just as the initial problem of asymmetric information is unequally severe 
depending on the type of victim, also the incentives to investigate given by the share 
of damages received are likely to be larger for commercial entities than for end 
consumers. The latter typically engages in economic exchange in a huge variety of 
markets and on relatively small scales, leading to relatively low damages. While the 
costs of monitoring and investigating for this affected party are considerably larger, 
the probabilities of finding an infringement are relatively low, due to the restriction to 
cases of own involvement. Risk aversion of end consumers exacerbates these 
problems. The share of damages received would have to be very large to justify these 
risky investments. For commercial entities, such as direct purchasers, granting a 
sufficient share of the total damages is likely to have much larger effects on the 
willingness to reduce existing information asymmetries. However, these entities will 
also be restricted to markets they conduct business in, but the information asymmetry 
is lower from the outset. 
As already discussed, it might be that even if a collective action system is designed to 
grant the lead plaintiff the most active role, it is in fact the lawyer who assumes this 
role. An attorney would have incentives to detect anti-competitive conduct when his 
financial remuneration is positively impacted accordingly, for example by receiving a 
share of total damage awards. The lawyer could find cases in any industry and is not 
restricted by the necessity of his own involvement. The attorney may be in a position 
to specialise or focus on specific industry sectors or certain types of infringement, 
thereby being able to reduce investigation costs due to specialisation. Also, 
infringements detected while investigating another infringement could be prosecuted. 
The incentives to invest resources in the uncertain endeavour of monitoring markets 
would be determined by the value of the share of the expected total awards in relation 
to the initial costs that have to be borne. Once an offence is found, victims could be 
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approached310 and offered to assume the role of lead plaintiff. The lawyer will also 
always weigh the risks and costs connected to investment in detection efforts against 
the potential financial rewards. Therefore, granting the lawyer only a share of the total 
damages caused to society (the total damages awarded in court, i.e. the optimal 
sanction), for example twenty or thirty percent, may lead to less detection efforts than 
society would like to see in certain cases.311 A share of the total damages might well 
be enough to trigger some amount of investigation and litigation, but possibly not up 
to the amount that society at large would be willing to invest.312
It may be noteworthy that in these cases where lead plaintiff and lawyer can freely 
contract about the remuneration, the lawyer may end up receiving almost the total 
damage awards. This is because many victims may be interested in assuming the role 
of lead plaintiff especially when the total damage awards will not be distributed. This 
gives great bargaining power to the attorney. If the contingency fee percentage is not 
regulated by law, the attorney could contract a fee close to 100 percent of the total 
damage awards, minus the share reserved for the lead plaintiff by law. Other victims, 
that now will otherwise receive none of the damages, may even be inclined to offer 
part of their share as side payments to the lawyer in order to become the lead plaintiff. 
De facto, the lawyer would then be in a position to receive a sum close to total 
damage awards.  Such a system is very likely to initiate competition amongst lawyers 
to invest in the detection and litigation of anti-competitive conduct. It may even be an 
efficient system. However, under such circumstances, it would be better to design the 
group litigation system accordingly and eliminate the then purely formal necessity of 
lead plaintiffs, which brings about costs but no additional benefits. While competition 
amongst several enforcers is likely to have positive effects on deterrence, some 
problems are also created. The effects and desirability of such a market for 
enforcement and possible solutions to emerging problems are discussed in section 
C.3. and C.4. below. 
In conclusion it can be said that the degree to which asymmetric information exists 
depends on the type of infringement and the nature of the victim supposed to act as 
                                                
310 These arguments presuppose that such conduct is not prohibited. However, in many Member States 
lawyers are still prohibited from approaching potential clients  
311 See section 3, below, discussing the problem of adequate remuneration of the agent. 
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lead plaintiff. End consumers in cases of very small and widely spread damages will 
face larger costs in overcoming these obstacles, than companies harmed in other 
cases. Individual end consumers are likely to lack the necessary knowledge and skills 
to pursue a case, and are also probably only involved in very few cases (one-shot 
players). Moreover, it is crucial that in general the acting agent for detection efforts is 
reimbursed in order to provide incentives to invest resources in detection of 
competition law infringements.  
Granting the agent only a proportional share of the total damages caused by detected 
infringements might give suboptimal incentives to invest in detection efforts, i.e., 
efforts to overcome the initial info asymmetry. Society would be better off paying the 
total damages to the agent but reaping the benefits of other infringements being 
deterred than to just suffer the losses without undertaking additional deterrence 
effects. Therefore, societies’ and agents’ interest in investing in detection efforts 
differ, as the latter do not take the deterrence benefits of their actions accruing to 
society at large into account. This problem will be discussed in greater detail below in 
section 3. 
1.4 Principal-Agent Problems 
As already stated, there are several principal-agent problems that can arise in a 
collective action setting. When the lead plaintiff is an active player with its own 
interests, conflicts can arise between the interests of society and those of the lawyer. 
When it is the lawyer that is the active agent, and the lead plaintiff is a silent figure 
head, the interests of society and the lawyer should be aligned. 
Principal-agent problems in a collective action settings may be increased as compared 
to the traditional client-lawyer relationship. It is possible that the lead plaintiff is 
unable or rationally unwilling to adequately monitor the lawyer. In addition the fact 
that the lawyer is representing all other possible victims which are able to have no 
influence on the proceeding exacerbates the problems. Especially when the victim is 
not engaged in such lawsuits on a regular basis, but is only a one-shot player, the 
                                                                                                                               
312 See the discussion of the market solution in section 3 below. 
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relevant abilities stemming from experience and litigation related knowledge are 
limited. This will often be the case when the victim in question is a private end 
consumer. In the case the victim is an experienced repeat player, for example 
someone who specialised in the detection and litigation of competition law 
infringements, principal-agent problems are less severe. Similarly, they are likely to 
be less severe in cases where undertakings are plaintiffs. The ability of such agents to 
monitor the lawyer’s conduct, punish insufficient effort by changing lawyer, and 
refusing future employment, can be a sufficient counterweight to conflicting interests 
between client and lawyer. In the other cases, principal-agent problems could remain 
significant. 
As noted above, a commercial client as a repeat player is likely to be in a better 
position to influence the legal representative’s conduct than other types of potential 
victims of competition law infringements, such as end consumers. If the lead plaintiff 
is inexperienced in such endeavours, and most likely to be involved only once in such 
a procedure, the lawyer will often be the person who can evaluate the case and 
chances of success to a better degree than the client. The lead plaintiff then is 
dependant upon getting correct and complete information from the lawyer, who may 
have incentives which deviate from those of the client.  
Depending on the remuneration scheme agreed upon between client and lawyer, 
which can be hourly fees, contingent (conditional) fees or contingency fees, incentives 
of both lawyer and client, may be more or less aligned. Fee arrangements for lawyers 
in civil law countries are predominantly hourly fee agreements.313 However 
contingency fees, in which the lawyer receives a certain percentage of the value of the 
claim, or contingent or conditional fee contracts, where the financial remuneration is 
based on an hourly fee but is increased in case the case is won, are also possible.  
Principal-agent problems can arise as the lawyer may have incentives to restrict the 
amount of effort spent on the case and consequently to advise his clients to agree upon 
settlement arrangements that fall short of what the plaintiff would have accepted 
under a complete information scenario.  
                                                
313 Stuyck, An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer redress other than redress 
through ordinary judicial proceedings Final Report, 317 f. 
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Several authors compared hourly fees and contingency fees with regard to their ability 
to extract optimal exertion from the legal representative and found that the incentives 
for the lawyer to put in effort are affected by the fee arrangement. While under an 
hourly fee arrangement, the procedure may be artificially prolonged by the lawyer so 
as to increase his total remuneration, a common criticism against contingency fees is 
that they provide incentives to settle sooner and also for lower amounts in order to 
induce the defendant to settle at an early stage.314 The ideal baseline in this analysis is 
found by the decision of a perfectly informed and risk neutral client able to monitor 
his counsellor’s behaviour, who is working on an hourly fee.315 Alternatively, it can 
be the effort the lawyer would exert were he to pursue the case for himself.316 As the 
hourly wage is lost to the lawyer by spending time on this rather than another case and 
thereby constitutes his costs (opportunity costs), this optimal effort equals the optimal 
effort the perfectly informed and risk neutral client would buy. The outcome of the 
case is a settlement, which is influenced by the hours spent on the case by the lawyer. 
The obtainable settlement amount increases with each hour, but on a decreasing scale, 
until a fixed maximum amount. Under such settings, the client will buy working hours 
of the lawyer to reach a settlement, where the client’s net benefit (settlement amount 
minus total fees) is maximised.  With a contingency fee of less than 100 percent, the 
attorney will spend less effort than optimal, as he bears all the costs but only receives 
a fraction of the additional increase in settlement amount with each hour spent on the 
case. If the plaintiff is risk averse, however, the loss in net settlement amount could 
also function as a risk premium, as gross recovery could be less than the benchmark 
under contingency fee arrangements.317 Neither competitive pressure on the market 
for legal services nor reputation mechanism or judicial review can effectively combat 
this predicament.318 On the other hand, if the client is imperfectly informed, lawyers 
working on an hourly fee would have incentives to prolong cases at hand, when taking 
                                                
314 See Schwartz, Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, An 1125; 
Miller, Some agency problems in settlement 189 ; Gravelle, No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of 
Contingent Legal Fees 1205. 
315 See Schwartz, Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, An 1125 ; 
Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation 213. 
316 Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal 
Actions taken by Associations 183, 194 . 
317 Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation 213, 223. 
318 Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal 
Actions taken by Associations 183, 194 f. 
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on new cases is connected to some fixed costs of transition. Other authors suggested 
non-linear fees as solution to principal-agent problems.319 Their analysis suggests that, 
the optimal fee will be lower, the higher the expected recovery and the lower the 
effort needed to obtain that recoupment, as large rewards for the attorney are 
necessary to provide incentives to exercise effort.
An inefficient settlement offer may be proposed by defendants when the bargaining 
power is relatively concentrated on the defendant’s side. Depending on the incentive 
structures guiding the decision making process of the lawyer, it is possible that the 
lawyer will collude with the defendant(s) to the detriment of his client while pursuing 
his own interest. If socially inefficient settlements can be beneficial for the lawyer, 
under deterrence may result.  
The total effect of contingency fee systems on settlement amounts depends on several 
other factors, so that the traditional negative view in Europe of contingency fees may 
not always be justified. A number of scholars320  suggest that the opposite of 
traditional analysis is the case and that contingency fees may in fact reduce the 
incentives for lawyers to settle. That may happen for example, when the possibility of 
frivolous suits is taken into account.321 Lower settlement rates and larger settlement 
amounts due to contingency fees also result, if the fact that once the case goes to trial, 
the lawyer will spend less than optimal effort on it, is adequately incorporated in the 
analysis.322 Some empirical evidence, finding decreasing settlement rates and 
increasing settlement amounts with the instruction of a maximum cap on contingency 
fees strengthen these theories.323
                                                
319 So Hay, "Contingent fees and agency costs," JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 25 (1996): 503 Also 
e.g. Miller, Some agency problems in settlement 189 describing contracts in which the lawyer's 
percentage depends on the stage of litigation in which the suit is resolved. Also Clermont and Currivan, 
"Improving on the Contingent Fee," CORNELL LAW REVIEW 63 (1977): 529 proposing contingent 
hourly fees combined with percentage bonuses. 
320 Bebchuk and Guzman, "How Would You Like to Pay for That--The Strategic Effects of Fee 
Arrangements on Settlement Terms," HARVARD NEGOTIATION LAW REVIEW 1 (1996): 53 ; 
Polinsky and Rubinfeld, "A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies," JOURNAL OF LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 23 (2007): 653. 
321 Miceli, Do contingent fees promote excessive litigation 211. 
322 Polinsky, A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers 217. 
323 Danzon and Lillard, "Settlement out of court: The disposition of medical malpractice claims," 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 12 (1983): 345. 
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Of course, lawyers’ actions may be restrained by their interest in gaining or keeping a 
certain reputation. However, reputational issues are likely to be of less relevance 
when it is the lawyer who is searching for a lead plaintiff, and when the lead plaintiff 
typically is a one-shot player, unable to assess and monitor the lawyers’ conduct. 
Apart from other possible motivations, such as ethical concerns and the notion of the 
lawyer to be part of the judicial system to promote justice, it can be assumed that a 
rational lawyer will estimate the benefits of accepting and investing resources in a 
certain case brought to his attention. Most probably, these benefits are largely 
determined by the financial rewards for the work effort.  
Solutions to the problems of adequate fee arrangements include the proposition to 
allow a multitude of mixed contracts, which create signalling and screening 
mechanisms to overcome the problems of information asymmetries between lawyer 
and plaintiff.324 The idea is that lawyers of high quality will prefer contingency fee 
arrangements providing them with a large share, while low quality lawyers would be 
willing to work for lower percentage shares, maybe connected to a fixed fee. Others 
have suggested a hybrid contingent fee, in which the lawyer receives a fraction or 
maybe all of the recovery but makes a fixed side payment to the client.325 Principal-
agent conflicts between client and attorney could be overcome completely, if the 
lawyer would claim the total damages for his own benefit, as agent and principal 
become the same person. One could envision a system allowing the plaintiffs to sell 
their claims to the attorney, effectively increasing the contingency fee to 100 percent 
for a fixed side payment made from the lawyer to the victims. This could be a 
contractual payment made by the lawyer. However, the transaction costs of 
contracting with all possible victims after detection through the lawyer, existing 
information asymmetries, and remaining rational apathy problems, would render such 
a system unfeasible in most cases of infringements, where the incentives to detect are 
crucial. Similar solutions, which may be more efficient, will be discussed below. 
Principal-agent problems are not confined to the relationship between lawyer and 
client. Society may also be seen as a principal, expecting the lead plaintiff or the 
lawyer as agent to enforce competition law for the benefit of society as a whole. In 
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325 Rubinfeld, Contingent fees 415. 
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this relationship conflicts of interests also arise. The individual incentives to sue 
systematically deviate from the social incentives.326 The agent does not take any 
external costs, such as the costs of the judicial system, or any external benefits, such 
as increased deterrence, into account when deciding whether and how to pursue a 
claim. These additional costs and benefits, however, are borne by society, so that their 
interests are not aligned. These principal-agent problems could be greatly reduced if 
the plaintiff were to be granted the total of the damages award.327
In conclusion, the principal-agent problems in a collective action system can be 
severe. They can arise not only between lead plaintiff and lawyer, but also between 
agent and society. For society as the main principal with the aim of deterrence, it 
might be best to grant the enforcer not only a share of total damage awards, but the 
whole (assuming that each litigated case and the detection efforts invested ex ante
would have at least a marginal deterrence effect).  Thereby, the incentives of society 
and agent would be better aligned. 
1.5 Nuisance suits 
The availability of a group litigation mechanism may, however, increase the risk of 
suits being brought against potential defendants for non-efficient reasons, such as the 
aim to harm a competitor or to pressure potential defendants into a settlement, even 
when the merits of the case are questionable.  
A first risk is that competitors may strategically abuse competition law in order to 
harm competitors.328 Cases of exclusionary abuses are especially prone to such 
strategic behaviour, as plaintiffs typically are competitors. Any increase in expected 
                                                
326 SeeShavell, Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, The 333. 
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below. 
328See Baumol and Ordover, "Use of antitrust to subvert competition," JOURNAL OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 28 (1985): 247 ; Breit and Elzinga, "Private antitrust enforcement: the new learning," 
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damage awards also augments the potential for abuse of competition law, as the threat 
of an adverse judgment becomes more severe. At the same time, the motivations to 
look for possibilities to abuse competition law also increase. However, in cases of 
exclusionary abuses or vertical restraints, the probability of detection will often be 
much closer to 100 percent than in cartel cases, for example, so that the increase in 
total damage awards due to the coupling with the inverse of the probability of 
detection is lower.  
Another risk is that claims are being filed with the main purpose of pressuring the 
defendant into a settlement, even when the merits of the claim are highly disputable. 
The risk of such frivolous or nuisance suits has been voiced frequently in the Law and 
Economics literature.329 However, not all researchers agree on the risk of such 
threats.330 The Law and Economics literature has examined circumstances where 
plaintiffs (or their lawyers as the acting agents) have an incentive to sue, even when 
the case bears no or little merits.331 Defendants may prefer an early settlement if this 
costs them less than the sum of the costs of defending the case in court. The latter 
losses consist of the attorney’s fees (the part which must be paid by the defendant 
irrespective of the outcome of the case), the harm to the company’s reputation, and 
the intra-company diversion costs (costs spent on the lawsuit that cannot be used for 
other purposes). The size of these losses creates scope for abuses if the suing attorney 
can easily pressure the defendant to pay damages (parts of which are paid to him 
under the contingency fee arrangement), because for the company the amount of this 
payment is lower than the costs of defending itself in court.  
A formal model of incentives to file a nuisance suit has been developed by Rosenberg 
and Shavell (1985). The authors show that settlement will result even when the 
defendant knows that the plaintiff’s case is not strong enough for the plaintiff to 
actually want to go to trial, when the costs of a legal defence in court for the 
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defendant outweigh the total costs of a settlement. In their analysis, the outcome 
depends on the assumption that filing the suit is relatively cheap, while the first 
response of the defendant is connected to large costs. This can be the case, when the 
filing a collective action by a lead plaintiff and a lawyer at relatively low costs would, 
for example,  require the defendant to gather and provide necessary information for 
the initial stages for the process, such as the data necessary to identify potential other 
victims.332 Further costs arise through potentially large reputational losses for example 
from the public notification of other victims or  media coverage of a large collective 
action, or large costs that would have to be borne due to a reallocation of resources 
within the firm in the course of a trial preparation.  
While the results are certainly influenced by the specific features of the US American 
system of class actions, empirical studies conducted in the US do hint at existing 
incentives to bring meritless claims to extract a settlement offer.333 Empirical 
evidence is difficult to find and results have often been ambivalent, although in the 
area of securities law the existence of nuisance suit seems to have found empirical 
support.334
A certain risk of unmeritorious or frivolous suits remains whether it is a lawyer or a 
lead plaintiff that acts on behalf of the injured parties. However, there may be ways to 
curb this problem. Two possible solutions suggested in the literature are contingency 
fees for lawyers and cost-shifting rules. 
The incentives and possibilities to file frivolous suits may be influenced by the choice 
of the fee agreement the lawyer works under. Several authors suggest that a lawyer 
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working on a contingency basis can act as gatekeeper in the civil justice system while 
still maximising her own benefit by rejecting cases with no or little merits that the 
plaintiff would like to bring.335 These effects of contingency fees have also found 
some support in surveys and empirical literature336 in the US. On the other hand, 
when in fact it is the plaintiff who is the better informed party with regard to the 
merits of the case, allowing a multitude of mixed contracts as possibilities by which to 
signal lawyers’ quality, will also help to overcome the problems of information 
asymmetries concerning the merits of the case. To enable the lawyer to distinguish 
strong from weak cases, he should be able to offer a multitude of different fee 
arrangements. In consequence, clients will signal strong cases by choosing the 
contracts with a low contingency fee and a mostly hourly based payment or a fixed 
fee, as the need to shift risk to the lawyer is lower.337
Some commentators argue that a fee-shifting rule, under which the costs have to be 
borne by the succumbing party, could be a suitable instrument to reduce the incentives 
to file unmeritorious cases.338 However, that rule only applies when the case goes to 
trial, and it seems unlikely that reputational losses sustained by the defendant will also 
be reimbursed. Therefore, plaintiffs still might have incentives to file unmeritorious 
suits under such a regime. 
Another argument often made, and also employed in practice, is to make the 
settlement subject to the judge’s approval. However, such a system is inefficient in 
several ways. First, the judge will have to at least partially mimic the trial in order to 
establish whether the settlement is indeed justified or not. Second, judges are unlikely 
to oppose a settlement that is been promoted by both parties, especially when judges 
are also working under resource restraints. And last, judges may not even be involved, 
when the settlement is made.  
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In concluding it can be said that the risk of nuisance suits increases with the awards 
that can be gained and/or the cost that can be imposed on the opponent. Especially 
when competitors act as plaintiffs, caution may be warranted. However, there may be 
ways to curb the problem by applying adequate cost-shifting rules, or employing 
adequate contingency fee arrangement for lawyers to induce them to act as 
gatekeepers. In such cases, however, it may be that the action will actually be run by 
the lawyer and the group litigation. If this is the case, then the group litigation should 
then be designed accordingly.   
1.6 Minimisation of costs 
Mandatory affiliation to the group ensures that all claims are dealt with in only one 
proceeding. Costs of litigation therefore are reduced.  
However, the costs of detection might still be inefficiently high. Depending on the 
incentive structure created for the individual to investigate and uncover competition 
law infringements, efforts spent on enforcement may be more or less efficient. 
Granted reimbursement for the risky investment in detection, several victims and/or 
several lawyers may compete in the detections stage. That leads to a doubling of 
efforts and consequently contributes to a waste of resources for society. 
In the case of lead plaintiff dominated collective actions the requirement to be a part 
of the group of victims in order to become a lead plaintiff channels the detection 
efforts of each potential victim.. A waste of resources because too many enforcement 
agents (victims) might compete to be the first to detect and file claim then are 
reduced.339 However, that is not the case when the lawyer is the driving force, where 
the problem of doubled efforts may be even larger. These problems and solutions will 
be discussed in greater detail in the sections on market and auctions. 
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1.7 Conclusion
A mandatory collective action, designed to be brought by a lead plaintiff who hires an 
attorney, has some merits but also raises some concerns.  The mandatory nature of the 
group litigation mechanism ensures procedural efficiency, as only one trial has to take 
place. Free riding incentives which otherwise might inhibit the filing of suits are also 
reduced, especially when the lead plaintiff is awarded more than just his actual 
damage. Also rational apathy problems and information asymmetries, although 
increasing with the introduction of mandatory group litigation, can be partially 
overcome by compensating the lead plaintiff for his efforts and costs.  
However, the incentives created by granting the lead plaintiff more than his share also 
increase the risk of unmeritorious or negative value suits. The necessity of being a 
victim reduces detection incentives and channels enforcement activities to parties 
which in some cases may not be the most suited enforcement agent, for example end 
consumers in cartel cases.  
Moreover, the system bears risks of considerable principal-agent problems, which 
may inhibit its efficiency. The relationship between attorney and client depends on 
several factors, including the sophistication of the client and the fee contract. The 
interests of lawyer and client, however, can be in conflict with each other as well as 
those of society and solutions to these conflicts have to be found. If the system is 
designed with the aim to align the interests of the lead plaintiff with those of society, 
these problems between lawyer and lead plaintiff (and also the rest of the group) can 
lead to inefficient outcomes. Consequently this can distort the deterrence effect of the 
group litigation mechanism. Also, smaller groups of injured parties may be in a better 
position to monitor and control the lawyers’ behaviour. The collective action system 
therefore seems less adequate for large groups of inexperienced victims. 
Consequently, such a system may be less suited for cartel cases than for other types of 
cases. Repeat player plaintiffs, such as firms frequently involved in competition law 
suits or other legal disputes, have an advantage over end consumers. Principal-agent 
problems between firm and lawyer, as well as problems of asymmetric information 
are likely to be much less severe.  
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Compensation for individual harm is irrelevant for the deterrence effect. Therefore, 
solutions that propose to eliminate principal-agent problems between client and legal 
representative, as well as between society and agent, by transferring the original right 
to the agent at the outset, thus making the agent also the principal, are preferable. 
Under such regimes, it is only the right holder’s incentives which should be aligned 
with society’s interest as far as possible. Mechanisms to achieve that goal and to 
reduce the risk of frivolous suits will be discussed below in the section dealing with 
market and auctions. 
2 Representative organisation 
Other agents which may act on behalf of all victims who have suffered harm due to 
anti-competitive conduct are associations. There are three different possible ways to 
grant associations the right to sue on behalf of victims. Bodies can be certified ex
ante, according to specified criteria, to represent their members. Also, they could be 
ex ante certified to represent the interests of a larger group, such as a consumer 
association representing end consumers at large. A third possibility is to allow the 
formation of an association on an ad hoc basis, to defend the interests of those harmed 
in a particular case at hand.  
In most Member States several individuals with common interests are typically 
allowed to found forms of associations to achieve any legal purpose.340 As already 
mentioned, this third form is less distinguishable from other forms of group litigation, 
as victims, lawyers or any other interested party may found an association to pursue 
their interests as a way to better organise and manage the suit. Moreover, the mere 
prospect of being able to form an ad hoc association once detection has taken place is 
unlikely to have a profound impact on the detection incentives. Founding an 
association is costly for just one individual and so is finding other victims to join. The 
obstacles are similar to those that make the more traditional form of group litigation, 
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the joinder procedures,341 less effective. Therefore ad hoc associations seem of little 
value to the analysis at hand and will not be considered further. 
Also ex ante certified associations granted standing to represent their members seem 
of little relevance for the creation of the best possible deterrence mechanism, since by 
definition not all victims will be represented. The optimal sanction could not be 
imposed in such a proceeding. Other mechanisms, which can achieve that goal to a 
larger degree, dominate this solution. Therefore, the only representative action 
discussed here is the one of an ex ante certified body granted standing to represent all 
victims of a competition law infringement. 
The agent under a representative action as defined here is an ex ante certified body, 
generally representing the interests of those who may fall prey to a competition law 
infringement. As already mentioned, typical associations comprised within this 
category would be consumer and trade organisations.  As the favoured feature of the 
group litigation would be a mandatory form, to limit free riding problems, to minimise 
costs and to allow for an optimal penalty to be imposed, these associations should be 
certified to represent both consumers and businesses harmed alike. We would 
therefore be looking for a trade and consumer body, granted standing to represent all 
victims.342
As argued above, the compensation of individual victims is superseded by the need to 
design the group litigation mechanism in a way to achieve the interest of society at 
large, i.e., ensuring optimal deterrence. Therefore, conflicting interests between 
consumers and undertakings (traders) are relevant only as far as they distort the 
deterrence effect of the system.   
2.1 Free riding
Incentives to free ride on prior public enforcement decisions will still persist when the 
action is not restricted to stand-alone claims. However just as in the case of collective 
                                                
341 For more details on joinder procedures, see Chapter 2. 
342 Similar to the actio popularis, an action brought in the general public interest, as known in Portugal, 
Spain or Hungary. 
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actions analysed above, waiting entails the risk of not being the first to file a claim, in 
as much as there is competition amongst several associations. If the association is a 
monopolist, incentives to save large costs by concentrating on follow-on cases are 
large. Free riding problems therefore will remain larger when competition amongst 
several associations is restricted. Similarly if several associations are granted standing 
only to represent their members or subgroup of victims, free riding incentives could 
remain large. 
So, overall, free riding problems in actions on behalf of all victims are largely reduced 
due to the fact that membership of the group represented is mandatory. This implies 
that once an action is filed, no other association can file suit as the group can only be 
represented once.  
2.2 Rational apathy   
The problem of rational apathy may be decreased when an association is the acting 
agent compared to cases brought by individual victims.  
Associations are likely to be more risk neutral than individuals, such as end 
consumers, so that the risk of losing at trial will have fewer negative effects. Another 
aspect to be considered is the rational apathy problem on the business’ side. 
Whenever the filing of suit against a larger business partner entails the risk of 
retaliation and future losses, firms may be inclined to refrain from filing suits. Under 
the lead plaintiff scenario, these problems remain when the lead plaintiff is such an 
enterprise. In the case of associations, however, retaliation is much less likely. The 
association will act in its own name without the requirement of consent of one or 
more victims. Individual victims may not even have to appear as an opponent 
anywhere in the legal dispute. Especially, when the case involves a multitude of 
victims, retaliation against one of the victims then seems unlikely because they may 
not have an influence on the associations’ decisions. 
Pre-financing problems when capital markets are imperfect are also likely to be 
reduced. Associations can finance themselves through the collection of membership 
fees as well as through public subsidies. The larger the latter portion of their funds, 
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and the more dependent the association from the public body, however, the more the 
system mirrors that of public enforcement through competition authorities. If, on the 
other hand, the association gets most of it funds from membership fees, the question 
arises as to why anyone would become a member of that association, when the benefit 
is spread amongst the whole of society. Of course, the advantages of membership 
could extend beyond the fact that the association may protect competition, as the body 
may also offer many different kind of services to its members. However , a rival 
association offering the same package of private goods and services but without the 
subsidised legal assistance in the form of representative actions would be able to 
charge lower prices and potential members would most likely prefer to join this 
second association.343 Individuals would therefore have disincentives to become 
members. Moreover, when associations are financed through membership fees, 
incentives may exist to find and prosecute only cases with high media coverage in 
order to attract new members. The best way for associations then would be to finance 
themselves through the enforcement efforts. 
Regardless of the funding issue, the benefits the association will gain by prosecuting a 
case will have to be at least as large the resources required to pursue it. In order to 
give real incentives to engage in such activities, especially when financing takes 
places through the rewards from enforcement efforts, the association will also have to 
reap some benefit on top of just breaking even.344 Just as under the system discussed 
above, here the association as agent will also have to at least be compensated for all 
the costs incurred in the litigation process, adjusted for the probability of losing at 
trial.345 Furthermore just as above, the association may be granted a certain share of, 
or the total damage awards, for precisely these reasons. If the legislator would want or 
allow the proceeds of the litigation to be used in the interest of harmed victims, or 
society at large, the association might be allowed to receive the total of damage 
awards when used to further competition in the markets by reinvesting in further 
enforcement efforts. Such ideas are already applied in cy press distribution 
                                                
343 Stigler, Free riders and collective action: An appendix to theories of economic regulation 359, 360. 
344 As described above, the idea that associations may gain in the long-run by increasing their 
membership is difficult to sustain, as the incentives for individual to become members and pay 
membership fees are not very clear.  
345 For simplicity, this is formulated as a static decision.  However, long-run gains such as gained 
experience or reputation positively influencing the associations standing can and will be incorporated 
just as in any other business decision weighing costs and profits as well.  
The Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence Perspective                                                            129
mechanisms, where individual victims are assumed to benefit from the damage 
awards in an indirect way. 
2.3 Information asymmetry 
An association as agent346  differs in many ways from the individual lead plaintiff 
and/or lawyer as agent, but there also are some basic similarities. Similar to the latter, 
the association as agent also needs to be provided with incentives to investigate and 
pursue competition law infringements. Similarly, a part or the total of the rewards 
granted in court could potentially be used as incentive mechanism.  If the association 
has to finance itself entirely through the prosecution of cases, the effects would be 
largely similar to the ones discussed under the lead plaintiff/ lawyer scenario leaving 
total damage awards to the respective agent. When the association can keep a certain 
share of total rewards, very much like a contingency fee, the similarity to the above 
discussed scenario with a silent lead plaintiff and an active lawyer is huge.  
However, there also are some differences to be considered. The existing information 
asymmetry between the association and infringers differs from the one between victim 
and infringer. In general, an association will only in a very small fraction of cases, if 
at all, be a victim itself and thereby part of the group of injured parties. This implies 
that information advantages that private parties may have, as victims of the 
exclusionary conduct, are lacking for the association in the same way as for the  
lawyer. Unless victims notify the association of possible breaches the exclusionary 
abuse of market power and hard-core cartels are going to be similarly difficult to 
detect. The association could offer financial rewards for the information about 
infringements. To encourage the detection of more complex offences, however, these 
rewards would have to be accordingly large.  
On the other hand, the association could be given a sufficiently large share of any 
proceeds, in order to encourage their investigation of markets, just as the lawyer as 
agent above. If that is the case, larger knowledge, learning effects, specialisation and 
                                                
346 The association will be treated as one entity. Corporate governance or principal agent problems 
within the association and its employees will not be discussed here, as this would fall out of the scope 
of the investigation. Such a treatment is justified in the comparative exercise, as also the lawyer in the 
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economies of scale would enable the association to overcome the information 
asymmetry problems more efficiently than the individual plaintiff in many cases. 
Comparably to the lawyer as active party in a collective action, the association would 
be a repeat player by definition. Specialists in the relevant legal and economic fields 
could be hired. Also, several different associations can specialise in different 
industries or types of infringements. All of these advantages would place an 
association in a better position as agent than an individual victim might be. 
To provide incentives to invest in the detection of competition law infringements, 
additional reimbursement for those costs incurred on top of compensation for 
litigation expenses will be needed. The amount of this remuneration depends on the 
possibility of the association to reap a profitable return on that investment.  
Under a first-come, first-served condition, the possibility that remuneration will 
depend on the probability of success is very high when there is no, or only very 
limited, competitive pressure.  For a monopolist, there is no risk of investing large 
resources in the evaluation of certain market developments and then being beaten by 
another entity which is quicker to start the procedure. However, the concept of a  
monopolist protecting competition law is not only a bit of a paradox, but also bears 
the risk of being very inefficient. A monopolist in markets typically is associated with 
supra-competitive prices, lower output and a consequent dead weight loss to society, 
which is inefficient from a total welfare perspective. Of course, large fixed costs and 
low variable costs could imply a natural monopoly. 347 However, the market 
characterised here is much more similar to the market concerning research and 
development, which is also characterised by large fixed costs and a patent right after 
successful innovation. Here, the market would be characterised by large fixed costs in 
detection and the consequent monopoly (due to the mandatory nature of the group 
litigation) in litigation. The relevant insights developed in innovation theory and could 
be applied analogously and they support the inefficiency of monopoly in dynamic 
markets with patent protection.348 In such a setting, a monopolist association is likely 
                                                                                                                               
collective action may in fact be an employee of a large legal firm, so that his private gain may differ 
from the contingency fee. 
347 In a natural monopoly, total demand can be more efficiently be served by only one producer, for 
example due to economies of scale. 
348 Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice, 55 f. 
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to have only little additional impact on deterrence. Initial costs of investigating are 
large and only few cases will be dealt with under budget constraints and other limited 
resources. These are similar to the problems that public enforcement agencies can 
face. This would be different only if a perfect capital market could provide virtually 
unlimited resources, creating incentives to invest as long as the expected net outcome 
is positive. Nevertheless, lack of competition allows the monopolist to carefully select 
and time the investigation of certain industry sectors, and the prosecution of cases. 
Just like a patent right holder, also the monopolist association may not be presented 
with the incentives to make optimal use of the rights it is endowed with.349 In 
addition, a monopolist is much more likely to be captured by certain interest groups, 
including potential defendants, as transaction costs accompanying the capture of many 
different agents are much larger than transaction cost dealing with only one party.  
The second alternative is to create competition amongst several similarly suited 
associations. In this case the remuneration paid also has to compensate for the risk of 
unsuccessful investments faced by the association. The more competition there is 
concerning detection and prosecution of competition law infringements, the more 
risky the upfront investment in detection efforts becomes to these entities. 
Consequently, the larger the expected return on that investment must be to justify the 
initial expenses. Moreover, there is a problem of doubling of efforts, which constitutes 
a waste of resources and a loss to society as a whole.  
Therefore, the association may be well suited and incentivised to overcome the 
problem of asymmetric information. However, this very much depends on the 
remuneration the association can reap from such activities. The same reasoning 
applies as in the case of the lawyer as agent. 
2.4 Nuisance suits 
In the optimal group litigation mechanism, the risk of unmeritorious suits also should 
be limited. However, associations may also be able to force defendant(s) into 
settlements, even when the case has little or no merits. In as much as incentives to do 
so exist, the risk of this under a representative group litigation system may be even 
                                                
349 Compare section 3 below. 
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larger than this risk under the collective action procedure. An association generally is 
in a better position to threaten litigation, as the financing problem is smaller. Also 
publicity is more easily and more extensively achieved than by a lead plaintiff and or 
lawyer. For an association, the probability of succeeding in these endeavours is higher 
than for some private individuals.  
However, the incentives of associations to file nuisance suits heavily depend on the 
gains associations can realise through litigation and therefore on what incentives 
associations are given for becoming active. These issues will be discussed in detail 
below. 
2.5 Principal-agent problems  
Principal-agent problems between society and association, and between association 
and possibly hired lawyer, may exist and cannot be overcome easily. Several authors 
have investigated the principal-agent problems persistent in representative actions, 
often in comparison with the US style class action.350
Typical principal-agent problems between the association and the hired lawyer could 
persist. The association however, as opposed to the individual victim, is a repeat 
player by design. This makes it a more sophisticated and experienced client, which is 
better able to assess and monitor the lawyers behaviour. Also the mechanisms 
mentioned above that could induce the lawyer to work in the interest of its client, such 
as building or maintaining a reputation and business relations, can work more 
effectively in this context. That is especially true, when in-house lawyers are used, as 
can be assumed in this analysis.  
The other principal-agent relationship of importance when looking at deterrence is the 
one between society as principal and association as agent. Also in this relationship, 
while the association acts as agent for society working on a certain remuneration 
                                                
350 See e.g. Kalven Jr, Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, The 684, who compare suits brought 
by public bodies with class action suits ; Dayagi-Epstein, "Representation of Consumer Interest By 
Consumer Associations-Salvation for the Masses?" COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 3 (2006): 209. See 
also Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal 
Actions taken by Associations 183, comparing class actions with suits brought by associations. 
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schedule, society as the principal is only imperfectly informed. Principal-agent 
problems therefore remain.  
As discussed above, especially in the case of a monopolistic association, the 
incentives to invest the optimal effort that the principal desires are limited.  
Once detection has taken place, the association may have large incentives to avoid 
further costs and strike a settlement with the defendant(s). Inefficient settlements or 
the possibility of collusion between enforcement agent and defendants have to be 
minimised.  Similar to the collective action, the difference between the expected net 
amount the defendant has to pay as result of a trial and the expected net amount the 
association will receive constitutes the range in which settlement negotiations can take 
place. However, here bargaining powers presumably are distributed more equally 
between the adversaries. The association is a more risk neutral repeat player and in 
some respects on a more equal footing with defendant(s) than most lead plaintiffs and 
their lawyers in the bargaining procedure.  Nevertheless, because the association bears 
all the costs of the proceeding and detection, while only receiving a share of total 
rewards, the profit maximising settlement agreement for the representative body may 
be below the amount required to reach optimal deterrence. 
Some authors argue that principal-agent problems may be better curbed in the case of 
associations as representatives, precisely because the associations are repeat players, 
so that reputation and credibility could inhibit the representing bodies to a certain 
degree from pursuing only their personal interests.351 The incentives for moral hazard 
or shirking therefore would be reduced. On the other hand, one might argue that 
decisions of associations are influenced to a larger degree by possibilities to achieve 
publicity or other factors influencing their financing method than is the case for 
private individuals or individual lawyers.  
However, possibilities to strengthen the position of society as principal may exist. 
Society, through the relevant organs, might be able to monitor and influence the 
association’s behaviour to a certain degree. Certification, for example, could be made 
                                                
351 Dayagi-Epstein, Representation of Consumer Interest By Consumer Associations-Salvation for the 
Masses? 209, 235 ; Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class 
Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations 183, 200. 
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dependent on the past success of the association. In many Member States, standing is 
granted only if certain specified criteria are met by the association.352 Also subsidies 
could be used and made dependant on performance criteria to assure better 
compliance to the social goal. To produce the desired outcome, such control 
mechanisms would require that settlements achieved in the past be assessed as to their 
optimality. As the association should have gathered the relevant information to 
establish a breach of competition law and the amount of total damages caused, 
assessment might be based on the available information. However, such controls are 
likely to be very costly. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the larger the influence and 
financial support through public bodies, the more the system resembles public 
enforcement. The risk that the association then is influenced by certain interest groups 
in society and geared towards or away from certain cases is inherent in such a 
system.353 The selection of markets to be investigated, or cases to be brought, could 
then be skewed. Generally, cases with large amount of damages and which are easier 
to detect are preferred by any enforcement agent that stands to gain from the damages. 
On the other hand, dependency on subsidies or donations can also lead to different 
preferences, for example combating competition law infringements in certain industry 
sectors only. 
The only solution to eliminate any kind of principal-agent problems without the need 
to strengthen the clients’ position by implementing costly systems of control is, again, 
to make the agent the principal. Only granting the association the total quantum of the 
damages awarded will give the association the correct incentives to reach efficient 
settlements for its own sake, and thereby align interests of society and association. 
The prospect of such immense financial rewards would lead to tough competition 
amongst associations, provided that there are many certified associations. Auctions 
could be used to decide, which association would be allowed to pursue the claim. This 
option will be discussed in the section C.4. below. 
                                                
352 See for example Franke and Puttfarken, Die Action Civile der Verbaende in Frankreich. DIE 
BUENDELUNG GLEICHGERICHTETER INTERESSSEN IM PROZESS. eds. Basedow, et al. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (1999), 149. Which is also the proposal by the European Commission, see 
European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 4. 
353 See Dayagi-Epstein, Representation of Consumer Interest By Consumer Associations-Salvation for 
the Masses? 209243 f. 
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2.6 Minimisation of enforcement costs 
Litigation costs can be greatly reduced in a mandatory representative action, similar to 
the collective action discussed above. However, costs of detection may not be 
minimised.  
When there is competition amongst associations concerning the detection of offences, 
total enforcement costs are probably not minimised. Overlaps in detection efforts are 
highly likely. Several entities will use a lot of resources to scan markets and 
investigate undertakings’ conduct. Often these entities would be searching in the same 
market, collecting information and assessing the legality of specific behaviours. These 
losses associated with the doubling of effort to society increase with with the number 
of competing associations in the market for detection.  
2.7 Conclusion
From a deterrence perspective, representative actions have little advantages over 
collective actions in general. Competition amongst several entities is necessary in 
order to minimise free riding problems. Rational apathy problems are less severe than 
in the case of collective actions. In addition, while problems of information 
asymmetry may initially be larger than under collective actions in some cases (those 
where private information is easily available and the lead plaintiff acts as agent), in 
others it may be more easily overcome. Compared to collective actions brought by an 
aggrieved victim of exclusionary abuse of a dominant position, these advantages are 
likely to be much smaller, and may even be outweighed by possibly larger 
information problem faced by the association. Th8is in turn may lead to a dependance 
on the assistance of the victims to identify or pursue a claim. On the other hand, 
advantages over lead plaintiffs as one-shot players reduce the obstacles faced in 
detection of other types of infringements, such as cartels.  
The risk of unmeritorious suits may remain significant. In order to become active, 
associations have to have an independent interest in detection and litigation. Indirect 
incentives, such as the possibility to increase its member base may induce 
unmeritorious litigation when the costs of doing so are smaller than the expected gain. 
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Granting the association a share of the rewards on the other hand can also increase the 
risk of unmeritorious suits.  
Also principal-agent problems can remain significant. Compared to collective actions 
brought by an end consumer, the representative body has several advantages as repeat 
player. When principal-agent problems between lead plaintiff and lawyer are severe, 
the association may be a better principal to control the agent. However, principal-
agent problems between society and association may remain, when adequate solutions 
to these problems are missing. One solution could be, to allow the association to 
retain the total of damage awards to finance further enforcement activities. 
Overall, representative actions brought by associations might be more effective than 
collective actions when rational apathy, information asymmetry and principal-agent 
problems between individual victim and lawyer are large. Such will be the case for 
example in cartel cases with wide spread but small individual damages. Conversely 
where rational apathy, information asymmetry and principal-agent problems are 
initially small, which is the case when undertakings are the victims of an offense, for 
example of an exclusionary conduct, collective action may allow for more efficient 
use of private information advantages. 
The right system of representative actions necessitates competition amongst several 
associations, which ideally should all be entitled to represent victims of a certain 
competition law offence. Allowing society to benefit from the competition amongst 
enforcers while avoiding unnecessary waste of resources is a challenge that occurs 
also in other areas, such as intellectual property. Solutions to these challenges and also 
the remaining problems of unmeritorious suits and principal-agent problems between 
association and society is discussed below, when the mechanism of competition of 
several enforcers, its advantages and disadvantages is discussed. 354
                                                
354 See sections 3 and 4 below. 
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3 The market based solution 
This section briefly sketches the general idea behind a market for enforcement. The 
benefits and problems of such a mechanism will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next steps, including possible solutions to the pitfalls. This discussion will, step by 
step, lead to a refined version of the general concept of a market for enforcement. 
The idea of enforcement directed through market mechanisms was already being 
discussed by Becker and Stigler as early as 1974.355 According to these authors, by 
using market mechanisms incentives to detect violations and to bring suit would 
increase, while free competition amongst a number of enforcement firms will reduce 
enforcement costs.356 The main idea is to align the interest of lawyers as agents, and 
society as principals, by assigning the rights to claim damages to the agent ex ante,
thereby making the interests of society directly those of the agent.  
In the real world, the Cartel Damage Claim357company and professional litigation 
investors are proof that, at least, the litigation of (through public authorities) detected 
infringements is treated as a financial investment decision by some entities. Though it 
may sound strange to some ears, particularly European ones, that lawyers or other 
entities may treat litigation as an investment opportunity, this idea has always been an 
argument in discussions about the contingency fee system in the US, describing 
lawyers as the entrepreneurial lawyer.358 If it were not for the requirement that 
victims are included in the group litigation action automatically (mandatory), 
enforcement agents such as the Cartel Damage Claim company could compete on not 
only the detection of infringements, but also the consequent representation of victims 
in front of a court as well. Depending on the system, victims could choose, who may 
                                                
355See Becker, Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of Enforces 1. 
356 Ibidem14 f. 
357 Cartel Damage Claim company – bought claims of 29 victims of a German cement cartel in the 
wake of a public investigation. 
358 Silver, Class Actions – Representative Proceedings. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, VOLUME I. THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS .
eds. Bouckaert andDe Geest. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2000), 194, 200. See also Miller, Some 
agency problems in settlement 189, 213 ;  Coffee Jr, "Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative 
Actions," COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 86 (1986): 669.  
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represent them359 or whom to sell their claims to. Therefore the injured parties would 
be in control to accept the best deals offered to them. That presupposes, however, that 
victims are sophisticated and not rationally apathetic. Studies conducted in the US 
find that opt-out rates are extremely low, indicating that injured individuals do not in 
fact search for better options.360 Of course, if not all injured parties would choose the 
same agent, several trials dealing with different bundles of claims would be possible. 
As argued above however, such a solution would not lead to procedural efficiency. 
Moreover, defendants could use the system to their advantage by striking early deals 
with the most important victims or groups to the detriment of other cases. In addition, 
whenever the agents would be working on any form of fee basis principal-agent 
problems would arise, further compromising the efficiency of the system. 
For the optimal market idea, it is important in this respect to keep in mind that 
deterrence only requires the violator to pay for the impairment caused to society. No 
further requirement is made to the distribution of this payment except that the 
infringer may not be among those who benefit from it. In consequence, the monetary 
awards granted in court could remain with the entity filing the claim, when deterrence 
is the only goal.361 If only a certain percentage of the total award is used to reimburse 
the agent, the incentives structures would be largely similar to those described above 
when analysing the incentives of a lawyer working on a contingency fee basis.362 One 
of the major problems in the group litigation forms discussed above are exactly these 
principal-agent problems, which occur between the representing party and the lawyer, 
but also between the society and the representing party. As far as the representing 
party’s interests do not equal those of society, inefficient deterrence may result. These 
problems arise, when lawyers or associations acting as agents have their own interests 
and motivation to pursue competition law infringement that differ from those of 
                                                
359 Either working on an hourly fee or a contingency basis. 
360 Eisenberg and Miller (2004), found an average of 0,6% opt-out rate. Eisenberg, Role of Opt-outs 
and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, The 1529available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=528146. 
361 This concept relates very much to the discussion of efficient assignment of property rights in the 
Law and Economics literature (for an introduction and overview see Bouckaert, Original assignment of 
private property. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. (1999),). However, the agent 
could not only be granted the rights, but they could also be transferred from the victim to the agent.  
362 See arguments made concerning effects of contingency fees on settlement and meritless claims 
above. 
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society  – which, following the deterrence approach, is the prevention of the harm 
caused by infringements of competition law.  
In general, society would be willing to incur costs of detection and prevention almost 
equal to the total harm avoided (which should include harm avoided by deterring 
other offences) and still be better off. Meanwhile individuals, lawyers and 
associations are only willing to invest up to their own benefits to be gained.363
Therefore, society can have a larger interest in the prosecution also of small individual 
damages, than the individual right holder. Again, one often cited solution to these 
problems would be to unite the interests of agent and principal into one single entity, 
for example by transferring the dispersed rights to claim damages (which in the hands 
of the original right holders may have no actual value) as a bundle to the agent (in 
who’s hands the claims may actually be valuable).364 This might in essence require 
the agent to be able to receive the total of the optimal sanction amount awarded as 
compensation for his efforts.  
The question to be solved is whether granting the agent a share of the optimal sanction 
(total damages awarded in trial, with the adequate multiplier in place to impose the 
optimal sanction) would give sufficient, or even efficient, incentives to engage in 
detection efforts to an adequate amount. If not, would granting the total amount to the 
agent be necessary to induce investments closer or equal to the investments society 
would regard as optimal. The optimal investment in detection would be up to the point 
were total marginal costs of enforcement would equal total marginal benefit. To 
answer that question, however, further research is needed to identify the functions of 
the costs of detection activities and the benefits resulting from these activities, which 
would also entail the knowledge about the value of losses caused by violations of 
competition law, as well as deterrence rates. Moreover, systematic relationships 
between these relevant values would need to be established. However, a few tentative 
thoughts may be provided here.  
                                                
363 Compare Shavell, Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, The
333. 
364 See Wagner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz – Regelungsbedarf bei Massen- und Streuschäden 41.  
The Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence Perspective                                                            140
The benefits of society gained by the detection of competition law infringements need 
to be known, in order to be able to compare the total benefits of one detected 
infringements against the relevant costs. Measuring deterrence is, however, very 
difficult. Nevertheless, it seems that methods are being developed to provide 
estimates, and they are already sometimes being employed. For example, the 
European Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK have both 
published estimates about avoided future losses due to the detection and ending of 
certain infringements. Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition, has 
stated that there have been: “Direct consumer savings of at least €8bn in 2008, which 
compares favourably to our operating costs of around €100 million. And this does not 
even begin to take into account the indirect benefits of deterrence.”365 Also the OFT 
calculated the benefits of ending of two offences against competition law to have 
avoided losses to consumers of a total of £ 90 million.366 Therefore, at least estimates 
of the value of future losses otherwise caused by detected offences do exist. 
Moreover, approximations on the deterrence effects are also being generated. A study 
conducted for the OFT delivered estimates about how many infringements were 
abandoned or significantly altered due to the detection of one infringement of the 
same kind.367 Their conservative estimates were as follows: for cartels the ratio was 
between 5 and 16 to one, for commercial agreements between 7 and 29 to one and for 
abuses between 4 and 10 to one.368 Therefore, one detected and ended infringement 
does not only avoid future losses caused by that particular infringement, which in 
some cases may be larger that the losses caused up to the time of detection, but in 
particular it creates considerable cost savings due to the deterrence of other offences. 
Considering these values, the tentative thoughts would be as follows.  
If one detected cartel infringement would only save society in total five times as much 
damages as the detected one already caused (as damage awards are based only on 
                                                
365 Neelie Kroes, "Introductory Speech, ICN SEMINAR ON COMPETITION AGENCY 
EFFECTIVENESS, Summary report, Brussels, January 2009" 7.p 7. Available at http://www.icn-
zurich.org/Downloads/Materials/ICN_CPIWG_Report-for-OIB.pdf 
366 Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, OFT Discussion Paper 916, 6.  
367 Deloitte & Touche LLP, "The deterrence effect of competition enforcement by the OFT," OFFICE 
OF FAIR TRADING (Nov 2007)A report prepared for the OFT by Deloitte, November 2007, OFT962. 
368 The range is due to the results of questionnaires answered by legal professionals (lower bound) and 
companies (upper bound), Ibidem 8 f. 
The Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence Perspective                                                            141
already caused damages),369 the deterrence benefit to society would be five times the 
actual damages. Assuming the market for enforcement would help to raise detection 
rates for cartels only to 25 percent,370  the optimal sanction would result in four times 
the actual damages, which is less than the benefits created to society, so that society 
would have a net gain when the payment to the enforcer is deducted. The difference 
becomes much greater, when the detection and deterrence rate, as well as the value of 
losses avoided, would indeed be larger. For a detection rate of 33.33 percent and a 
deterrence rate of 10, for example, the net benefit to society would be at least seven 
times the actual damages. If the agent were to receive the whole optimal sanction, that 
remuneration (the four or three times the actually caused damages) would include a 
large risk premium for having taken on the highly risky and uncertain task of 
investing in enforcement activities. Whether or not the resulting investment decision 
made by the enforcement agent would result in the optimal, under or over investment 
of resources can not be deduced from these figures. However, it seems, especially 
when the net benefits to society are considerably larger, that more detailed and 
elaborated research may show that providing the enforcement agent with the total of 
the optimal sanction would at least not lead to over investment in enforcement 
activities. Also taking the benefit-cost ratio provided by the Commission into account, 
it seems as if there might be room for further, total welfare increasing investment in 
enforcement activities. If, on the other hand, the optimal sanction would induce 
enforcement agents to invest too much into detection efforts, providing the agent with 
only an adequate share would then make it possible to set up a fund with the other 
share, which then might be used in one way or another to compensate victims.371
Further developments in the next years might provide knowledge about the amount of 
                                                
369 That would mean that the other deterred cartels in average only would have caused losses of the 
same amount as the detected cartel did until it was detected. However, the deterred cartels may also 
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370 Assuming public detection efforts remain constant, this could be a tentative estimate. The argument 
here is that the discussed system would fare better than existing systems and the optimal sanction, i.e. a 
larger damage multipler, would be imposed, so that detection rates should be increased considerably. 
Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 73 and  101 ff, provide an overview 
over estimates of current detection rates and the impact private actions for damages may have on these. 
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(page103).  
371 Which, when costly, would be inefficient from a deterrence perspective, but might greate other 
benefits to compensate these costs (i.e. increasing compensatory justice or the like). 
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remuneration necessary to at least induce some investment in private detection 
activities, when it happens that also stand alone actions will be brought.  
Despite the question of the optimal reward for the agent, such a theoretical 
mechanism does not work when the legal system in question prohibits the transfer of 
such rights. In the US, for example, already the alienability of legal claims is strictly 
restrained.372  In most European States, rights can be transferred, especially those that 
are largely independent of the original owner where the right was generated. In the  
case of widely dispersed and small damages, where the individual’s rights are more or 
less only theoretical present, governments of Member States have already considered 
alternatives to traditional damage claims.373 The actual legal possibilities of such 
reassignment transfers may be another question. Nevertheless, here it suffices to say 
that until recently, many victims of offences were not granted standing to sue under 
their national competition laws, so that a legal transfer in any form of these non-
existing rights would not have been necessary and that the granting of these rights to 
indirect purchasers is still debated in some countries. In addition, the transfer of 
personal rights generally is not only a theoretical possibility. 
Once the transfer of rights were installed, or adequate standing provided to the agent, 
the total of the damage awards could remain with the agent bringing the claim, 
thereby aligning his interests with those of society. Transferring the damage claims to 
the agent should cause great incentives to a large number of parties to spend resources 
into matching specialisation, as well as detection and prosecution of infringements. 
Given the large damages caused to society by many violations of competition law, the 
number of entities closely observing the firms conduct in the market could at least 
initially become sufficiently large. Investing in the detection and conviction of 
competition law infringements could become a very profitable business. The result 
could be a market for enforcement.  
To avoid several litigations of the same infringements, a mechanism is needed to 
ensure that only one costly proceeding will take place. Giving the right to proceed to 
                                                
372 See (also for an economic analysis) Abramowicz, "On the Alienability of Legal Claims," THE YALE 
LAW JOURNAL 114 (2004): 697. 
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trial or to pursue the case any further could be given on a first-come, first-served, 
basis. Anyone finding an infringement could be granted the rights to pursue the case 
when he is the first to register that infringement with an established registry. That 
eliminates the problems of several trials and part of the resources wasted due to 
doubling of efforts connected to it. However, there are also some problems connected 
to such a system, as it creates a race to court. These effects will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following analysis.  
For the individual enforcer, such private enforcement equals a financial investment 
into a risky business transaction. Similar to research and development activities, large 
upfront investments are required, and the return on these investments is connected to 
large uncertainties. Private information, where it exists, could be put into use in two 
ways. In some cases, the victims themselves would be encouraged to file suit. In 
others, the enforcers offer rewards for the information brought to their attention. As 
long as the expected profits outweigh the costs, economic entities should find it 
profitable to enter such a market. Risk neutral agents should be more inclined to do so 
than risk averse agents, so that larger and diversified firms should develop.  
To investigate certain effects of competition between several enforcement agents, one 
might start with the perfect competitive market. Other possibilities, such as a market 
of diversified products, will be discussed later. Such a market would require all 
private enforcers (P.E.’s) to be of a symmetrical nature. That implies that they all have 
the same costs functions, the same information and the same probability of success. 
Ideally, entry into that market of enforcement of competition law should be costless. 
Naturally, when such a system is introduced, some parties may have a competitive 
advantage over others, such as lawyers and professional entities over laymen. 
However, just as in any other market, too, no one possesses all the necessary skills, so 
that all have to incur entry costs at some point in time.  
Investment in such endeavours entails many uncertainties. P.E.’s will only invest 
resources in detection efforts, if the expected awards (which as the optimal sanction 
equal the total damages to society caused by the detected infringement, times the 
                                                                                                                               
373 For example skimming-off procedures, see Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), BT-Drucks. 15/1487.
The Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence Perspective                                                            144
inverse of the probability of detection) exceed those costs. Also the individual 
probability of finding a violation, the probability of being the first to file claim, and 
the probability of prevailing in trial, flow into their calculation. This is because under 
the portrayed circumstances, only one plaintiff can reap the rewards of his efforts, 
while all others will strike out. Consequently, private actors will also have to include 
the probability of being the first to file claim into their cost-benefit calculation.  
In such a market, if it is a perfect competitive market, the probability of getting caught 
faced by the violator increases with each additional entry, as more resources in total 
are spent on detection efforts. As assumed, these additional costs should have the 
desired effect, and some potential infringers will be deterred from their anti-
competitive conduct. Those missing infringements in turn should reduce the 
probability each P.E. spots an offence. Or, to still find an infringement, more costs 
have to be borne. These effects reduce the expected return on investment, depending 
on the number of competing P.E.’s. Each entry of a newcomer reduces the overall 
probability of success of all P.E.’s in the market. The risk of losing the race to be the 
first diminishes the expected return on investment for the individual investor, 
analogous to the patent race problem in the area of intellectual property protection.374
At some point, another entry will reduce total rewards below costs, deterring that 
entry. Just as proclaimed by the theoretic concept of the market in perfect 
competition, a certain number of entities will then remain in the market and earn a 
normal return on investment. Competitive pressure in the market should also, 
according to general economic theory, lead to the development of the most cost 
efficient methods to detect and prosecute infringements.  
The existence and the level of that equilibrium depend on several factors.  The higher 
the costs of enforcement compared to the damages awarded, and the lower the 
individual’s probability of success, the less lucrative the investment in enforcement is. 
If that is the case, the market should consist of fewer participants.  
                                                
374 Compare:Abramowicz, "The Uneasy Case For Patent Races over Auctions," STANFORD LAW 
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If enforcers are indeed not of a symmetrical nature, another market structure could 
instead develop. This could be more a market of differentiated products. The 
participants in the market could develop specific skills to investigate selected industry 
sectors, certain types of markets, or different types of infringements. Such a 
development may have an effect on the specific features of the equilibrium, but the 
other features of the market would remain the same. Some firms may also specialise 
in detection, and after having secured the rights to the claims, sell them to firms 
specialising in further analysis of the cases and prosecution. As there already are some 
professions that focus on the economic analysis of markets or on the solution of legal 
disputes, such a division of labour could be relevant, particularly in the early stages of 
such a market system.  A further specialisation may be between P.E’s who 
concentrate on the detection, and firms or lawyers that specialise in the litigation of 
offences. Once a P.E. has secured the rights, he may sell or licence them to a more 
efficient firm (specialised in litigation rather than detection). 
The number of infringements is not fixed, but changes over time. New infringements 
occur, old ones cease to exist. This remains true even when the optimal sanction leads 
to optimal deterrence. As the costs of enforcement will be weighed against the 
benefits in terms of deterrence, it would most likely not be optimal to deter all and 
every infringement. As a consequence, there would always remain a certain set of 
offences.375  In addition to the fact that infringements that are not subject to a per se
prohibition but more to a rule of reason approach376 leads to a probability of detection 
and conviction that will be lower than 1, meaning that the market for enforcement will 
remain attractive for enforcement businesses.  
3.1 Free riding
Mandatory affiliation to the group of represented victims eliminates free riding 
incentives for the individual victims. Therefore, free riding could only be a problem in 
the arena of the P.E’s. 
                                                
375 This would all the more be true for less theoretical and more practical approaches. Even the most 
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With regard to free riding at the detection stage, P.E’s cannot free ride on each other, 
as long as the first one to file suit or to register the infringement is the only 
beneficiary. Also incentives to await a prior public enforcement, when follow on suits 
are allowed, are reduced, as the economic risk of not being the first is likely to 
outweigh any possible cost savings. Time is of essence in such a setting and free 
riding will be significantly diminished.  
Free riding could take place when one infringement makes the detection of others 
easier (as the path-dependency argument states).377 The detection and subsequent 
prosecution of one infringement can provide information that facilitates the detection 
of another infringement in the same market. In as much as that is a reliable feature, 
enforcers could still have an incentive to wait for others to make the first step. This 
could allow them to focus their research efforts on more profitable targets. However, 
the first one to detect an infringement will probably have an advantage over his 
competitors in detecting the next infringements, as he is the first to have relevant 
information discovered in the first infringement. Therefore, there is little scope for 
free riding after all. 
Free riding could also still occur after detection has taken place and the cases have 
been registered. Depending on the specific requirements to be met to file or register 
such claims, it could be possible that several infringements against competition law by 
the same defendant(s) are registered by different P.E’s. If they are related, as can be 
the case for example with price maintenance in the downstream market and a cartel in 
the upstream market, evidence collected in one trial could reduce the resources 
necessary to pursue the other offence. Then one P.E. might prefer the other P.E. to 
proceed to trial first, leading to delayed or no action. Such free riding may be curbed, 
however, with an adequate definition of the scope of the rights that can be registered, 
so that there is as little overlap as possible. 
Overall, with strong competition in the market for enforcement, free riding behaviour 
is kept to a minimum. 
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3.2 Rational apathy  
Rational apathy on behalf of the victims is overcome, as it is the agent, or P.E. that 
becomes active, suing for the total of damages caused to society. However, some 
rational apathy may remain even on the P.E’s side. Having to provide evidence for 
total harm caused to society undoubtedly does put a great burden on the enforcer and 
the proceedings are very costly in consequence. This is true for all of the above 
discussed agents. This is all the more so in cases that are not subject to a per se
prohibition. In cases of a per se prohibition large returns on investment in some cases, 
for example large cartels, would likely justify virtually any expenses necessary to 
provide proof of liability and damages in front of court. Once detection has taken 
place, any calculation weighing the costs of litigation against the expected rewards 
should turn out in favour of litigation. Nevertheless, in other cases, for example cases 
of vertical restraints, the expected rewards may not trigger large investments in 
litigation or detection, especially when the issue of whether or not the behaviour 
constitutes an infringement is highly debatable in court.  
The market idea as structured so far would provide large incentives to invest in both 
detection and litigation of competition law offences, as the agent becomes a 
professional investor or enforcer, weighing the costs of enforcement against the 
expected benefits. However, not all types of infringements may seem equally 
attractive as investment opportunities. 
3.3 Information asymmetry  
Unfortunately, it is not only the incentives to litigate that matter in determining 
deterrence effects. In addition a major point of consideration are incentives to invest 
in the detection itself.  The type of infringement is likely to have an impact on these 
decisions.
As described above, the information costs of getting the necessary information, 
knowledge and data can be immense, especially for those who are not already 
specialised in competition law and the underlying economic theories. The detection of 
an infringement requires a lot of resources to be spent on scanning the developments 
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in markets, conduct of firms, and keeping up to date with legal developments, while 
success is uncertain. To compensate for these costs and risks, a large benefit is 
necessary.   
In the case of a market for enforcement, however, the agent enforcer would be placed 
in the position to weigh the costs and benefits of investing in detection, in a manner 
that is more aligned with the aims of society. The expected awards from such 
investments would justify investment in detection (and litigation) up to the amount 
that society would be willing to incur in order to avoid the losses caused by 
infringements.  
3.4 Nuisance suits 
Nuisance or frivolous suits can be brought for a number of reasons. Whenever costs 
can be imposed on potential defendants that would exceed a certain settlement 
amount, defendants may prefer to settle the case, even when it has little or no merits. 
As discussed earlier, such costs can be caused by losses in reputation or internal 
reallocation of resources necessary for the defence against such a claim in court. 
These incentives to bring frivolous suits remain, also under a market scheme. 
As has been investigated and pointed out in the Law and Economics literature, awards 
that exceed the actual harm suffered by victims and thereby impose a windfall on the 
plaintiff create incentives to file unmeritorious suits.378 This is especially the case in 
non cartel cases. The immense awards that could be granted can outbalance the 
minimal probability of winning the case at trial. For such reasons, in the US, where 
treble damages are awarded in antitrust cases, scholars suggested the actual damages 
be decoupled from the remaining part.379 However, that has to be balanced against a 
reduction in incentives to litigate. 
The here envisioned system of first-come, first-served, could encourage the filing of 
cases where the merits have not yet been established. If defendants have to react 
                                                
378 See discussion on incentives to file unmeritous suits above  
379Polinsky, Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of 
Enforcement 1231 ;  McAfee, Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis 1863. 
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already to the first filing, costs are imposed on them arbitrarily. Therefore, the ability 
to abuse such a system depends highly on the way the first filing will be regulated, 
i.e., what requirements have to be fulfilled. Moreover, the concern about nuisance 
suits would be larger in cases where competitors to the proclaimed offender act as 
P.E.  
It is possible that the combination of market ideas with auction mechanisms could 
counter the incentives and possibilities to file unmeritorious suits. These mechanisms 
will be analysed in detail later. 
As already described above, applying the fee shifting rule predominant in Europe, 
which forces the losing party to reimburse the prevailing party for their legal 
expenses, also can have a dampening effect on the possibility of such suits. However, 
it may not be able to counter it completely on its own.380
3.5 Minimisation of enforcement costs 
As with the other systems, the mandatory property of group litigation enables costs 
savings for society, when the optimal sanction is imposed on infringing parties in only 
one costly proceeding. Through this process tltigation costs could be minimised. 
On the other hand, costs of detection also have to be considered. Following the 
analyses by Polinsky and Shavell, and Landes,381 the optimal sanction includes only 
variable enforcement costs, such as costs of litigation and gathering of evidence once 
detection has taken place. Costs of detection, the costs associated with screening of 
markets, are fixed costs and only enter the optimal sanction through their impact on 
the probability of detection faced ex ante by the infringer. These costs of detection, 
and accordingly the probability of detection, have to be set at an optimal level. In their 
model, Polinsky and Shavell leave it to the public enforcement agency (or 
                                                
380 Generally increased incentives to sue:Wagener, Modelling the effect of one-way fee shifting on 
discovery abuse for private antitrust litigation 1887. American Rule spurs frivolous suits:Feuerstein, 
Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or Dismissal: An Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious 
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381 Polinsky, Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of fines 133 ; Landes, 
Optimal sanctions for antitrust violations 652.
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government) as a monopolist to set these costs at the optimal level. Under the 
envisaged system of competition amongst several enforcement agents in an 
investment market, however, these costs are the sum of individual investment 
decisions rather than the decision of a centralised authority.  
Under the portrayed circumstances, many enforcers may like to investigate and 
prosecute anti-competitive conducts. The problem with the first-come, first-served, 
scenario is that, similar to the problems connected to patent races, many enforcers 
may be spending resources to detect an infringement in the same market, but they may 
not be the first. All costs spent on the detection of the same infringement are wasteful 
and a loss to society. Solutions to that complication have been discussed also in other 
areas of law, which may also be applicable here.  
In the stream of literature concerning economic analysis of patent rights, such 
problems have been studied as patent races. Patent race models typically also rely on a 
winner-takes-all contest.382 Several competitors try to be the first to complete a certain 
innovation and secure the patent rights on it. As only one can succeed in getting the 
patent, resources of the competitors spent could be considered a waste to society from 
a total welfare perspective. The literature is divided into two groups. Some authors 
proclaim the inefficiency of patent races due to such duplication of efforts. 383  Others 
argue that the race leads to offsetting benefits, such as more innovations in 
aggregate.384 While an increased number of total innovations may offset the waste of 
resources to society in patent races, in this application the benefits could be seen in 
the increased deterrence effect due to larger detection rates. It is possible that these 
avoided losses to society outweigh the inefficiently large costs of detection. 
Moreover, the simplest models of patent races, and the race to be first to file a claim, 
might not be entirely analogous. In the case of fixed screening costs and variable 
litigation costs, the fixed costs spent by competitors on investigating the same market 
can not be said to be a complete duplication of efforts. This is different compared to 
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those models of a patent race, where there is only one firm that innovates in the end 
and achieves the patent while all the other resources are lost. Other patent race models 
might be more applicable, particularly those in which the Research and Development 
(R&D) investments by other competitors are not completely wasted but may lead to 
different types of innovations. The first entity to detect a certain infringement is not 
going to make the detection costs spent by his competitors redundant altogether. This 
is because the resources invested in screening the market in question may well lead to 
the detection of other infringements.  
To limit the losses to society, commentators propose letting firms secure the patents 
as early as possible.385 Likewise, enforcement agents should then be allowed to file an 
initial claim as early as possible, to secure the rights of representation. Thereby other 
enforcers would cease to spend resources on the investigation of the same case, while 
the detector would be protected from the free riding behaviour of other enforcers. As 
mentioned above, the right balance concerning the requirements to file suit, has to be 
found between allowing early filing, and avoiding meritless claims.  
Alternative mechanisms could also be considered. The state could reimburse the 
enforcement agent for their efforts and resources spent. The reimbursement for efforts 
rather than only for successful efforts can lead to inefficient investment in detection 
efforts, as such a system borders on a system with public enforcement agencies with 
agents working on a certain salary scheme.386 Therefore, that alternative will not be 
discussed here in greater detail.  
To avoid large a waste of resources due to duplication of detection efforts, one might 
also divide the totality of competition law infringements into certain sectors, for 
example, certain industry sectors in specified geographical markets. Rights to 
investigate these sectors and litigate the resulting cases could then be granted to only 
one enforcement agent each, similar to license agreements. As the possible returns on 
investment in these sectors are unknown to the regulator as well as the agents, a 
                                                
385 See Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case For Patent Races over Auctions 803, 806 f. Filing claims 
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suitable way to determine which area should be given to which agent and at what 
price has to be employed. For such reasons, auctions could be held, in which the right 
to detect and litigate are granted to the highest bidder. That option will be discussed in 
the section C. 4 of this chapter. 
3.6 Principal-Agent Problems 
The relevant principal-agent relationship in the market scenario is that between 
society and the enforcement agent. The risk that enforcement agencies collude with 
defendants and not invest optimal efforts will be minimised, when the interests of 
agent and society are completely aligned.  
It is possible that once the enforcer has secured the right to proceed to trial, he may 
strike a deal with the defendant to settle the claim. Nevertheless, the settlement 
amount acceptable for the enforcer agent will generally equal the expected trial 
awards.387 On basis of the theories described above,388 granting the agent 100 percent 
of the awards should then lead to low settlement rates but large settlement awards. 
This would diminish the risk of both unmeritorious suits and inefficiently low 
settlement agreements. 
However, principal-agent problems may not be overcome completely, even if the 
enforcer agents are allowed to keep the total of damage rewards and therefore work 
on a 100 percent contingency fee scheme.  Some differences in interest may 
nevertheless remain. Society will prefer to tailor detection efforts and consequent 
deterrence effects to those infringements that lead to the largest damages. Generally, 
this aim would also be pursued by the individual P.E. The enforcer may also have 
other incentives, however. His decision on who to pursue may also be based also on a 
minimisation of costs and/or risks, rather than a maximisation of rewards. Even when 
assuming symmetric enforcers, the selection of subjects to be investigated and that of 
cases to be prosecuted is likely to be skewed. To save on investment costs, the first 
detection will take place with the most easily detectable types of infringement, and 
only later will more complex issues be tackled. Nevertheless, these deviations from 
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society’s interest should be lower, compared to the other alternative mechanisms 
discussed above. 
Another problem is moral hazard. Similar to the situation in patent rights, allowing the 
filing of a claim (granting the patent) at an early stage may lead to the decision that 
litigation (or development of the patented invention) is not worthwhile after all or that 
it may be profitable to wait. Once detection has taken place and the rights have been 
secured, the enforcers could have an incentive to prolong the time until litigation 
begins. In particular this will be the case, when damages awarded include interest 
rates, so that the damages to be compensated are calculated from the moment of the 
harmful act until the resolution of the case. This is the case in most Member States.389
However, such risk can be considered minimal, as it can be expected that defendants 
will abandon their anti-competitive conduct once it has been spotted and officially 
noted. Other reasons to wait might be more probable. Much more important is the risk 
that it may in fact be the defendants themselves securing the rights and postponing or 
over all preventing litigation of the case. Therefore, a group of defendants should be 
excluded from having standing. Additionally, to avoid any risk that rights are secured 
but never tried, additional regulations could be enacted to make sure that once the 
detection is official, litigation has to follow within a given time period. If not, the case 
should be given to other enforcement agencies willing to start proceeding.  
Nevertheless, even if litigation after a certain amount of time is mandatory and 
defendants are officially excluded from the process, the problem remains that 
defendants may unofficially become the active participants. Defendants may be 
seeking or providing an enforcement agent that will file suit and immediately settle 
the case for a symbolic amount. Deterrence would be severely impeded that way. One 
way to combat that problem would be, again, to make the settlements dependant on 
courts approval. However, that would entail increased costs, as courts would still have 
to examine all the evidence to be able to assess the adequacy of the settlement 
amount. Prohibition of settlements could avoid these problems, but comes at the cost 
that total enforcement costs will not be minimised. One way to avoid that possibility 
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for defendants is to separate detection from litigation and to hold auctions for the 
litigation procedure. This mechanism will be discussed in Section C. 4. below. 
3.7 Conclusion
Under such a market system free riding and rational apathy will be minimised. Also 
problems of asymmetric information will likely be overcome to a larger degree in 
some cases compared to collective actions and the system of representative actions. 
Generally, cost efficiency would be also in the interest of the enforcer agent and the 
incorporation of all damages in one procedure should lead to procedural efficiency. 
This could be a very efficient mechanism especially in those cases, where the 
damages are spread amongst a very large population of victims, rational apathy is 
large, and information asymmetry is severe. This may be less the case concerning 
types of infringements that mainly harm other companies. However, some problems 
will still have to be dealt with.  
Risks of frivolous suits can however remain. To curb these, attention has to be paid to 
the way the filing of suits to secure the rights is regulated. The requirements would 
have to be broad enough to allow an early filing, to minimise the costs associated to 
doubling of efforts. On the other hand, the requirements should be strict enough to 
avoid completely meritless claims, filed solely with the purpose to secure potentially 
existing rights or to pressure defendants into settlements. Another option to curb these 
problems could be additional auction mechanisms. 
Another disadvantage of such as system is the competitive waste of resources that also 
occurs in the area of research and development under patent rights. The legislator 
could decide to regulate the market, but that would distort the market forces and lead 
to other problems. With regard to the goal of minimisation of enforcement costs, there 
will likely remain some waste of resources in such a system. This waste could only be 
avoided if there was a monopolist conducting the detection and prosecution, like the 
competition authority. However, that as discussed above, would open the door to 
other problems which can inhibit the efficiency of the enforcement system. In 
addition, the individual incentives to invest in enforcement may be sub-optimal. 
Effects of such an enforcement monopoly will be relevant below, when auction 
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mechanisms before detection are described, as the auction winner will be a 
monopolist within the licensed area. 
A major risk in such a system relates to the possibilities of collusion between 
enforcement agents and offenders. Defendants could search for an enforcement agent 
to strike a settlement even before their infringement is discovered. That way, 
infringers could buy their freedom from prosecution at very low stakes. Deterrence 
would not be achieved. One way to solve this problem (and potentially also others) 
would be to compel the enforcer who secured the rights of representation to make an 
upfront payment according to the expected value of the claims, which he then can 
only recoup when he actually prosecutes the case. This upfront payment should be 
large enough to avoid any profitable buy off possibilities for the defendant, in which 
defendant and enforcer collude. To efficiently receive information about the value of 
the claims and the consequent amount of up front payment, auctions could be held. 
This is analysed below. 
4 Determining the agent: Auction mechanisms 
When total damage rewards remain with the enforcer, either because the claims were 
transferred to him, or because some other legal instrument is employed to come to the 
same effect, such as cy press distribution, auction mechanisms may be employed to 
either replace or amend the enforcement market solution investigated above. 
Auctions may be employed at two stages of the enforcement activities, before and 
after detection. Auctions held before detection resemble ideas voiced in the area of 
patent rights, where they are discussed as possible solutions to the problem of double 
efforts in patent races.390 Auctions held after detection has taken place have been 
advocated as solutions to principal-agent problems in group litigation mechanisms.391
Both auction systems could be employed to complement any of the above discussed 
                                                
390 See Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case For Patent Races over Auctions 803. 
391 Macey and Miller, "Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder," 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 87 (1992): 458 ; Rosenberg and Sullivan, 
"Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law," JOURNAL OF 
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (2006): 159. 
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systems as a device to establish the agent in particular cases, whenever competition 
between enforcement  agents arise.  
Another distinction to be made would be whether the action itself is subject to the 
auction, so that the representing agent becomes the owner of the action, or whether it 
is only the right to represent the aggrieved victims. The latter types of auctions have 
in fact already been employed to establish the legal counsel in group litigation, for 
example in the US.392 However, as in the market mechanism, the action winner is 
considered to be granted the total damage awards granted in court in general.393
4.1 Auctions before detection 
Auctions before the detection stage could be held to sell the rights of investigating 
specified sectors for a limited time period. These rights to investigate would have to 
be clearly defined in order to avoid resources wasted on litigation between different 
right holders. Then it would be possible to “licence”394 these rights to enforcement 
agents. As the value of these licences is initially unknown to the agents as well as to 
the licensor (society), the most efficient way to discover that information would be to 
hold auctions for these licences. That way, the licensees (enforcement agents) 
determine the price for the licences. Under this type of auction, the agent becomes the 
owner of the actions. The proceeds of the auction might be used to set up funds to 
compensate victims or to use in a cy press distribution. However, that will be less 
relevant from a deterrence point of view, as long as offenders will not profit from that 
redistribution.
The specific design of the auction depends on the particularities of the market and has 
to be constructed with great care. A whole stream of literature is dedicated to the 
analysis of the optimal design of auctioning mechanisms under specific 
                                                
392 Critical on the U.S. experience:Fisch, "Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of 
Class Counsel by Auction," COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 102 (2002): 650.  
393 The proceeds of the auction could theoretically be used to compensate victims directly or indirectly. 
However, any distribution mechanism that will create additional costs could be avoided from a 
deterrence point of view, as it has no effect on the prevention of competition law infringements. 
394 See Stein and Harel, "Law & Economics at the Animal Farm: Offering a New Solution to the Class 
Action Agency Problem," WORKING PAPER SERIES, 17. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=271431. The authors discuss this solution as Franchising of Law-Enforcement. 
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circumstances.395 Some of the major problems faced by auction designers are risks of 
collusion and predation or entry deterrence.396 While general concepts of auctions 
exist, for example ascending, descending or sealed bids, a multitude of variations are 
possible. Different mechanisms can be combined in several stages, or additional 
regulations can be used. When deciding upon an auction system, the auctioneer has to 
tailor the auction mechanisms to the specific features of the subject at hand. 
Following the idea of a sealed-bid first-price auction here, licensing the enforcement 
activities through auction could take place as follows. In the auction, agents will place 
bids to be able to investigate and prosecute infringements in a specific area according 
to their estimates of: their individual probability of detection and the harm caused by 
the infringements. Each participant would have to assess the expected damage awards 
that can be earned in that particular market segment and his individual costs of 
detection and litigation. When deciding upon the bid, each will have to weigh larger 
expected profit margins against the possibility that someone else places a higher bid. 
Although each bidder would like to keep his bid as low as possible in order to 
maximise the net expected profit, placing low bids decreases the probability of 
winning the auction. More efficient enforcers, with lower costs, will be able to place 
higher bids than less efficient competitors, so that licences will be granted to more 
efficient enforcers. The proceeds of the auction may be used to set up funds to be used 
to compensate victims of infringements.397
If the rights to investigate and litigate go to the highest bidder, the risk associated with 
the detection and prosecution are placed on that party. Risk averse agents are 
therefore less likely to participate in such endeavours than risk neutral or risk loving 
agents. 
Also potential defendants could place a bid in the auction. In case all defendants in 
one market would be able overcome collective action problems and jointly win the 
                                                
395 For an overview seeKlemperer, "Auction theory: A guide to the literature," JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC SURVEYS 13 (1999): 227. 
396 See Klemperer, "What really matters in auction design," JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 16 (2002): 169. 
397 Though these redistribution issues matter less from a deterrence perspective, as long as they do not 
benefit the offender and do not distort the incentive structures connected to the deterrence based 
enforcement mechanisms. 
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bid, they in effect would compensate society. It seems that any auction where 
potential defendants participate should result in large bids, as participation of those 
potentially violating the law should be a good indicator that there is something to 
detect and litigate.  However, when in civil litigation the multiplier to total damages 
given by the probability of detection will be in place, this option will be less attractive 
to the potential offenders.  
The effectiveness of such a system greatly depends on the way the auction is 
organised. Obviously, the auction mechanism has to be designed in a way that 
effectively prohibits any form of bid rigging398 and assures as many competitive bids 
as possible. Moreover, the auction design has to incorporate circumstances relating to 
the auction, such as the likely number and distribution of bidders.399 Under 
circumstances of perfect information, perfect capital markets and perfect competition, 
winning bids should equal the optimal expected damage awards, placed by the most 
cost efficient enforcer.  
4.1.1 Free riding
Under such a scenario, free riding behaviour is eliminated, as no agent can expect to 
be able to free ride on some other entities efforts. A necessary requirement is, 
however, that the rights to be auctioned are adequately defined. 
4.1.2 Rational apathy 
Generally, theoretically rational apathy concerning the weighing of litigation costs 
and expected damage awards should not be relevant under such a system. Rational 
apathy on the side of victims as represented entities is avoided by the mandatory 
group affiliation. The agents are motivated by expected profits. 
A crucial aspect in this set up, however, is that the auction participants will have to 
have substantial financial resources in order to be able to place and pay the winning 
                                                
398 Bid rigging refers to a collusive behaviour by competitors in auction like setting. Competitiors come 
to an agreement of who should win the auction, while the non-winning parties place bids only for 
appearance sake. 
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bid.400 In an ideal world, firms should have access to virtually unlimited funding in 
the perfect credit markets.401 In less perfect circumstances, the ability to place and pay 
bids could be severely hampered, and only very few undertakings may be able to 
participate in the auction. However, it may be also possible to postpone the actual 
payment of the bid until the “license” to investigate expires. In case the expected 
profit was realised, the enforcer has the relevant amounts at his disposal. If the bid 
was overly optimistic, the winner could be held liable for the rest of the bid.402
Another aspect of such a system in a less than perfect world also includes the 
constantly changing circumstances in the market. This implies that the value of the 
rights bought at the auction changes over time, as markets evolve. The probabilities of 
certain states of the market to be investigated reduce the expected return on 
investment and in consequence also the amount participants are willing to bid in the 
auction.   
Again, enforcement efforts would be a large investment under uncertainty for the 
enforcer, which will only be undertaken if a sufficient return on investment is 
expected. In the other systems discussed above, the enforcer was able to earn a profit 
from either a share or the total of damage awards. Such amounts can be substantial. 
Expected profits for the auction winner are determined by the difference between bid, 
the costs of detection and litigation or settlement, and the expected damage awards. It 
is questionable whether the prospect of profits determined that way would suffice to 
induce sufficient, or even efficient, investment in these enforcement efforts.403
Rational apathy on the side of individuals as enforcers is likely not to be overcome by 
such a system and to remain large. Especially risk averse agents with limited financial 
                                                                                                                               
399 For a description of more or less successful auctions and analysis of the mistakes made see:Ibidem.
400 Very rough estimates of cartels operating in Europe for example place the total social losses caused 
between € 25 billion and € 69 billion, see Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more 
effective. Study in support of the impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages 
actions, 110 f.  
401 Assumptions of a perfect financial or credit market: No arbitrage opportunities, no transaction costs, 
no taxes, and no restrictions on short selling. Lending rates equal borrowing rates. All securities are 
perfectly divisible. See , Franke, et al, Statistics of financial markets: an introduction, Berlin: Springer 
(2008), 11 . 
402 Similar proposal has been made by Harel and Stein, who propose a fee-forfeiture in auctions for 
class action litigation. See: Stein, Law & Economics at the Animal Farm: Offering a New Solution to 
the Class Action Agency Problem, 33. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=271431. 
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resources will not embark on such highly risky investment opportunities. The 
necessity to compete for licences and pay the licence fee greatly reduces the 
incentives to invest compared to the market solution. 
4.1.3 Asymmetric information 
The problem of asymmetric information is slightly different in this scenario than in 
the group litigation mechanisms discussed above. Also here, information about 
particular infringements is missing from the outset, therefore the general statistical 
distributions of infringements and the damages caused become very important. 
Estimates of these values are inherently difficult, but attempts have frequently been 
made.404 Some markets are likely to be more prone to certain types of infringements 
than others. Damages caused can also depend on the type of market in question.405
Theoretically, also competition authorities working under budget constraints and 
under pressure to show results should be capable of making similar estimates in order 
to decide which markets to focus their efforts on. If such a system were in place for a 
longer time, experience might also provide some data which could be used. In this 
respect, comparisons with legal systems in which private enforcement of competition 
law infringements has been in place for some time, such as the US, might also be 
helpful.
However, compared to the other systems described above, the licence mechanism 
hinders efficient specialisation in overcoming asymmetric information. When the 
licence is defined as applying to a certain market segment, for example, very different 
types of infringements may appear in that market segment, so that the licensee can not 
specialise on, for example, the detection of cartel infringements rather than that of 
abuses of dominant positions. Compared to the market mechanism, specialisation is 
hampered. 
                                                                                                                               
403 See the discussion about the remuneration of P.E.’s in the enforcement market above. 
404 For a summary and overview see: Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more 
effective. Study in support of the impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages 
actions, 71 ff.
405 Empirical evidence found connections between size of overcharge and industry. See Bolotova, 
"Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis," JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND 
ORGANIZATION 70 (2009): 321 ; Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. 
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4.1.4 Nuisance suits 
The risk of unmeritorious suits to be brought is likely to remain significant under 
these circumstances. The agents investigating certain areas have had to incur large 
upfront costs or liabilities to obtain the licences. The pressure to at least recapture 
these costs is likely to increase the already existing incentives to file suits with little or 
no merits, to force potential defendants into settlement agreements whenever there is a 
possibility to do so. 
4.1.5 Principal-Agent Problems 
The risk of under deterrence because the winner might collude with potential 
defendants once the auction process is completed is minimised. Whoever wins the bid 
has to at least recoup the amount of his bid and will not accept settlement offers below 
that amount.  
In the best possible auction with numerous bidders, the winning bid would equal all 
expected damage awards406 that could have been litigated for. Therefore, if the 
auctioning system is optimally designed, competition amongst bidders should prevent 
the defendants from being able to buy their freedom from competition for an 
inefficiently low amount. 
It should also be possible that some offenders join forces in the auction to place a bid 
for the market section they operate in. Winning the auction would relieve them for the 
assigned period of the risk of detection of any anti-competitive behaviour. 
Nevertheless, defendant(s) would have to place the highest bid to win the auction and 
that forces the winner to actually pay the expected collectible damage awards either 
upfront, or after the license expires. This leads to an imposition of the damages done 
to society on the defendant(s) in any case without the requirement for litigation.  
                                                                                                                               
Study in support of the impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions.Connor, 
Optimal deterrence and private international cartels. Available at : http://ssrn.com/abstract=787927. 
406 To be more precise: the expected damage awards as estimated by the highest bidder. 
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It could also happen that a small share of the firms in that particular industry sector 
join forces in a consortium to win the auction. In such a case, highly informed and 
interested parties will enforce the competition law in that industry, controlling the 
conduct of other firms outside the consortium.  
When agents place bids according to the total expected damage awards of the 
auctioned sector, and litigate the detected infringements to recoup their bid, principal-
agent problems are minimised. The interests of society as principal and enforcement 
agent are aligned to a great extent through the auction mechanism. 
4.1.6 Minimisation of costs 
Procedural efficiency is guaranteed by the mandatory inclusion of all possible claims 
into just one proceeding. Moreover, detection and litigation efforts will be distributed 
more efficiently. More efficient enforcers will be in a better position to win the 
auctions than less efficient enforcers. Also after the auction takes place, the auction 
winner will have large incentives to keep the costs of detection and litigation as low as 
possible, while still achieving the aimed at profit. The actual detection and litigation 
efforts therefore should be efficient. 
On the other hand, while at first glance such an auction may be a remedy for 
allocative inefficiency due to a doubling of efforts,407 one also has to take into account 
that enforcement agents will all have to invest large resources on the gathering of 
relevant information in order to be able to place an adequate bid. To establish the 
value of the rights to investigate a certain market share for a limited time period, 
information about the likelihood of infringements, the probability of being able to 
detect different infringements, and the amount of damages caused is needed. The 
more accurate firms want to be in their estimation, the higher the social losses will be 
due to a doubling of efforts preceding the auction. Moreover, the auction process itself 
can be very costly, which adds to total enforcement costs. 
                                                
407 Classical problem in the case of patent races, see Perry and Vincent, "The Optimal Timing of 
Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 43 (2002): 
1035. 
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4.1.7 Conclusion
A major advantage of a system complemented by auctions as described above is that 
auctions overcome the principal-agent problems between society and the agent. 
Incentives to collude with the defendants and to agree on inefficiently low settlements 
are lacking. In case the defendants wanted to buy their freedom from prosecution 
through a settlement with the auction winner, they will at least have to compensate the 
enforcer for the bid paid at the auction. The enforcement agent would demand at least 
the expected share of the bid and consequently the expected damages (as evaluated by 
him) caused by each defendant. The defendants as well as the enforcer would 
therefore theoretically settle on the expected amount of damages that would result 
were the case(s) brought to trial. Such settlements would be efficient from a social and 
deterrence point of view.408 Also free riding behaviour is avoided and procedural 
efficiency is achieved. Detection and enforcement efforts would be channelled to the 
most efficient enforcement agent. 
However, the auction mechanism also imposes a lot of costs on society. These costs 
comprise the cost of the auction itself as well as all resources spent by competing 
bidders when estimating adequate bids. Moreover, the increased incentives to file 
suits with little merits bear the risk of inefficient use of resources and of over 
deterrence. Moreover, smaller possible profits compared to the market mechanism, 
combined with the huge obstacle of adequate funding because a perfect capital market 
is lacking and the complexity of the licensing mechanisms, further decreases the 
efficiency of such a system. Overall, this system seems not to be an attractive or even 
feasible solution, especially not for risk averse individuals or agents with limited 
resources. 
                                                
408 See discussion on merits of settlements above. 
The Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence Perspective                                                            164
4.2 Auctions after detection 
Auctions may also be held at a later stage, when detection has already taken place, to 
cure some of the problems found in the other litigation systems discussed above. 409
This section therefore deals with a variation of these systems, rather than a substitute. 
However, as the optimal collective action as well as the optimal representative actions 
will end up at the market solution, the auction discussed here takes the market 
solution as starting point. These auctions can be combined with collective and 
representative actions, as well as the more general market approach. It then needs to 
be investigated how introducing a second step, the auction after detection, alters the 
incentive structures of these described mechanisms. 
Once detection of a competition law infringement has taken place and the rights have 
been established (registered), an auction system may be used to organise the litigation 
of the claims. The auction model effectively splits the enforcement market into two 
markets in which entities compete with each other. In the first market, detectors
compete on the detection of an offence. In the second stage, litigators compete in 
auctions for the right to litigate the arising damages claims due to competition law 
infringements. Detectors would be compensated for their efforts through the auction 
proceeds, so that in effect the total damage awards would be split between litigators 
and detectors, incorporating the costs and risks borne by each party. The litigator will 
take his costs, risks and expected profit into account when placing the (winning) bid, 
so that the detector would be compensated accordingly. 
Just as in the other type of auction described above, the litigant considering placing a 
bid in the auction to represent the total group of victims will have to weigh the costs 
of litigation and the connected risks of loosing at trial against the expected awards. 
Placing his bid, he will further have to carefully balance the probability of placing a 
non winning bid, because it is too low, against the reduction of his expected profit 
margin. As opposed to the system discussed above, however, the information 
necessary to establish the value of the detected case is already present and could be 
                                                
409 This approach could be said to mirror the so called two-tier patent system, in which a registered idea 
is sold at auction to be developed by another entity. See Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky, "A marketplace 
for Ideas?" TEXAS LAW REVIEW 84 (2005): 395, 417 f. 
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made available to all participants. Under these circumstances, the costs to be incurred 
to place a bid are considerably smaller and competition amongst several bidders is 
focused on efficiency in litigation.  
If the litigator does not succeed in obtaining the ownership of the claim, the auction 
could nevertheless be conducted to establish only the right to litigate. As mentioned 
above, such auctions have already been employed in practice. The litigators 
competing in the auction could place a bid according to their estimate of the damage 
awards, according to their fee, or both. Harel and Stein410 discussed such systems and 
argued that a bid on the amount to be sued for would be part of the optimal system. 
The litigator would be bound by that amount and lose his fee in case his bid was 
“unreasonably optimistic”.411 Together with a ban on settlements yielding an amount 
below the winning bid, the authors argue that most problems with existing auctioning 
mechanisms (and general principal-agent problems in class actions) could be 
overcome that way. 
Another alternative would be the auction of the action itself, so that the litigator 
succeeds in obtaining ownership. In that scenario, the detection agency can be 
reimbursed for the invested resources through the auction proceeds. Under perfect 
circumstances, the winning bid would equal the net expected damage awards from 
litigation. In order to give the right incentives to detection agents, these proceeds 
would have to go to the detector, net a return on investment for the litigator.  
4.2.1 Free riding
Free riding behaviour in such a setting is not profitable for either detectors or litigants. 
Detectors trying to free ride in any way on other detectors’ efforts risk not being the 
first to secure the rights and therefore forfeit remuneration for their costs through the 
auction proceeds. Litigators are unable to free ride as their right to litigate is 
established only in the auction. 
                                                
410 Stein, Law & Economics at the Animal Farm: Offering a New Solution to the Class Action Agency 
Problemavailable at : http://ssrn.com/abstract=271431. 
411 Ibidem, 33. 
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4.2.2 Rational apathy 
Whoever detected the infringement and filed suit already has already established the 
right to represent the total of victims. Be it the market, collective actions or 
representative actions, the rational apathy of the individual victim to file suit would be 
at least reduced if not overcome. 
Rational apathy concerning agents’ incentives to file suit under this system would be 
rational apathy concerning participation in the auction. The profit to be gained 
depends on several factors, including the amount of and nature of competing bidders, 
as well as the risk of loosing at trial. Greater competition should increase the amount 
of the winning bid, thereby reducing the winners’ profit. More efficient litigants 
should be able to place higher bids. Riskier cases should yield smaller auction 
proceeds than more straight forward ones.  
Of course, the financing problem is the same as in the previously discussed auction 
system. However, the amount of financial resources needed is considerably smaller in 
this scenario, though still very large in total amounts. The specific design of the 
auction has an influence on the degree of the financing problem. Again, actual 
payment of the bid could be postponed until the trial has ended.  
Under most ideal circumstances, winning bidders would be able to earn a normal 
return on their investment.  However, the final proceed of the auction also depends on 
the bidders’ attitudes towards risk and their adequate estimation of the relevant 
parameters.   As together with the transfer of the rights,412 also the remaining risk 
connected to the prosecution of the claims is passed on to the successful bidder, the 
payment made to the detector will be less than the total and the winning bidder could 
earn a potential profit. This resembles auction ideas that already have been employed 
in the United States. Incentives to participate in such auctions are dependant on the 
potential profits litigators may gain. As these are taken away from detectors, ideally 
the potential profits for litigators reflect the costs and risks connected to the litigation. 
                                                
412 Either the right to represent or the rights to claim damages 
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In this scenario the detector does not have to bear these, so that the incentives are only 
distributed amongst two parties instead of one enforcement agent. 
However, with regard to optimal deterrence of competition law infringements, the 
incentives for detection are also highly relevant. In the Law and Economics literature, 
this issue has generally not been a focal point. Instead the majority of the 
contributions have focused on the US style class action with a lawyer working on a 
contingency fee basis as starting point, and the alignment of interests between lawyer 
and victims as goal. In the scheme discussed here, two parties form the private 
enforcement agent: detector and litigator. The first has incentives to invest in 
detection according to the group litigation scheme in place. If it is a market for 
enforcement, the incentives are similar to those under the market mechanism. He does 
not receive the total of expected damage awards (the winning auction bid), but he also 
does not bear the risk and costs that are connected to the litigation. The litigator does 
not invest in detection, but only in the litigation. His incentives are influenced by the 
prospect of profit that can be obtained when the bid is less than the actual damages 
awarded. 
In the second stage auction model, the detector could and should be reimbursed 
through the proceeds of the auction. In a perfectly designed auctioning system under 
perfect information, the winning bid should equal the expected proceeds of the trial, 
minus litigation costs and normal return on investment. Granting the detection agency 
a certain share or all of the proceeds would then give incentives for detection as 
analysed in the different systems above.  
4.2.3 Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information could be overcome according to the underlying scheme in 
which the detector operates. The litigator may still face some information problem 
when investigating the potential value of the bid. However, depending on the way the 
filing is regulated, most of the relevant information will have already been discovered 
by the detector. 
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4.2.4 Nuisance suits 
Auctioning the rights to litigate a detected infringement greatly reduces the 
possibilities to file meritless suits. At least initial information on the case at hand has 
to be provided to conduct the auction and will be made public to (at least) the 
potential auction participants in the process. The auctioneer could resemble a control 
mechanism weeding out cases with little or no merits, allowing only those cases to 
proceed that pass a preliminary revision. If the filing of such a suit will only be made 
public after it has been decided to take the case to such an auction mechanism, then 
the threat of filing a suit in order to extract a settlement even though the case has little 
merits is also made less credible and the costs for the potential defendant could be 
reduced. Nuisance suits may be eliminated completely, when litigation is made 
mandatory. 
4.2.5 Principal-agent problems 
The effectiveness of such a system to overcome principal-agent problems between 
representing and represented parties by aligning the interest of both and eliminating 
incentives to strike inefficient settlements seems quite straight forward.  
Auctions have been frequently discussed in the Law and Economics literature as 
solutions to the perceived principal-agent problems between representing party 
(mostly a lawyer conducting a class action) and the injured parties.413 The basic effect 
of auctioning claims to competing lawyers is to unite lawyers and claimants interests, 
as plaintiffs are compensated from the proceeds of the auction and the lawyer winning 
the bid will succeed to the rights of the plaintiffs. An alternative proposed in the 
literature is to auction only the right to represent the victims, leaving their rights intact 
and their compensation dependant not on the auction proceeds but the outcome of the 
trial. In this scenario, the right to represent the class is auctioned to the bidder with the 
highest expected recovery. In case the lawyer fails to recover that amount later, she 
will lose her (contingency) fee in case her bid was unreasonably optimistic. 
                                                
413 See Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and 
Legal Actions taken by Associations 183 ; Rosenberg, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public 
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Settlements yielding less than the proposed recovery for claimants would be 
prohibited. With these three mechanisms at work, the principal-agent problems would 
be solved efficiently, while the interests of the claimants would be appropriately 
protected. 414
The second step auction compels the litigating agent to at least recoup the winning bid 
from the defendants. That greatly reduces principal-agent problems between society 
and agent.415
4.2.6 Minimisation of costs 
Again, when bidders assess the value of the claims to be auctioned, which includes 
the assessment of the total damages caused, the ex ante probability that this 
infringement will be detected, and the probability of winning the suit, all bidders 
invest resources. This doubling of efforts seems unavoidable, but it presumably is 
much less than in other scenarios. In this case, only one specific infringement has to 
be investigated and depending on the requirements to be fulfilled by the detector to 
register the claims, a lot of necessary information may already be available. 
However, the doubling of efforts which takes place at the detection stage still persists. 
As argued above, this may be a waste for society that could be outweighed by the 
benefits of increased deterrence. 
One has to bear in mind that auctions are costly. Not only to the ones investing 
resources in research to calculate their optimal bid, but also the procedure itself 
generates costs that must be borne by society, on top of the detection and litigation 
costs. However, the total costs to society have to be weighed against the reduction in 
losses caused by principal-agent problems and inefficient group litigation mechanisms 
that insufficiently deter violations of competition law.  
                                                                                                                               
Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law 159 ; Macey, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A 
Rejoinder 458.   
414 Stein, Law & Economics at the Animal Farm: Offering a New Solution to the Class Action Agency 
Problem. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=271431 
415 For a brief discussion of whether or in how far such a mechanisms could be incorporated into legal 
systems of Member States, see the legal obstacles discussed in chapter 4, section C. 
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4.2.7 Conclusion
Auctions held before the litigation stage have a number of advantages over the other 
individual systems discussed above. Free riding behaviour, the risk of frivolous suits 
and principal-agent problems are minimised. Also the problems of individual rational 
apathy concerning the filing of suits or investing in detection efforts (overcoming 
information asymmetry) are reduced in those cases where they are large. However, 
such a system creates additional costs, on top of unavoidable double effort costs, and 
may not lead to the socially optimal investment in these detection and litigation 
efforts. Moreover, adequate funding mechanisms for auction participants as well as 
detectors are needed. Of vital importance is also the requirement that the auction 
mechanism is carefully designed to fit the specific circumstances. 
Nevertheless, auctions after detection seem to be a viable and quite efficient way to 
curb principal-agent problems, which can persist in any of the above discussed group 
litigation mechanisms. Moreover, risks of unmeritorious claims are largely reduced, if 
not eliminated by establishing another control instance. Incentives to participate in the 
litigation auction are provided through the profit that litigators are able to secure for 
themselves in the winning bid. The more competition in the auction, the smaller that 
profit is likely to be. The incentives to detect for the detector remain dependant on the 
remuneration the detector can expect from the auction proceeds. These would not be 
total damage awards, but, depending on the complexity of litigation and its riskiness, 
more or less close to that amount.  
A two stage model with market for enforcement in the first stage, and an auction for 
litigation in the second stage, is likely to be the most beneficial in cases of wide 
spread and small individual damages caused by competition law infringements. This 
will be the case, for example, when end consumers suffer losses due to a price cartel 
where all losses where passed on to them.  
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D Conclusions  
The introduction of group litigation mechanisms for damages actions based on 
competition law into existing legal systems brings about the potential to overcome 
some obstacles that exist to individual claims for damages. On the other hand, other 
problems might be made more severe or created by such a legal change. It is therefore 
necessary to carefully examine the goal to be achieved with such a mechanism and to 
intelligently design the system in a way that it achieves the given goal in the most 
efficient way. A cost benefit analysis as conducted here, even if only qualitative and 
not quantitative statements are possible, provides necessary information to legislators 
in order to make adequate choices.  
The legal aim of introducing group litigation mechanisms in this analysis is assumed 
to be only that of deterrence of anti-competitive conduct. Compensation of individual 
harm is only a matter of redistribution from an economic point of view. Admittedly, 
the goals of enforcement of competition law and its enforcement are numerous, 
including compensatory justice. However, just as aiming with one arrow at several 
targets simultaneously is a challenge, the different goals pursued by the introduction 
of group litigation mechanisms may be in conflict with each other. For example, 
pursuing optimal deterrence comes at the costs that compensatory justice for 
individual victims may not be achieved at the same time. The policy makers and 
legislators then have to decide which goal is given preference over others, and has to 
be aware of the fact that the pursuit of one goal may come at costs with regard to the 
degree to which other goals can be achieved.  
Breaches of competition law affect various types of victims to larger or lesser degrees 
and pose more or less specific obstacles to individual claims for damages. 
Consequently, the different forms of group litigation are also more or less suited to 
overcome the specific problems at hand. The main reasons for these differences are 
asymmetric information problems and the possibilities of the victim or agent in 
question to overcome these, as well as the severity of principal-agent problems 
between the various affected entities (victims, agents and society at large).   
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Table 1 
Remaining problems 
with regard to: 
Lead plaintiff 
collective action 
Representative action  Market & Auction after 
detection 
Free riding 0 / - 
(mandatory group, but: 
incentives to become lead 
plaintiff ?) 
0
(mandatory group, no free 
riding) 
0
(mandatory group, no 
free riding)
Rational apathy - - 
(lead plaintiff bears costs 
and risks of initiating 
collective action, 
compares individual 
benefits with costs of 
litigation)
-
(association compares 
total damages with costs 
of litigation, but: what are 
incentives?) 
0
(compares total damages 
with costs, business like 
investment decision) 
Information asymmetry - - - 
(initial problems are 
large, little incentives to 
invest resources to 
overcome these problems) 
- - 
(better abilities to 
overcome asymmetry, due 
to expertise, learning 
effects, etc.)  
-
(most incentives to 
overcome, specialised in 
overcoming these 
problems) 
Nuisance suits -
(collective action 
increases potential costs 
that may be imposed on 
defendant, individual 
gains might be increased) 
- - 
(larger threat potential 
than individual(s) in 
collective action)) 
0 / - 
(can be reduced in 
auctions) 
Principal-Agent- 
Problems 
- - - 
(lead-plaintiff is one-shot 
player, problems remain 
between client(s) and 
lawyer as well as plaintiff 
and society) 
- - 
(association is repeat-
player, more options to 
curb these problems, 
remaining agency 
problems between society 
and associations) 
-
(agents are repeat 
players, incentives are 
better aligned with those 
of society) 
Minimisation of costs 0 / - 
(mandatory group, little 
doubling of efforts, also 
because of little 
incentives to invest) 
- - 
(mandatory group, but 
competition between 
several associations leads 
to doubling of efforts)
-
(mandatory group, most 
efficient detectors and 
litigators, but race to 
detect) 
To provide a quick summary, table 1 above shows the efficiency of different group 
actions in cases of infringements causing small and widely spread individual 
damages.416 The forms of group litigation compared are collective actions with a lead 
plaintiff as main actor, representative actions brought by associations and the 
combined market/auction-after-detection solution. The degree to which problems 
                                                
416 The table can only depict a very rough comparison. For detailed discussions of the issues involved 
please see the relevant text above.  
The Optimal Group Litigation from a Deterrence Perspective                                                            173
remain, relative to the other options, are indicated by - signs, ranging from 0 
(problems are largely reduced) to - - -  (problems remain large). 
Collective actions initiated by a lead plaintiff in competition law cases claiming 
damages seem to be less efficient in those types of infringements, where especially 
end consumers are affected. Such a system requires the largest participation of the 
victims, who as end consumers might not be adequately equipped. Such a system 
would fare better in cases where only few firms are affected, for example in cases of 
abuse. The harmed undertakings are likely to be more sophisticated, experienced and 
repeat players. However, the necessity for group litigation mechanisms to foster 
actions for damages due to competition law infringements is less obvious in cases 
where only one or few sophisticated victims, such as firms, suffer relatively large 
damages. In such cases the added benefits of group litigation compared to individual 
litigation might be only small and possibly outweighed by the increased complexity 
and costs compared to individual litigation and the risk of unmeritorious suits.  
When the collective action is in fact run by the lawyer, the whole group litigation 
should be designed accordingly, as the lawyer will be acting as an entrepreneur. As 
has been argued, the lawyer as enforcement agent could be an efficient mechanism, 
especially in cases where obstacles to individual litigation are large, when that form of 
group litigation it is designed in a way that actually introduces the market of 
enforcement.  
Similar to the results of the analysis concerning collective actions run by a lawyer, 
adequately designed representative actions seem to be more suited in cases where a 
large number of victims is affected, especially when they consist of mainly end 
consumers. When the consequences of a competition law infringement are typically 
spread over a large group of various victims, the obstacles to detection and litigation 
faced by individual victims are more severe. Therefore mechanisms that create 
incentives for an agent to act on behalf of society at large become more attractive. 
Allowing the benefits of competition between different associations and especially 
providing adequate incentives to detect and prosecute infringements again pushes the 
representative action in the direction of a market of enforcement agents in such cases. 
Just as is the case for collective actions, representative actions also seem less needed, 
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when the number of victims is small, individual damages are large and the victims 
tend to be sophisticated players. 
When individual damages are very small and widely spread amongst a large number 
of victims, mechanisms that turn the detection and litigation into actual investment 
decisions seem to be most efficient, thereby inducing a market based enforcement of 
competition law. That is particularly the case when auction mechanisms are 
employed, in order to secure that the optimal (or best possible) sanction will be 
imposed on the infringer. The use of the market based mechanism combined with 
auction mechanisms seems to be most efficient way to align the interest of society as 
principal and those of its private enforcement agents. Auctions also provide  solutions 
to curb remaining problems in collective and representative actions, when several 
enforcement agents compete. 
It can not be neglected that legal restrictions as they exist in the area of tort law, 
constitutional law or other regulations might severely inhibit the efficiencies of all of 
the above systems. These limitations will be discussed in the following chapters. 
However, the insights developed in this chapter provide several layers of vital 
information for legislators contemplating to design group litigation mechanisms. First, 
when deviations from the most efficient system, as developed here, are made, for 
example the selection of an opt-out rather than a mandatory system in cases of small 
and widely spread damages, the analysis conducted here will answer the question, at 
what costs these deviations will have to be made. Hence, justification of these choices 
will have to make sure that the gains realised by that choice at least compensate for 
these costs. Second, the analysis also highlights necessary trade-offs that occur within 
the design of a specific mechanism, for example between incentivising litigation and 
avoiding nuisance suits, so that additional safeguards may be established. These 
theoretical results should therefore also be very valuable in the real world. Moreover, 
comparison with the mechanism developed here allows for a better assessment of 
existing systems. 
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Chapter 4 : The European Way Ahead 
In this Chapter, the proposals made by the European Commission are analysed with 
regard to their potential to reach their different goals. In the first part of the Chapter, a 
short overview is given of the way ahead as envisaged by the Commission. In the 
second part, the proposed mechanisms are analysed with regard to their ability to 
achieve the goal of enforcement, i.e., deterrence, using the insights gained in the 
previous Chapter. The focus remains on the group litigation mechanisms, but other 
mechanisms that strengthen or weaken some of the potentials of the group litigation 
will also be taken into account. In the third part, legal obstacles regarding the 
introduction of the optimal deterrence mechanism as they may exist are discussed. 
Lastly, the other aims of the reform and the degree to which those might be realised 
are also discussed. The last two parts provide some general, though sometimes 
critical, ideas concerning the justification of the Commission’s decision.  
A The way ahead as painted in the White Paper417
Vigorous competition in an open internal market provides the best guarantee that European companies will 
increase their productivity and innovative potential. Competition law enforcement is therefore a key element of the 
"Lisbon strategy" which aims at making the economy of the European Union grow and create employment for 
Europe’s citizens. 
Facilitating damages claims for breaches of the antitrust rules will not only strengthen the enforcement of 
competition law, but will also make it easier for consumers and firms who have suffered damage from an 
infringement of competition law rules to recover their losses from the infringer. […] (European Commission, 
Background to the Green and White Paper)418
While the major aim of the planned reform remained a bit of a mystery after the 
Green Paper, the Commission has clarified this point in the following White Paper. 
With the adaptation of the White Paper, the primary focus of enhancing enforcement 
of competition law through private actions for damages now seems to have been 
placed on full compensation of victims of competition law infringements. “All 
                                                
417 Although expected already in spring of 2009, unfortunately the Directive following the White Paper 
did not materialise while the work on this thesis was still conducted.  
418 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html
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victims” should be “fully compensated”.419  Deterrence has been degraded to being a 
side effect, albeit a welcomed one. In its Impact Assessment Report, the Commission 
addressed again the “clear deficit in terms of corrective justice” 420 with regard to the 
current redress mechanisms in cases of antitrust damages in the Member States and 
the expectation that effective mechanisms will “create additional deterrence”.421 The 
major aim of the discussed and proposed changes in procedural rules and other 
regulations seems to be to overcome these deficits, in order to ensure effective 
compensation of victims of competition law infringements. However, whether this 
goal should always take clear precedence over the goal of deterrence has not been 
clarified.
In this section, only a quick overview over the proposed legal changes is given. The 
effects of these proposals are discussed in greater detail when the White Paper is 
assessed with regard to its potential to achieve deterrence or other goals. 
The most important proposal in the White Paper to this research was the introduction 
of several group litigation mechanisms. In particular, the Commission proposed the 
following group litigation mechanisms as complements:422
“ representative actions, which are brought by qualified entities, such as consumer 
associations, state bodies or trade associations, on behalf of identified or, in rather 
restricted cases, identifiable victims. These entities are either (i) officially designated 
in advance or (ii) certified on an ad hoc basis by a Member State for a particular 
antitrust infringement to bring an action on behalf of some or all of their members”  
“ opt-in collective actions, in which victims expressly decide to combine their 
individual claims for harm they suffered into one single action.”
                                                
419 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404White Paper, 2 f.  
420 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment, {COM 
(2008) 165 final} {SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 406}," (2008), 13. 
421 Ibidem, 13, 22, 23.  
422 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 4. 
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Next to these, a number of additional mechanisms are proposed, to facilitate the 
bringing of actions for damages due to competition law infringements. With regard to 
standing, the Commission has opted for allowing also indirect purchaser standing. The 
passing-on defence, with the burden of proof resting on the defendant, is being 
allowed and a presumption of full passing-on should be established in cases brought 
by indirect purchasers. National courts are advised to employ mechanisms to avoid a 
double indemnification of the same harm, which may result from such presumptions. 
Disclosure inter partes should be ensured at a minimum, in line with existing legal 
procedures in many Member States.  Final decisions taken by public bodies should be 
made binding for national courts dealing with follow-on actions for damages. Once an 
infringement has been proven, the defendant can only escape liability when able to 
prove that the breach of competition law was the consequence of an excusable error.
Therefore, fault does not need to be established by the plaintiffs.  With regard to the 
calculation of damages, the Commission offered to publish non-binding guidelines on 
simplified methods, or approximate methods to establish the amount of harm. Some 
minimum requirements concerning limitation periods are also proposed. Accordingly, 
limitation periods for continuous or repeated infringements should not start before the 
day the infringement ceases and before the victim can reasonably be expected to have 
knowledge about the harm.423 For follow-on actions, a new limitation period should be 
set to at least two years after a final decision has been taken by public authorities 
concerning the infringement. Also, the Member States are encouraged to re-evaluate 
their cost and fee shifting rules. In particular, court fees should be set “in an 
appropriate manner”.424 Further, mechanisms to enhance settlements should be 
installed and in certain circumstances should it be possible to alleviate the potential 
financial burden on plaintiffs by reducing their liability for the defendants costs even 
if their claim is unsuccessful. A last thought is given to the interaction of private 
claims for damages with the public leniency programmes. The leniency applicant 
should be given protection through a non-disclosure rule concerning all corporate 
statements made by the applicant. Further protection is not proposed, yet, but opened 
for discussion. 
                                                
423 The latter requirement might be in need of further qualification, as in some cases an individual 
indirect purchaser may hardly ever be reasonably expected to gain knowledge about the harm, until 
some third party informs him or her. 
424 Ibidem,  nr 2.8., 9 f. 
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B Evaluation of the proposed mechanisms with regard to 
deterrence 
From its selected options, the Commission expects, next to enhanced compensation of 
victims, also an increase in “deterrence rates”.425 Despite the problem that the 
achievement of these two goals sometimes may be in conflict with each other, 
deterrence as well as compensatory justice can only be increased in as much as the 
proposed systems have the potential to overcome the problems faced by plaintiffs in 
individual litigation.  The first issues to be analysed in this section is therefore the 
degrees to which obstacles to individual private litigation can be mitigated or 
overcome. In the second part, the question whether the amount of damages awarded 
will suffice to reach the optimal sanction is discussed. In the third section, the 
potential to reduce costs imposed on society is analysed. The fourth section provides a 
summary of the findings. 
The analysis therefore draws on the insights gained in the previous Chapter and thus 
analyses, how well the proposed mechanisms will fare with regard to deterrence, 
which is one of the goals pursued by the European Commission. The previous 
analysis focussed on stand-alone actions, while the European Commission proposal 
also allows for follow-on actions.426 However, that analysis can still be applied for two 
reasons: first, it can serve to analyse the efficiency of the proposals with regard to the 
(also wanted) stand alone actions. Second, the inefficiencies discovered in the 
previous analysis can also be used to identify inefficiencies with regard to follow-on 
actions. 
                                                
425 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment, {COM 
(2008) 165 final} {SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 406}, 58. 
426 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, nr 21, 11 f.  
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1 Overcoming existing obstacles to private litigation 
1.1 Free Rider Problems  
Free rider problems may persist despite the proposed group litigation mechanisms. 
The system as proposed by the European Commission envisions collective opt-in 
actions, representative actions by ex ante certified associations and by ad hoc certified 
associations, as complements. 427 Along side these mechanisms, traditional litigation 
will persist unaltered, as the individual plaintiffs will not be deprived of their right to 
bring claims for damages on their own.428 This, combined with the system inherent 
feature that in most cases each form of group litigation will capture only a sub-group 
of the total group of victims, free riding incentives and possibilities remain.  
Given the complexity connected to the establishment of competition law 
infringements, individual victims may decide to wait for others to litigate whenever 
possible. This may either be by individual suits or through collective actions, or for 
associations to step in and bring the first suit. The judgment, alongside the 
information made public in the first claim can in some cases greatly reduce the burden 
on the individual plaintiff. While the judgements in prior actions for damages might 
not be binding for the court in all cases, they could at least be invoked as evidence.429
Therefore, especially in complex cases, where a lot of investment into the legal claim 
is required, individuals may still hesitate to take action. 
Associations may have incentives to free ride for similar reasons. As all the proposed 
systems are considered to be complements, different representative bodies, for 
example trade and consumer associations, or associations representing different 
subgroups, may hope to be able to free ride on the efforts of another. This is predicted 
to be especially likely in those cases where all the plaintiffs will be identified and the 
total of awards eventually distributed. That is because, depending on the regulation on 
how the associations will be remunerated for their expenses, the incentives to become 
active may be very limited in the first place.  
                                                
427 Ibidem, nr 59 f, 21 f. 
428 Ibidem, nr 61, 21 f. 
429 Ibidem, nr 225, 68 and fn 118. 
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Depending on the specific regulations enacted, discovery rules may decrease the 
possibilities to free ride on efforts spent on prior litigation by other agents. When, due 
to the confidential nature of relevant information, public access to vital evidence 
gathered in one proceeding is limited or evidence is only indirectly produced,430
important information might not be disclosed to other parties. Albeit, such limitations 
run counter the Commission’s plans to alleviate the burden for potential plaintiffs.  
The incentives to free ride may be further mitigated if there is effective competition 
between several bodies or collective actions and when the representative agent has 
some personal interest in litigating the case. Theoretically, the complementary nature 
of the proposed mechanisms, together with the requirement to avoid double 
indemnification of specific harms,431 could induce competition between different 
representing agents. This may be especially so, when double compensation is to be 
avoided on a first come, first served, basis. Under such circumstances, an entity 
generally interested in being able to prosecute a specific case on behalf of a defined 
group could, in theory, face the risk that all members or a subgroup of the group 
might be represented in another group litigation which is initiated at an earlier stage. 
If that happens, the association might forego all or part of the benefit it was hoping to 
reap from pursuing the case. This would greatly reduce the incentives to free ride. 
Any benefits that might be gained by waiting for other actions to provide necessary 
information would have to be weighed against the risk that the group members would 
all or in part be represented in another proceeding. However, the actual possibilities 
for competition are limited. The first obstacle to effective competition would be 
specific regulations envisioned for the group litigation mechanisms. Ex ante certified 
entities might stand to gain the most from prosecuting cases, especially when the 
damages sued for are those of unidentified victims, and will be awarded to the entity 
in way of cy pres to be used in the further interests of those represented. On the other 
hand, these bodies shall be subject to specific verification requirements,432 which 
confines the number of designated bodies and consequently greatly reduces possible 
                                                
430 The Commission discussed both of these possibilities to reduce the scope of disclosure, see 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White 
Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment, {COM (2008) 165 
final} {SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 406}, nr 117, 36. 
431 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,  22, nr 61. 
432 Ibidem, 19. 
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competition amongst them.433 Ad hoc certified bodies, established with the aim of 
protecting a specific interest, may only represent their members. Therefore, the 
options for competition are severely limited. It may be that after one ad hoc certified 
body has been established, another may try to get sufficient members to join and to 
get certified as well. These options, however, will not lead to real competitive 
pressure.  
A lack of sufficient funding further decreases the possibilities for competition. This is 
especially so when associations are self financing though membership fees. 
Additionally it is also the case when their certification requires them to meet a certain 
threshold of members, in which case they will need to develop a considerable 
membership base. Only few consumer organisations or associations actually reach 
large numbers of membership.434 Therefore, competition between different 
associations on a national level is, and will be, limited. 
Competition on an international level is likely to be even less feasible. Organising an 
association which represents members located in different Member States is likely to 
be a very complex task.  Moreover, it is envisaged certification requirements will be 
established through national law. Therefore it seems that certified bodies, such as 
consumer associations or trade associations, are and shall remain, limited to 
representing the interests of national consumers or industries. Though there will be 
several associations within the European Union, competition amongst them will 
nevertheless be severely restricted. The prospect for competition between 
representative actions and collective actions also seems to be limited. As individuals 
will always retain the possibility to enforce their rights themselves, the filing of suit 
through an association seems not to foreclose the possibilities for individuals to opt-
out, for example by leaving the association, and starting their own proceedings at a 
later stage.  
                                                
433 Experience from the UK for example show, that the certification requirements can lead to very, very 
small numbers of certified bodies. In fact, in the UK, only one consumer association was certified to 
bring actions for damages before the CAT. See section B in Chapter 5. 
434 Some Member States regulate a minimum member base for certain certifications. The UK consumer 
association Which? for example is one of the largest and most active in Europe and still only a small 
fraction of UK population is covered. Dayagi-Epstein, Representation of Consumer Interest By 
Consumer Associations-Salvation for the Masses? 209, 224 ff. 
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Very important in this respect are the inadequate levels of self interests that 
representative agents (associations or the lead plaintiff/lawyer duo) may have to 
initiate cases. This depends on how inducements for the agents are regulated. When 
associations in representative actions stand to gain from the litigation only indirectly, 
for example through increased popularity, possibly leading to a larger income in 
membership fees or subsidies in the future, the cases that associations will be willing 
to take and compete on are severely restricted. For opt-in collective actions, the 
stimulus for active competition is even less. When being the lead plaintiff is not 
connected to some additional benefits on top of receiving the individual damages 
awarded in court, it would be preferable for each potential lead plaintiff if someone 
else expends the effort.  
Incentives to free ride on decisions by any competition authority can be assumed to 
remain significant, due to the complexity of competition cases. Limited budgets may 
well lead to a focus in the litigation efforts of both private individuals and 
associations, using the group litigation mechanism on follow-on actions. The 
proposed rules on the binding effects of competition authorities, the possible usage of 
prior judgements as evidence and the extended limitation periods facilitate the 
bringing of follow-on actions.435  That in turn increases the incentives to free ride on 
public enforcement efforts rather than to initiate stand-alone cases. 
It therefore is likely that free riding behaviour will remain significant and lead to a 
focus on follow-on rather than stand-alone actions. Even in such cases, however, the 
risk that only a fraction of these cases will be initiated seems to be high. Much 
depends on the approach the legislator will take on issues of the remuneration and 
incentive schemes for associations and lead plaintiffs or lawyers alike.  
                                                
435 See proposals on Limitation periods, Binding effect of NCA decisions and indication of usage of 
prior judgements as evidence, European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 8 f and 5f , and nr 225 at 68, 
respectively. 
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1.2 Overcoming rational apathy  
Additionally rational apathy on the side of the victims is likely to remain significant. 
While opt-in collective actions might enable the individual plaintiff to gain 
information about other similarly suited victims, the plaintiff initiating the suit 
remains uncertain about how many of the informed victims will decide to opt-in after 
being informed about the suit. Opting-in still requires efforts by the individual, who 
has to gather information and possibly also to provide evidence. Depending on the 
specifics of the case at hand, the rate of others opting-in may be very small. The 
initiating plaintiff then faces the risk of solely having to bear the costs of a litigation 
that is more complex, time consuming and expensive than a traditional trial. This is 
especially the case, when, in order to protect the interests of the represented claimants, 
similar regulation will be enacted as has been in a number of countries that already 
have experience with collective or class action mechanisms. With some variations, 
typical criteria for the admissibility of such class action proceedings include: 
numerosity of claimants; a preliminary investigation into the merits of the claims; 
commonality of claims; and, adequate representation.436 All of these requirements 
make the proceeding more complex and costly for the initiating defendant, due to the 
fact that it has to be evaluated by court whether they are sufficiently met. There are 
also other issues that increase the cost risk faced by the potential plaintiff. One issue is 
the costs that have to be incurred because of the nature of the proceedings as group 
litigation, such as the costs of notifying other victims. Also, the rebuttable 
presumption of full pass-on of overcharges in price fixing cases, as proposed by the 
Commission, can have a negative effect on indirect purchaser claims. The information 
of passing-on rates is likely not to be in the hands of the defendants, but in the hand of 
the direct purchasers. As third party to the proceeding, these are more protected and 
would have to be heard in the event the defendants achieve a disclosure order.437 That 
also complicates the procedure and therefore increases the costs faced by the potential 
plaintiff in case he loses and has to bear the costs of the proceedings.438
                                                
436 Mulheron, The class action in common law legal systems: a comparative perspective, Portland: Hart 
publishing (2004), part 11.  
437 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, nr 122 f, 38. 
438 As is common in the EU Member States, applying the British or European cost shifting rule. 
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Of course, when a large number of claimants can be found and opted-in, the costs can 
then be split amongst a large number of participants. Therefore, individual costs will 
be reduced. Another possibility would be to let the costs be borne by professional 
litigation funders. However, such professional funders are likely to be more interested 
in cases with large values, this could be at risk if only few victims decide to opt-in, 
especially when the individual values of the claims are low. Experience in the UK 
showed, that opt-in rates varied enormously.439 This is likely to reduce the willingness 
of professional funders to invest before the opt-in stage has been completed. The 
named plaintiff and/or his lawyer might have better access to such third party funding 
when a sufficient number of victims have been contacted earlier and have declared 
their willingness to opt-in. That again can be a time consuming and expensive task. 
Another cost adding factor may be the lawyer’s fees. This will particularly be the case 
if they increase with the stakes in the proceeding, as they may do either because of the 
way lawyer’s fees are regulated, or because the work load increases. 
On the other hand, when the plaintiff pondering whether to initiate such a suit already 
has information about the number of other victims and their willingness to participate 
in the suit, the system might work well. However, in such cases where the number of 
victims is not too large, joinder procedures might also be feasible and the additional 
costs created by filing several claims440 might be offset by the cost savings due to the 
less stringent requirement tests in a certification proceeding. 
If the system is able to encourage a representative association to become active and 
bear the costs of risks on behalf of individual victims, then the problems related to the 
rational apathy of individuals causing them to refrain from filing a suit due to the 
possible financial risks may be reduced. Associations on the other hand may not have 
large incentives to become active from the outset. Detection and establishment of anti-
competitive conduct is a difficult task. One way or another, associations would have 
to stand to gain from such activities, otherwise their level of activity may remain 
suboptimally low. This largely depends on the way they will be reimbursed for their 
                                                
439 As reported in Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, ""Improving Access to Justice through 
Collective  Actions", Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions," 
(2008) 100. 
440 Which may even be avoided when the plaintiffs decide to assign their claims to one of them, who 
then would litigate all claims in one proceeding (joinder of claims). 
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services. However, such reimbursement schedules need to be designed very 
cautiously, as not to encourage abuse.  
Overall, the rational apathy problem can not be overcome efficiently through the 
mechanisms proposed by the European Commission. While the rational apathy of 
individual victims may be reduced when an agent becomes active representing them, 
the incentives for the possible agents to become active remain suboptimal with regard 
to the rational apathy concerning litigation. 
1.3 Asymmetric information 
As discussed above, asymmetric information problems can be an immense obstacle to 
litigation concerning the breach of competition law. In particular, end consumers 
harmed in large numbers, but on very small individual scales, are very likely to face 
these problems. 
Surely, an opt-in collective action might make it possible for one aggrieved victim to 
inform others. Once the claim has been filed, notification of other victims has to take 
place in order to give them the opportunity to opt-in. Thereby, victims who might 
have been ignorant of the fact that they were harmed could be made aware, as well as 
becoming informed about the cause of their damages. Such systems would work best 
in cases where the lead plaintiff has the relevant information about harm, causes and 
potential other victims readily available. Such cases might arise in the context of 
exclusionary abuses or vertical restraints, for example. The contractual relationship or 
the failure to contract are obvious to the lead plaintiff, so the cause for the resulting 
harm is easily established. Other potential victims, those operating in the same market 
as the lead plaintiff, might also be known to the lead plaintiff. Even if the other 
victims for some reason are  not in a position to recognise the harm and cause, the 
lead plaintiff can initiate proceedings and thereby inform others. Similarly, 
representative actions may cure the lack of information on the victims’ side, once they 
have detected an infringement and started proceeding. 
However, the question remains how these patrons, be it individuals or associations, 
will be encouraged to overcome the asymmetric information problems they are facing. 
The European Way Ahead                                                                                          186
In cases where the information about the infringement is easily obtainable, for 
example in cases of vertical restraints or refusal to deal, the problem is less 
significant. Typically, the number of aggrieved victims is relatively small and the 
information of the harm and its cause is transmitted directly from the infringer to the 
victim. However, in such cases the added value of utilising a group litigation 
mechanisms compared to traditional individual litigation or joinder procedures may 
also be limited. That is because the problem of asymmetric information, one of the 
major obstacles to be overcome, is limited by nature, so that there is less need for a 
group litigation mechanism. Especially, when the lead plaintiff is in a similar position 
as the rest of the group, so that actually all members would have virtually equal access 
to information and resources. Such cases may arise in vertical restrictions with 
contractual limitations on the retailer, for example.    
The problem of asymmetric information is much larger in the case of covert 
infringements causing losses to a large number of victims, who might remain unaware 
of the harm and its cause. In such cases, the potential for group litigation mechanisms 
to install agents acting on behalf of victims that are in a better position to overcome 
the lack of information is largest. However, these agents will have to be adequately 
incentivised, and it is questionable whether the proposed representative action or the 
collective action is going to have such effects on lawyers, potential named plaintiffs, 
or associations. The named plaintiff, initiating a collective opt-in action can only start 
proceeding once he has been harmed and is aware of the amount of harm and the 
causes. Lawyers and associations however, will typically not be harmed themselves. 
For these agents, the information asymmetry is at least as large, if not larger in some 
cases, than for the individual victims. The comparative advantage these agents can 
have over the individual victims arises in their specialisation into overcoming these 
information asymmetries that is possible on their side. In order to overcome these 
asymmetries, incentives will be needed to give the agents a personal benefit from 
curing the lack of information. Detection of competition law infringements is a 
complex task, which typically requires more knowledge and resources than, for 
example, a case concerning product liability or disputes with travel agencies. It is 
questionable, whether hourly fee arrangements for lawyers or the prospective larger 
membership base for associations will grant sufficient benefits for these agents to 
become active in solving the considerably large information problem. Moreover, 
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lawyers in many Member States are prohibited from advertising, so that their 
possibilities to contact potential victims are severely inhibited. Under the current 
proposals discussed here the question of how to adequately incentivise associations 
has not been addressed.  
Of course, in follow-on actions, much of the missing information regarding the law 
violation and the infringing parties will be made available by the public authorities. If 
private actions for damages will only take place in such cases, the proposed group 
litigation mechanisms add little to remedy the remaining problems of asymmetric 
information. The question in such cases remains, who will be aware of this discovered 
and published information and who stands to gain sufficiently enough to act on that 
information. 
Overall, the problems of asymmetric information remain significant. The group 
litigation mechanism, as proposed, grants few incentives to overcome that problem. 
When drafting the regulations concerning group litigation mechanisms, Member 
States should pay attention to the question of incentives. This question has not been 
dealt with sufficiently thus far. Both associations and individuals will still have great 
incentives to limit their activity in bringing stand-alone actions to only those cases 
where information asymmetry is not present to any significant extent, evidence is 
easily acquired and the illegality of the conduct is quite unambiguous. In short, to 
cases where obstacles also to traditional individual litigation are very small. Stand-
alone actions therefore will only take place in a limited number of cases, most likely 
those where the problem of asymmetric information is small from the outset. 
Therefore, the effect of these measures on detection rates of infringements is likely to 
remain extremely limited. 
1.4 Principal-Agent Problems  
In opt-in collective actions, principal-agent problems between the victims and the 
legal representative, the lawyer, could increase slightly compared to the individual 
client-lawyer relationship as it exists in individual trials. The less those victims that 
opt-in are involved in the process, the less influence they can exert on the lawyer. It 
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could happen that only the lead-plaintiff has an impact on the way the case is handled. 
This very much depends on how exactly the opt-in collective action is going to be 
designed. When victims are not parties in the proceedings themselves, but are also 
bound by settlement decisions taken by the lead plaintiff/lawyer duo, principal-agent 
problems could be more severe than when victims are involved in the proceeding and 
can decide upon settlement offers themselves. The lead plaintiff himself may not be 
adequately trained to monitor and assess the lawyer’s conduct. Even if the lead 
plaintiff is a sophisticated client, the mere requirement of similarity of claims to be 
bundled into one proceeding can not guarantee that the lead plaintiff will have exactly 
the same preferences as other victims in the collective action. Attitudes towards risk 
as well as the nature and importance of the relationship between the plaintiffs and the 
defendant(s) can differ. For example, some victims may have made specific 
investments in reliance of their relationship with the defendant and depend heavily on 
the business relationship with the defendant, meanwhile others may have sufficient 
alternatives. On top of this, the lawyer himself may have interests that slightly differ 
from those of the group. The fee schedule may have an important role in that 
respect.441 Regardless of the way the fee system is construed, it is the lawyer putting 
effort into the case. He therefore has to evaluate the reimbursement he obtains for 
expending these efforts also with regard to possible alternative uses of his resources 
and their reimbursement.  
Similar problems between association and represented victims may persist in the case 
of representative actions. Though the association is probably a more sophisticated 
client in the lawyer-client relationship than individual plaintiffs the association may 
nevertheless pursue its own interests by initiating a certain case, which may or may 
not coincide with the interests of those represented. Here, it is the association that 
bears the risks and costs of the proceeding, and on top of that, possibly the costs of 
distributing any damages awards. Limited budgets would compel associations to 
choose between different cases and their efforts and persistence in pursuing them. 
These choices can be influenced by various factors such as the media attention 
connected to certain but not other cases, the possibilities to make use of professional 
litigation funders, the number of members affected, or the degree of harm caused. 
                                                
441 See Chapter 3, 2.2.1.5 for a more detailed discussion 
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These problems have been analysed above442 and in the legal and economic literature 
to a great extent. The requirement of representativeness of the lead plaintiff is one of 
the elements considered as capable of mitigating against these problems. Therefore it 
has been applied in many countries that have introduced collective actions.  It has to 
be noted that there will always be a conflict between the goal of securing the 
representativeness of the lead plaintiff and the effectiveness of group litigation 
mechanisms. As has been the experience in the UK443 with the representative rule 
under the Civil Procedure Rule,444 the introduction of too narrow a definition of 
required “same interest” can render the procedure ineffective. Moreover, that 
requirement alone will not solve the problem sufficiently and will be irrelevant in the 
case of representative actions. Other solutions discussed to solve the problem in both 
collective and representative actions include: judicial review of settlements and 
lawyers fees, or even auctioning the action or rights to represent. However, the 
European Commission has only foreseen mechanisms to facilitate settlements, but 
none of the solutions to the principal-agent problem have been proposed. 
More important than principal-agent problems between the representing parties and 
individual victims from a deterrence point of view, however, is the principal-agent 
relationship between society and the active parties. Society would prefer resources to 
be spent on deterring those infringements that cause the largest total losses to society. 
The agents however may prefer to concentrate their activities on other sets of cases, 
for example cases where the facts are clear and evidence is easily obtainable, or, due 
to the specific construction of the group litigation mechanisms, where identification 
and notification of victims is a simple task and therefore less costly.  Society might 
also prefer investment be made into the pursuit of stand-alone cases, especially when 
increasing detection would lead to larger deterrence effects as the increase in sanction 
may have,445 whereas the agents are likely to prefer follow-on actions to save on costs. 
All these principal–agent problems relate to the different incentives of private parties 
to sue, compared to the social optimum. 
                                                
442 See Chapter 3. 
443 Ibidem, 70 ff. 
444 See Chapter 5, under section B.1. 
445 As is suggested by the availability bias as researched in the behavioural economics, sociology  and 
criminology. 
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The designs of the proposed group litigation mechanisms are constructed with the 
main aim of compensating victims. Therefore the prior discussed conflicting interests 
between society and agents concerning deterrence effects are less relevant. However, 
the conflicts between victims and their representatives will remain unsolved also 
when compensation for victims is pursued. If Member States have to implement these 
group litigation mechanisms, they should incorporate possible solutions to mitigate 
principal-agent problems, because these are likely to be even more severe when the 
aim is that of deterrence. 
2 Reaching the optimal sanction 
Establishing a system that includes the losses of all victims will coincide with the goal 
of establishing the total harm caused to society by an antitrust-infringement, as basis 
for the optimal sanction. However, the optimal sanction may never be achieved in the 
proposed systems. This is not only because that amount will still have to be adjusted 
for the low probability of detection and conviction. In this section, a closer look is 
taken at the potential of the proposed mechanisms to reach the optimal sanction. 
With regard to the amount of damages, several issues become relevant: whether 
aggregate damages may be sued for and awarded to the group as a whole, how 
damages are to be calculated, whether exemplary damages will be used, and how 
many individual damages will be included in the proceeding.  
The first issue is the question as to what kind of damages are going to be awarded. On 
the one hand, the Commission states that victims should not receive more than the 
total actual harm.446 According to the ECJ447 this includes both actual loss (damnum 
emergens) and lost profits (lucrum cessans). Additionally, damage amounts awarded 
in group litigation actions should “correspond to the harm suffered by those included 
                                                
446 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment, {COM 
(2008) 165 final} {SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 406}, 23. 
447 European Court of Justice, Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v. Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others ECR I-6619, nr 95. 
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or represented”.448 This would require total damages to be established on the basis 
only of the harm caused to those victims represented and sufficient proof of these 
damages in order to avoid over- or under-compensation, which would exclude some 
of the victims harmed by the infringement. 
On the other hand, the Commission also recognises that there are no Community 
principles prohibiting victims from receiving more than their actual damages, even if 
it may constitute an unjust enrichment.449 On the contrary, the Commission stresses 
the point that in the  Manfredi judgement the ECJ dealt with damages awarded in 
excess of actual damages suffered in an “enabling”450 way. It is also acknowledged 
that victims might need further incentives than mere compensation of actual harm in 
order to bring action for damages, so that changes in the definition of damages are 
foreseen by the Commission if experience should show a need for such additional 
incentives.451 These deliberations are a departure from the principle of just and full 
compensation of individual harm, which would be welcomed from a deterrence 
perspective.  
Apart from the discussion of whether supra-compensatory damage awards could be 
available in cases of competition law infringements or not, a second issue relates to 
the calculation of damages. That also has an impact on whether victims will receive 
full, and not more than, compensation for the factual loss suffered and naturally also 
on the degree of deterrence effects. In that respect, the Commission again argues that 
the requirement of precise quantification of the amount of harm suffered may not 
stand in the way of awarding damages, due to the principle of effectiveness.452 It is 
submitted that calculating damages in a way to neither under- nor over-compensate 
victims may be “arguably a practically impossible or excessively difficult” exercise.453
For such reasons, the Commission considers simplifying the calculation of harm in 
accordance with the legal principle of ex aequo et bono (according to the right and 
good). The explicitly proposed options include: an a priori assumption of harm in 
                                                
448 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,  21. 
449 Ibidem, 57 f. 
450 Ibidem, nr 191, 58  
451 Ibidem, nr 195, 59. 
452 Ibidem, nr 197, 60. 
453 Ibidem, nr 198, 60. 
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price fixing cases as that of average overcharges;454 the rebuttable assumption that 
damages were fully passed-on to indirect purchaser plaintiffs;455 and the illegal gain as 
basis for calculating the damage in those cases where the exact calculation of harm 
would be too complex, for example in representative actions, where the victims 
neither need to be identified, nor be directly compensated.456 From a deterrence 
perspective, any approximation mechanism can lead to both over- and under-
compensation of individual victims, as well as to under deterrence for some cases and 
over deterrence for others, since the sanction has no systemic relation to the harm 
caused.457
Whether punitive damages are available or not, as long as damages are based on 
individual harm, opt-in collective actions will increase the potential sanction faced by 
infringers, only in as much as it encourages those plaintiffs to become active or 
involved who otherwise would have remained silent, for example due to rational 
apathy or asymmetric information problems. The same is true for representative 
actions where the number of victims represented depends on membership. 
Associations will in many cases only represent a sub-group of all harmed individuals. 
However, as opt-in or membership based mechanisms are likely to lead to less than 
full participation of all potential claimants, the amount of damages, when calculated 
only on basis of the harm done to those that opt-in, will also remain too low to 
efficiently deter. This is true even in those cases where all aggrieved parties will opt-
in, since other types of losses, for example those caused by the dead weight loss, will 
still not be recoverable.  
A further difficulty related to the amount of damages awarded relates to the concept 
of passing-on defence in direct purchaser claims and the rebuttable presumption of 
full passing–on of overcharges in the case of end consumer claims. This is discussed 
in more detail below. These rebuttable assumptions entail the risk of the same 
damages being claimed by different plaintiffs in parallel or subsequent proceedings. 
The Commission encourages national courts to take measures to prevent any “under  
                                                
454 Ibidem, nr 200, 60. 
455 Ibidem, nr 219, 66. 
456 Ibidem, nr 194, 59. 
457 See the discussion on the optimal sanction in Chapter 2 section C. 
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or overcompensation”458 in such cases.  In some cases, the passing-on defence will be 
a fairly simple mechanism to apply, for example in cases where cost-plus contracts or 
other forms of fixed mark up contracts exist between the direct purchaser and the 
original seller. There, the passing-on is easily established and is likely to be invoked 
by the defendant. In other cases, however, this may not be the case. From a deterrence 
perspective, the potential double compensation of harm is not very problematic in 
itself. Any doubling of damage awards would, in the deterrence model, equal actual 
harm and a probability of detection and conviction of 50 percent, which is very high. 
However, these measures could also have a negative impact on other issues, which 
will be discussed below.459 Moreover, there will be no legal certainty and no 
systematic relationship between harm caused, probability of detection, and the 
sanction imposed. This reduces the deterrent effect of “double damages” and may 
distort the potential infringers decisions ex ante.
Another problem might arise with regard to the proposed assumptions on passing-on 
rates. Under the proposed regimes, defendants and direct purchasers might have 
incentives to collude to the detriment of indirect purchasers. A defendant facing 
subsequent actions for damages, one brought by direct purchasers and another by 
indirect purchasers might try to collude with the direct purchasers. This will be an 
especially attractive option when the judgement in that case is either directly binding 
or can be used as evidence in the rebuttal of the assumption of full passing-on in the 
claim of indirect purchasers. Both, defendants and direct purchasers, will have 
incentives to reach a verdict stating that there was no passing-on. The defendant then 
will be able to rebut the presumption favouring the indirect purchasers in subsequent 
indirect purchaser claims. If plaintiffs then are unable to rebut the rebuttal, the 
defendant can save additional costs of litigation and possible exposure to media 
attention. For the direct purchaser, this outcome amounts to enrichment in the amount 
of the actual passed on overcharges. This additional profit could be, of course 
indirectly and hidden, be split between defendant and direct purchaser. This would 
decrease any deterrence effect of the proposed mechanisms. On top of that, the 
loosing parties would be the very ones the Commission tries to favour – the end 
consumer. A solution to this risk would be to exclude prior judgments as either 
                                                
458 Ibidem, nr 128, 69. 
459 See directly below. 
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binding or as prima facie evidence. However, that again would jeopardise some of the 
major aims of the reform, including facilitating access to evidence, procedural 
efficiency and legal consistency. 
In summary, the optimal sanction will most likely not be reached. The awarded 
damages under the proposed systems risk remaining insufficiently low for several 
reasons. These include: the lack of adjustment of the damages for the probability of 
detection; the related issue of unavailability of exemplary damages; the requirement to 
base the calculation of damages on the individual harm suffered and proven; and the 
necessity to avoid overcompensation. However, much depends on the way damages 
are to be calculated in the end and the mechanisms the courts will apply to avoid 
double indemnification of a particular harm. Unless a different way to assess damages 
is introduced which captures the missing parts of the optimal sanction, i.e., the 
deadweight loss and the adjustment for the probability of being caught and convicted, 
the non-participating victims and the probability of detection, the amount of damages 
will not reach optimal deterrence levels. 
    
3 Minimisation of costs 
In general, the costs imposed on society are likely to increase under a group litigation 
system. A proclaimed cost saving found in the comparison of the procedural costs 
under group litigation and individual procedures initiated by all group members relies 
on the assumption that all victims would have initiated individual claims absent the 
group proceeding. However, this will seldom have been the case, especially since the 
reform is based on the finding that hardly any cases have been brought.460 Therefore, 
when more cases are brought before the courts due to infringement of competition 
law, also the system costs will rise.461 Apart from that, the reform will also have an 
impact on other costs. These will be discussed in this section. The minimisation of 
                                                
460 See the results of the Ashurst Study.Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages 
in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure 
COMP/2003/A1/22, Ashurst Study for Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, 
London, England.
461 Unless the courts so far have been paid, but without having enough work load. In that case, when 
the work load increases but no further working hours or other costs have to be paid, the costs will 
remain the same. However, that seems to be fairly unlikely. 
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costs incorporates several issues. The first relates to the costs imposed on society 
through abuses of the system. These costs will be discussed in the first part. The 
second part will analyse the potential to reach procedural efficiency with the proposed 
mechanisms. A last factor, which could also be classified as costs imposed on society 
includes the negative impacts the envisioned system may have on the efficiency of 
leniency programs. 
3.1 Minimising the risk of nuisance suits 
Abuse of the possibility to litigate could impose large costs on society. Some cases 
could be brought with the sole aim to extract a settlement, others with the aim to 
increase the defendant’s costs. 
Taking into account that the outcome of a trial might not always be certain, potential 
defendants face a large risk when threatened with a trial, even if the estimated chances 
of winning the case are large. The costs faced when the judgement does turn out to be 
in favour of the plaintiffs can be enormous. This encourages settlement of cases, even 
if the probability of winning the case is relatively large, i.e., when the plaintiffs’ case 
has relatively little merits.  In addition, the concept of joint liability puts a lot of 
pressure on the party being the defendant. In cases of several firms being jointly 
responsible for a breach of competition law, for example in cartel cases, the plaintiffs 
can choose one of the defendants and claim the total damages from him. The 
defendant can then, at a later stage, take redress from his partners. However, this will 
entail further costly proceedings and also includes the risk that some of the other 
parties may be judgement proof, leaving the main defendant with the costs of paying 
the damage awards.  
The risk of unmeritous suits being brought by or on behalf of end consumers is likely 
to be only marginally influenced through the introduction of opt-in collective actions 
in the way envisioned. Cases with little or no merit are strongest when the group of 
represented victims is large. Also media attention can have an impact. Larger media 
attention can damage the defendant(s) reputation to a larger degree. Compared to 
individual litigation, both threats are more credible in an opt-in collective action.  
The European Way Ahead                                                                                          196
However, proceedings initiated by one of the victims might not result in a great 
number of others opting-in. The represented group is subject to the risk of remaining 
relatively small. Under such circumstances, media attention given to the potential case 
might be limited as well. Similar effects arise with regard to representative actions 
brought by associations, with the variation that associations through representative 
actions might be able to put more pressure on the defendant than individuals can in a 
collective action. Associations can represent larger groups and have a large advantage 
with regard to generating publicity over individuals.   
As all group litigation mechanisms are supposed to be complements, the defendant(s) 
might still fear any publicity concerning a potentially illegal conduct, as other group 
litigations, or their threat, might follow, and therefore be willing to settle quickly. The 
Commission opposed the introduction of very low discovery thresholds as well as a 
shift of burden of proof, as it recognised the related potential for abuse.462 As 
alternative, the Commission proposed a minimum level inter partes disclosure,463
subject to a careful proportionality test balancing the interest of defendants and 
plaintiffs.464 However, the envisioned facilitation of access to evidence may still 
enable plaintiffs to threaten defendants with a costly disclosure procedure. The 
detailed proposal by the Commission reads:  
“As a minimum standard of disclosure in actions for antitrust damages, national 
courts should under specific conditions have the power to order disclosure inter 
partes of precise categories of information or evidence relevant to the claim.  
Conditions for a disclosure order in actions for antitrust damages should include that 
(a) the claimant has asserted all the facts and offered all those means of evidence that 
are reasonably known and available to him, provided that they show plausible 
grounds to suspect that he suffered harm through the infringement of competition 
rules by the defendant; (b) he has shown to the satisfaction of the court that he is 
unable, applying all efforts that can reasonably be expected, to assert the specific 
facts or to produce the evidence for which disclosure is envisaged; (c) he has 
specified sufficiently precise categories of information or evidence to be disclosed, 
and (d) the court is satisfied that the envisaged disclosure measure is relevant to the 
case as well as necessary and proportional in scope.” 465
Much will depend on the courts’ definitions of what can be “reasonably expected” of 
the plaintiff and what “sufficiently precise specification of categories of information” 
                                                
462 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, nr 91 f, 29 f. 
463 Ibidem, nr. 93 f, 30 f. 
464 Ibidem, nr. 100-109, 31 f. 
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is. With regard to that, however, the Commission states that “the claimant cannot be 
expected to demonstrate any elevated degree of probability that his claim is 
funded”.466 Especially in stand-alone litigation, courts may take that severe limitation 
on the plaintiffs’ side into account, thereby possibly encouraging cases to be brought 
despite their having limited merits. Then there is scope for abusive claims, brought in 
order to extract a settlement offer from defendants that wish to avoid relatively broad 
discovery orders issued by the court. Severe sanctioning of the non disclosure of 
requested evidence and new mechanisms to preserve evidence, through regulations 
enabling public or private seizure could further boost the pressure on defendants to 
avoid the discovery stage.  
The same is true for the presumption of full passing on in indirect purchasers’ claims, 
which the defendant must rebut. This rebuttal would probably require him to ask for a 
disclosure order against the indirect purchasers, which are the parties most likely to be 
in possession of the relevant evidence. As third parties, however, these are more 
protected than the direct parties to the proceeding,467 which increases the risk that the 
defendant may not be able to rebut the assumption and even if, only at larger costs.  
Also, a general reduction of court fees and the proposed introduction of special cost 
rules that would alleviate the plaintiff from having to bear the defendants costs if the 
action was unsuccessful would make bringing cases with little merits or “blackmail 
suits” more profitable in general.468
The Commission also encourages the Member States to create settlement mechanisms 
to reduce costs. If there is an incentive for defendants and direct purchasers to collude 
as described above,469 then the parties could pursue a judgement when settlements 
would not provide evidence to be used by the defendant in a subsequent claim brought 
by indirect purchasers. That would make the envisioned settlement mechanisms 
unattractive to the parties and reduce the number of settled cases. 
                                                                                                                               
465 Ibidem, nr. 109, 34. 
466 Ibidem, nr. 102, p. 32. 
467 Ibidem, nr 122 f, 38. 
468 Ibidem, nr 261 f, 79. 
469 See section on the sanction above. 
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The undifferentiated approach to actions for damages, which fails to distinguish 
between the different types of infringements and different types of victims, might also 
increase the possibilities for competitors to strategically abuse the judicial system. 
The “competitor plaintiff” has substantial motivation to initiate also cases with low 
merits, to protect himself from competitive pressure, and/or to raise his rivals’ costs. 
Civil litigation cases concerning vertical restraints or abuse of dominant position may, 
contrary to the findings of the Ashurst Study470 already be being widely used by (more 
or less) aggrieved companies. At least, the German Federal Competition Authority 
contradicted the Ashurst Study by pointing out that in Germany in the year 2004 
alone, 240 cases applying competition law rules were brought by companies. In 174 
of these companies were using competition law as a shield, for example claiming 
nullity of anti-competitive contracts.471 This could be argued to demonstrate that the 
obstacles for companies against using competition law when it is to their advantage 
are not as large as may have been suspected. Any facilitation of private claims for 
damages increases the risk that firms will take advantage of these possibilities where 
possible. The added value of group litigation mechanisms in cases where the group of 
aggrieved parties is very small and necessary data is readily available then has to be 
weighed against the increased risk of abuses in such cases.  
Summarising, the proposed group litigation mechanisms have the potential to increase 
the scope for abusive claims from the plaintiffs’ side compared to the traditional two-
party proceedings. Taken as a whole, however, the proposals in the White Paper are 
likely to increase the incentives to file unmeritous suits only to a small degree when 
enacted. That fact might be contributed less to the efficiency of the system and more 
to the system inherent preference of victims and representatives to focus on follow-on 
actions rather than stand-alone cases. 
                                                
470 Ashurst Study, Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of 
Infringement of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, 
Ashurst Study for Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, London, England
471 Bundeskartellamt, "Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven - 
Diskussionspapier," (2005), 4.  Available at: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Diskussionsbeitraege/05_Proftag.pdf . 
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3.2 Reaching procedural efficiency 
Procedural efficiency relates to the potentials of group litigation mechanisms to 
reduce the cost of proceedings compared to several individual litigations, from a 
society point of few. Bundling several claims into one procedure allows for the 
realisation of economies of scale, for example with regard to the costs of court or 
legal representatives. Also, costs for the individual plaintiff can be reduced when 
these are split amongst a number of claimants and the defendant can also save on 
costs when defence has only to take place once for all claims. However, the full 
potential for that procedural efficiency will not be reached through the proposed 
mechanisms for several reasons. 
The proposed devices to foster actions for damages in cases of infringements of Art. 
81 and Art. 82 will apply to “any individual”,472 including direct purchasers. The 
Commission therefore decided not to follow proposals to limit standing in actions for 
damages to direct purchasers. Theoretically, that would open the door to the 
possibility to include all victims of breaches of competition law in one group 
litigation, thereby reaching the greatest procedural efficiency. However, the specific 
design of the proposed group litigations will not allow for that possibility to be 
realised in practice.  
Opt-in collective or representative actions allow for the realisation of some economies 
of scale in the judicial process, compared to several individual cases. Although the 
action itself may be more expensive than one individual trial, the sum of the several 
individual trials held otherwise could outweigh these costs. However, these 
improvements compared to traditional means of litigation will presumably be 
relatively small. This is because an opt-in collective action is generally more attractive 
for plaintiffs in cases where the group of victims is small and the facts of the case are 
                                                
472 In line with ECJ Courage and Manfredi , see European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF 
WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, 15, 61. 
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quite clear, as identification of victims and individual harms are less complex in these 
cases.473
In representative actions brought by associations on behalf of their members, the 
group of represented parties will also fall short of encompassing all victims in most 
cases.  Some victims can never fulfil the requirement of proving their damages, some 
victims may have interests converse to those represented by the association, and not 
all victims with similar or identical interest might be members of the association in 
question. Several associations can represent several subgroups of victims. For 
example, indirect purchaser and direct purchaser could never be included into one 
group, as the former are granted the rebuttable assumption that all overcharges were 
fully passed on, 474 which runs exactly counter of the claims the direct purchasers 
would bring. This requirement de facto excludes direct purchaser claims being 
brought in the same proceeding.  
The concept of several group litigation mechanisms and individual trials as 
complements further reduces the economies of scale that can be realised. Incentives to 
free ride on prior decisions could lead to several trials even if all victims could 
theoretically be included in one proceeding. In theory, courts would be able to 
consolidate parallel actions brought by or on behalf of plaintiffs at different stages of 
the distribution chain, if several actions are brought simultaneously. However, the 
burden on the courts may become immense in such cases. The reason for this is the 
solution the Commission proposed with regard to passing-on of overcharges, which 
will make it unfeasible to include all victims in one proceeding. Moreover, it will be 
in the interests of parties not to bring suits simultaneously in order to be able to free 
ride on the efforts of another party. 
The Commission did not follow proposals of commentators on the Green Paper which 
advocated a prohibition on the passing-on defence.475 Therefore, defendants can rebut 
                                                
473 Unless adequately remunerated for their efforts, also lawyers will have little incentives to step in and 
become active. See discussion in Chapter 3 and above, and the problems in Germany with the 
KapMuG, discussed in Chapter 5. 
474 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 8. 
475 See for example :Bulst, "(Comments on the Green Paper) Damages Actions for breach of EC 
Antitrust Rules," (2006) 3 f ; The European Consumers' Association (BEUC), "Damages Actions for 
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the harm as calculated by direct purchasers, if part of that harm has been passed on. 
Evidence necessary to prove and calculate the amount of passing-on will typically be 
in the hands of the direct purchasers, but may be extracted by court order in the 
proceeding. On the other hand, the Commission opts for a rebuttable presumption of 
full passing-on of overcharges in cases brought by indirect purchasers. Again, the 
evidence needed by the defendant is likely to be in the hand of direct purchasers, not 
parties to the proceeding. Standards regarding the disclosure order in these cases are 
set higher and the third parties would have a right to be heard in the proceeding.476
This adds to the complexity of the proceeding in general and the costs of the 
proceeding for the defendants in particular. If separate actions could be joined into 
one in which direct as well as indirect purchasers claim to have suffered the full 
amount of passing-on, the proposed solution seems to be to leave it for the court to 
establish who actually suffered which part of the harm.477 Under such conflicting 
interests of the parties, however, it seems unlikely that it would be possible to join 
actions under national laws requiring a certain similarity or alignment of claims.  
Overall, procedural efficiency is not realised to the full extent that is theoretically 
possible. Not all victims can be included in just one proceeding, and the 
complementary nature of all proposed group litigation mechanisms and the traditional 
ways of redress, can lead to a number of proceedings arising from the same 
infringement. The procedure will become more complex, not only because of any 
safeguards installed related to the certification of group litigation, but also because the 
courts are advised to avoid double jeopardy for the defendant concerning any? 
particular harm caused. Depending on the mechanisms designed to avoid such 
problems, overall procedural efficiency may be even more severely hampered. 
                                                                                                                               
breach of EC anti-trust rules: BEUC position on the Commission`s Green Paper," (2006), 5 f ;  Max 
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, "Comments of the Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law (Munich) on the DC Competition Green 
Paper of December 2005," (2006), 2. 
476European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, nr 122 f, 38. 
477Ibidem, nr 222, 68. 
The European Way Ahead                                                                                          202
3.3 Interaction with leniency programs 
The Commission has recognised the need to investigate the effects of private actions 
for damages on public leniency programs. In the White Paper, protection of leniency 
applicants is only granted with regard to the disclosure or reproduction of information 
submitted to public authorities in the application process for immunity.478 Further 
considerations concerning the limitation of civil liability of the applicants vis-à-vis the 
victims or with regard to joint liability are discussed, but no definite proposal is given 
yet. 
The evidence provided by the leniency applicant will be protected, but the decision 
taken by the authority will have binding effect. Therefore, evidence concerning the 
illegality of the conduct is not necessary in a follow-on group litigation. The leniency 
applicant therefore still risks being held liable, under the joint liability approach, for 
all the harm caused, not only to his direct contract partners but also plaintiffs. This is 
likely to have a negative impact on the willingness of infringers to come forward and 
apply for leniency. As the leniency programs have been considered successful in 
destabilising cartels, the deterrence effect of leniency programs will be reduced. It is 
questionable, whether the increased litigation for damages can compensate these 
losses to society efficiently.  
4 Conclusion
The proposal of the European Commission fails to realise all the potential group 
litigation mechanisms could have with regard to deterrence. In their proposals free 
riding behaviour between different agents is not completely eliminated and large 
incentives to free ride on prior public investments in investigation and prosecution 
remain. The problem of asymmetric information also remains significant with regard 
to opt-in collective actions. In cases, where lack of information is most prominent, 
opt-in collective actions will most likely be seldom used. In such cases, representative 
actions might have more potential to overcome these problems, however the 
                                                
478European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, nr 285 f, 84 f. 
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incentives for the representative agents may be insufficient to realise these potentials. 
The amount of sanction necessary to efficiently deter anti-competitive behaviour can 
hardly be reached. The focus on compensating individual harm severely hinders 
possibilities to adjust damages awards accordingly. Principal-agent problems are not 
solved satisfactorily. The optimal behaviour from a total social welfare point of view 
does not coincide with the incentives schemes created for the agents and the victims. 
Also, principal-agent problems between agents and victims will remain. The risk of 
unmeritous suits is not severely increased, just as the incentives to sue in general are 
not. Last but not least, one of the most prominent potentials of group litigation 
mechanisms, procedural efficiency, is not realised to its full extent.  
Overall, the proposed mechanisms are not designed to efficiently increase deterrence 
in any meaningful way. This may be justified by legal restraints as they exist and the 
desire to necessitate as little change in the existing legal systems of the Member States 
as possible.479 Another justification may be the pursuit of goals other than deterrence. 
Then the question remains, whether these other goals the Commission is pursuing will 
be reached sufficiently to offset the costs of failure to enhance deterrence and the 
costs brought about by the introduction of these mechanisms. 
C Legal Obstacles Created by Tort Law and Other Areas of Law 
In addition to the pursuit of differing goals, the legal limitations that currently exist in 
the Member States of the European Union may provide justification for the European 
Commission’s deviation from the optimal group litigation structure. First, legal rules 
as commonly found in the Member States may make it impossible to achieve the 
optimal sanction in actions for damages. Second, there might be constitutional and 
other restraints on the possibility to introduce mandatory affiliation to the group of 
represented victims and possibly even opt-out solutions. Third, regulations and 
general concepts of legal systems can inhibit the possibilities to grant enforcement 
                                                
479 It may also be considered to be too costly to change specific regulations. This could be framed as 
harmonisation costs, which will not be explicitly discussed here. For a detailed analysis of the 
harmonisation costs with regard to the main features of private enforcement of competition law see 
Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, incorporating these costs. 
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agents part of or even the total of damage awards in order to grant incentives to 
engage in detection and/or litigation. These three issues will be discussed in this 
section.480
This section draws on, inter alia, the national comments on the White Paper of several 
Member States, literature of a legal comparative nature, as well as on the consensus 
reached and ideas developed by the European Group on Tort Law. 
1 Limitations concerning the optimal sanction 
In order to reach the optimal sanction, damages have to be calculated in a more 
abstract way than the sum of exact individual losses as proven in court. Also, they will 
have to be amended by punitive or exemplary damages of some sort. This may be in 
conflict with long standing legal traditions in many Member States.  
The general principle in most Member States still remains that of exact damages. A 
general and widely applied principle of tort law is that of restitutio ad integrum.481
The basic idea is to restore the victim to the position he would have been in had the 
damaging event never occurred, in as far as monetary compensation can achieve that. 
The focus therefore in most Member States is on the injury suffered by the victims. 
Consequently, harm is typically established according to the (in German) so called 
Differenzmethode , which is the difference between state the victim finds itself in after 
the event and the state victim would be in had the event not occurred.482 Thus, 
damages have to be substantiated and proven on an individual basis, even when 
                                                
480 Without claiming completeness. 
481Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, OFT Discussion Paper 916,  7;  Comparing UK and France, noting the general principle is 
restitutio ad integrum: Hill, "Litigation and Negligence: A Comparative Study," OXFORD JOURNAL 
OF LEGAL STUDIES 6 (1986): 183 ; Quarta, "Recognition and Enforcement of US Punitive Damages 
Awards in Continental Europe: The Italian Supreme Court's Veto," HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 31 (2008): 753;  Magnus, Unification of tort law: Damages, 
Principles of European Tort Law, 188.;  Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more 
effective. Study in support of the impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages 
actions, 236 ; European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European tort law : text and commentary,
Wein, New York: Springer (2005), Art. 10:101. 
482 See Clark, et al, "Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules-Analysis of economic models for the calculation of damages," (2004).Available at: 
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bundling measures are used.483 Therefore as a general rule, a plaintiff has to 
substantiate his claim that he incurred damages.  
Where this kind of evidence is necessary, harm caused to some types of victims by 
anti-competitive behaviour may never be considered. These are the victims, for 
example, that would have gained consumer surplus by an exchange with the offender, 
had he offered his products at competitive prices. However, where general provisions 
allow a deviation from the general principles that a specific form of proof for the harm 
caused has to be provided, it might be possible to also include these victims. Such 
exemptions are described, for example, as general principles by the European Group 
on Tort Law, in cases where providing sufficient proof would be too difficult or too 
costly.484 Also European Member States have similar regulations in place that allow a 
separation of the individual amount of harm suffered and the granted damage 
awards.485
While the idea of an abstract calculation of damages seems to be obviously in conflict 
with principles of just compensation applied in the Member States, it may not be as 
clear cut in every and all cases. In fact, some Member States already allow more 
abstract definitions of damages in some specific instances. Provisions that allow for 
the disgorgement of (illegally gained) profits are an exception from the general 
principle of strictly harm based damage awards. 486 Under such regulations, the 
awards granted to the plaintiff are in fact not connected to the actual damages 
                                                                                                                               
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/economic_clean_en.pdf ; European Group on 
Tort Law, Principles of European tort law : text and commentary, Art. 2:101 .
483 Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, et al, "Comments of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Consumer Protection and the Bundeskartellamt on the EU Commission’s White Paper on 
“Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules," (2008), 5. Deutscher Bundesrat, "Comments of 
the German Federal Council (Stellungnahme des Deutschen Bundesrats) (2008), BR-Drucksache 
248/08," (2008), 4. Both sources available at; 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html 
484 European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European tort law : text and commentary, Art. 2:105.
Such deliberations also led the European Commission to issue a call for a tender to conduct a study on 
quantification methods for damages caused by competition law infringements, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/proposals2/2008a510_tender_specifications.pdf. 
485 In the UK, exemplary damages can be awarded in cases, where the profit aimed at by the defendant 
exceeds the amount recoverable by the plaintiff. Also, restitutionary damages are possible, when other 
remedies are considered inadequate. In Germany, § 33 Abs. 3 GWB allows the damages to be based on 
the illegal gain, explicitly because of the difficulties to estimate individual harm in cases of competition 
law infringements. See Chapter 5, sections B 1.2.1 and C 1.3.1 respectively. 
486 Also called restitutionary damages. 
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suffered. However, the proceeds of such proceedings do not always flow to the 
plaintiff. Under some regulations, the disgorged profits go to the Treasury, while the 
plaintiff can only expect to be reimbursed for his costs.487 A few examples may suffice 
here. Establishing the illegal gain is recognised as a way to calculate the harm caused, 
for example in Par. 97 I UrhG (Copyright Act) Germany, and under the concept of 
restitutionary damages in the UK. In Hungary even a legal presumption concerning 
the damages in hard-core cartels has been debated, regulating the damages to be a 10 
percent market price increase.488 The Commission also proposes similar presumptions, 
when overcharges are assumed to have been entirely passed on in cases claimants are 
indirect purchasers and damages are to be presumed to be average overcharges in 
price fixing cartel cases.489 Whether all these rules have to be seen as very specific and 
restricted exceptions proving the general rule or might be taken as hints to the fact that 
the general rule itself has to be interpreted less strict than traditionally presumed, is a 
subject to be clarified in legal disputes and analysis.  
The Commission stretches the point that exact calculation of damages may be too 
complex to ensure to possibility to exercise the rights for damages and that the 
principle of exact damages shall not conflict with the principle of effectiveness.490
Moreover, the envisioned possibility in exceptional cases to sue on behalf of victims, 
who will not be identified either before or during the proceeding,491 necessitates a less 
rigid approach to the calculation of damages. It remains to be seen, if the Commission 
includes suggestions on this subject in the expected non-binding guidance on the 
calculation of damages. 
A closely linked issue is that of exemplary damages. According to the minimum 
standard of European law,492 at least compensation of the actual losses (damnum
emergens), lost profits (lucrum cessans) and interest are granted. Punitive damages, 
however, or any other form of damage awards that exceed the calculated harm, are 
foreign to a great number of member states as general principle. However, in order to 
                                                
487 See for example regulations under German law against unfair competition practices (UWG, par. 10) 
488Competition Law Research Centre (Hungary), "Comments on the White Paper," 6. Available at; 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html 
489 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 67, nr. 220, 60. 
490 Ibidem, 58, nr. 192.  
491 See Ibidem, 19, footnote 30 and acc. Text. 
492 As recognised by the ECJ in Manfredi,European Court of Justice, Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 
Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others ECR I-6619.
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be able to adjust the damages for the probability of detection, such a legal instrument 
would be necessary.  
Only few countries of the European Union allow a departure from that concept in the 
form of punitive or exemplary damages (Cyprus, Ireland and UK),493 although they 
are not commonly used.494 Where such damages are available, they are considered to 
fulfil functions of punishment as well as deterrence.495 In most member States, 
however, such punitive damages are considered to be against public policy (ordre
public)496 and the monopoly of the state concerning sanctions497 as general principles. 
For similar reasons, for example, Italian498 and German499  courts rejected the 
enforcement of US punitive damage awards. Again, however, the legal landscape in 
the Member States is not as strict as it may seem at first glance. In 2001, the Spanish 
Supreme Court recognised a US judgment including punitive damages.500 The court 
argued that deviations from the principle of mere compensation are not uncommon in 
the legal system and the judgement not contrary to public policy. Forms of damages 
that have no connection to the actual harm suffered or such with the declared goal of 
deterrence or sanctioning function have also been applied in Germany.501 In copy right 
                                                
493 Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 424. 
494 Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC 
Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, Ashurst Study for 
Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, London, England, 84.
495 See for example:The Law Commission, "Sixth Programme of Law Reform: Damages, LAW COM 
No.247, 1997," (1997) 5.  Available at: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc247.pdf ;  The Law Reform 
Commission, "Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages," MODERN LAW 
REVIEW (2000), 5. Available at: http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/lrc107/lrc_107.html. 
496 Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 236 ; Möschel, Kommentar: 
Erweiterter Privatrechtsschutz im Kartellrecht 115, 115. 
497 Joint Working Party Of The Bars And Law Societies Of The United Kingdom (“JWP”), Response to 
the Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Competition Rules, 3. 
Available at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html. For 
Germany see: Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Decision of Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 4th June, 
1992, BGHZ (4th June, 1992 – IX 149/91) (1992)118, 312, 344. 
498 The Italian Supreme Court, Corte di Cassazione, 1183/2007 (2007)n. 1183, 19 January 2007.  
499 Topic of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Decision of Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 4th June, 
1992, BGHZ (4th June, 1992 – IX 149/91) 312 
500 Jablonski, "Translation and Comment: Enforcing US Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts-
A Recent Case in the Supreme Court of Spain," THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE 24 
(2004): 225, 242. 
501 Discussing and proposing supra-compensatory damages in competition cases, see:German 
Monopolies Commission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle, 
Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß, § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB 40 ff . For a comparison 
between US and Germany, see: Behr, "Punitive Damages in America and German Law-Tendencies 
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law,502 infringement of personal rights,503 and (in accordance with European law) in 
cases of gender discrimination in employment issues504 the preventive and sanctioning 
functions of damages have been recognised. It also seems that the principle of 
monopoly of sanctioning of the state is at least generally interpreted as not to extend 
to contractual sanctions, which are privately imposed sanctions.  
The implementation or recognition of exemplary damages awards is generally 
debated.  In the regulation Council Regulation 864/2007, On the Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II) ,505,as well as the Council Regulation (EC) 
44/2001506 an explicit exemption was made for cases where non-compensatory 
damages are regarded as conflicting with the public policy. The question of exemplary 
damages was also addressed in the Manfredi judgment by Advocate General 
Geelhoed who was of the opinion it would be best to leave such decisions to the 
national legislators.507 The Commission’s opinion is that the concept of punitive 
damages is not considered to be against the acquis communautaire508 and that 
Community law does not exclude the possibility that victims are better off after the 
claim has been brought.509
                                                                                                                               
towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts," CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 78 
(2003): 105. 
502 § 97 I Urheberrechtsgesetz UrhG (Copyright Act) 
503 In the judgement BGH, Caroline of Monaco BGHZ (15th November, 1994 – VI 56/94) (1994)128, 1 
ff, the German Federal Court (BGH) pointed to the necessity of damage awards to be large enough to 
deter.  
504 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz AGG (Equal Treatment Act). (2006),§ 15 (1) 1, (2) 1. That 
law, was the consequence of Directives 76/207/EEC, 2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC. Accordingly, damages 
are awarded for material as well as immaterial losses. The expressive aim is to ensure deterrence effect 
of those damages, see European Court of Justice, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case - 14/83 (1984). 
505 Par. 32: Considerations of public interest justify giving the courts of the Member States the 
possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based on public policy and overriding 
mandatory provisions. In particular, the application of a provision of the law designated by this 
Regulation which would have the effect of causing non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages 
of an excessive nature to be awarded may, depending on the circumstances of the case and the legal 
order of the Member State of the court seised, be regarded as being contrary to the public policy (ordre 
public) of the forum. 
506 Par. 34 (1): A judgment  shall not be recognized: (1) if such a recognition is manifestly contrary to 
public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought [ …]. 
507 Manfredi, European Court of Justice, Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v. 
Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others ECR I-6619
508 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, {COM(2008) 165 final} {SEC (2008) 
405}, 57 f , nr. 190. 
509 Ibidem, 58, nr. 192,  64 , nr. 211. 
The European Way Ahead                                                                                          209
Overall, also here exemptions from the general rule can be found and might hint 
towards possible solutions to the perceived impossibility of the desired rules 
concerning the optimal group litigation mechanism.  
2 Limitations concerning mandatory group litigation 
Apart from the difficulties in establishing damages, which may require each 
individual and his damages to be identified, other legal restrictions to mandatory 
group litigation may exist.  
Already the opt-out solution for group litigation in Europe has been frequently 
rejected by commentators on constitutional grounds, as they may conflict with 
principles of due process as well as the right for a day in court if not all victims are 
adequately notified of and included in the proceedings.510 In a mandatory group 
litigation that covers all victims, including those who refrained from purchasing the 
good or service in question, victims will generally not participate in the proceedings. 
Conflicts with constitutional and human rights might make the implementation of 
such a system impossible. 
However, some legal concepts exist that might be interpreted as mirroring a 
mandatory group litigation.511 In Spain, representative consumer associations are 
granted standing to represent unidentified victims and claim for their damages.512
However, only positive judgements are binding and victims are left to execute the 
judgement themselves.  A similar approach is taken in actions brought in the public 
                                                
510 See R. Nordh, "Group Actions – The Swedish Experience" 2 June 2005),. Available at: 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/formation_br_4/2005_2033/intervention_m._nordh_anglais_8144.html ; 
Micklitz, The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil 
Procedure 1473, 1494, 1499. Possible conflicts with Art. 6 ECHR are also seen byJoint Working Party 
Of The Bars And Law Societies Of The United Kingdom (“JWP”), Response to the Commission White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Competition Rules, 5, footnote 5 and acc. text. 
Available at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html.  
511 Although they may not exclude individual rights to claim for damages, as would be the case in the 
optimal deterrence regime developed here. 
512 Art. 11 LEC (Spanish Civil Procedure Act) 1/2000.  
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interest, such as the popular action in Portugal.513 In addition, in cases of widely 
dispersed and small damages, where the individual’s rights could be considered to be 
only theoretically present, the governments of Member States have already considered 
alternatives to traditional damage claims, proposing the introduction of skimming-off 
procedures.514 Such mechanisms may be especially relevant in cartel cases where the 
group of end consumers bears most or all of the total damage. If the legal systems of 
the Member States allow such mechanisms, either because the public interest is 
concerned or individuals will be unable in practice to exercise their rights, there 
possibly might be room also for a mandatory group litigation system. Moreover, when 
individual damages are too small to justify litigation or will not be even discovered in 
the first place, one may argue that the right of having the “day in court” would remain 
nothing but an empty shell. 
Apart from constitutional and human rights concerns, the incorporation of all victims 
of a certain infringement into one group could also be rendered impossible when strict 
laws are enacted that require the members of the group to have essentially identical 
subject matter.515 The same is true with regulations that limit standing in 
representative actions to associations representing their members or only a subgroup 
of the potential victims. Such limitations are common in the Member States with 
regard to actions brought by associations 516 and have also been followed by the 
Commission in its White Paper. 
3 Limitations concerning the possibilities to reward enforcers 
As has been pointed out in all forms of group litigation mechanisms, providing the 
representative with less than the total damages is likely to give rise to principal-agent 
                                                
513 Law 83/95 and Art. 26-A Portuguese Procedure Code, see Bonelli Erede Pappalardo, Bredin Prat, 
Hengeler Mueller, Slaughter and May and Uría Menéndez, "Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, Comments on the Commission’s White Paper," (30 June 2008), 13.  
Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html 
514 For example German skimming-off procedures under § 10 UWG- Gesetz gegenden den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb (Act against unfair competition) in cases of dispersed damages (Streuschaeden), see 
Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 
(UWG), BT-Drucks. 15/1487
515 For example required in Germany for joinder procedures in the ZPO  § 59 ff. 
516 For example in Germany, industry associations are restricted to representing their members, while in 
the Netherlands the Dutch Consumentenbond can represent only consumers. 
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problems between society and agent and therefore to interfere with the deterrence 
goal. To align the interests of society, which wishes the optimal sanction to be 
imposed on the infringing parties, with those of the representative agent, the latter 
would have to be granted the total optimal sanction. 
Providing the agent or the litigant with the total of damages awarded also raises legal 
concerns. Depending on interpretation, the agent either succeeds the victims in the 
rights to damages, works on a 100 percent contingency fee basis, or is awarded the 
damages by way of cy press. All of these concepts are not very common in the 
Member States. 
3.1 Transfer of rights 
The contractual transfer or the right to claim damages seems to be largely 
unproblematic in most Member States. A right can be transferred by either contractual 
relationship or a juridical act.517 In general concepts of subrogation (as they exist, the 
direct contract between injured parties and representative might not even be necessary 
when the third party (representative) performs the obligations of the debtor.518  Such 
transfers are already used in the case of the Cartel Damage Claim company.519
Whether such transfers can take place without compensation for the original right 
holder, however, is questionable. The damage claims being assets of economic value, 
transfers without compensation might be in conflict with fundamental property 
rights.520 The value of he claims in the hands of the individual victims might be 
disputed, however, when the rights would or could not be enforced anyway, and are 
negligible on an individual basis.521
                                                
517 European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European tort law : text and commentary5:101 ff. 
518 Compare, Study Group on a European Civil Code in co-authorship with the Research Group on EC 
Private Law, Book III: Obligations and corresponding rights. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND 
MODEL RULES ofEuropean PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 
INTERIM OUTLINE EDITION. 141, 154 f., Par. 2:101 : Performance by a third person. Available at: 
http://webh01.ua.ac.be/storme/DCFRInterim.pdf  
519 See the discussion of the Cartel Damage Claim Company at 2.2.3.2 above, and below 
520 As garanteed by Art. 71 (1) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
521 See also Landes, The Private Enforcement of Law 1, , 33 f., arguing that the assignment of property 
rights of legal claims on a first-come first-serve basis might be sensible in cases where enforcement 
costs are relatively large compared to the individual claim value. 
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In theory, the representative could succeed the victims in the role of right holder, so 
that the rights have to be transferred in one way or another. While transferring of 
claims typically takes place in contractual relationships, it can also be regulated by 
law or follow a judicial order.522  Such a transfer can also follow widely accepted legal 
mechanisms, under which a party who fulfils a legal obligation of another party 
(debtor) to the benefit of the creditor, succeeds in the role of creditor. In the case of 
group litigation mechanisms, such a transfer could occur when the agent would make 
an upfront payment to the victims, fulfilling the expected obligations of the 
defendant(s).  This could be the case, were the victims to be compensated by auction 
proceeds in the case of auctions for litigation, which will be discussed below. 
However, that would inhibit the efficiency of such systems with regard to deterrence. 
The transfer might possibly also be achieved by court decision, when the agent acting 
on behalf of victim would register the claims in cases where the individuals would not 
file suit themselves. Then, it may not even be necessary to transfer the rights from the 
individual right holder in those cases, where individual effectuation of these rights 
will not take place in any case. For example, in case of damages that fail to reach a 
certain amount, victims may not be granted standing in court anyhow. There are also 
estimates, which amounts of damages are too low for individuals to pursue their rights 
for damages.523 In these cases, the rights to claim damages may remain with the 
victims, who will not effectuate them. Then, its seems, there should be fewer 
problems with granting standing to the agent as well for the same amounts, acting on 
behalf of total society, even if that standing would not be based on the same legal 
right.524
Nevertheless, the transfer of rights to the agents might be too difficult to implement 
into existing legal systems. 
                                                
522 For actual selling of damage claims see CDC. On the legal possibilities of transferal see section C 
523 In Germany, that amount is estimated to be between 25 and 75 Euro.Micklitz and Stadler, Das 
Verbandsklagerecht in der Informations-und Dienstleistungsgesellschaft, (2005), 1323 ;  Säcker, Die
Einordnung der Verbandsklage in das System des Privatrechts,CH Beck (2006), 50.  
524 Such arguments are also made by Wagner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz – Regelungsbedarf bei Massen- 
und Streuschäden 41, 75 ;Micklitz and Stadler, Leistungsklagen von Verbänden. DAS
VERBANDSKLAGERECHT IN DER INFORMATIONS-UND 
DIENSTLEISTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT. eds. Micklitz andStadler. (2005), 1309, regarding claims 
brought by associations, 1339 ff. 
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3.2 Contingency fee of 100  percent 
The representative or agent could also be instituted as mandated to represent the rights 
of the victims, as is done for example with associations in injunction procedures. As 
remuneration for his effort, the agent could also be working on a 100 percent 
contingency basis. However, the view on contingency fees in the Member States 
differs from country to country, and has been subject also to recent changes. While 
most Member States have a ban on contingency fees, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
the UK have had recent debates on the subject. In Germany, contingent, as well as 
contingency fees, were prohibited for a long time.525 However, the Federal 
Constitutional Court just declared the complete ban on contingency fees 
unconstitutional, if access to justice is hampered.526 In Italy, the government just 
recently abolished the ban.527 However, even if the contingency fee is prohibited, there 
might be legal ways to come to the same result de facto. While in Germany the ban on 
contingency fee was not questioned by the German Federal Constitutional Court, yet, 
a group of lawyers decided to found a company (in Belgium, where it is permited)_ to 
buy the claims of victims of a German Concrete Cartel, which had been fined by the 
German Federal Competition Authority. In the contractual transfer of the rights, the 
Cartel Damage Claim company receives 20 percent of the total rewards.528  This 
amounts to a de facto contingency fee. However, a contingency fee arrangement still 
presupposes a contract between the original right holder and the agent, which is 
impossible in practice between agent and all represented victims of a particular 
competition law infringement. That solution may therefore also be very difficult to 
implement. 
                                                
525 Both contingency fees and conditional fees were prohibited under section 49b of the Old German 
Act on Lawyers’ Remuneration (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz). 
526 See in the matter BverfG, 1 BvR 2576/04 2006, Bundesverfassungsgericht - Pressestelle, 
Pressemitteilung Nr. 27/2007 vom 7. März 2007,Zum Beschluss vom 12. Dezember 2006 – 1 BvR 
2576/04 (press release 27/2007) (2007),, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/ 
press/bvg07-027.html.  
527 The Italian government also removed the prohibition of the pactum quota litis with the recent decree 
223/06. 
528 See http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/presse/CompetitionLaw360_080707.pdf. 
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3.3 Cy press distribution 
If the cy press mechanism of compensating the victims can be employed, the 
enforcement agent can theoretically be granted the proceeds to continue his mandate 
as enforcement agent to the benefit of society. The cy press mechanism requires that 
the awards be used to further the interests of those represented. That indirect benefit to 
all victims could be found in the increased deterrence and future persecution of 
competition law infringements. However, cy press seems to be much less feasible in 
case one of the victims is in fact the agent, as for example the lead plaintiff. That a 
private individual could be held responsible for such investments in the public good is 
debatable. Nevertheless, when the agent is a company or association with the aim to 
persecute competition law infringements, cy press distribution might well be an 
option.  Especially in those cases, where group litigation promises the largest benefits 
and the individual victims are least likely to ever have brought actions, which are 
probably cartel cases with end consumers as the victims. Therefore, from the 
discussed three alternatives, this mechanism might be a way to achieve the desired 
incentives for the agents. 
D Other specific aims of the Commission and their realisation 
As has been pointed out already, the Commission made clear in the White Paper, that 
the overriding goal of the reforms was not deterrence, but compensatory justice. 
Whether the mechanisms will lead to efficient compensatory justice is not easy to 
establish. This is because compensatory justice is not clearly defined and the value 
society places on an increase in compensatory justice for a certain number of victims 
of competition law infringements is difficult to measure.529  However, a tentative 
discussion is possible, as to what degree the aim of full compensation to all victims is 
reached.530 Thereby potential pitfalls and costs can be identified, using the insights 
                                                
529 It might also be noteworthy at this point to mention that the focus on justice and compensations 
deliberations by policy makers has been extensively analyised and criticised by Kaplow and Shavell, as 
it may make individuals often worse off than policies established under a welfare approach, see 
Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare,Harvard University Press (2002). 
530 The Commission wants to introduce measures that insure that “all victims of infringements of EC 
competition law have access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated
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gained in the analysis on the deterrence effects. That exercise will be done in this 
section.
1 The goal of compensatory justice 
Corrective justice for the “greatest possible number of victims”531 is the primary 
objective the Commission pursues, apparently not only in the area of competition law.   
Compensation of individual harm is not a typical goal in the economic analysis of law 
based on a total welfare analysis. The mere redistribution of wealth, ceteris paribus,
amongst different members of the society does not have an impact on total welfare. 
However, economic analysis focused on deterrence can also inform the deliberation of 
compensatory justice. One crucial factor made clear in the deterrence analysis above 
is that that both, deterrence and compensation, will only be achieved in as much as 
actions for damages will be encouraged. Also, independent of the specific aim, that 
goal will be pursued at costs that have to be borne by society. With regard to the goal 
of compensatory justice, whether or not the costs will be justified depends on how 
much corrective justice will in fact be achieved and the value society attaches to 
compensatory justice. Quantifying the value of compensatory or corrective justice to 
society is a difficult task. However, at least some remarks might be made with regard 
to the potential of the proposed mechanisms to reach the goal of full compensation of 
all victims. As both requirements: “full compensation” and “all victims,” may not be 
met simultaneously, the analysis will first deal with the first and then the second 
requirement individually. 
1.1 Full compensation 
Full compensation requires the compensation of total harm, including lost profits and 
interest. As such, the Commission aims at providing full compensation. However, 
                                                                                                                               
for the harm they suffered” European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final , SEC(2008) 404, 2 f. 
531 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the 
White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment, {COM 
(2008) 165 final} {SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 406}, 65 f. 
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several features of the proposed and discussed mechanisms may be in conflict with 
that aim.  
There are a number of obvious deviations from the goal of full compensation. The 
explicitly proposed possibility to use cy pres distribution mechanisms in those few 
cases, where individual victims may not or only very difficultly be identified, is one 
example. The indirect use of the damage awards to the benefit of certain groups of 
society will most likely not lead to full compensation of individual borne harm. The 
use of the damages awarded will only indirectly benefit the victims. Moreover, some 
members of the society will benefit from cy pres distribution that never incurred a loss 
due to the infringement. In such cases, it seems, the focus is shifted away from the 
goal of individual compensation towards other legal concepts and principles, such as 
punishment of the breach of law, the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and possibly 
even deterrence.  
A second, very obvious deviation, is constituted by any deliberations on facilitating 
the way damages could be calculated. Using already existing mechanisms in the 
Member States, such as: establishing the damages as the amount of illegal gain; and 
the proposal to use ex ante fixed amounts in cases of price overcharges; deviate from 
the principle of compensation of actual harm. Such tools, though certainly a way to 
reduce expenses and efforts necessary to establish the amount of harm, would make 
full compensation of actually suffered harm, while avoiding unjust enrichment a 
matter of chance. Both mechanisms bear no relation to the actual harm suffered. The 
same is true for the a priori assumption of full passing-on in cases brought on behalf 
of indirect purchasers. It is undoubtedly true, that the exact calculation of individual 
damages may be too complex in some cases, so that other mechanisms may be more 
feasible. But again, this waters down the principle of just and full compensation of 
incurred losses to the victims. 
Full compensation is also hampered by incentives of the agents acting as 
representatives, which do not coincide with those of the victims, especially in the area 
of settlement negotiations. Whenever representative associations or the named 
plaintiff and or his lawyer stand to gain something on their own behalf, may it be cost 
savings or direct additional financial benefits, from settling also for less than the 
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actual amount of harm, full compensation will not be reached. Therefore, the 
principal-agent problems between the victims and their representatives are crucial. 
However, they are not entirely overcome by the proposed mechanisms.  
Overall, the goal of full compensation of victims can not be fully reached. At best, it 
seems, something will be taken from the infringer and something will be given to 
some of the victims. Too many trade-offs are necessary, including the trade-off 
between full compensation and incentives for the agents, as well as a trade off 
between too high costs and the degree to which the goals can be achieved.  
1.2 All victims 
The question of whether all victims will receive at least some partial compensation 
depends on two issues. One concerns the potential of all victims being included in 
proceedings and the other the incentives to initiate such proceedings.  
Without going into detail it is clear that those victims bearing the losses which 
constitute the total welfare loss will not receive any compensation unless they stand to 
gain from cy pres distribution by chance. 
Also, the proposed group litigation mechanisms are designed in a way as to always 
include only a subset of the victims. Direct and indirect purchasers will have to be 
represented in different proceedings. Members of one consumer association will not 
be included in the proceeding initiated by another. In that respect, it must be noted 
that the envisioned collective action and representative actions are likely to be more of 
use to victims which have relatively large claims and/or are part of a stronger interest 
group. On top of that, the selection of cases to be pursued is skewed, depending on the 
own incentives of the agents, be it lawyer, named plaintiff or association, to become 
active. Larger claim values will ease the opt-in collective action proceeding and cause 
larger publicity also in representative actions. Media attention is also more likely to be 
given to members of some certain interest groups than to others. While the individual 
victims may stand to gain the most in such cases, that is not necessarily true for the 
whole society. Cases with widely dispersed damages of low individual value are 
likely to remain unattractive for the agents, event though the total harm caused to 
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society may be immense. Only if all subgroups will in the end have their own 
proceeding, will the number of victims receiving at least partial compensation not fall 
short of all those, who might have been granted compensation in court. For that, 
sufficient incentives must be created for all those agents to actually initiate 
proceedings, which is likely not to be the case.532
All those who might in the end be represented in either a collective action or a 
representative action will also only receive some damage awards, when cases will be 
initiated. As most of the cases will be follow-on cases, the probability of getting some 
form of collective redress will be equal to the probability of detection and conviction 
of infringers by the public authorities at best. The number of potential stand-alone 
cases will not increase that probability significantly. It has to be weighed against the 
public proceedings, which will not be followed by actions for damages, as there may 
be some stand-alone cases, but also some public proceedings without follow-on 
litigation. Follow-on cases are likely to be less than 100 percent, because of 
difficulties of proving harm, lack of sufficient funding for the proceedings, lack of 
own incentives of the agents to pursue that particular case, and other conceivable 
reasons.  
Overall therefore, only a subset of all victims harmed by a competition law 
infringement will receive some form of compensation under the envisioned system. 
1.3 Conclusions
The goal of full compensation of all victims as compensatory justice can not be 
achieved by the proposed mechanisms. Feasibility necessitates trade-offs already 
between the two subsets of that goal, i.e., between full compensation and the 
compensation of all victims. On top of that, compensatory justice in general has to be 
compromised to make the litigation system workable. Therefore, the proposed 
solutions can only be seen as some compromise between conflicting goals and the 
result of inability to rank the pursued goals strictly and explicitly. 
                                                
532 See Chapter 3. 
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2 Intermediary goals 
Next to the overriding goal of compensation of victims of a competition law 
infringement and the welcomed side effect of increased deterrence, some related 
considerations and aims of the proposed reform steps were mentioned by the 
Commission. In this part, a quick look is taken at the degree to which these goals may 
be achieved. 
2.1 Reducing the difference between small damages and large individual costs533
The goal of reducing the difference between small damages and large individual costs 
relates to the litigation costs. In economic terms, this goal seems to address the 
problem of rational apathy, where the victim weighing the potential benefits of 
litigating the case against the costs of doing so finds it better to refrain from filing 
suit. However, the presented group litigation mechanisms on their own are unlikely to 
be the best tools to achieve such goals, if they were chosen as the ones to pursue. 
Numerous alternatives exist, all with their own benefits and possible problems. 
Amongst these alternatives are reduced or waived court fees, special small claims 
procedures, contingency fee regulations for lawyers, and different types of legal 
insurances, all of which reduce the individual costs. On the other hand, awarding 
punitive damages could increase the otherwise too small damage awards, also forming 
an alternative.  
Opt-in collective actions are not a first choice tool to reach such a shift in the 
individual cost-benefit ratio regarding the incentives to claim damages. As has been 
stated above, the procedure in itself will be more costly than traditional litigation and 
the possibility to share the costs depends on the willingness of other victims to opt-in. 
However, these need to be identified and contacted in order to do so, which increases 
the costs and consequently the risks of the victim trying to initiate the case. 
Considering the additional problems created through the introduction of collective 
actions, it is far from certain that they would constitute a better solution to the 
                                                
533 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 15 ff. 
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problem of rational apathy than other alternatives, which relate to the adequate 
financing of civil litigation proceedings.534
Representative actions also do not necessarily diminish the costs and compensation 
ratio in themselves. By being able to bundle a large number of claims into one 
proceeding, the association may be enabled to realise some economies of scale. 
However, again the costs of the proceeding will be larger than under traditional 
litigation. That is all the more so, when the costs of preparing and prosecuting a case 
increase exponentially with the stake of the claim. On top of these costs, also costs 
connected to the notification of victims and the distribution of the damages awarded 
in court must be included in the calculation. It should also be noted that these costs in 
some cases may even outweigh the damages awarded.535 Most importantly, the costs 
are not borne by the parties supposed to receive the damage awards, so that in fact one 
party (the victims) receives damage awards and has no costs, while the other (the 
association) only has costs and no awards per se.
2.2 Fostering stand-alone as well as follow-on actions536
Despite the stated intent to foster not only follow-on but also stand alone actions, the 
above conducted analysis suggests that the incentives to bring stand-alone actions are 
very limited. So far, the Commission has not developed specific incentives schemes 
for parties that are or might become involved to invest resources in the detection of 
competition law infringements. Stand-alone cases are therefore only likely when the 
detection is very simple and most of the relevant information for filing suit is readily 
available. In these circumstances it is also likely that damages actions will have been 
brought by the aggrieved victims even without group litigation mechanisms. 
                                                
534 For an overview and a discussion of different funding alternatives in the UK, see Lord Justice 
Jackson, "Review of Civil Litigation Costs,Preliminary Report by Lord Justice Jackson, part 4 chapter 
12,  The Funding of Civil Litigation," (2009), available at: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about_judiciary/cost-review/docs-prelim-report/part4.pdf. Discussion 
conflicts between plaintiff, lawyer and professional litigation funder, see Waye, "Conflicts of Interests 
between Claimholders, Lawyers and Litigation Entrepreneurs," BOND LAW REVIEW 19 (2007): 9.  
535 See  Wagner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz – Regelungsbedarf bei Massen- und Streuschäden 41, 75 ; 
Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust 
Actions Brought by State Attorneys General 361, 399 f ; Eichholtz, Die US-amerikanische Class Action 
und ihre deutschen Funktionsäquivalente, 299.  
536 See European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,  nr. 1, 7. 
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2.3 Preserving competition in the internal market (deterrence) 
All arguments under the heading of “preservation of competition” are related to the 
goal of deterrence. The preservation of competition is done through the deterrence of 
anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, little can be added here and the reader is referred 
to the analysis in Chapter 3 and the one above in this Chapter. 
A few comments could be in order, however, with regards to the comments of the 
Commission, that neither consumers nor competitors should bear the costs of illegal 
anti-competitive conduct. So far, the focus has not been on the protection of 
competitors, probably rightfully so, as possibilities for competitors to file suit against 
each other have to be treated very carefully. On the other hand, focusing on the 
consumers may lead to systems that force the competitors and other market 
participants to bear the costs of an infringement. 
3 Conclusion
The goal of corrective justice for aggrieved parties in cases of illegal anti-competitive 
conduct is not reached to the full extent.  Consistently, choices have to be made 
concerning trade-offs between just compensation and the incentives for active parties 
or the costs involved. Exact establishment of harm can be too complex and hinder 
potential plaintiffs in exercising their rights.  Some claims may never be adjudicated, 
so that cy press distribution mechanisms might be an option. Throughout the 
initiatives, however, one central problem seems to be too little addressed, whether 
looking at deterrence or at compensatory justice as goal: the incentives of parties to 
become active. Without adequate incentive schemes, the effect of all mechanisms will 
be severely hampered. Also, none of the intermediary goals discussed are reached to 
substantial extents. 
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E General assessment 
After taking a look at the potentials of the planned group litigation mechanisms, 
including the other legal reform proposals, to reach the proclaimed purposes, it 
becomes clear that the proposed mechanisms fall short of their potential. Neither 
compensatory justice nor deterrence are reached to their full extent. Moreover, these 
goals do not seem to be pursued in a strict and consequent manner. Trade-offs with 
feasibility or costs can explain these deviations from the set goals only to a certain 
degree. The question arises whether there exists some justification outside the analysis 
which may be responsible for some of the choices made. This section provides a few 
thoughts on this subject, without the claim of completeness. 
There are many possible explanations for the Commission’s choice of avenue?. Most 
likely a combination of several or all forms the real driving force, though it is not 
possible to identify the bundle exactly.  One of the potentially most influence reasons 
may have been that, irrespective of the legal discussion about whether the 
Commission has the mandate to impose such regulations on the Member States, the 
Commission had to take into account the legal and cultural traditions of the Member 
States. Otherwise, the opposition to such changes would likely be large and an 
acceptable compromise has to be found, if at least some progress is desired. 
Economically, that could be framed as harmonisation costs. Mandating the 
introduction of legal rules that do not fit into the general concepts of the legal systems 
in the Member States would lead to very large costs of harmonisation, especially 
when the introduction of new codes on civil procedure concerning competition law 
infringements would spill over to other areas of law. During the initial consultation 
stages, where comments on the Green Paper were invited, it also became clear that 
there exists a wide spread, and profound European prejudice, against the American 
class action, with its “bounty hunting” or “ambulance chasing” lawyers and an overly 
litigious culture.537 Such a system therefore was to be avoided in Europe, according to 
                                                
537 To demonstrate the wide spread of such colourful assessments, see for exampleSchnell, "Class 
Action Madness in Europe-a Call for a More Balanced Debate," EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
REVIEW 28 (2007): 617, 617. ; Kroes, “left cowboy hat at home”, Speech march 9, 2006. Kroes, 
"More private antitrust enforcement through better access to damages: an invitation for an open 
debate," OPENING SPEECH AT THE CONFERENCE ‘Private ENFORCEMENT IN EC 
COMPETITION LAW: THE GREEN PAPER ON DAMAGES ACTIONS'(9 March 2006) ; “litigation 
culture”Hodges, "Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: what is the case?" COMMON 
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many commentators on the Green Paper and the Commission itself.538 Opposition to 
the introduction of a system that would capture a majority of the US class action 
features was likely to be very strong. However, as has also been pointed out by 
commentators abroad,539 the question remains whether in the aim to introduce a very 
European group litigation mechanism the European Commission has not “thrown out 
the baby with the bath water”. Despite the justifications given for the choices made, 
there might still be room for improvement. 
First of all, the goal which was to be achieved with private enforcement of 
competition law seems to have changes from a focus on deterrence540 to a combination 
of deterrence and compensation541 to a full focus on compensatory justice.542 That shift 
in focus may well be an extreme expression of the shift in European Competition Law 
in general, away from a total welfare perspective and towards a consumer welfare 
oriented approach. The Commission was frequently reprehended by commentators 
abroad, who claimed that the focus on consumer protection was lacking.543 Obviously, 
the choice of the major goal of the reform largely influences the methods to be 
employed and the variables to be taken into account. It should be made clear, 
however, that despite the typical wording used in the discussion by practitioners and 
                                                                                                                               
MARKET LAW REVIEW 43 (2006): 1381, 1398; “ambulance chasing laywers” Kroes, More private 
antitrust enforcement through better access to damages: an invitation for an open debate.
538 Associazione fra le società italiane per azioni, "Comments on the Green Paper on damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules," (2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/assonime.pdf ; 
CEFIC, European Chemical Industry Council, "The comments of the chemical industry on the 
commission GREEN PAPER on damages actions for breach of EC Antitrust rules," CEFIC(12 Apr 
2006) 
 http://www.cefic.org/Files/Publications/comments.pdf; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
"ICC Comments on the Commission’s Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules,"
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/icc.pdf. 
539 Issacharoff, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?. Available at:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296843.  
540 See Mario Monti, "Private  litigation as a key complement to public enforcement of competition 
rules and the first conclusions on the implementation  of the new Merger Regulation" Brussels, 2004), 
, where compensation is considered a positive side-effect. 
541 See Kroes, Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in 
Europe,SPEECH/05/533, where “a strong deterrent effect” and “benefits for the functioning of the 
market and the competitiveness of the economy” are mentioned as the acknowledged benefits, while 
compensation of victims is considered second addition “there is more to private enforcement than 
optimising the impact of competition policy”.  
542 See Kroes, Consumers at the heart of EU Competition Policy SPEECH/08/212, dealing with 
compensation of harmed consumers, where deterrence is reduced to “obvious deterrent effects we 
cannot put a price on”. 
543 See Fox, ""We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors"," WORLD COMPETITION 26 
(2003): 149. 
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theorists alike, which is that the pursuit of compensatory justice also adds to 
deterrence, conceals the fact that focusing on the one goal comes at a cost – the cost 
that the other goal is not achieved as well as it might have been. Moreover, to allow 
for transparent decision making and a higher quality in the debates and discussions, 
definitions of concepts like consumer welfare and corrective justice would be needed 
just as much as a ranking of different goals. 
Another point strongly emphasised by the Commission is the need to preserve a 
strong and effective public enforcement system.544 The Commission did not want to 
enhance private enforcement in a way that it might work as a substitute to public 
enforcement. It was stressed, that the aim of private enforcement was considered to be 
different to that of public enforcement. A focus on compensation for victims achieved 
through follow-on actions would have been a consequent result. However, it seems 
that that approach was not followed though completely either, especially since the 
first group of cases under which private enforcement of competition law may act as a 
complement to public enforcement mentioned was stand-alone cases.545 The group 
litigation systems and all the other proposed mechanisms to enhance private 
enforcement could have been more specifically tailored to these types of actions and 
the general reference in the discussion to stand-alone actions and the enhanced 
deterrence effects could and should have been skipped entirely.   
Therefore, even though the Commission may have several justifications for their 
choices, such as legal limitations or other goals pursued, the whole analysis and 
discussion of private enforcement of European competition law could be improved if 
such restrictions were to be made explicit. Under the same heading, a clear statement 
of the goals to be achieved and their relative importance, as well as a definition of the 
relevant concepts used would be needed.  
                                                
544 European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER accompanying the WHITE 
PAPER on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, nr. 17, 11. 
545Ibidem, nr 21, 11 f. 
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Chapter 5 : Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal 
Systems 
This Chapter examines the forms of group litigation developed in three selected 
countries: the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK),546 and 
Germany. The focus is on those mechanisms that are, or may be, applied in the case of 
competition law infringements.  
The selection of these countries was motivated by the following facts. The US system 
is one of the most prominent group litigation mechanisms world wide, it is considered 
a prime example of group or collective action,547 and is also the mostly widely used. 
Moreover, most of the insights concerning the effects and efficiency of issues 
concerning group litigation have been developed in the US. Therefore, it seems 
absolutely necessary to investigate this form of bundling similar interest into one 
proceeding, even though the European Member States profess they do not want to 
copy that system. The UK was selected because, while also a common law system as 
is the US, it is also close to the European civil law countries in some areas. Therefore 
it is an interesting intermediate between continental civil law and the US. The UK 
developed a different set of mechanisms which have been applied for some time and 
are now being assessed and possibly altered. The experience of the UK, and the 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of different mechanisms, can provide very 
valuable insights for future group litigation designs for other European Member 
States. Germany was selected as representing one of the more traditional civil law 
countries, where, so far, only few cautious steps have been taken in developing new 
forms of group litigations. The German resistance and scepticism towards other types 
of aggregate litigation, especially the American-style class actions, can be considered 
to be very large.  
                                                
546 The UK will be used as only comprising England and Wales. 
547 German commentators used the term “Paradebeispiel”, seeBeuchler, Länderbericht Vereinigte 
Staaten. DAS VERBANDSKLAGERECHT IN DER INFORMATIONS-UND 
DIENSTLEISTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT. eds. Micklitz andStadler. Münster: Landwirtschaftsverlag 
(2005), 941, 953. 
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After its description, each system will be assessed with regard to its potential to reach 
optimal deterrence, using the insights gained in chapter 3. Because the overall effect 
of a specific group litigation mechanism depends also on other regulations beyond the 
mere design of the group litigation mechanism, such as rules on fees and cost shifting 
or rules on damages, a selection of other relevant issues deemed as most important 
will also be presented.  
In the conclusions, a final comparison between the systems will be made and possible 
policy implications will be drawn. 
A United States of America 
In the US, as a Federal State System, Federal Regulation concerning class actions 
exists next to regulations in the 50 individual States. As the comparison between US 
and EU competition law is made at the federal level in this thesis, many US States’ 
regulations mirror the Federal Regulation548 and the trend set in the Class Action 
Fairness Act 2005 (CAFA) was towards more federalisation of class actions, in this 
section the focus will be also on the Federal System. Within that choice, also more 
emphasis is placed on class actions, rather than on other procedures like joinders, and 
furthermore on class actions seeking monetary relief. These types of actions in the 
realm of private enforcement seem to account for the vast majority of private 
enforcement cases in the USA.549
                                                
548 Although there can be differences in substantive law as well as the application of regulation in the 
courts. For an overview seePace, Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the 
Process and the Empirical Literature.
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/USA__National_Report.pdf. 
549 See Lande and Davis, "Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases," 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW 42 (2008): 879, 901. 
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1 The US Federal legal system 
1.1 Joinder and Consolidation 
Joinder and consolidations are, as in many countries, also part of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) in the USA. Rule 69 (a) of the FRCP on permissive joinder 
of parties allows plaintiffs to join in one action “if they assert any right to relief 
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of 
law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” 
Likewise, consolidation regulation exists. Rule 42 (a) of the FRCP allows courts to 
order joint hearings or trials in cases where common questions arise in separate 
actions before the court. 
These regulations mirror very similar regulations in most countries also in European 
Member States. 550 However, these mechanisms are of much less importance in reality 
than the class action mechanism discussed below. 
1.2 The class action 
The most prominent example of group litigation is the US American class action 
under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (FRCP 23). This rule also applies to 
class actions in antitrust cases. There are two basic forms of class actions regulated 
under that rule. Generally speaking, the first is a mandatory class action and the 
second an opt-out class action. This distinction is presented here, even though a 
specific class action can be based on a number of grounds for certification and 
liability issues. For example, it is possible to seek injunctive relief and (punitive) 
damages at the same time or sub-classes of one case may be based on different rules.  
Rule 23 (b) (1) and (2) apply to mandatory class actions, which are applied when 
separate actions would risk inconsistent adjudications or conflict with the interest of 
                                                
550 These procedures are very similar to the procedures also common in Civil Law countries. SeePace, 
Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical 
Literature26 ff. Available at:  http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/USA__National_Report.pdf. 
Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 228
other class members on the one hand, and when the adequate remedy for the class as a 
whole would be injunctive relief or a declaratory judgement, on the other hand.  In 
cases, where the limited funds of the defendant(s) might risk access to justice for 
future plaintiffs, a class action claiming damages can also be taken under Rule 23 (b) 
(1).
Rule 23 (b) (3) is the more common opt-out class action, also called common –
question class action, which can also be brought as action for damages. Rule 23 
requires that for such an action to take place, it must be superior to any other available 
method (FRCP 23 (b) (3)) and therefore forms a kind of superiority test. This needed 
superiority also refers to joinder or consolidation procedures. The opt-out class action 
is the most widely known American class action; nevertheless, opt-in procedures are 
also possible.551 Another exception, where the default rule for the class action is one 
of opt-in, can be found in the Federal Fair Labor Standard Act, for example.552
In order to be certified, a class action must fulfil a number of requirements. These are: 
numerosity of claims; commonality of issues; typicality of the representative parties; 
and, adequacy of representation. Definability is also considered to be an implicit 
requirement553 and refers to the necessity of the class being sufficiently identifiable.  
Numerosity of claims under federal regulation does not prescribe a minimum number 
of parties or claims, but the general practice seems to be a comparison with a number 
of claims that could still make a mere joinder of claims feasible.554 Commonality of 
issues refers to the requirement that legal or factual issues that are common to all 
represented parties should predominate the questions of law or facts that only are 
relevant in the individual claims (FRCP 23 (b)(3)).  However, restricting the class 
action to certain issues is also allowed by law (FRCP 23 (c)(4)), although the exact 
                                                
551 Willging et al report 3 cases found in the Georgetown study that required opt-in 
procedures,Willging, Empirical study of class actions in four federal district courts: Final report to the 
advisory committee on civil rules, 54. Available online at: 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf. 
552 United States Code, 29 U.S.C. Par. 216 (b) (2000).  For a discussion see also: Lampe, Procedural 
Approaches for Countering the Dual-Filed FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Wage Class Action
311. 
553 Rowe Jr, State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-
Federal Rule 23 147, 152 ff. 
554 Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical 
Literature6 ; Sergius Koku, "An analysis and the effects of class-action lawsuits," JOURNAL OF 
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relationship between issue-classing and the requirement of predominance of common 
issues seems to be debated at Federal Appellate Courts.555 Typicality means that the 
claims or defences of the party that represents the class have to be typical of the 
claims or defences of those represented (FRCP 23 (a)(3)).  With regard to adequacy of 
representation, the federal regulation applies to lawyer and lead plaintiff 
simultaneously and requires that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class"  (FRCP 23(a)(4)). A preliminary inquiry into the 
merits of the cases is not mandated, and the US Supreme Court held that the 
certification of an action as class action does not require such an exercise556, however 
rulings on dispositive motions before certification are possible.557
Certification of the class, if it fulfils all the necessary requirements, takes place after 
motions already have been filed and decided upon and a preliminary discovery has 
taken place. If the class is not a mandatory class falling under FRCP 23 (b)(1) and (2), 
where notification may take place but is not required by law, the class members have 
to be notified in a next step. The court then has to order a notification of the potential 
class members, using “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort” (FRCP 23 (c)(2) (B)). The law also establishes some minimum requirements to 
the form of notices, which have to be submitted “in plain, easily understood 
language”558 and also to the content, having to state the nature of the action, the 
binding effect of such action and how and when victims can opt-out. The 
impracticability of other alternatives, such as individual letters to all victims, which 
need to be identified beforehand, sometimes can lead to notification through 
newspaper or magazine advertisements. Even if notification takes place through 
letters to the individual class members, information of all those represented can not be 
guaranteed, as only those identified will receive such notice and sometimes the letter 
sent may go unnoticed by or not even reach the recipient.  
                                                                                                                               
BUSINESS RESEARCH 59 (2006): 508, 510 ; Rowe Jr, State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and 
Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-Federal Rule 23 147, 153. 
555 Ibidem, 161. 
556U.S. Supreme Court, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), 174 (1974) 
557  Rowe Jr, State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-
Federal Rule 23 147,160. 
558 FRCP 23 (c) (2) (B). 
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When the class is certified, the court also has to appoint the class counsel and, in cases 
where there are several applicants for that position, to decide on which counsel would 
best be able to represent the class.559 In recent years, courts have increasingly used 
auction mechanisms to determine the best suited class counsel when one has had to be 
chosen out of a number of competitors.560   
During the procedure, the court may also make use of several orders, so as to protect 
the represented class members or to manage the procedure in an efficient way. 
Amongst the possibilities to protect silent class members is the option that the court 
may order further notice to be given to inform them about the steps in the action, 
proposed extent of the judgment, a possibility to notify the court about inadequate 
representation, or to grant intervention possibilities.561
Settlements are generally dependant on courts approval (FRCP 23 (e)). In case of a 
class action under Rule 23 (b) (3) FRCP, the court may make approval dependant on a 
second stage opt-out possibility for the class members (FRCP 23 (e) (4)). However, 
that rule is reported to have been applied only in a very limited number of cases.562
1.3 Other relevant issues   
1.3.1 Rules on Damages 
With regard to antitrust damages, Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act provides a 
special feature for antitrust litigation, as it states that any injured party shall recover 
treble the actual damages suffered.563 Whether this mandatory trebling is to be 
interpreted as mandatory punitive damages or as mandatory remedial damages, seems 
to be a matter of dispute in the courts as well as the literature, though it may be of less 
importance with regard to its deterrence effects.  
                                                
559 FRCP. 23 (g). 
560 One of the more prominent examples was the class action against the auction houses Christie’s and 
Sotheby’s, see  U.S. District Courts, In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (2001). 
561 FRCP 23 (d) (1) (B). 
562 Rowe Jr, State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-
Federal Rule 23 147, 167 f – possibly because both class counsel and defendant have incentives to 
argue against such opt-out at that stage. 
563 United States Code. 15 U.S.C. Par. 15 (1994). 
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Pre-judgment interest is generally not granted. Although Section 4 of the Clayton Act 
provides that a court may award prejudgment interest in antitrust cases for the period 
between the filing of the complaint and judgment, if such an award is considered “just 
in the circumstances”, it seems that such interest has been hardly ever granted.564 For 
such interest to be granted, only three factors shall be taken into account by the court: 
intentional delay caused by one of the parties by making assertions or filing motions 
lacking in merit or otherwise acting in bad faith, breach of regulations that provides 
for sanctions due to dilatory behaviour or expeditious proceedings and conduct of one 
of the parties with the major aim to delay the proceedings or to increase the costs.565
Because of the lack of pre-judgment interest, the US treble damages may be closer to 
actual damages with interest than to threefold the sustained damages.566 It may also be 
noteworthy that de-trebling for successful leniency applicants was introduced in the 
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004.567
When not all class members can be identified, or not all of them are willing or able to 
collect their damages after the procedure (which may be subject to submission of 
claim forms and supporting materials), cy press and fluid recovery class recoveries are 
possible.568 Under the cy press mechanism, the class recovery fund will not be 
distributed amongst the class members, but put to its next best use, for example given 
to an organisation that works in the interest of those represented. Under fluid recovery 
it may be decided, that instead of compensation, other mechanisms may be used, for 
example a general price reduction for the defendant’s product for a certain time of 
period. Both mechanisms can be also employed, when individual compensation is 
regarded as too costly or unfeasible.  
                                                
564 Lande, Are Antitrust'Treble'Damages Really Single Damages? 115. 
565 United States Code. 15 U.S.C. Par. 15 (a) 
566 In fact, Lande (1993) calculates the real multiplier from a defendants (deterrence) point of view to 
be only between 0, 35 and 2,01 instead of 3, for business plaintiffs around 1 and for consumer plaintiffs 
to be between 0,64 and 1,32. See Ibidem.
567 For a discussion see Randall, "Does De-Trebling Sacrifice Recoverability of Antitrust Awards," 
YALE J.ON REG. 23 (2006): 311. 
568 Shepherd, "Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy," UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 39 (1971): 448. For a discussion of fluid recovery (cy press distribution) as 
one form of nonpecuniary settlements, seeMiller and Singer, "Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements," 
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 60 (1997): 97, 154. 
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As regulation seems to be missing, the Federal Courts have discretion with regard to 
the use of left over funds, which they have been using in a variety of ways.569 It seems 
that the use of unclaimed funds is sometimes not even decided upon or supervised by 
judges.
1.3.2 Costs, fees and Cost-Shifting Rules 
Generally, the so called American rule (as opposed to the British or European rule) 
applies with regard to cost-shifting, which postulates that each party bears her own 
costs.  
However, there are some exceptions to this rule. One relates to the settlement 
possibility. Under the offer of judgement rule, the plaintiff that declines an offer made 
by its opponent prior to the trial risks having to face the defendants litigation costs 
that result later in the trial, when the judgment rendered turns out to be not more 
favourable than the settlement would have been. (FRCP 68 (d)).   
Another exception specifically for antitrust litigation is regulated in Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act. Under this rule the successful plaintiff can recover treble damages, as 
well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The United States Code (15 U.S.C.) § 15 states that 
the plaintiff “shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” This is in fact a one way fee-shifting rule 
that does not foresee the same rule for the defendant in general. The downsides and 
upsides of such a rule have been heavily debated in the literature.570 It seems plausible 
that such a one way fee-shifting rule encourages plaintiffs to file suit in general. That 
includes also cases involving small stakes, a low probability of winning or large 
expected litigation costs. At the same time, it increases the costs imposed on 
                                                
569 Rowe Jr, State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-
Federal Rule 23 147, 170 ff. 
570 Arguing for a shift from the American to the British Rule: Polinsky and Rubinfeld, "Optimal awards 
and penalties when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs," THE RAND JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 27 (1996): 269. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=567 ;  analysing the 
incentives to file unmeritous suits:Bebchuk and Chang, "Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin 
of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, An," JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 25 (1996): 371; modelling the effects of cost shifting rules on with regard to (inter 
alia) settlement offers :Gravelle, "The efficiency implications of cost-shifting rules," INTERNATIONAL 
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defendants, and may thereby add to deterrence. Higher expected trial costs for the 
defendant may also encourage defendants to reach settlement agreements. This could 
be a more ambivalent effect, when nuisance suits are a possibility.
A very common fee schedule in the US is the so called contingency fee arrangement. 
Under a contingency fee contract, the lawyer agrees on pre-financing the litigation 
against a certain percentage of the recovery. Thereby at least large parts of the costs 
and risks connected to a trial are shifted from the plaintiff to the lawyer. As such 
agreements between counsel and individual class members are not possible ex ante in 
class actions, the courts developed the so called common fund doctrine, which mirrors 
the contingency fee contract.571 Under this principle, class counsel will be rewarded 
from the common class fund, the recovery for the class as a whole, as it is regarded 
fair and adequate that all those represented in and benefiting from the class action 
would also participate in the costs of the litigation. The contingency fee arrangement 
seems to have worked as an effective alternative to other mechanisms of financing of 
litigation, such as legal aid and legal insurance, so that these alternatives did not 
develop to such an extend that can be found in other jurisdictions without such fee 
arrangements.572
In the case of antitrust litigation, however, a cost shifting rule is applied. 15 U.S.C. 
(Clayton Act) § 26 states “in any action under this section in which the plaintiff 
substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee, to such plaintiff”. What is to be considered reasonable fees will have to 
be determined by the judge. In cost-shifting cases, such as antitrust cases, judges can 
also apply the so called “loadstar” method to determine lawyers’ fees to be 
reimbursed by the defendant. Under this approach, the lawyer will receive 
remuneration based on an hourly fee, which will be adjusted by a multiplier reflecting 
the complexity of the class action in question and the service rendered to the class.573
However, it seems that de facto contingency fees are the prevailing method for 
lawyers’ remuneration. 
                                                                                                                               
REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 13 (1993): 3 ; see also Kaplow, "Shifting plaintiffs' fees versus 
increasing damage awards," THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 24 (1993): 625. 
571 See for exampleU.S. Supreme Court, Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank 307 U.S. 161,167 (1939); 
and U.S. Supreme Court, Trustees v. Greenough (1882) 105 U.S. 527 (1882). 
572 Kilian, "Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broadening 
Access to Justice: The German Experience," JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 30 (2003): 31, 36 f. 
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In a settlement, the structure and amount of lawyers’ payment may be agreed upon by 
class counsel and defendant, for example whether the fee will be a percentage of the 
total amount to be paid to the class or whether lawyers and court fees will be paid on 
top. Though subject to courts approval,574 the fee arrangement may be very often 
approved by courts, especially when defendant and lawyer jointly argue the adequacy 
and fairness of their agreement also concerning attorney’s fees and no class member 
comes forward to object.575
Empirical literature has found that class action contingency fees for lawyers have 
tended to be somewhere between 18  percent and 30  percent of the recovery, i.e., the 
class fund. Eisenberg and Miller found a mean of close to 22  percent, while Willging 
et al found values between 24  percent and 30  percent of total recovery amount as 
attorneys’ fees.576
1.3.3 Passing-on defence 
Arguing that indirect purchasers may refrain from filing suit, so that the efficiency of 
private enforcement would be in danger, and the estimation of passing on amounts 
would be a complex burden on the courts, standing to sue has been restricted by the 
US Supreme Court to direct purchasers in the famous decision Illinois Brick v. 
Illinois.577 This decision was a consequence of the equally famous Supreme Courts 
decision of 1968, Hannover-Shoe,578 in which the court decided that the passing on 
defence was not available under federal law. Though continuously discussed and 
sometimes heavily criticised,579 these rules are still in place on the federal level. 
                                                                                                                               
573 Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical 
Literature 42. Available at: http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/USA__National_Report.pdf. 
574 Polverino and Cengiz, "A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union," WORLD COMEPTITION 30 (2007): 479,486. 
575 See also the discussion on judges approval of settlement agreements below. 
576 See Eisenberg, et al, "Attorneys Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study," JOURNAL
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2004): 27, 27;Willging, Empirical study of class actions in four 
federal district courts: Final report to the advisory committee on civil rules. Available online at: 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf  
577 U.S. Supreme Court, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720.
578 U.S. Supreme Court, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481.
579 Instead of many, Critical:Harris and Sullivan, "Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A 
Comprehensive Policy Analysis," UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 128 (1979): 269. 
Supporting:Landes, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust Laws--An 
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However, a large number of States allowed the passing on defence under their State 
antitrust laws. 
1.3.4 Disclosure Rules 
The Federal Rules on Civil Procedure provide for generally wide discovery 
possibilities, compared to common discovery procedures in civil law countries. FRCP 
26 (a), regulates that the lawyers on both sides, within short time after the pleading, 
must disclose “all documents, data compilations, and tangible things” in their 
possession, without a request from the other side This also includes “a copy of, or a 
description by category and location of, all documents, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things that are in the possession, custody, or control of the 
party and that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defences, unless 
solely for impeachment” (FRCP 26 b) and depositions of witnesses, interrogations, 
even before the facts of the case have been tried. Non-compliance with these 
discovery rules can result in serious punishments. Next to reimbursement of the 
opposing parties costs, the judge may also rule that certain evidence is no longer 
admissible or even draw adverse conclusions from the failure to provide the required 
information.580
It is quite possible that broad discovery rules have an impact on the effectiveness of 
the group litigation mechanism, by shifting costs and risks of evidence production 
away from plaintiffs and more towards defendants. While therefore the initial 
problems of asymmetric information and/or rational apathy may be reduced, the scope 
for nuisance suits might be augmented by the same token. 581
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1.3.5 Role of judges 
Judges in civil law countries are generally perceived to have a much more active role 
in the litigation process than they typically have in common law countries, such as the 
USA.582 In the US, the opposing lawyers are the main players presenting evidence and 
questioning witnesses, while the judge retains a position as manager of the case or 
referee between the opposing parties.583 Therefore, in civil law countries the judge has 
a larger influence on the scope and form of the litigation process than in the US. 
It may be possible, that the more active role of judges in civil law countries may have 
slight advantages in controlling the development of a group litigation suit and maybe 
even to curb some of the problems arising, for example, from principal-agent 
problems between represented and representing parties. 
1.3.6 Jury trials 
One of the large differences between civil law and common law countries is the right 
to a jury trial in civil litigation cases.584 In the US, that right is embedded in the 
Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution. “In Suits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of common law”.585 Actual and punitive 
damages are considered legal remedies, for which cases the right for a jury trial is 
generally applicable.586
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Consequently, under FRCP 38(b), any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue 
triable of right by a jury. In antitrust cases, the requirement of a minimum amount of 
controversy of $20 is likely to be met in most cases. If the parties do not demand a 
jury trial, a bench trial will result, unless the judge himself orders a trail by jury. 
(FRCP 39(b).)  
It is questionable and highly debated whether a jury consisting of a representative 
sample of the whole society would be able to adequately understand and assess the 
factual and legal questions brought up in a competition infringement case, which are 
likely to be much more complex in many cases.587 For example, plaintiff’s lawyers in 
Canada consider antitrust cases as too complex to be heard by a jury.588 However, the 
generally perceived biases and shortcomings of jury trials are not always supported by 
empirical findings. Some research suggests that juries do not fare as badly as is often 
common prejudice. 589
While the benefits or disadvantages of jury trials are disputed in the US and in other 
countries, specifically in complex issues like antitrust cases, it seems that the number 
of cases that actually reach the trial stage and therefore the decision by a jury in the 
US is relatively small.  
Crane reports that in fact only 77 of 3,766 private antitrust cases filed between 2001 
and 2005 went to trial in the end. Of these only 45 cases were tried in front of 
juries.590 Consistent figures can be found also for the year 2005, in which of a total of 
                                                
587 For a discussion see Crane, "Antitrust Antifederalism," CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 96 (2008): 1, 
33.
588 Nicholson and Hersh, Canada. PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2007 – IN 19 
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE. ed. Mobley. Global Competition Review (2007), 13. 
589 See Clermont and Eisenberg, "Trial by jury or judge: Transcending empiricism," CORNELL LAW 
REVIEW 77 (1991): 1124 ;Vidmar, "The American Civil Jury for Auslander (Foreigners)," DUKE 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2003): 95. 
590Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism 1, 35, fn 140, basing the statistics on data collected from the annual 
reports of the administrative offices of the U.S. courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov. Also 
Connor and Helmers report that the great majority of private antitrust suits are settled. Of 36 
international cartels convicted in the United States during 1990-2003 only 5 cases went to trial. See 
Connor and Helmers, "Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005, AAI Working 
Paper No. 07-01," THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE(2007). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=944039. 
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707 terminated federal antitrust cases only 12 cases reached a trial and of those, only 
9 were jury trials.591
So the overall effect of that specific feature of US antitrust litigation may be relatively 
minor, at least at trial stage. However, it may be that the availability of jury trials may 
influence the opponents bargaining powers or strategies in settlement negotiations. It 
could be that large company defendants are strongly opposed to jury trials, when they 
perceive juries as generally more plaintiff friendly, even when that belief is not 
supported by empirical evidence. 
1.3.7 Multiple nationwide class actions 
In the US, defendants can face problems that may also occur in cases of 
internationally operating defendants in the EU, having to defend themselves against 
multiple group litigations that may include the same plaintiffs in different States. In 
the US, a nation wide operating defendant may face several class actions in several 
states, all trying to certify nation wide classes. These cases arising in different courts 
cannot currently be consolidated.592
Inefficiencies arise through the connected doubling of efforts and the possibility of 
defendants to choose a suitable plaintiffs counsel to strike a beneficial settlement 
agreement. Moreover, a consistent adjudication and the development of the law is at 
risk in such cases. This may have a negative impact on the deterrence function of such 
cases, especially when they provide an opportunity for defendants to undergo forum 
shopping, and form a kind of menu of plaintiffs and lawyers amongst which to choose 
the most favourable from.  
                                                
591 See Crane, "Antitrust Modesty," MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 105 (2006): 1193. The statistics 
reported by Crane come fromU.S. District Courts, Table C-4, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases 
Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, during the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 
2005 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/c4.pdf (last visit: October 12, 2007). See 
also, for 2006, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/contents.html. (last visit: October 12, 2007).  
592 Alexander, "An introduction to class action procedure, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf," ONLINE(2000), 21.  
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2 Deterrence effects 
Private enforcement of antitrust laws plays an important role in the USA. Recent 
studies report that damage awards granted in civil litigation represent a major share of 
the penalties imposed on competition law infringers.593 Surprisingly, stand-alone suits 
seem to be a large part of this litigation activity which by no means is marked 
overwhelmingly by follow-on actions. In fact empirical studies conducted for the time 
between 1973 and 1983 found that up to 91 percent of private antitrust cases were 
stand-alone suits.594 Only 20 percent of cases concerning horizontal antitrust 
infringements were follow-on suits.595 Also today, in the large majority of private US 
cases, the avenue chosen in antitrust litigation is that of a class action.596
2.1 Joinder and Consolidation Procedure 
These mechanisms are based on individual claims being filed by plaintiffs. As such, 
they generally are not able to overcome problems of individual suits. Rational apathy 
may be reduced when an individual cost reduction is possible under certain 
circumstances. For example when the costs of the trial can be divided between several 
plaintiffs and the joinder does not lead to a more complex and costly trial. However, 
information asymmetry and free riding behaviour can not be cured by this mechanism. 
Also, procedural efficiency can not be achieved when a small number of plaintiffs 
join in an action against a defendant, whose anti-competitive behaviour leads to 
damages for a large number of injured parties, who may bring individual suits or form 
other joinders. 
                                                
593 Connor, Global price fixing, 109.  
594 See Kauper, Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and 
Independently Initiated Cases Compared, An 1163,1180. See also Lande, Benefits from Private 
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases 879, 890 f, stating the majority of damage awards 
was recovered came from stand-alone actions. 
595 See Kauper, Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and 
Independently Initiated Cases Compared, An 1163, 1180.  
596 Emanuelson, et al, "More of the same: growth in private antitrust litigation and cutbacks by the US 
Supreme Court," THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS(2009), 1. Available at: 
http://www.howrey.com/files/News/3efcfaf9-bf96-44ee-afe8-
c2ff63e38fdc/Presentation/NewsAttachment/9a415689-9d64-4c61-b096-
dfd4ee74cdf6/US%20Private%20Enforcement%2019.pdf 
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2.2 Class actions 
The number of antitrust class actions has been on the rise since 1997.597 One of the 
reasons for the success of class actions mentioned by American commentators is the 
existence of entrepreneurial lawyers.598  Also other features of private antitrust 
litigation as described above, including the contingency fee for lawyers, are seen to 
have helped the perceived success of the class action regime in the US.599 Therefore, 
though applicable at least in part also to joinder procedures, these will be discussed 
here in combination with the class action mechanism, as this is the most prominent 
and debated group litigation mechanism in the US private antitrust litigation.  
One-way fee shifting greatly reduces the financial risks that potential plaintiffs face in 
litigation, especially when coupled with a contingency fee arrangement, under which 
the lawyer pre-finances the litigation. While this combined effect will influence the 
private cost-benefit analysis concerning the filing of a suit and therefore reduce the 
problem of rational apathy in those cases where it exists, it also creates an increased 
risk of unmeritous cases being brought. The plaintiff can become risk free under the 
applied cost shifting rule. It would then rest on the lawyer as investor of the litigation 
to act as a gatekeeper and to select only cases with sufficient merits. However, the 
pre-trial discovery following a relatively uncomplicated and unsubstantiated first 
filing of a claim can impose substantial costs on the defendant or the first filing of the 
case may trigger follow-on cases. This increases the defendant’s willingness to settle 
also cases with little merits, to avoid these other costs. Therefore, the lawyer may also 
be willing to take on cases with little merits but with a potential for an early 
settlement. 
As far as procedural efficiency is concerned, the great number of class members 
represented in class actions greatly reduces the costs per case compared to individual 
                                                
597 Issacharoff, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?; Emanuelson, More of the same: growth in 
private antitrust litigation and cutbacks by the US Supreme Court, 1. 
598 Alexander, An introduction to class action procedure, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf, 26, ;Issacharoff, Will Aggregate 
Litigation Come to Europe?.
599Alexander, An introduction to class action procedure, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf, 26.  
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suits brought by all members of the class. However, Willging et al600 also found in 
their study that the vast majority of federal class action required significantly more 
time and resources than non-class cases. These additional costs would have to be 
taken into account when determining the procedural efficiency overall. 
Settlements in class actions are dependant on judge’s approval.601 While this 
sometimes has been regarded also in the literature as a safeguard against unfair 
settlements or settlements that are more beneficial to the lawyers than to class 
members, it efficiency might be questioned in reality. Judges may be reluctant to re-
open a case that could be closed with the settlement, when their time and resources 
are limited. Moreover, in cases where the settlement is already agreed upon and filed 
for approval together with the claims and motion for class certification, which can 
happen as well, judges will not have been presented the facts and expert testimonies 
they might have seen at trial. Under such circumstances, it will be difficult also for 
generally well informed and specialised judges to judge the adequacy of the 
settlement agreement. Some empirical findings may provide substance to such 
criticism. Willging et al602 found in their study on class actions that in fact 90 percent 
of settlements are approved by the courts, even when class members object against the 
terms of the settlement. 
Contingency fee arrangements are seen as providing large incentives for lawyers to 
specialise in class action litigation, as collected fees can be substantial.603 However, 
these fee arrangements can also give rise to principal-agent problems, as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3.604 The incentives for lawyers to investigate and to litigate against 
competition law infringements will always deviate from the social interest in doing so, 
as lawyers receive only a fraction of the total damages caused to society and do not 
take the benefits accruing from deterrence effects to society at large into account.  
                                                
600 Willging, Empirical study of class actions in four federal district courts: Final report to the 
advisory committee on civil rules. Available online at: 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf. 
601 Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical 
Literature 41. http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/USA__National_Report.pdf. 
602 Willging, Empirical study of class actions in four federal district courts: Final report to the 
advisory committee on civil rules. Available online at: 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf 
603Alexander, An introduction to class action procedure, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf, 12.  
604 See section on collective action in Chapter 3. 
Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 242
Overall, as far as the deterrence effect is measurable or can be estimated,605 even the 
US private enforcement system seems to fall short of optimal deterrence effects. 
Connor606 reports that damages awarded are low compared to the overcharges brought 
about in price fixing cases and also too low compared to the optimal level of 
deterrence needed when the low probability of getting caught is taken into account. 
He estimates that the real sanctions/real damages ratios in the US for the “harshly 
punished”607 vitamin cartels were only about 26 percent, of which 7.5  percent were 
imposed by the government.608 Compared to the 4,2  percent  real sanction/real 
damages ratios that the EU penalty achieved, the deterrence effect of the US system 
may well be larger, if one can extrapolate from these findings. However, attempts to 
analyse the deterrence effect focusing on detection rates also seem to point to a larger 
effectiveness of the US system compared to the existing European systems, as it 
constitutes a combination of public and private enforcement, with the majority of 
cases being brought by the latter enforcement agent.609 While not perfect and leading 
to optimal deterrence, the US system at least seems to have an advantage over the 
currently dominant systems in the European Union. 
B United Kingdom 
The system of the United Kingdom (UK),610 though also a common law system as the 
legal system of the United States, has developed their own unique procedures to 
bundle similar interests into one proceeding. Its experience and the current discussion 
in the UK about future reforms of these systems can provide useful insights for other 
countries contemplating the design and implementation of new forms of group 
litigation. 
                                                
605 A good overview of methods and results in determining deterrence effects can be found in Gordon 
and Squires, "The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement," DE ECONOMIST 156 (2008): 
411. 
606Connor, Global price fixing, 410 ff. 
607Ibidem, 424. 
608Ibidem, figure 16.3, 430. 
609 See Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the 
impact assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 70 ff. 
610 The UK will be understood in this text as comprising England and Wales. Scotland has not 
introduced a group litigation mechanism, see Hodges, "Country Report: England and Wales," (2007), 
1. http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/PDF/England_Legislation.pdf. 
Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 243
1 The legal system 
1.1 Forms of Group Litigation mechanisms in competition law infringements 
Generally, actions seeking the establishment of a competition law infringement and 
resulting compensation for damages can be brought by any harmed individual in front 
of the ordinary English courts.611 In addition, any person who has suffered loss as a 
result of an infringement may institute a claim for damages before the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT), when an infringement of competition law has been found by 
public authorities. 
The procedure before the ordinary English courts is governed by the general Rules on 
Civil Procedure (CPR). Therefore, the general CPR are applicable and consequently 
so are the mechanisms for bundling similar interest into one proceeding that are laid 
down or applied therein. These mechanisms will be presented shortly under the 
heading of Litigation Before Ordinary Courts. As part of the general CPR, the 
management powers of the Court also extend to handing down a group litigation order 
(GLO). This particular group litigation mechanism will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
The individualised follow-on proceedings before the CAT are of lesser importance, 
when looking at group litigation mechanisms, as is done here. Therefore, the focus 
will be placed on a special Representative Follow-On action, which can be brought by 
designated bodies on behalf of consumers. This representative action was particularly 
designed for cases of competition law infringements and enacted 2003. This 
mechanism will be described and discussed last. 
1.1.1 Litigation Before Ordinary Courts 
As is the case in many other countries, those in the UK are also long familiar with 
traditional mechanisms to bundle claims, such as joinder, consolidation and even test 
                                                
611 Cumming, et al, Civil Procedure Used for Enforcement of EC Competition Law by the English, 
French and German Civil Courts, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International (2007), 14. 
Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 244
cases. A special representative rule, which may have been akin to collective action 
mechanisms, has also existed for a long time, however, it was very rarely used. Also, 
attempts to increase representative actions by associations have been made in several 
areas of law. These mechanisms will be described only briefly in this section. 
1.1.1.1 Joinder, Consolidation and Single Trial of Multiple Actions 
As is common in most countries, courts in the UK also have the power to consolidate 
any number of individual proceedings into one, resulting in only one large claim 
being brought against a defendant (CPR 3.1. (2)). Similarly, the court may order 
several claims to be tried at one proceeding, without consolidating them, thereby 
leaving the individual claims intact (CPR 3.1. (2) h). 
Also, several actions claiming damages due to the same competition law infringement 
with the same or similar issues brought before the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT) can be consolidated or heard at the same trial by power of the Tribunal.612
These mechanisms are similar to the ones used in the US, discussed above. Their 
effects have been analysed above, so that further analysis here will be refrained 
from.613
1.1.1.2 Test Cases 
Test case procedures have been employed for a long time in the UK as mechanism to 
efficiently deal with cases that involve multiple plaintiffs, without a specific statutory 
provision for it (except for test case procedures employed within the Group Litigation 
Order, discussed below). The court, within its role of managing the litigation, has the 
power to stay individual claims, which raise a number of common issues, and only 
prosecute one or a limited number of cases which entail these common issues (CPR 
3.1 (2) f). The outcomes of these prosecuted test cases are binding via and within the 
limitations of the precedence rule.614 The selection of a case or cases to be the test case 
                                                
612Competition Appeal Tribunal, Rules 2003, para 17 (1).  
613 USA in this section B 1.1.1.1. and in Chapter 2, A 1.1. 
614 Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 
Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions, 25 f. 
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is not regulated and up to the courts discretion, which led to numerous selection 
criteria.615
However, test case procedures still require plaintiffs to file suit on an individual basis 
and also to litigate the individual issues or at least file claims once the common issues 
are decided upon in the test case procedure. This mechanism therefore lacks 
efficiency and the barriers for prospective plaintiffs to come forward remain 
unsolved.616
Overall, the test case procedure mirrors test case procedures in other jurisdictions, for 
example the German test case procedure (KapMuG, discussed below) and generally 
exhibits the features that are used here to define a test case procedure.617
1.1.1.3 Representative Rule 
The representative rule (regulated in CPR 19.6) establishes a form of collective action 
mechanism, under which one named plaintiff (or defendant) can file (or defend) an 
action on his own behalf and on behalf of a represented class, when they share the 
same interests. Also, the court may order that an action be continued under the 
representative rule. Contrary to the consolidation procedures, the represented class 
members do not themselves become party to the litigation, but are bound by the 
outcome, unless the court rules otherwise (CPR 19.6 (4)). The possibility for the court 
to rule on the binding effect of the outcome of such an action also reduces the 
certainty for plaintiffs and defendants with regard to the actual size of the group, as 
the court may make the binding effect on represented parties dependant on certain 
circumstances or requirements.  
The requirement of the same interest has traditionally been interpreted very narrowly 
and understood as entailing i) a common interest, arising, for example, from the same
contract;  ii) a common complaint; and iii) a remedy other than damages, that benefits 
                                                
615 Gibbons, "Group Litigation, Class Actions and Lord Woolf's Three Objectives-A Critical Analysis," 
CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 27 (2008): 208, 231 f. 
616Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 
Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions 84. 
617 See Chapter 2 A 1.1.  
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all represented.618 Later judgments tried to establish a more flexible interpretation, 
also allowing damages as remedy and widening the very narrow definition of the 
same interest requirement.619 One recent case under that rule was Emerald Supplies 
&ANR / British Airways,620 following the commencement of investigation by the 
European Commission of several airlines in 2006.  The plaintiffs tried to bring a case 
against British Airways for price fixing and market sharing agreements on their own 
behalf as well as on behalf of other direct or indirect purchasers of air freight services. 
The court ruled that as the interests of those parties that should be represented could 
not be considered to be in line, the case could not be brought under rule 19.6 CPR.621
However, the court pointed to the GLO procedure as alternative. 
However, despite the fact that this mechanism has been in existence for over 100 
years and several attempts were made to apply this rule and to make it more flexible 
with regard to the two requirements, the representative rule nevertheless has not been 
used to any significant extent, mainly because of the generally strict interpretation of 
the requirements, especially the requirement of the same interest.622
1.1.2 Group Litigation Orders  
The group litigation mechanism in the UK that attracted the most interest in the 
literature and debate concerned with group litigation mechanisms, is the so called 
Group Litigation Order (GLO). The GLO was introduced in 2000 and is regulated in 
the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 19.10 – 19.15. It was part of a general reform of the 
Civil Procedure under Lord Woolf and heavily relies on general principles established 
at that time for all types of civil litigation.623 The perceived inefficiencies with regard 
                                                
618 This interpretation was established in judgements rendered as early as 1901 and 1919. SeeIbidem34. 
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to case management that the other existing forms of bundling similar interests into one 
proceeding (test cases, consolidation and actions under the representative rule) 
exhibited especially in cases with many plaintiffs, lead to the need for an efficient 
mechanisms to deal with large scale multiparty litigation.624
The main feature of this system is that it is to be understood as a case management 
procedure, intended to provide an efficient mechanism to manage multiple individual 
claims, rather than a new form of civil procedure. Judges facing multi party claims 
already were applying similar mechanisms.625 In the general reform of Civil 
Proceeding, the judge was sought to become an actively involved case manager, to 
allow for a (cost) efficient and just dealing with cases. Saving expenses and a dealing 
with cases in a way that is proportionate to (amongst others) the amount of money 
involved were explicitly laid down as explanation for a just dealing with cases in CPR 
1.1(2).
Each plaintiff must still file its own claim, which is connected to a fee.626 When a 
GLO is established, these claims have to be entered into a group register, established 
for that GLO (CPR 19.11). The court may determine, upon application or on its own 
initiative, whether GLO procedure will be applied, when a number of claims giving 
“rise to common or related issues of fact or law” (CPR 19.10) exist or are presumed to 
exist. In an application for a GLO procedure, a summary of the nature of litigation, 
the number of claims already filed and the likely number of parties involved, the 
common issues of fact and law likely to arise and whether subgroups with regard to 
any matters may exist must be provided.627
A GLO must fulfil a number of requirements to be certified.628 The two most 
important ones are: numerosity of claims and commonality of interests (CPR 19.10. 
and 19.11). CPR 19.11 states that a GLO may be ordered “where there are or are 
                                                
624 Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 
Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions, 2008, 28. 
625 Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 2 f. 
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627 Practice Direction 19 B - Group Litigation, 3.2. 
628 See Mulheron, "Reform of collective redress in England and Wales," CIVIL JUSTICE 
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likely to be a number of claims giving rise to the GLO issues”, while CPR 19.19 
defines GLO issues as “common or related issues of fact or law”. Predominance of 
common over individual issues is not a formal requirement, however, sometimes a de 
facto predominance test has been applied when determining the effective approach to 
deal with certain cases.629 Next to these requirements, the GLO procedure has to 
follow the general principles of civil procedure, which would demand suitability of 
the GLO procedure as a way to deal justly with cases (CPR 1.1 (1)) and superiority 
over other litigation mechanisms (Practice Directive 19 B – Group Litigation, 2.3). 
Also, the GLO must be permitted, after consultation, by the Lord Chief Justice 
(Queen’s Bench Division), the Vice Chancellor (Chancellor Division) or the Head of 
Civil Justice (Country Court) (PD 19 B 3.3). In the Order, directions for the 
establishment of a register must be made, a court must be selected and also the GLO 
issues to identify claims that are to be treated under the GLO have to be specified 
(CPR 19.11 (2)).  
The mechanisms to establish the group of represented seems to be one that lies 
somewhere between test case and opt-in procedures. Claimants that are or whish to be 
represented in the GLO procedure need to be entered into the register established 
through the GLO. As lawyers are not generally prohibited from advertising, it is 
possible for them to inform and seek out potential group members to be 
represented.630 Therefore, also lawyers may be the actual initiators and actors in the 
GLO. However, extensive advertising by lawyers can also have negative effects, as it 
may find courts disapproval and possibly some of the costs incurred might be 
considered as unreasonable and unnecessary.631
The court can specify the details to be given in the statement necessary in order for a 
plaintiff to be entered into the register. This may require plaintiffs to file their own 
proceedings with all the costs involved, but the court may also exempt plaintiffs from 
any costs and just allow them to enter the register.632 It is also possible that, in order to 
verify the plaintiffs’ right to join the GLO, the court orders that special evidence or 
                                                
629Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 17 and 22. 
630Ibidem, 14. 
631 Mulheron, Reform of collective redress in England and Wales, 2008, 27 
632 Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 18. 
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documentation to be provided upon application.633 Cut off dates for the entry can also 
be given, after which claims can only be added with special permission (CPR 19.13. 
(e)). However, plaintiffs can also opt-out by applying for a removal of their claim 
from the group register (CPR 19.14). 
The judge’s discretionary power in effectively managing the case also extends to the 
determination of the lawyer(s) to represent the GLO issues (CPR 19.13). In practice, it 
seems, the lawyers tended to come to an agreement amongst themselves, possibly 
mediated by the Law Society (bar association), on which lawyer or which group of 
lawyers will represent the GLO issues in court.  
The court can also decide that one or more claims of the group have to proceed as test 
cases ( CPR19.13. (b)). It seems that this approach has been widely used, especially in 
product liability cases.634 This system then mirrors the classical test case procedure, as 
defined here. 
Whether the GLO is conducted as test case or not, any judgment or order given binds 
all members of the group and the judge may also decide upon the binding effects for 
future claims that will be entered in the register (CPR 19.12 (1)).  
The court can not estimate an aggregate amount of damages.635 Each plaintiff has to 
prove his or her damages individually and these issues have to be decided upon on an 
individual basis, so that only in settlement agreements, a lump sum payment to be 
divided between the group members may be possible.  
One particular feature of the civil proceedings that should also be mentioned is, that a 
viability test, some form of cost-benefit weighing, evolved especially in the group 
litigation and has also been introduced in the CPR, which asks courts to consider 
whether the costs of taking a certain steps will be justified by the resulting benefits 
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(CPR 1.4(h)). This, however, does not seem to be a strict weighing of costs of 
litigation against the damage awards, as the application in cases shows. 636
1.1.3 Actions for damages before the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
In addition, any person who has suffered loss as a result of an infringement may 
institute a claim for damages before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), when 
an infringement of competition law has been found by the European Commission, the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) or the CAT (Competition Act 1998 (CA), s47A & B). 
1.1.3.1 Individual actions for damages before CAT 
The restriction of private actions for damages before the CAT to only follow-on 
actions was introduced in the Enterprise Act 2002, which became active in 2003. In 
the 5 years after that provision, a total of only 8 follow-on actions for damages had 
been commenced  (one by the designated consumer association Which?, which will be 
discussed below), although the sum of OFT and European Commission decisions was 
much larger (15 infringements finally established by the OFT (or CAT) alone in the 
years 2003-2006).637
The filing of such a damage claim before the CAT requires the plaintiff also to 
include in the claim form a “concise statement of the relevant facts” (CAT R 32 (3) 
(a)) and calculation and proof of the harm caused. Such “front-loading” has been 
considered as barrier to filing claims on an individual basis as well as claims brought 
by consumer associations.638
                                                
636 In the GLO case Judge Macduff, Dawson & Others v. First Choice Holidays & Flights Limited
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637 Mulheron, Reform of collective redress in England and Wales, 50 ff. 
638 See the discussion of the case brought by the consumer body Which? discussed below. 
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1.1.3.2 Follow-on representative action  
In several areas of law, the UK introduced the possibility for designated bodies to 
bring representative actions. For example, in the area of misleading advertising, unfair 
terms in consumer contracts, and consumer law, designated bodies may bring actions 
for injunctions or enforcement orders against infringers. Typically, the available 
remedy is restricted to injunctions or enforcement orders, which order the defendant 
to cease a certain conduct. In the area of consumer protection, the representative 
action may be brought to enforce a certain consumer protection regulation, so that the 
remedy typically is an injunction. 639 There are only few exemptions, the most 
important of which for our purposes is the follow-on representative action in the area 
of competition law. 
The Enterprise Act 2002 introduced two possibilities for initiatives due to competition 
law infringements. The first was the so called “super-complaint” (see Enterprise Act 
2002), under which a designated consumer body may bring a complaint to the OFT, to 
which the OFT must respond within 90 days.  
The second, and important one, was a special procedure for actions for damages due 
to competition law infringements, which has come into force in 2003 in Section 47B 
of the Competition Act 1998 (CA). Under this regime, an ex ante specified body may 
bring representative actions on behalf of two or more harmed consumers. Harm 
caused to a business is not covered by that provision.   
Also this representative action before the CAT is limited to follow-on actions, as an 
anti-competitive infringement must be established prior to the proceeding (CA s 47 A 
(5)). This establishment can only be done by public authorities, such as the OFT, the 
CAT or the European Commission.   
The associations applying for specification need to meet a number of criteria, 
including impartiality, integrity, independence and proof that they act in the interest of 
                                                
639 See Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 26 and elsewhere. 
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the consumers.640 The Secretary of State decides over specification. As the only (until 
2009) specified body was the consumer organisation Which?, designated in 2005, the 
mechanism was de facto only available since 2005.  
Represented parties have to give their explicit consent in order to be represented in the 
proceeding. The commencement for such a proceeding requires the filing of the 
claims on behalf of the consumers by the designated body according to the general 
rules (CAT R 32)641, and in addition the names and addresses of those represented, 
their written consent to being represented and clarification whether all named 
individuals are consumers within the purpose of section 47B of the Competition Act 
1998 (CAT R 33). 
Damages are awarded on an individual basis, unless the designated body and all 
individual represented are in agreement, that the total be paid to the designated body, 
which then will take on the task of distribution. 642
While the individuals represented are protected against an adverse cost ruling in case 
the claims would be unsuccessful, as these can not be enforced against them 
(Enterprise Act 2002, 4, cl. 7) the designated body to bring such an action faces the 
risk having to bear the defendants costs under the British cost rule that is applied. 
Also the CAT R define a “justly” dealing with cases, mirroring the general CPR, as, 
amongst others, dealing with a case in ways which are proportionate to the amount of 
money involved (CAT R 44 (2) (c))  and saving expenses (CAT R 44 (2) (b)). 
Therefore, also the CAT may apply a certain viability test. 
The experience in the one case brought under this procedure showed that the filing of 
such a claim is connected to substantial upfront efforts by the designated bodies, as 
the claim forms have to state succinct statements of the facts and legal issues of the 
case, as well as the amount of damages sued for. All these statements have to be 
                                                
640 Secretary of State, Claims of behalf of consumers, guidance for prospective specified 
bodieshttp://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file11957.pdf. 
641 See  The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules. (2003). Available at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/20031372.htm. 
642Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 10. 
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supported by documents, which also have to be added to the claim form. This 
approach to representative action can be considered an opt-in solution connected to 
substantial front-loading.643
1.2 Other relevant issues  
1.2.1 Rules on Damages 
In principle, it seems, the UK also follows the common concept of compensation of 
actual harm caused in cases of actions for damages. As opposed to many civil law 
Member States, however, the UK is familiar with exemplary or punitive damages. 
The general rules on damages restrict the application of punitive or exemplary 
damage awards to very specific circumstances, for example when the defendant aimed 
at making a profit that exceeds the generally recoverable damage amount by the 
plaintiff.644 This requirement could be fulfilled in a number of cases of antitrust 
infringements. However, there seems to be no established case law yet on whether 
exemplary damages can be generally awarded in damages actions due to breach of 
either national competition law or European competition law.645 It seems that at least 
in follow-on cases, exemplary damages may not be available. In the Devenish case, 
where a number of direct purchasers of the vitamin cartels filed claims for damages 
after the European Commission had already imposed a fine on the defendants, the 
High Court restricted the availability of exemplary damages to stand-alone cases. 646
The court reasoned that, based on the ne bis in idem principle, exemplary damages 
could not be awarded in cases where the defendants already were subject to a fine 
with regard to the same conduct.647
                                                
643 See the discussion of the case brought by the consumer association Which? below.  
644 See The Law Commission, Sixth Programme of Law Reform: Damages, LAW COM No.247, 1997,
1. Available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc247.pdf.  
645Simmons, "Damages for economic loss: Questions of procedure," COMPETITION APPEALS 
TRIBUNAL(2007), 17. Availabe at: 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/colloques_activites_formation_4/2007_2254/economic_loss_10397.htm
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646 High Court of England and Wales, Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others 
[2007] EWHC 2394 (2008). 
647 The judgment was upheld by theEngland and Wales Court of Appeal (UK), Devenish Nutrition Ltd 
v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others [2008] EWCA Civ 1086; [2008] WLR (D) 317 (2008). 
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In the same ruling, the court established that in antitrust cases restitutionary awards 
would not be available and that damage awards based on the illegal gain of the 
infringer would generally be only appropriate where compensatory damages would 
not be the adequate remedy for the claimants.648 It seems that this point touched upon 
the issue of passing-on, as the claimant may have passed part of the excessive prices 
on to its purchasers, so that restitutionary damages may have made the claimant in 
fact better off than he would have been absent the competition law infringement. 
However, the Court of Appeal did not want to address the passing-on defence 
explicitly.649
Aggregate damage awards are also not available, yet. As is common also in civil law 
countries, for example Germany, the individual damages have to be assessed and 
proven. The Civil Justice Council has, however, made arguments for the introduction 
of aggregate damages in group litigation proceedings as part of its reform proposal 
concerning access to justice.650
1.2.2 Costs, Fees and Cost-shifting Rules 
The general provision on cost shifting in the UK is the loser pays principle (the so 
called British, Continental or European Rule). This rule is also applied in the case of a 
consumer association under the representative follow-on action, but is not enforceable 
against the individuals represented in that proceeding. Cost recoveries, however, are 
made dependant on reasonableness.651
In the GLO, the cost shifting rule also applies to the plaintiffs that entered the register. 
The costs there are divided into individual and generic costs, the latter are born by 
agreement by the group jointly and typically also include the costs of a test case.652
Potential plaintiffs therefore face the risk of having to bear the defendants litigation 
                                                
648 Mcdougall and Verzariu, "Vitamins Litigation: Unavailability of Exemplary Damages, 
Restitutionary Damages and Account of Profits in Private Competition Law Claims," EUROPEAN
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Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others [2007] EWHC 2394
649 Ibidem, nr 91. 
650 Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 
Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions165. 
651 Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 28 f. 
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costs, when the case is lost, while having possibly very limited influence on the 
proceeding itself. 
It is necessary to guarantee the possible payment of defendants costs in case of an 
adverse judgment, so that it is required from plaintiffs for any type of litigation to 
acquire an after the event insurance (ATE insurance), when Legal Expense Insurance 
(LEI), also called Before-the-Event Insurance, is not obtainable.653 As LEIs may not 
cover tort cases, have limit or group litigation, getting ATE insurance may be 
necessary especially on group litigation. However, applying for such insurance in a 
group litigation mechanism may also be extremely costly and complex. Insurers are 
likely to require a detailed risk assessment of the case, which in a group litigation may 
sometimes be a very complex task. Insurance premiums for ATE insurance seem 
often to be larger than reasonable in group litigation,654 and as only a reasonable 
premium may be recovered from unsuccessful defendants, the prospective plaintiffs 
will face additional costs.  
Contingency fees as in the US are not available in England. However, conditional fee 
arrangements are possible, regulated in The Conditional Fee Arrangements 
Regulations (CFAR)655 and the Conditional Fee Arrangements Orders (CFAO).656
These agreements consist of a no-win-no-fee arrangement, coupled with the 
possibility to increase lawyers’ fees up to 100  percent in case of a success (CFAO 
2000).  Just as with the cost-shifting of reasonable costs in general, the court will 
decide, what percentage increase is considered reasonable and therefore 
recoverable.657
Further different mechanisms to finance litigation exist.  Legal aid is available and 
relatively well funded.658 The Legal Services Commission (LSC) provides funds for 
                                                                                                                               
652 Ibidem, 19 f.  
653 Ibidem, 22 and 26 f. 
654 Ibidem, 28. 
655 Conditional Fee Arrangements Regulations (2000). Available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2000/20000692.htm 
656 Conditional Fee Arrangements Order. (2000).Available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2000/20000823.htm 
657 Cumming, Civil Procedure Used for Enforcement of EC Competition Law by the English, French 
and German Civil Courts, 60 ff. 
658 See European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), "European JudicialSystems 2002, 
Facts and figures on the basis of a survey conducted in 40 Council of Europe Member States," (2002), 
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high cost litigation, but the annual budget for such expenditures is capped (at 
currently £ 3 million).659 Three criteria should be met in order to qualify for such legal 
aid: a public interest in the case, it must be affordable and the case must exhibit 
sufficient merits.660 Applying for such funding therefore seems to entail a certain level 
of efforts to be devoted to providing the LSC with adequate and sufficient material to 
apply these tests. Generally, the LSC considered funding common interest litigation 
over individual litigation, as the latter can be financed through LEIs.661 Overall, the 
legal aid system is much more predominant in the UK, compared to Germany.662
However, the strong reliance on legal aid may not come without problems and costs, 
especially in group litigation cases.663 Also, the industry of professional litigation 
funders is developing in the UK, as in many other European jurisdictions as well.664
The Judge in a GLO also has the discretionary power to review, upon objection of a 
party, and to cap costs when necessary, with the effect that a maximum amount of 
recoverable costs is established.665 While this may help to avoid unnecessary spending 
of the parties, it also increases the uncertainty of plaintiff’s lawyers, concerning their 
remuneration for their efforts and litigation expenditure in general. 
1.2.3 Passing-on defence 
The concept of a passing-on defence is a matter of discussion in the UK, as it is in 
Germany and other European Member States. In the UK, it also depends also whether 
the damages to be sued for due to competition law infringements are considered to be 
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based on the right of restitution, under which a passing-on defence would not be 
possible.666 The OFT, in its discussion paper concerning private actions for damages 
in competition cases argued, that representative actions should also be available on 
behalf of consumers.667
So far, no judgment has been rendered concerning the issue.668 The issue was raised in 
the case BCL OLD Co and others v Aventis SA and others before the CAT and 
mentioned as a “novel and important issue”.669 However, the case settled before the 
CAT could rule on these issues. 
1.2.4 Disclosure Rules 
The UK has, compared to other European countries, wider disclosure provisions.670
Also compared to the US disclosure mechanisms, the CPR provide for a more 
encompassing obligation to list all relevant information the party is aware off, 
including information in the hands of third parties (CPR 31.10(9); 43 (2)) or such 
information that may adversely affect the parties own case (CPR  31.6). Within the 
process of litigation, the discovery process, relevant documents on which the parties 
intend to rely on have to be listed and to be disclosed upon request of the opposing 
party, unless the opposing party has legal rights or duties to refuse the disclosure 
(CPR 31.3 (1)).
Pre-action disclosure orders can also be given by the court on application of a 
prospective party to the proceeding, when a number of requirements are met (CPR 
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31.16). The requirements include the desirability of such advance disclosure to 
dispose of the proceeding or to save on costs. However, in the order, the court must 
specify the documents or group of documents to be disclosed (CPR 31.16.(4)). 
De facto, the scope of disclosure is often determined in negotiation processes between 
the opposing parties, in so called preliminary meetings.671 Because this may be a 
disadvantage for one party when large information asymmetries exist, as may often be 
the case in competition law cases, the judge in CAT procedures is supposed to take a 
more proactive approach in the preliminary stage to ensure a better balance of powers 
of the opposing parties.672
1.2.5 The Role of Judges 
Especially since the reform of Civil Procedure, the judge is expected to play an active, 
interventionist, managerial role in a civil proceeding. Special re-education of judges 
and lawyers has taken place and the approach seems to have been widely accepted.673
As such, the judge has much more influence on the way the proceeding is conducted 
than its US American counterpart. Thereby, the more actively involved judge may 
also have some more possibilities to potentially curb problems occurring in group 
litigation, for example due to principal-agent problems.  
2 Deterrence effects 
In this section, some observations made concerning the deterrence effects of group 
litigation mechanisms in the UK will be discussed, concentrating on the two most 
relevant and most discussed features, the GLO and the representative follow-on 
actions in the area of competition law.  Overall, the number of UK and European 
competition law litigation cases solved in court in the UK since 1970 seems to have 
                                                
671 Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 355 f. 
672 CAT R 20 (1) 
673 Hodges, Country Report: England and Wales, 12. 
Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 259
been not more than 90. However this figure may leave out a larger number of 
settlements.674
2.1 Group Litigation Order in general 
The GLO procedure is a case management tool and remains closer to joinder 
procedure (or test case procedure) than to a collective opt-in collection, as claims will 
remain intact and only during proceeding be (partially) be treated in aggregate. It is 
questionable, if this mechanism helped to bring forward claims, that otherwise would 
not have been brought. While even proponents of the GLO state that some issues still 
remain to be solved,675 critical voices brought forward a number of facts and 
discussion points, that severely question the efficiency of the GLO mechanism in its 
current form.  
One crucial point of criticism is the opt-in approach.676 Opt-in rates reported in a 
survey showed that the rates of the 97 cases dealt with in one form of group 
proceeding or another,677 varied enormously (between less than one and up to 90 
percent) and only achieve an average of 50  percent.678 The major reasons given in 
that survey for low opt-in rates were the large number of potential group members to 
be identified at the outset of the action, the low expected damage recovery per 
individual and the existence of actual or merely perceived barriers to opting-in by 
individuals, such as economic or social reasons, such as having to bear also a share of 
the common costs on top of the individual costs, having too small individual damages, 
assuming better outcomes in individual trials or are sceptical towards the “class 
action” process or the other class members.679 Also for some exemplary cases found in 
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European Member States, the found participation rate was established as being less 
than one percent.680
Low opt-in rates can have a number of adverse effects. In case the court applies a 
stricter cost-benefit analysis early on in the proceeding, when not all potential group 
members have opted in yet, the costs of the proceedings could be found as not being 
justified by the total of damages to be recovered.681 As has been discussed in Chapter 
3, low opt-in rates of harmed parties also lead to inefficient proceedings and/or too 
little sanctions for reaching optimal deterrence. 
Another crucial aspect which could render the procedure inefficient is the question 
how such litigation can be financed. It is recognised by critics and proponents of the 
GLO alike, that the funding issue still needs to be solved or at least improved.682 As 
described above, the insurance system is a complex one in the UK and insurance for 
group proceedings may be difficult and/or costly to obtain. Also, applying for Legal 
Aid via the LSC can take a lot of time and resources and still not be granted at the 
end, which could create disincentives to start proceedings. Lack of funding, however, 
will always severely inhibit the efficiency of a group litigation mechanism, and 
thereby reduce deterrence effects of available civil litigation procedures. 
The applied cost shifting rule of loser pays may help to reduce the amount of 
unmeritous claims being brought, as plaintiffs face the risk of having to pay 
defendants litigation costs. However, some experience in the UK shows that cases 
with little or no merits are still brought. Especially in product liability cases, plaintiffs 
seem to have lost in most cases and only few cases were settled. Commentators 
claimed that defendants went to trial in these cases because of the strong belief that 
the cases brought against them had little or no merits.683 Another case commentators 
and the court judged as speculative was a GLO run by lawyers as the first GLO under 
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a contingency fee arrangement, in the course of Tobacco litigations.684 While only 
anecdotal evidence, such cases at least highlight the remaining possibility of abuse. 
Settlements are not subject to judge’s supervision. This increases the risk that 
settlement agreements may fall short of the optimal amount necessary to influence 
(potential) defendant’s behaviour. Especially, as the individual in the GLO may have 
very little influence on the proceeding, despite the fact of having enough interest to 
file a claim or at least go through the procedure of applying for entry into the GLO 
register. As has been stated, full information of individuals represented in the GLO, 
which would be necessary in order to exert control, may be desirable, but might be 
“simply not compatible with efficient management and resolution of a case within 
sensible price constraints”685. It is therefore likely that these procedures are more 
under the control of the selected lawyers, than that of the individuals. That is 
particularly likely to be the case, when the GLO is continued as test case procedure. 
This entails the risk of all the consequences discussed above.686
The great flexibility and discretionary power that is given to judges in general and 
particularly in the GLO may allow courts in multi-party cases to apply the most 
appropriate management mechanism on a case by case basis, however it also 
introduces a great element of uncertainty for actual and potential parties involved.  
Lawyers may not have sufficient incentives to bring cases, where the actual costs of 
filing and trying the case are large. First, there is a risk that these costs may be 
considered unreasonable by the judge at one point and the recoverable fees could be 
reduced to a certain amount. Second, the conditional fee, capped at a maximum of a 
100 percent success fee, may not achieve sufficient incentives to take on such high 
cost and high risk tasks.687 That is all the more true, when lawyers should also be 
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incentivised to discover breaches of competition law and therefore be the actual 
enforcement agent.688
All of these effects reduce the efficiency of the GLO with regard to deterrence. And 
indeed, commentators concluded that the GLO procedure had no influence on 
defendants conduct.689 It is not surprising, that reform proposals are being discussed.  
As far as actual experience is concerned, the theoretical effects may be supported by 
empirical findings. From 2000 until 2009, there have been a total of 70 group 
proceedings registered as GLO.690 Of the first 62 cases, the largest part of claims dealt 
with issues of care home or child abuses and the next largest part with environmental 
issues.691 The total number of multi-party cases brought has gone down constantly and 
considerably, which is claimed to be an effect of increased public investigations in the 
beginning, especially in the area of care home or child abuses.692 Similar 
developments can be seen in the number of GLO’s. While in 2001 and 2002, 18 and 
11 cases were brought, respectively, the numbers declined to 6.75 cases per year in 
the following years, and there were only 4 cases in 2007 and 3 in 2008.693
2.2 Actions for damages due to competition law infringements 
As has been mentioned above, and also noted by the OFT, consumer compensation in 
cases of breaches of competition law has been extremely limited so far, despite the 
legal possibilities to obtain damages. Consumers had, according to the OFT, obtained 
“virtually no redress”.694 The actual deterrence effect of these avenues to sue for 
damages is consequently likely to be only very limited as well. Indeed, surveys 
conducted in an attempt to estimate the deterrence effect of the OFTs enforcement 
activities revealed that private actions for damages are still seen as relatively 
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irrelevant regarding their influence on companies conduct.695 These studies conducted 
for a report for the OFT in 2007, which used questionnaires send to companies, 
showed a lack of interest of harmed companies to bring damages claims despite the 
legal possibilities to do so. Amongst the reasons for not bringing an action despite 
being harmed by anti-competitive conduct were the bad expected cost/damage award 
ratio, the time to be spend on litigation, the importance of the business relationship 
with the potential defendants, lack of sufficient evidence and that there were no prior 
decisions by the OFT for commencing a follow-on action.696
Follow-on representative actions have been used only once by the only designated 
body so far, the consumer organisation Which?, in the case of the football T-shirt 
price fixing of manufacturers and distributors.697 Which? had originally asked for 
exemplary damages. However, the ruling by the High Court in 2007 stated that 
exemplary damages can not be recovered, when the defendant has already been fined 
by a public body and that restitutionary damages can not be granted in competition 
law cases.698 This put the case at serious risk, greatly diminishing the value of the 
case. Although the potential group of represented encompassed thousands of 
consumers of these T-Shirts, and Which? launched considerable media campaigns, the 
number of harmed individuals that opted-in was very low (in the end only 144 
consumers were named in the action). The small number of participating consumers, 
coupled with the ban on exemplary and restitutionary damages and the low value of 
individual damages (about £ 20 each) would have run the risk of making the case fail 
the viability test if continued in court. Ultimately, the case was settled between the 
parties though an agreement that the defendants would reimburse the named 
consumers in the representative action and offer other victims a free mug or T-Shirt or 
optionally £ 10, upon proof of a purchase of one of the T-Shirts in question in one of 
their stores.  After this case, Which? publicly announced that it was not to bring any 
more actions of this kind in the future.699
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As this case may demonstrate, problems with the representative follow-on procedure 
are connected to the limitations of the opt-in feature and the important problem of 
funding and risk bearing. Though only one proceeding has taken place, it can be 
assumed that the opt-in limitations experienced in the GLO may also apply to the 
representative follow-on action. Under both procedures, identifying and gathering 
potential plaintiffs prior to or early on in the process of filing the claim are costly and 
time consuming exercises. A potential viability test or cost capping orders by the 
judge could have a great influence on the selection of cases brought under both 
regimes, so that cases with small individual damages might not be brought. 
Under the representative follow-on action, the designated body bears the risks and 
costs of such an action. When such designated bodies are charity organisations and 
dependant on donations, the funds available for such (potentially extremely costly) 
actions are extremely limited. Under the GLO, application for necessary insurance for 
litigation may be de facto unavailable. 
The lack of exemplary or punitive damages in these proceedings further decreases the 
deterrence effect, when the total of damages sued for are less than the actual damages 
caused and the fines imposed in the prior public proceeding are not large enough to 
cover the remainder of the optimal sanction.  
The restriction for competition law infringement cases brought before the CAT to 
follow-on cases reduces the potential for deterrence effects of private actions for 
damages. The same is true for the restriction of representative actions to consumer 
protection cases, which exempts a number of harmed parties, such as small or medium 
enterprises or any consumer in a business relationship with the defendant(s).  
Overall, the experience in the UK seems to have been that the currently available 
mechanisms of group litigation are still far from achieving the goals they were set up 
to meet. The OFT recommended already in 2007 that representative bodies should 
also be allowed to bring stand-alone cases on behalf of consumers as well as 
                                                                                                                               
699 Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 
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business.700 Moreover, it also suggested that the opt-in regulation could be broadened 
to allow judges also to pursue a trial on an opt-out basis, where it is deemed 
appropriate.701 The above mentioned findings on the efficiency of private competition 
law enforcement with regard to its deterrence effects support such calls for changes. 
Recent discussions and reform proposals therefore aim at widening the scope of 
existing group litigation procedures and at introducing new procedures, in particular 
opt-out mechanisms, mechanisms to include business in representative actions and the 
possibility for aggregate damage awards.702
C Germany
As opposed to the assessment of the Ashurst study703, several commentators stated 
that private enforcement of competition law had already been heavily used even 
before the German competition law (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen,
GWB) 704 had been reformed in 2005. Basing their assessment on the statistics 
collected by the German FCA, they report that in the time between 2002 and 2006 
about 900 cases where registered dealing with violations of antitrust law.705 While this 
has been seen as proof that private enforcement is already sufficiently developed, it 
has to be noted that these cases where typically cases brought by firms due to vertical 
agreements, abusive practices or discrimination against dependent companies, while 
hard-core cartels where not often alleged.706 Taking into account issues like the 
problems connected to the treatment of the passing-on defence before (and after) the 
                                                
700 Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, Recommendations by the Office of Fair Traiding 
04.10.2009, 12. http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916resp.pdf 
701 Ibidem, 26 f. 
702 See Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective 
Actions", Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions ; Mulheron, 
Reform of collective redress in England and Wales.
703 Waelbroeck, Study on the Conditions for Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC 
Competition Rules: Comparative Report, Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, Ashurst Study for 
Directorate General Competition of the EU Commission, London, England.
704 The analysis of the German competition law will be restricted to the law against restrictions of 
competition (GWB), excluding the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, UWG) unless noted otherwise. 
705 Böge, Up and Running, or is it? Private enforcement-the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives 197, 197 ; Bundeskartellamt, Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, Stand, Probleme, 
Perspektiven - Diskussionspapier, 4. Available  at: 
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706 Ibidem,  4. 
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reform,707 it is unlikely that this amount of litigation reached the full potential even the 
old regulations would have provided for. The detailed assessment of the efficiency of 
the now existing regulations will be done below.  
1 The legal system 
1.1 Test case procedures (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz) 
Though not applicable in cases of competition law infringements today, the test case 
procedure in the area of capital market litigation (KapMuG) that came into force 2005 
should be mentioned here as well for three reasons. First, because the test case 
procedure under the KapMuG is the most innovative approach to collective actions in 
Germany at the moment.708 Second, the legislator provided this mechanism in order to 
overcome some of the problems that are also relevant for a group litigation 
mechanism in anti-trust cases, such as procedural inefficiency and the problem of 
rational apathy due to a disparity between costs and damages in cases of small and 
dispersed damages.709 The experience with this form of litigation may provide 
valuable insights when contemplating the introduction of this mechanism also in 
competition law. And third, this procedure was designed as an experiment running for 
five years until 2010 and if the experiment is considered to be a success, an 
integration of that procedure into the general rules of civil litigation (ZPO) is 
proposed.710 When that happens, this mechanism would also apply to civil litigation in 
competition law cases.  
The procedure begins with individual actions for performance, including actions for 
damages, filed before the Regional Court (Landgericht), which has jurisdiction in the 
region in which the defendant has his registered office. In these individual claims, also 
a motion for a test case declaration (Musterfeststellungsantrag) has to be filed. In that 
motion, the plaintiff has to describe the legal or factual questions to be answered in 
                                                
707 See the discussion of the passing-on defence issue in Germany below. 
708 For the development and a description seeStürner, "Model case proceedings in the Capital Markets," 
CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 26 (2007): 250. 
709See Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung von 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren, BT-Drucks. 15/5091 (2005). available at 
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the test case declaration and to show that these questions are relevant for other 
similarly suited cases.711 Test case declaration motions are published in a registry, § 
2KapMuG, and the individual procedures are halted, § 3 KapMuG. Once a minimum 
of ten such motions in similarly suited cases are registered in the registry, the 
Regional Court rules upon which questions are to be sent to the Higher Regional 
Court (Oberlandesgericht) to be decided upon in a test case trial, § 4 KapMuG.  
The trial of the test case itself takes place before the Higher Regional Court. Once the 
test case procedure has been published in the register, all cases that may be affected 
by the test case declaratory judgment are halted, irrespective of whether a motion for a 
test case declaratory judgment has been made in the individual trial or not, § 7 Abs. 1 
KapMuG.712 The selection of a test case plaintiff is done by the court, taking into 
account the value of the plaintiffs claims or an agreement amongst the plaintiffs on a 
test plaintiff (§ 8 Abs. 3 KapMuG). The plaintiffs not chosen to be the test case 
plaintiff are included as third party plaintiffs. The ruling is binding on all courts in 
which the individual cases have been filed and will be continued after the declaratory 
judgment in the test case procedure, as far as it is relevant for the ruling of these 
courts, § 7 Abs. 1 KapMuG.  
Once the test case declaration has been issued, the individual trials are continued and 
the individual issues like damages and causation are decided upon. 
As a consequence of the individual claims remaining intact, settlements can only be 
agreed upon concordantly, requiring the consent of every individual plaintiff and 
defendant (§ 14 (3) KapMuG).  
                                                                                                                               
710 Stürner, Model case proceedings in the Capital Markets 250, 265 f. ; Deutscher Bundestag, 
Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses (6. Ausschuss) zu dem Gesetzentwurf der 
Bundesregierung– Drucksache 15/5091,  BT-Drucks. 15/5695,  22. 
711 Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung von 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren, BT-Drucks. 15/5091 20 ff. 
712 However, in a recent decision the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) ruled, that a halting of a procedure 
where no test case motion could have been filed, is not legitimate. It thereby rejected the wide 
interpretation of that rule of the Regional Court, seeBGH, BGH, 16.06.2009, case no XI ZB 33/08.
(2009).
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For the test case procedure, no additional court or lawyers fees arise § 17 KapMuG. 
However, the costs, for example expert fees, are borne jointly and divided between 
the plaintiffs on a pro rata basis (§ 17 KapMuG).  
1.2 Group litigation in competition law 
Germany reformed its competition law (GWB) also to facilitate private damages 
claims. One of the major legal disincentives to bring actions for damages due to 
competition law infringements was abandoned in that reform. The so called principle 
of Schutzgesetzverletzung (breach of a law intended to protect other individual’s 
rights) previously required parties to have incurred harmed caused by the breach of a 
legal rule designed to protect them. In restrictive interpretations by courts, the breach 
of competition law only gave rise to compensation rights, when the infringing act was 
particularly aimed at harming the claimants. With the reform, § 33 Abs, 1 GWB now 
allows for damage claims by competitors or other market participants, as far as they 
are (directly) affected by the infringement.713 Moreover, § 33 Abs. 4 GWB made prior 
decisions by national public competition authorities or the European Commission 
binding for courts in cases of § 33 and § 34 a GWB and thereby facilitated follow-on 
claims for damages or skimming-off procedures.714
All actions brought before the court due to competition law infringements (either 
national or European Competition Law) have to be filed at the general courts for civil 
litigation, the Regional Courts (Landesgerichte), though there dealt with either by 
trade chambers of the court or assigned to a Regional Court determined to be a court 
for competition cases (Kartellgericht).715 As these are courts for civil litigation 
matters, the general rules for civil litigation apply unless some special regulation takes 
precedence. 
                                                
713 The requirement to be directly affected will be discussed below together with the passing-on 
defense. 
714 Though verbally restricted to actions for damages, legal scholars regard the binding effect to also 
apply to representative actions for injunctions. See Halfmeier, Popularklagen im Privatrecht: zugleich 
ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Verbandsklage, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2006), 139. 
715 Bechtold, Kartellgesetz: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: Kommentar, München: CH 
Beck (2008), 614 f. 
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It may be noteworthy, that the German Federal Competition Authority has to be 
informed about all civil litigation concerning competition law infringements, 
including Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty and may decide to participate and get involved in 
civil proceedings (§ 90 GWB).  
1.2.1.1 Joinder, Consolidation and Assignation  
As far as the general rules on civil litigation are applicable, the traditional forms of 
bundling similar interests into one proceeding in Germany are joinder §§ 59 and 60 
ZPO and consolidation procedures §147 ZPO.  Under both mechanisms, each plaintiff 
has to file an individual claim, which may be bundled later on. Even under joinder 
procedures, it is not necessary that the plaintiffs will all use the same legal 
representative and all issues of individual cases will be dealt with and decided upon in 
the joint proceeding. As these procedures have been discussed already above, the 
analysis will focus on other mechanisms to bundle similar claims into one proceeding. 
It would also be possible for a number of claimants to assign their claim to just one 
plaintiff (§ 398 BGB), however, this mechanism has rarely been used.716 One notable 
application of this concept are the cases the Carted Damage Claims company (CDC) 
acquired form victims of cartels, which will be discussed in detail below. 
1.2.1.2 Representative injunction actions  
Representative actions for injunction are possible to be brought by specified 
associations under § 33 Abs. 2 GWB (Unterlassungssanspruch) in cases of breach of 
the GWB or EU competition law. Associations that are granted standing have to foster 
and protect trade issues and to represent firms, that offer “the same or similar products 
or services on the same market” (§ 33 Abs. 2 GWB). Moreover, to have standing, the 
association must have a substantial number of affected firms as members.717 This 
limits standing to associations representing the interests of competitors of an infringer 
and reduces possibilities for other trade associations to become active on behalf of 
                                                
716 Schilken, Der Zweck des Zivilprozesses und der kollektive Rechtsschutz. KOLLEKTIVER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ IM ZIVILPROZESS. ed. Meller-Hannich. Baden-Baden: Nomos (2008), 21, 42.   
717 Ibidem, Bechtold, Kartellgesetz: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: Kommentar, § 33, 303, 
rn16.
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other market participants. The legal literature considers this limitation as an oversight 
on behalf of the legislator.718
Consumer associations, though discussed in the legislative process, were expressively 
not included in the new GWB.719 They also do not fall under the current definition of 
associations which can be granted standing. 
This form of representative action under § 33 GWB has hardly ever been applied, so 
that legal literature and jurisprudence on the topic, as well as conclusive experience 
are lacking. 
1.2.1.3 Representative actions for (restitutionary) damages: Skimming-off procedures 
Associations founded to foster or protect trade and industrial interests can also initiate 
skimming-off actions under § 34a GWB. The competition law infringements causing 
the activity have to be done intentionally and affect a large number of parties (in the 
sense of widely dispersed and scattered damages).720 These widely dispersed effects 
are considered to only exist in cases, where harmed individuals are not expected to 
enforce their own rights on a larger scale.721 As the Federal Competition Authority has 
the same possibilities to employ skimming-off procedures, the standing for 
associations is subsidiary to the activities of the FCA. Only if the latter does not 
pursue that particular infringement is it possible for associations to file such actions.  
The proceeds from the trial flow to the State and do not remain with the association. 
This has been heavily criticised already during the legislative process, as incentives 
for associations to invest resources in such activities can be expected to be of very 
limited nature.722 Also this type of action has not been applied, yet. 
                                                
718 Seeliger, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht. KOLLEKTIVER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ IM ZIVILPROZESS. ed. Meller-Hannich. Baden-Baden: Nomos (2008), 73, 83 ; 
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apply. 
720 Bechtold, Kartellgesetz: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: Kommentar, § 34, rn 3 f, 319 ;  
German Monopolies Commission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle, 
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1.2.1.4 Assignation as special case: The Cartel Damage Claims Company 
Assignation is a possibility to assign claims to another party which then succeeds in 
the rights, which is very common in many civil law countries.723 While this principle 
does not in itself form a real group litigation mechanism, it has been successfully 
applied in Germany recently and shall therefore be discussed here. 
The Cartel Damage Claims Company,724 although a company established under 
Belgian law, shall be discussed here for three reasons. First, the company was (at least 
co-) founded by two German lawyers. Their “circumvention” of the ban on 
contingency fees and the general legality of their approach were strongly debated in 
Germany. Second, their first case was brought against a German cement cartel, 
discovered and fined by the German FCA, in front of a German court. And last, this 
case is greatly influencing the development of private antitrust litigation in Germany, 
as it raised many relevant questions that at least have to be ruled on now, establishing 
new case law. 
In 2005, the Cartel Damage Claims company was founded under Belgian law, with 
the company statutes of enforcing damages claims due to competition law 
infringements. The company acquired the damage claims of 29 companies harmed by 
a German cement cartel, which had been investigated and fined by the  FCA earlier on 
and claimed the damages before the court in Düsseldorf, Germany on its own behalf. 
This approach was heavily discussed and sometimes its legality disputed in the 
literature and the print media, sometimes viewed as a way to circumvent the ban on 
contingency fees and collective actions in Germany.725 However, the court ruled in 
2007 that that claim was admissible, as the CDC had become the owner of the claims 
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in accordance with § 398 BGB.726 This ruling was upheld by the German Federal 
Court of Justice in 2009.727 The case still continues. 
Since then, the CDC became active in further cases. In March 2009, CDC filed an 
action for damages, again in Germany, due to a European hydrogen peroxide cartel, 
which had been investigated and fined by the European Commission.728 This time, 32 
companies harmed by the cartel assigned their claims to CDC, which consequently 
filed the claims on its own behalf. 
The CDC acquires the claims as valuable property from the original right holders 
against a certain amount that could be a percentage of the discovery. As a financing 
option, the CDC uses their earnings from past cases to pre-finance future litigations, 
but also uses external professional litigation founders and investors.729 Thereby, the 
CDC bears the risks and costs of litigation and not the original claim holders. As a 
return on investment, the CDC keeps a percentage of the damages awarded. This 
indeed resembles the contingency fee arrangement known in the US and, until 
recently, strictly banned in Germany. It is now only available in very specific 
circumstances.730
1.3 Other relevant issues 
1.3.1 Rules on Damages 
Exemplary or punitive damages, as well as damages multipliers, like double damages, 
have been discussed,731 but have never found their way into regulation. In general, 
damages are only awarded up to the degree of actual harm suffered, according to the 
so called Differenzhypothese. The principle of Differenzhypothese refers to the 
assessment of damages on basis of a comparison of the current state the victim (or the 
victim’s wealth) is in and the state the victim (or the victim’s wealth) would have 
                                                
726 LG Düsseldorf, 21.2.2007 - 34 O (Kart) 14705 (2007), 847-849. 
727 BGH, BGH, Beschluss vom 7. April 2009 – KZR 42/08 (2009) 
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730 The change in the ban on contingency fees will be discussed below. 
731 Supporting double damages:German Monopolies Commission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in 
der Siebten GWB-Novelle, Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß, § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB
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been in, had the damaging event never happened. This form of assessment of damages 
consequently includes also interest or lost profit.  
Interest on the damages is generally available and granted from the date where the 
damage occurred, § 33 Abs. 3 GWB. The amount of interest is calculated according to 
the general rules of laid down in § 288 and 289 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetz Buch, BGB). 
Due to the difficulties in assessing the amount of the damages, § 33 Abs. 3 GWB 
allows the estimation of the damages incurred by a plaintiff, also on the basis of the 
illegal profit the defendant gained as a result of the infringement. The latter amount is 
then presumed to equal the damages incurred by the opposing party, but this 
presumption can be disputed. Overall, the plaintiff might only have to provide an 
estimate of damages, for example a certain range with a minimum amount.732
However, the plaintiff does not have a free choice between the methods of estimation, 
rather, the illegal gain is one possibility to estimate damages in cases, where other 
mechanisms fail or are too difficult.733
1.3.2 Costs, Fees and Cost-shifting Rules 
Court fees as well as lawyers’ (hourly) fees in Germany are strictly regulated, for 
example lawyers fees are determined according to the German Statute on Attorneys 
fees (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetzes ,RVG). These fees increase with the value of 
the claim (Streitwert) in each case, but on a decreasing scale. This may give lawyers 
an incentive to avoid, whenever possible, a bundling of similar interests in one case, 
where the value of the claims would then be aggregated, as the sum of fees assessed 
on the individual value would be larger than the fee assessed on bases of the aggregate 
value.734 Freedom of contract does allow lawyers and clients to agree to larger 
payments. However, these agreed fees are not subject to the cost-shifting rule, so that 
the plaintiff will have to pay these additional sums in any case from his own expenses, 
                                                
732 Mühlbach and Rinne, Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation THE 2009 EUROPEAN ANTITRUST 
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733 Bechtold, Kartellgesetz: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: Kommentar, § 33, rn 28. 
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even if he wins. However, when plaintiffs are using legal insurance to finance their 
litigation, the regulated fees for lawyers become de facto binding, as insurances will 
only cover these expenses. 
Contingency and conditional fees had been banned in Germany until recently, and 
now are only available in a very restrictive set of circumstances. The Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled in 2006, that a general ban of 
contingency fees was against the Constitution, when it was the only way for an 
aggrieved party to gain access to justice.735 The legislator therefore changed the rules 
of the RVG accordingly in 2008, particularly § 4 a, on contingent fees.736 However, 
the conditional fee arrangement or contingency fee arrangement, can only be agreed 
upon when the financial circumstances of the plaintiff are dire enough to allow such 
an agreement. Nevertheless, other costs, such as court costs or the costs of the 
opposing party in case the trial is lost, remain with the client. Moreover, the lawyer 
may not pre-finance the litigation, § 49 B II (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, BRAO). 
As such, the effect will be different to those arising from the contingency fee 
arrangements in the USA per se. It remains to be seen, if many plaintiffs will fulfil 
these strict requirements in the future and what impact on litigation this new 
regulation can have. 
Germany does, however, have legal aid and legal insurance systems. Legal aid, 
however, seems to be the less favourable alternative, being subject to a stringent test 
of the available means of the applicant, so that it is not very often and not to large 
extents granted.737 The German legal expense insurance market, however, is the 
largest in Europe.738 Legal expense insurance, on the other hand, while significantly 
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736 For a discussion of this new rule and its interpretation seeKilian, "Das Gesetz zur Neuregelung des 
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used,739 does not cover all risks. Given a lack of non-commercial,740 private litigation 
for damages due to competition law in Germany so far, damages actions for breaches 
of competition law may not be explicitly excluded, yet. However, given the large risks 
and uncertainties involved, it seems likely that such risks may not be insurable in 
Germany at reasonable rates.741
The general cost-shifting rule applied in Germany is the so called British or European 
rule, under which the succumbing party has to bear the costs of the proceeding and the 
lawyers’ fees of the opposing party. However, § 89 GWB provides the possibilities 
for parties to apply to the court for a one-way fee reduction in cases on basis of § 33 
or § 34 a GWB, when the financial strain would otherwise be too large. In such a cost 
protection order, the court can diminish the value of the claim for the party requesting 
such an order. Thereby, the court and lawyers fees will be calculated on basis of the 
lower claim value for the party protected by such order. However, if the party subject 
to such a cost protection order prevails at trial, the succumbing party will have to bear 
the court costs and lawyers fees as calculated on basis of the full value of the claim. 
The non-protected party will also remain liable for the costs not recoverable from the 
cost protected opponent even when it prevails.742 Notice, that at least in such cases, 
lawyers will earn more in case the party they represent wins as compared to when 
their party looses at trial, introducing a contingent element into the lawyers’ 
remuneration.  
1.3.3 Passing-on Defence: an open question in Germany 
The passing-on defence was, prior to the reform, sometimes assessed by the court at 
the stage dealing with the accruement of damage. When passing-on was established, 
courts could dismiss the case on the basis that the existence of damages had not been 
                                                
739 Kilian, Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broadening 
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Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 276
proven.743 Other courts and also voices in the legal literature considered the passing-
on of damages as part of the establishment of the amount of harm, at which off-setting 
benefits would have to be taken into account, according to the so called principle of 
Vorteilsausgleich.744
The new regulation unfortunately is not clear on the subject. § 33 Abs. 3 GWB now 
states, that “When a service or product is purchased at too high prices, the damage is 
not already excluded, because the service or product was sold on.”745 This formulation 
has opened the door to further discussions and has not added to legal clarity.746Some 
consider this regulation as an exclusion of a passing-on defence, possibly with the 
necessity to restrict standing to direct purchasers.747 Others argue, the exclusion is 
only directed at a general passing-on defence, used as an argument to deny already the 
rise of damages and thereby the grounds for the claim. The new regulation should 
instead be read as dealing with the burden of proof. While under the general 
assessment of damages (following the Differenzhypothese) the plaintiff has to provide 
proof of the amount of harm he incurred, this new regulation would shift the burden 
of proof with regard to passed-on overcharges on the defendant.748 The passing-on 
defence then could still be applied under the principle of Vorteilsausgleich, taking 
offsetting benefits into account when assessing the amount of damages.749 However, 
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ECONOMICS 2007 (2007): 18, 22 ff. 
747 Bechtold, Kartellgesetz: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: Kommentar, § 33 rn 23, 26 ; 
305 f. ; German Monopolies Commission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-
Novelle, Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß, § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB 35 ; Andrelang, 
"Damages for the Infringement of Art. 81 EC by Cartel Agreements According to sec. 33 (3) GWB The 
Changes of Law Concerning" Protective Law" Requirement and the" Passing-On" Defence," WORLD 
COMPETITION 30 (2007): 573, 583 ff. 
748 Wissenbach, Schadenersatzklagen gegen Kartellmitglieder. BEITRÄGE ZUM 
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT. eds. Tietje, et al. (2006), 21, 21. , ,Böge, Up and 
Running, or is it? Private enforcement-the Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives 197 199. See 
also Bundestag, "Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Arbeit zu dem 
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Drucksache 15/3640, Entwurf eines Siebten Gesetzes zur 
Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, BT-Drucks. 15/5049," BUNDESTAGS-
DRUCKSACHE 15 (2005): 5049, 49. Avaiable at: 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/15/050/1505049.pdf. 
749 Bundeskartellamt, Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven - 
Diskussionspapier, 12 ; Mühlbach, Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation .
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this approach has already been rejected by some commentators in cases of passing-on 
of damages onto third parties in general, as the required direct causal link between the 
harming event (here the cartel prices) and the resulting benefits (the passing-on of 
overcharges) is considered absent.750 It is very interesting that the majority of 
commentators even seem to reject that possibility to apply the Vorteilsausgleichung 
because of the preventative function of tort law, which would be at risk if indirect 
purchasers would not file claims.751
In the preamble, the legislator left the final solution to the case law, but so far no 
judgment has brought clarity regarding this subject.  
1.3.4 Disclosure Rules 
A general discovery process separated from the trial does not exist in Germany and 
suggestions to introduce pre-trial discovery procedures are rejected in the literature.752
As in many civil law countries, claims being filed need to be sufficiently substantiated 
by the plaintiff to allow for a preliminary robustness assessment of the case by the 
judge.753
Discovery of further evidence takes place during the proceeding. Concerning the 
procedural rules on discovery in trial, each party has to present evidence for the facts 
presented. The court may order a party, upon request of the other party, to provide 
certain and specified evidence, § 142 ZPO. Such an order can also be given against 
third parties, which may hold relevant documents. § 422  ZPO states that the opposing 
party has to provide the documents requested by the other party, as long as the rules of 
private law provide the right for such a request. These discovery rights in Germany 
are generally based on substantive law. For example, § 810 BGB states that anyone 
                                                
750 Roth, § 33 GWB. FRANKFURTER KOMMENTAR ZUM KARTELLRECHT. ed. Helmuth. Köln: 
O. Schmidt (2001), nr 145 ff. 
751 Kersting, "Perspectives for Private Enforcement in European Antitrust Law (Perspektiven der 
privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht)," ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WETTBEWERBSRECHT (ZWeR)-
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW-HEFT(2008): 252, 257,  with references.  
752 Böge, Up and Running, or is it? Private enforcement-the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives 197,  202. 
753 Renda, Making antitrust damages actions in the EU more effective. Study in support of the impact 
assessment of the EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions, 348. 
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may request the presentation of a document from another party, if she has a legal 
interest in the document. Though not explicitly regulated, information asymmetry 
should also be taken into consideration. The Federal Supreme Court has stated that the 
party not bearing the burden of proof can be expected to cooperate in clarifying the 
facts.754
1.3.5 The Role of judges 
The judge in a German civil trial takes a much more active approach, than is common 
in the US. It is the judge that questions witnesses and even has certain obligations to 
protect the right of the parties presenting their case before him. Under § 139 ZPO, the 
judge has to discuss the issues of facts and law with the parties, ensure that all 
relevant points are commented on by the parties and may even point out relevant 
facts, which a party may have overlooked.  
Again, as such, the more active civil law judge may be better suited to influence the 
group litigation proceeding than its counterpart in the US. 
2 Deterrence effects 
The discussion of the deterrence effects of the German procedures will focus only on 
the most relevant mechanisms, representative skimming-off procedures, the Cartel 
Damage Claim company model and the test case procedures under KapMuG. 
2.1 Representative skimming-off procedures 
The experience in Germany with skimming-off procedures in competition cases is 
quickly subsumed – it does not exist. As of 2008, no such case has been brought, not 
even as follow-on claim.755 It is reasonable to expect, that also the deterrence effect of 
                                                
754 See, e.g. BGH, Decision of September 30, 2003 (file No.X ZR 114/00) (2003), 335, 336. In this 
context see also the new version of § 142 of the ZPO (German Civil Code of Procedure) which came 
into effect on January 1, 2002 and provides for a possibility to order the presentation of files which are 
(probably) in the possession of a party to a lawsuit. 
755 CDC, "Comments on the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
EC antitrust rules,", nr 17. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/cdc_en.pdf 
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this mechanism can only be marginal. It is probable, that the lack of such actions is a 
result of the specific design of this mechanism. While the specified body does bear all 
the costs and risks connected of such an action, the proceeds in case the trial is won 
will go to the state treasury. Moreover, the potential to gain otherwise, for example by 
attracting a larger member base and thereby increase the revenue from membership 
fees, is also limited, as such actions do not provide direct benefits to the members. 
The indirect effect, i.e., protection through increased deterrence, may be too hard to 
sell to potential members.  
Given budget constraints of associations and the complexity of competition cases 
even as follow-on cases, it is very unlikely that the mechanism as it stands will ever 
create a significant amount of civil litigation. 
2.2 The Cartel Damage Claim company model 
The Cartel Damage Claim is surely an innovative and interesting approach, which 
potentially can, compared to traditional litigation, partially reduce rational apathy 
problems, free riding behaviour and principal-agent problems, and lead to more 
procedural efficiency.  
However, the limits of such an approach with regard to the goal of deterrence are also 
quite straight forward. One of the major downsides is to be found in large transaction 
costs. While high value cases with a small number of direct purchasers as victims can 
be profitable investments for such companies, cases with small and widely dispersed 
damages will most likely not be taken on by such companies. The costs of finding and 
contracting with a sufficient number of victims are likely to outweigh the potential 
profit to be earned, especially when the law allowing assignation of claims is very 
restrictive and entails a number of requirements and safeguards.  
Moreover, even when competition should arise in this new market for cartel damage 
litigation,756 it is very probably that litigation companies would always rather pursue 
follow-on cases rather than stand alone cases, as these require considerable less 
investment and risks than stand-alone cases. That remains true even when, like the 
                                                
756 As may well be the case, as US firms start to enter the European market.  
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CDC, firms would offer their own version of leniency programs for cartel members 
that provide necessary information and proof.757 Unless otherwise regulated, cartel 
members are separately and jointly liable, so that one cartel member can be sued for 
the total amount and then can take redress on the other members. As a result no 
reduction in actual liability is granted for a cartel member that comes forward. 
Consequently, such leniency programs are likely to have only small impacts. The 
effect of such an approach on the level of detection in turn will also be very limited or 
non existent. However, it is discussed and may be possible under current legal 
regimes, to reduce the actual liability of the cartel member that provides useful 
information to the plaintiffs, as this could be interpreted as partial reparation. 
From a deterrence perspective, not only the impact on the rate of detection will be 
limited, but also the sanction that can be imposed on the infringer will fall short of the 
optimal sanction for several reasons. The fact that some harm caused to society by 
competition law infringements has no victims eligible to claim damages, such as the 
dead weight loss, already reduces the potential sanction to be imposed below the 
optimal sanction. Even if all the eligible victims of a cartel infringement could be 
found and their claims bought without incurring any transaction costs, the fact that the 
profit to be earned by this activity will only be a percentage of the sum of damages 
also only grant incentives to invest in that activity up to a certain degree, and not 
correspond to the interest society as whole would have in that activity. Investment in 
that activity will consequently be lower than the optimal investment from a society 
point of view. This problem is the same problems that can occur under the 
contingency fee arrangement in the US.  
2.3 Test case procedures akin to the KapMuG 
The test cases procedure, if applied in it current form also in competition law cases, is 
also likely to fall short of the optimal deterrence level. First of all, the fact that each 
plaintiff still has to file an individual suit has a number of restricting effects on this 
form of group litigation compared to other alternatives. The rational apathy problem, 
as far as present, will not be overcome by this mechanism to a large degree. While the 
test case procedure allows the plaintiffs to share the costs concerning the trial over the 
                                                
757 http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/english/leniency_plus_engl.htm. 
Comparison and Analysis of Selected Legal Systems 281
common issues, all remaining issues that were not part of the test case declaration 
have to be tried individually at own costs and risks. The potential cost reduction for 
the individual plaintiff also has to be weighed against the reduced possibilities to 
influence the test case trial.  
A legally problematic point, but positive from a deterrence perspective, is the fact that 
all potential plaintiffs could be de facto forced to claim their damages and then 
possibly join the test case trial, when a test case procedure has begun, due to the 
regulation on limitation periods. The publication of the test case procedure may be 
considered to be the date at which harmed individuals could be reasonably expected to 
have become aware of the damaging conduct, so that the relatively short limitation 
period of one year would begin to run (according to § 46 BörsG).758 This effect would 
largely reduce incentives to free ride on other plaintiff’s efforts.759
Moreover, lawyers are given adverse incentives that inhibit the full potential of the 
test case procedure. As the test case trial itself does not entail any additional payment 
for the lawyers, these may well have incentives to maximise their fees by influencing 
the choice of test case plaintiff to their favour. Possibilities to do so are given by the 
fact that the court may chose the plaintiff with the largest case value and that the test 
case trial can be commenced as soon as ten motions for a test case declaration are 
registered. Under these circumstances, lawyers may try to secure ten plaintiffs early 
on and promote the largest value case as test case procedure, as their fees in the test 
case trial will be determined on basis of the test case value. This in turn may lead to a 
run-to-court amongst the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Otherwise, lawyers will have little 
incentives to take on the complex and difficult test case, without additional 
remuneration. Moreover, they may prefer to pursue the cases on an individual level, 
rather than to employ test case or joinder procedures, due to the design of the fees, 
                                                
758 Schneider, "Auf dem Weg zu Securities Class Actions in Deutschland?-Auswirkungen des KapMuG 
auf die Praxis kapitalmarktrechtlicher Streitigkeiten," BETRIEBSBERATER (BB) 60 (2005): 2249, BB 
2005, 2249, 2256. 
759 This effect would have been even more efficient when the BGH would not have ruled that cases 
without a legitimate possibility for a motion for test case procedure could not be involved in a specific 
test case proceeding, so that a wider spectrum of plaintiffs against the same defendant could have been 
included. 
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which can be larger being a sum of individual fees than one fee based on the sum of 
the claim values.760
D Conclusion 
In comparing the three described legal systems of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Germany, certain trends seem to emerge. While Germany seems to be 
the most traditional system, only reluctantly, it seems, deviating from traditional 
forms of two party litigation, the UK seems to have made a larger development in that 
direction in the near past.  Therefore, the experience made in the UK is very valuable 
to other European Countries. However, even though the UK introduced developments 
with regard to group litigation much earlier than Germany for example, it seems that 
the current situation is only an intermediary step. As their different types of group 
litigation have not in general been considered as a great success, the voices arguing 
for reform are proposing changes towards a system that uses more of the US 
American features. This development should be of great interest to all Member States 
considering the introduction of a group litigation mechanism in competition law 
cases.  
While the US system itself maybe less than perfect considering deterrence, from the 
presented legal systems here it seems to be the most widely used and potentially most 
effective. Arguably, features of the US system, such as opt-out class actions, may 
come at costs which are not included in this analysis, such as the often cited 
guaranteed right to a day in court or due process, which society may or may not give a 
value of its own – even if it may not be reasonably exercisable in reality. However, 
whatever the arguments for a deviation from a system that would reach a higher, or 
the highest, degree of deterrence are, their value to society should always and 
explicitly be weighted against the costs that lesser degrees of deterrence would 
impose on society.   
                                                
760 That is due to the fee structure under which fees increase with the claim values but on a decreasing 
scale. 
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The experience in the UK and Germany clearly show that especially representative 
actions lack real efficiency when the incentive structure guiding the decisions of an 
association are disregarded. Costly and risky proceedings may be taken on once in a 
while, but the system inherent disincentives for associations gaining little from such 
activities compared to the costs involved mirrors the rational apathy problem 
encountered in traditional individual suits.  
Mechanisms designed merely to make cases manageable that involve a large number 
of claimants also miss the point when having the goal of deterrence, as they do not 
eliminate the individuals’ incentives to remain rationally apathic or to free ride. Also 
principal-agent problems can persist, as can be seen for example regarding the 
lawyers’ incentives in the German test case procedure. Managing mechanisms are 
valid in those cases, where the obstacles to individual litigation by companies or 
private individuals are only small from the outset. However, even in such cases they 
do not lead to procedural efficiency.  
Procedural efficiency can only be fully reached when all victims can be joined in one 
proceeding. Therefore, neither the opt-out class action procedure of the US, the opt-in 
GLO procedure of the UK, nor the joinder/test case procedures of Germany can reach 
full procedural efficiency. However, the degrees to which procedural efficiency can 
be reached runs in the opposite order, with the US being followed by the UK and 
Germany last. 
Overall, for both collective and representative actions, one cannot escape realising one 
crucial point. The incentives given to the agents of society, may they be lawyers or 
associations, can not be disregarded. Companies such as the CDC realised this already 
in the case of follow-on suits. And it is all the more true when the goal of deterrence 
should also be reached by increasing the probability of being caught and convicted for 
potential infringers. In that respect, both US and European commentators may have a 
very valid point when they argue that the European group litigation may fail to be 
effective when the entrepreneurial side of lawyers (or other agents) is simply 
denied.761
                                                
761 Issacharoff, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296843; Schnell, 
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Developing the right design of a group litigation mechanism is a very complex task 
and the governments of the Member States need to approach this issue with great care 
in order to avoid the costly introduction of systems that turn out to be inefficient in the 
end.
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Chapter 6: Summary, Policy Implications and Future 
Research 
A Summary 
Chapter one and two provide the basis for the analysis conducted in this thesis. In 
Chapter one, an overview of enforcement of European Competition law is provided, 
including the rationale of European Competition Law, the debate about private versus 
public enforcement in general and the discussed legal changes to enhance private 
enforcement.  Chapter two provides the economic and legal framework which will be 
used to analyse the efficiency of group litigation mechanisms with regard to 
deterrence of competition law infringements. That structure is mainly based on 
economic insights and knowledge developed in the Law and Economics literature. 
Such an economics based approach entails the choice of the goal to be pursued by 
private enforcement to be that of deterrence of unlawful conduct, in this specific case, 
the (inefficient) breach of competition law and the focus on total welfare. Therefore 
the insights of the theories on optimal deterrence are applied to the setting of private 
enforcement of competition law. I am fully aware that this analysis largely neglects 
other relevant aspects, such as strictly legal issues and debates and also the political 
choices to be made. However, as has been stated several times throughout the text, the 
insights gained by conducting an economic cost-benefit analysis, albeit only in 
qualitative terms, help to clarify and highlight many issues that are currently discussed 
in the European Union, conflicts between different goals and necessary trade-offs that 
remain relevant even in any other approach. Even when the discussion should be a 
purely legal one, or a chiefly political one, the costs and benefits of specific choices 
concerning the design of a particular group litigation mechanism still would be 
relevant when the results of the discussion shall be implemented in reality and the 
debate is not restricted to a merely theoretical exercise. Moreover, specific choices 
made between one option and another should be explicitly stated and justified 
whenever they entail trade-offs. This can only increase the transparency and enhance 
the quality of the debate and the resulting choices. 
Summary, Policy Implications and Future Research 286
Using the economic framework laid out in Chapters one and two, in Chapter 3 two 
necessarily slightly abstract forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, i.e. 
collective actions and representative actions, with regard to their potential to reach 
deterrence were analysed. Outcomes resulting from an initial analysis showed that the 
optimal group litigation mechanisms from the point of view of society at large (total 
welfare approach), would be a stand-alone action brought in the form of a mandatory 
group litigation, including all losses caused to society at large. The main arguments 
for that outcome are that to reach optimal deterrence, the penalty imposed on the 
infringer, in form of damages to be paid, should be based on total harm caused to 
society and therefore include all losses caused to different members of society. This 
leads to the conclusion that the optimal group litigation should incorporate all 
individual losses in one proceeding, to be (cost-) efficient. Therefore, and because 
free-riding problems can be eliminated, the optimal system would be a mandatory 
one, rather than opt-in or opt-out mechanism. Stand alone actions are to be preferred 
over follow-on actions from an efficient deterrence perspective, as only the former 
increase the rate of detection, which is important as that decreases the amount of the 
optimal sanction, which otherwise may be prohibitively large, and also when the 
availability bias leads to a greater value of the risk of detection compared to an 
increase in the damage awards, i.e. the imposed monetary penalties. Follow-on actions 
merely contribute to the amount of sanction faced by the infringer when public fines 
are too low to deter. However, it would be more (cost) efficient if in such cases, where 
the public fine is too low,  the public fine would be raised sufficiently. Therefore, the 
analysis continued focusing on mandatory stand-alone group actions. 
In the analysis of the two abstract forms of existing group litigation systems of 
collective and representative actions, problems and obstacles to private litigation for 
damages specific to certain types of breaches of European Competition Law were 
taken into account. The analysis suggested that neither collective nor representative 
actions would be the optimal group litigation in the sense of the best group litigation 
to reach the goal of efficient deterrence, unless the existing systems would be 
substantially altered. Problems specific to collective actions, such as the necessity of 
one of the victims (lead plaintiff) to become active on behalf of himself and other 
victims of the infringement, render that particular system of bundling similar claims 
into one procedure less efficient, especially in those cases where the information 
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asymmetry on the side of the victims is large. One way to reduce such problems 
would be to motivate the lawyer representing the group of victims to become the 
actual driving force and the active party. However, as the analysis showed, problems 
and large inefficiencies occur when the collective action is not adequately and 
explicitly designed to have a lead-lawyer, rather than a lead-plaintiff. Similar 
outcomes resulted in the analysis of representative actions brought by associations on 
behalf of the victims.  
One particular necessity crystallised out of the analysis, which is to take into account 
that the incentives given to the acting agent need to be adequately designed in any 
form of group litigation. In cases where typically individual victims (such as end-
consumers) will not be the acting agent themselves, that has large implications for 
other goals which one may pursue, such as complete compensation of individual 
losses of these victims.  This important insight was used to develop the idea of a 
market based approach to private enforcement, where agents compete with each other 
for detection and litigation of competition law infringements. As has been shown, 
such a market may heal many of the problems and inefficiencies that would remain in 
the two stylised forms of existing mechanisms described before.  Such a market with 
competiting enforcement agents would, however, be facing similar problems as the 
economic analysis of competition in research and development unearthed. Both are 
characterised by large upfront investments that are necessary in order to gain profits 
that are highly uncertain. Therefore, under a first-come first-serve mechanisms, there 
will be many resources wasted in the competitive process. Solutions to these market 
failures were then presented, which can be found in auctions for the right to litigate 
held after detection of a certain infringement has taken place. This solution would not 
only increase the efficiency of the market idea in general, but also systems of 
collective actions or representative actions, characterised by strong competition and 
races to the courts. 
After the features of the theoretical optimal system of group litigation with regard to 
deterrence were determined, the insights gained were used to compare and discuss the 
efficiency of the Commissions proposal against this benchmark in Chapter four. The 
proposed mechanisms did not reach the potential efficiency of the theoretical optimal 
solution developed in the previous Chapter. This result was no surprise, as already the 
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starting point, the goal to be achieved though private enforcement in the Commissions 
point of view, is presumably not deterrence - at least not the dominating one. 
Moreover, while the theoretical analysis in chapter three focuses on stand-alone 
actions, the Commission wants to encourage follow-on actions in addition to stand-
alone actions. However, the examination nevertheless highlighted inefficiencies, 
necessary trade-offs and costs imposed on society by choosing those particular 
mechanisms that the Commission suggests, which also are relevant for follow-on 
actions and other goals to be achieved.  A discussion of the goals other than 
deterrence also showed, that even these goals may be achieved to the highest degree 
possible. After all, the choices made by the Commission can be interpreted to stem 
from compromises made in the issues (e.g. the goals) themselves and in the political 
arena (e.g. taking harmonisation and implementation costs into account). 
The fifth Chapter illustrated the basic features of three selected legal systems, i.e. the 
group litigation mechanisms developed in the US, UK and Germany.  Then, these 
were compared to the features of the theoretical optimal solution developed in chapter 
3. As these existing mechanisms deviate substantially from the theoretical benchmark, 
they are unlikely to achieve the results the optimal group litigation mechanisms is 
argued to achieve with regard to optimal deterrence. However, the stark differences 
between the developed systems and their experienced effectiveness and difficulties 
provide some partial support to the insights gained in the theoretical part of Chapter 
three.  In very broad terms, it seemed that the less attention was paid to the question of 
who would actually have incentives to become active under the currents system, 
which problems might occur and what possible regulative remedies to these might be 
enacted, the less effective the systems turned out to be. This outcome would also hold, 
if the goal to be achieved would be any other than deterrence, for example corrective 
justice as compensation of individual victims. If these incentives structures that 
economic analysis highlights are neglected neither deterrence not compensation can 
be achieved in any efficient or even just effective way.  
Summary, Policy Implications and Future Research 289
B Policy Implications 
The policy implications of the conducted analysis are manifold. The most important 
one would be that policy makers faced with the task to develop a group litigation 
mechanism and to imbed it into their existing legal framework should pay attention to 
the incentive structures their choices will provide to the relevant subjects of the legal 
rules. Not only economic theoretical, but also some empirical research exists and 
experiences have been made in several countries with different systems, which 
provide essential insights into these incentive structures and the legal rules creating or 
governing them.  
The theoretical analysis conducted in this thesis showed that policy makers should not 
attempt to design one solution that would be applied to all types of competition law 
infringements, at least not without explicitly acknowledging the resulting 
inefficiencies. It might be much more efficient end effective to rather tailor specific 
instruments to the particular circumstances they should and could be applied in,when 
the costs of doing so will be outweighed by the additional benefits.  Moreover, in 
cases where the traditional concepts of group litigation would prove to be inefficient, 
other mechanisms may be considered. Though ideas like the here presented idea of 
professional enforcement agents may sound strange at first glance, the basic 
arguments supporting such a venue are not merely theoretical. Similar deliberations 
are already taking place, for example in the debate about passing-on defense and 
indirect purchaser standing, where some argue that indirect purchasers should not be 
granted standing due to efficiency reasons. Overall, policy makers should be aware 
that  lip-service paid to a “one size fits all” group litigation system where the victims 
are only supposedly  enabled to claim and fight for their rights does a disservice not 
only to the victims in question but to society at large. 
Experiences of some European Member States hint, inter alia, towards opt-in 
requirements in group litigation as inhibiting the efficiency of group actions. That is 
not a unique experience made in the GLO of the UK, also Sweden, for example, has 
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made such observations with regard to their collective action.762 Consequently, both 
countries are debating reform steps. On the other hand, Portugal with opt-out 
solutions in collective/representative actions seems to report much more favourable 
experiences763 and there are more countries having similar experiences with opt-in 
and opt-out systems.764 Also with regard to representative actions by associations, 
experiences in the UK and Germany identified larger potential obstacles to the 
efficiency of such systems, while Portugal, planning to introduce consumer 
representative actions including aggregate damages and representation also of 
unidentified consumers, seems to have much less problems with the implementation 
of features, which may make such a system much more effective.765 So, instead of 
rejecting certain ideas from the outset as being against the “ordre public” or 
constitutional rights, it might be worth looking at some countries solutions to such 
dilemmas and to accept that first of all, exemptions to general principles can be found 
in many areas of law and second, that reform will not be possible without changes of 
the status quo.   
Another relevant implication of the found results of the analysis conducted here, is 
that trade-offs between different goals, explicitly or implicitly pursued at the same 
time through the same means, are inescapable. Compensatory justice, despite lacking 
a clear definition, can often be in conflict with deterrence effects. The protection of 
consumer welfare can be in conflict with dynamic efficiency of markets. In addition, 
sustaining old traditions and principles, for example focusing on the compensatory 
function of tort law and neglecting its potential deterrence function, might be in 
conflict with progress and reform. While being unavoidable, such trade-offs should be 
made unambiguous and choices made for one or the other side of these trade-offs 
should be justified in order to enhance transparency of the political process, both on 
European and on national levels. Important and difficult choices will have to be made 
                                                
762 See Chapter 5 section B for the UK and Lindblom, "Sweden," THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN 
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763 Antunes, "Portugal," THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 622 (2009): 161. 
764 Apart from the US, also Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, seeGaudet Jr, "Turning a blind eye: 
The Commission's rejection of opt-out class actions overlooks Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch 
experience - Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch experiences contradict " EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 30 (2009): 107. 
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and those governed by the rules should be informed about the reasons for particular 
choices. Anything else distorts the democratic process.  
In a broader framework one may ask whether the individual members of society 
supposed to be better protected against the losses caused by competition law 
infringements, i.e. end-consumers, may not be served better by a system designed to 
achieve deterrence rather than compensatory justice after the harming incident has 
taken place.766 As stated before, measuring deterrence is a difficult task, but the 
necessary methods and tools are in the process of being developed and sometimes 
already employed. A very simplistic comparison of a few numbers may help to clarify 
this point.767
Taking the figures provided by the OFT768 on the amount of losses avoided by 
detecting and ending price fixing agreements to increase the price of replica football 
kits in the Replica Football Kit769 case, the abortion of the price-fixing agreement 
saved the consumers over £50 million in losses. Estimated 1,2 to 1,5 million 
conumers were affected,770 so that the savings in future losses due to the abortion of 
the detected offence alone mounted to up to £ 41, 66 for each affected consumer, not 
taking the additional saved losses due to deterrence of smilar competition law 
infringements into account. Due to the same competition law infringement, the 
consumer organisation Which? was claiming £ 20 in damages per consumer in its one 
and only follow-on case against JJB Sports plc.771  Competition law infringements 
occur across industries and products, as well as over time, so that consumers may well 
be harmed by one or the other at one point. However, it is possible that the value of 
                                                
766 Even Nelie Kroes stated clearly “Most people would agree that prevention through deterrence is 
better than cure”, Kroes, Damages Actions for Breaches of EU Competition Rules: Realities and 
Potentials Opening speech at the conference ‘La reparation du prejudice cause par une pratique anti-
concurentielle en France et à l’étranger : bilan et perspectives ’, Cour de Cassation.
767 Following an example by Nelie Kroes,Kroes, Consumers at the heart of EU Competition Policy 
SPEECH/08/212, calculating a direct benefit of the Commissions activities to consumer of 30 EUR for 
each European citizen.  
768 Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, OFT Discussion Paper 916, 6. Available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf 
769 Office of Fair Trading, Decision of the Office of Fair Trading No. CA98/06/2003, Price-fixing of 
Replica Football Kit (2003).
770 Final Report for the Civil Justice Council, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 
Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedurefor Collective Actions, 88. 
771 Competition Appeal Tribunal, The Consumers Association v JJB Sports PLC, case number 
1078/7/9/07. See also Chapter 5 on this case and the problems encountered by Which? 
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avoided future losses cause by the detection and ending of certain infringements 
already outweigh the value of individual harm that can or will be compensated. And if 
that is not the case, one may want to add the value of the losses avoided, because 
(similar) infringements were deterred or abandoned because of the detection and 
prosecution of that one offence. Studies conducted in the UK, for example, report 
cautious estimates of deterrence ratios and estimate that for one detected cartel case, 
the number of deterred or abandoned cartels ranged between 5 and 16. 772 Taking 
these values into accout, would increase the total amount of avoided futue losses 
significantly.  
C Future Research 
If further research conducted in the area of estimating and measuring deterrence 
effects should show that the benefit for end-consumers gained by increasing 
deterrence would outweigh the potential value of compensation in individual cases, 
the argument for protection of consumers should be made to primalily favour ex ante 
deterrence systems rather than ex post compensation systems, i.e. to desing 
compensation systems in a way that they would lead to deterrence, as prevention can 
be argued to be better than cure. Therefore, another policy implication would be to 
foster important research in the relevant areas of estimating deterrence effects and 
costs of enforcement activities, the results of which would not only be relevant for the 
debate about private enforcement in general and group litigation in particular, but also 
for the accountability of  public enforcement of competition law. Such research is also 
necessary to establish the optimal resources spent on enforcement and may provide 
better answers to the question whether the theoretical enforcement agent described in 
chapter three would need all of the sanction to have the right incentives to invest in 
detection efforts or whether indeed a fraction of this sum would suffice. 
In light of such research, it might of course also turn out that the necessary changes to 
be made to make private enforcement of competition law efficient or even just more 
effective, especially through the introduction of group litigation mechanisms, are not 
                                                
772 Deloitte & Touche LLP, The deterrence effect of competition enforcement by the OFT, 8 f. 
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desirable or too costly from a society point of view. That may be the case, for 
example, when it is considered to be simply impossible to introduce a system that 
goes farther than a very elaborate opt-in mechanism in order to protect individual 
rights. As a consequence, policy makers then should reconsider whether the fostering 
of private enforcement really is the right way to proceed. When the costs and benefits 
of private as well as public enforcement can be reasonalbly well estimated and 
compared, it might also be that resources otherwise spent on the reform of civil 
procedure rules to introduce half-hearted group litigation tools then would be more 
efficiently spent on improving and/or extending public enforcement of competition 
law, to the benefit of all. In such a case, the enforcement of competition law may 
indeed remain very different in the European Union compared to the enforcement of 
competition in the U.S.. While the former would concentrate and mostly rely on 
public enforcement activities, the latter would have a strong part of private 
enforcement and there would be less convergence, at least with regard to enforcement 
activities.  
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Dutch Summary 
In dit proefschrift zijn inzichten vanuit de rechtseconomische literatuur verzameld 
teneinde de kenmerken van optimale collectieve procedures ter voorkoming van 
schending van het Europese mededingingsrecht te ontwikkelen. Deze zijn vervolgens 
vergeleken met de voorstellen van de Europese Commissie in het Witboek over 
schadevergoedingsacties. 
Hoofdstuk 1 en 2 vormen de basis voor de analyse die in de rest van dit proefschrift is 
uitgevoerd. Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een overzicht van de handhaving van het Europese 
mededingingsrecht, met inbegrip van de rationale van Europees mededingingsrecht, 
het debat over private en publieke handhaving in het algemeen en de besproken 
juridische veranderingen ter verbetering van private handhaving. Hoofdstuk 2 
verschaft het economische en juridische kader voor de analyse van de effectiviteit van 
diverse vormen van collectieve procedures met betrekking tot het voorkomen van 
inbreuken op het mededingingsrecht. Deze structuur is voornamelijk gebaseerd op 
economische inzichten en kennis ontwikkeld in de rechtseconomische literatuur. Een 
dergelijke economische benadering impliceert een keuze voor wat betreft het doel dat 
wordt nagestreefd met private handhaving, te weten het voorkomen van onrechtmatig 
gedrag. In dit specifieke geval betreft het onrechtmatige gedrag dat dient te worden 
voorkomen de (inefficiënte) schending van het mededingingsrecht, waarbij een focus 
wordt gelegd op de totale welvaart. Derhalve zijn de inzichten uit theorieën over 
optimale preventie toegepast op de setting van private handhaving van het 
mededingingsrecht.  
Met behulp van het economisch kader zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 1 en 2, worden in 
hoofdstuk 3 twee enigszins abstracte vormen van bestaande collectieve procedures 
besproken, te weten collectieve acties en representatieve acties. Deze acties zijn 
geanalyseerd voor wat betreft hun potentiële preventieve werking. De resultaten van 
een eerste analyse laten zien dat de optimale procedure, vanuit het oogpunt van de 
samenleving als geheel (totale welvaart benadering), een stand-alone actie zou zijn in 
de vorm van een verplichte collectieve procedure, die alle verliezen die zijn 
toegebracht aan de samenleving als geheel omvat. Het belangrijkste argument voor 
deze uitkomst is dat optimale preventie alleen dan wordt bereikt wanneer de sanctie 
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opgelegd aan de overtreder, in de vorm van een te betalen schadevergoeding, 
gebaseerd is op de totale aan de samenleving toegebrachte schade. Deze totale schade 
dient te worden bepaald met inbegrip van alle verliezen die aan alle verschillende 
leden van de samenleving zijn toegebracht. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat in de 
optimale collectieve procedure, om (kosten)efficiënt te zijn, alle individuele verliezen 
in één procedure moeten worden opgenomen. 
Daarom, en om free riding problemen uit te sluiten, zou het optimale systeem een 
verplicht systeem moeten zijn, in plaats van een opt-in of opt-out-mechanisme. 
Aangetoond wordt dat, vanuit het perspectief van efficiënte preventie, stand-alone 
acties de voorkeur hebben boven follow-on acties, aangezien alleen de eerste de 
pakkans kan verhogen. Dit is belangrijk omdat het de verhoogde pakkans is die de 
omvang van de optimale sanctie verlaagt, die anders te hoog zou kunnen zijn. Dit 
geldt te meer omdat vanwege de availability bias de pakkans hoger zal worden 
ingeschat, zodat dit meer invloed heeft dan het verhogen van de opgelegde financiële 
sanctie (de schadevergoeding). Follow-on acties dragen voornamelijk bij aan de 
omvang van de sanctie waarmee de inbreukmaker wordt geconfronteerd als de 
publieke boetes te laag zijn om af te schrikken. Echter, het zou meer (kosten)effectief 
zijn om in dergelijke gevallen, waar de publieke sancties te laag zijn, deze aanzienlijk 
te verhogen. Derhalve is de analyse vervolgens gericht op verplichte stand-alone 
groepsacties.  
In de analyse van de twee abstracte vormen van de bestaande systemen van 
collectieve en representatieve acties, werd rekening gehouden met problemen en 
belemmeringen bij private schadevergoedingsacties die kenmerkend zijn voor 
bepaalde soorten van schendingen van het Europese mededingingsrecht. De analyse 
suggereert dat noch collectieve, noch representatieve acties het optimale mechanisme 
zullen zijn, in de zin van de beste procedure om het doel van efficiënte preventie te 
bereiken, tenzij de bestaande systemen ingrijpend zouden worden gewijzigd. 
Specifieke problemen van collectieve acties, zoals de noodzaak dat een van de 
slachtoffers (hoofdaanklager) actie onderneemt namens zichzelf en andere 
slachtoffers van de inbreuk, zorgen ervoor dat bundeling van gelijke claims in één 
procedure minder efficiënt wordt. Dit is vooral zo indien de informatie-asymmetrie 
aan de kant van de slachtoffers groot is. Een manier om dergelijke problemen te 
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verminderen zou zijn om de advocaat die de groep van slachtoffers vertegenwoordigt, 
te motiveren om de werkelijke drijvende kracht en actieve partij te worden. Echter, 
zoals uit de analyse blijkt, problemen en grote inefficiënties treden op wanneer de 
collectieve actie niet adequaat en expliciet is ingericht op een leidende advocaat, in 
plaats van een leidende eiser. Soortgelijke uitkomsten resulteren uit de analyse van 
representatieve acties van verenigingen ingesteld namens de slachtoffers.  
Eén specifieke noodzaak werd duidelijk uit deze analyse: er moet voldoende rekening 
worden gehouden met de gedragsprikkels die aan de agent gegeven worden in elke 
vorm van collectief procederen. In zaken waar de individuele slachtoffers (zoals 
eindconsumenten) niet zelf de eisers zijn, heeft dit inzicht grote gevolgen voor andere 
doelen die men na zou kunnen streven, zoals volledige compensatie van individuele 
verliezen van deze slachtoffers. Dit belangrijke inzicht is de hoeksteen van het idee 
van een marktgeoriënteerde benadering van private handhaving, waar 
vertegenwoordigers met elkaar concurreren voor de opsporing en vervolging van 
inbreuken op het mededingingsrecht. Zoals is aangetoond kan een dergelijke markt 
veel van de problemen en inefficiënties oplossen, die zouden blijven bestaan in de 
twee gestileerde vormen van bestaande mechanismen zoals hiervoor beschreven. Een 
dergelijke markt met concurrerende handhavingsvertegenwoordigers zou echter met 
vergelijkbare problemen worden geconfronteerd, zoals die naar boven kwamen in de 
bespreking van de economische analyse van concurrentie in research and 
development. Beide worden gekenmerkt door grote initiële investeringen die nodig 
zijn om winst, die zeer onzeker is, te verwerven. In een ‘wie het eerst komt, eerst 
maalt’ mechanisme zullen daarom veel middelen worden verspild in het competitieve 
proces. Voorgestelde oplossingen voor deze tekortkomingen van de markt omvatten 
het gebruik van veilingen van het recht om te procederen nadat detectie van een 
bepaalde overtreding heeft plaatsgevonden. Deze oplossing zou niet alleen de 
efficiëntie van het marktidee in het algemeen verhogen, maar ook die van andere 
systemen van collectieve acties of representatieve acties, wanneer deze worden 
gekenmerkt door sterke concurrentie en races to the courts.
Nadat de kenmerken van het theoretisch optimale systeem van collectieve procedures 
met betrekking tot preventie zijn bepaald, zijn de verkregen inzichten gebruikt in 
hoofdstuk 4 om de efficiëntie van het voorstel van de Commissie hiermee te 
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vergelijken en te bespreken. De analyse toont aan dat de voorgestelde mechanismen 
niet de potentiële efficiëntie van de theoretisch optimale oplossing, zoals ontwikkeld 
in het vorige hoofdstuk, bereiken. Dit resultaat is geen verrassing, aangezien het 
uitgangspunt of te bereiken doelstelling van private handhaving volgens de 
Commissie vermoedelijk niet – althans niet in overheersende mate – preventie is. 
Bovendien, terwijl de theoretische analyse in hoofdstuk 3 is gericht op stand-alone 
acties, wil de Commissie follow-on acties bevorderen, in aanvulling op stand-alone 
acties.  
Het onderzoek benadrukt niettemin de inefficiënties, noodzakelijke trade-offs, en 
sommige van de kosten die aan de samenleving worden opgelegd indien de specifieke 
door de Commissie voorgestelde mechanismen zouden worden gekozen. Deze 
overwegingen zijn ook relevant voor de follow-on acties en voor het bereiken van 
andere doelstellingen. Een bespreking van de doelstellingen, anders dan preventie, 
laat ook zien dat zelfs deze doelstellingen niet in de hoogst mogelijke mate kunnen 
worden bereikt. Immers, de keuzes van de Commissie kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd 
als compromissen die gesloten worden zowel in de kwesties zelf (zoals de doelen) als 
ook in de politieke arena (bijvoorbeeld rekening houden met harmonisatie- en 
implementatiekosten).  
Het vijfde hoofdstuk illustreert de basiskenmerken van drie geselecteerde 
rechtssystemen, te weten de collectieve procedures zoals die ontwikkeld zijn in de 
Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland. Deze worden vervolgens 
vergeleken met de kenmerken van de theoretisch optimale oplossing zoals ontwikkeld 
in hoofdstuk 3. Omdat deze bestaande mechanismen aanzienlijk afwijken van de 
theoretische benchmark, is het onwaarschijnlijk dat ze de optimale preventieve 
resultaten zullen behalen, die, zoals wordt beargumenteerd, de optimale collectieve 
procedure zal bereiken. Echter, de grote verschillen tussen de ontwikkelde systemen 
en hun ervaren effectiviteit en problemen bieden gedeeltelijke steun aan de inzichten 
opgedaan in het theoretische deel van hoofdstuk 3. In zeer algemene termen kan het 
volgende worden gesteld: het lijkt het erop dat naarmate minder aandacht werd 
besteed aan de vraag wie daadwerkelijk gedragsprikkels zou hebben om actief te 
worden in de huidige systemen, en welke problemen zouden kunnen optreden en 
welke mogelijke oplossingen hiervoor zouden kunnen worden vastgesteld, de 
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systemen minder effectief bleken te zijn. Deze conclusie zou ook gelden als de te 
bereiken doelstelling iets anders dan preventie zou zijn, bijvoorbeeld corrigerende 
rechtvaardigheid in de zin van compensatie van individuele slachtoffers. Als de 
prikkelstructuren die de economische analyse benadrukt, worden verwaarloosd, dan 
zal noch preventie, noch compensatie kunnen worden bereikt op een efficiënte of zelfs 
maar effectieve wijze. 
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